An involuntary act, as it has no claim to merit, so neither can it induce any guilt; the concurrence of the will, when it has its choice to do or to avoid the fact in question, being the only thing that renders human actions either praiseworthy or culpable.
The will, properly and strictly taken, as it is (of things which are referred unto the end that man desireth) differeth greatly from inferior natural desire which we call appetite. The object of appetite is whatsoever sensible good may be wished for; the object of will is that good which reason does lead us to seek.
The determination of the will, upon inquiry, is following the direction of that guide; and he that has a power to act or not to act, according as such determination directs, is free. Such determination abridges not that power, wherein liberty consists.
When the will has exerted an act of command upon any faculty of the soul, or member of the body, it has done all that the whole man, as a moral agent, can do for the actual exercise or employment of such a faculty or member.
There cannot be a more important case of conscience for men to be resolved in than to know certainly how far God accepts the will for the deed, and how far he does not; and to be informed truly when men do really will a thing, and when they have really no power to do what they have willed.