FINAL PAPER 202142055 OGBOLE OCHE REVIEWED second edition

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Sociology

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Feb 20, 2024

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QUESTION: DISCUSS HOW THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE HAS AFFECTED THE THREAT OF THERMONUCLEAR WAR AND INCLUDE A DISCUSSION OF HOW NUCLEAR DETERRENCE APPLIES OR DOES NOT APPLY TO THE CONFLICT. NAME: OCHE OGBOLE STUDENT NUMBER: 202142055 DATE: 16/11/2023
INTRODUCTION The invasion of Ukraine by Russia, which started in February 2022, has not only developed into a localised conflict but also into a turning point that is changing the face of global security. The war's ongoing course raises a terrifying question that will live on throughout history: How has this geopolitical crisis affected the threat of thermonuclear war? With the help of several critically analysed articles that break down the complexities of the conflict and the significance of nuclear deterrence, this essay aims to investigate the complex aspects of this question. The battleground is decorated with the backdrop of accepted beliefs and doctrines, most notably the idea of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence, which has historically been linked to the Cold War, uses the real threat of catastrophic retaliation to scare off possible enemies. Nonetheless, the current conflict in Ukraine has evolved into a modern laboratory for evaluating the effectiveness and constraints of this age-old idea. Reassessing how nuclear weapons influence the actions of both nuclear and non-nuclear states becomes necessary as the conflict heats up. The debate surrounding the conflict centres on the idea of nuclear deterrence, which is closely related to major powers' possession of nuclear weapons. Russia and the other five NPT- permitted nuclear weapon states have historically used their arsenals as instruments of strategic influence (Sinovets and Adérito, 2022). However, the paradoxes arising from Russia's aggression against Ukraine cast doubt on the conventional wisdom surrounding nuclear deterrence. The examined articles for this essay analyse the subtleties of these paradoxes, providing insight into how the architecture of international security is changing.
The conflict in Ukraine has accelerated the conversation about military strategy, extending it into the fields of political psychology and game theory. As the conflict puts the fundamentals of nuclear deterrence to the test, leaders' words, gestures, and decision-making procedures are scrutinised. The carefully examined articles highlight the nuances of the language used by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has blurred the lines between conventional and nuclear warfare by invoking red lines and historical precedents out of a relentless determination. The idea of "aggressive actualization" or "offensive deterrence" is introduced by the conflict's changing terrain (Sinovets and Adérito, 2022). The limitations of traditional nuclear deterrence paradigms are highlighted by Russia's attempts to establish anti-access and area denial capabilities along its borders, as well as the intricate interplay of political and military strategies. The question that emerges as non-nuclear states like Ukraine traverse this dangerous terrain is whether the threat of thermonuclear war can be used as a deterrent or if it will become less effective in the face of unconventional warfare tactics. In addition, the articles under analysis explore the conflict's geopolitical aftermath, which goes beyond the battleground. They investigate the use of secondary sanctions and possible economic deterrence as tools to prevent nuclear-armed states from escalating their conflict to thermonuclear levels. This economic dimension adds a new dimension to the discussion of nuclear deterrence by demonstrating how the world economies are intertwined and influence the actions of countries facing crises. To understand the complexities of the conflict and its implications for the evolving threat of thermonuclear war, we will navigate the nuanced analyses offered by the reviewed articles in the following sections of this essay. This exploration aims to
expose the hitherto unseen dangers and obstacles that the Russia-Ukraine conflict presents to the precarious balance of international security. ANALYSIS The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has put the idea of nuclear deterrence under intense scrutiny and called into question its traditional applications in modern conflicts. Nuclear deterrence, which has historically relied on major powers having nuclear weapons, requires the legitimacy of a devastating retaliatory threat to deter possible enemies. The efficacy of nuclear deterrence, particularly in dissuading states lacking nuclear weapons, is becoming less certain as the conflict progresses. A complex interplay of geopolitical, strategic, and psychological factors characterises the nuanced and evolving phenomenon of applying nuclear deterrence in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Although the foundation of conventional nuclear deterrence theory is the idea that the presence of nuclear weapons acts as a credible threat to deter aggression, the way this conflict is playing out calls into question the ease with which these ideas can be applied. Russia has significantly lost credibility because of its repeated use of deterrent threats, as demonstrated by its annexation of Ukrainian territory (Cheng, 2022) The annexation of Ukrainian territories is one example of how deterrent threats are frequently used, which has led to a paradox. For nuclear weapons to be tools of non-use, they must also continue to be credible threats. But Ukraine's ongoing testing of Russian deterrence has made the threat less potent, prompting military actions that go beyond the bounds of conventional nuclear deterrence. Furthermore, T.V. Paul introduced the concept of the "tradition of nuclear non-use," which holds that the possibility of nuclear use is undermined by several factors, including strategic considerations and the destabilising nature of nuclear weapons (Sinovets and Adérito, 2022).
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