Epistemology Is A Better Choice Over Traditional Epistemology

Epistemological Foundationalism essentially claims that some empirical beliefs carry justification that does not require, or depend, on the justification of other empirical beliefs. In this essay, I intend to introduce the reading, “Can Empirical knowledge Have A foundation?” Written by Laurence Bonjour, to give a detailed summary of his arguments - as well as those who object to his - and ultimately to assert my belief that there is currently no example of an empirical belief that of which can be justified in an epistemic sense without avoiding reference to other empirical beliefs, which would then have to be justified themselves, not solving the regress problem.

Corbetta (2003) defined paradigm as the perception adopted by researchers to inspire and direct a given science. Similarly, Guba and Lincoln (1994) noted that paradigms shape research in terms of reality (ontology), knowledge (epistemology) and methods of gaining

Kuhn believed that science develops through stages and these stages are susceptible to evolution to form the next “paradigm”. Kuhn believed in scientific revolution that allows some flexibility in the theory to be falsified or verified according to the circumstances surrounding the discovery of that theory. For Kuhn, the

In order to elucidate the way in which the choice of epistemology influences the formulation of a management research problem, it is necessary to define the term epistemology and clarify some of the varying epistemological stances. In doing so, the reader will be able to understand the myriad different variations of epistemological viewpoints, each of which shape the direction of research and the sort of problem that research attempts to identify. Management research builds on the long tradition of research in the social sciences (Somekh and Lewin, 2005). Primarily, epistemology provides the very lens through which research is conducted. Certain epistemological lenses, therefore, are best suited for certain types of research and research problems, whereas other research problems can be determined most efficaciously through other epistemological lenses.

Kuhn himself used the term rather loosely in his landmark book “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”, referring to either the laws and principles that govern scientific inquiry within a specific field or just a collection of landmark works showcasing a common body of beliefs. Although one could consider arguing that the Copernican revolution (but definitely not Copernicus himself) started the shift away from deriving scientific knowledge from scripture and thus he started a paradigm shift in the former sense, those implications are fairly removed from Copernicus himself. As such, arguing whether he initiated a paradigm shift in the latter sense is a more meaningful

My current views of Justification, regarding Internalism and Externalism will be discussed. Justifying knowledge is hard to understand and what is justified knowledge has been a significant issue in Epistemology. We heavily discussed Internalism and Externalism in the course. In my second exam I have discussed my favoritism toward the views of Internalism. And I still hold that current view today. I believe the understanding and knowing how you came to know that knowledge, is really important. I believe knowledge is not justified if someone haves knowledge, but does not understand how they came to such knowledge. My views sill favor Internalism

Authoritative epistemology occurs when an analyst relies on another person’s authority to make a judgement. Their “basis of knowledge resides in a reference to something more

In my essay I plan to argue that Thomas Kuhn was incorrect when he presented his theory that no paradigm is better than any other paradigm and how he believed that people who occupy different paradigms are in different universes, in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. I believe that there is no valid deductive or inductive support for incommensurability, there are examples against it throughout the history of science that do not exhibit the discontinuity and replacement of paradigms, as Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis predicts, but rather continuity and supplementation. If this is correct, then there are no compelling epistemic reasons to believe that Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis is true or probable. The argument that the point of the same kind terms changes or ceases from one theoretical context to another, it does not fundamentally mean that these two abstract frameworks are taxonomically or methodologically incommensurable. Kuhn’s theory takes a relativist stance and uses it to make all theories and paradigms equal with none being better than the other. This poses a major problem because the hope of scientific research is best said as “For a realist conception of scientific progress also wishes to assert that, by and large, later science improves on earlier science, in particular by approaching closer to the truth.” This means that all realist scientist hope that by advancing our scientific knowledge we will eventually come closer to the truth about

The philosopher and historian of science Thomas Kuhn introduced the term paradigm as a key part of what he called “normal science”: In normal (that is non revolutionary) periods in a science, there is a consensus across the relevant scientific community about the theoretical and methodological rules to be followed. (Marshall 1998). Paradigms tend to shift over time as new scientific discoveries are made, and anomalies or observations that conflict with the current paradigm begin to accumulate. Eventually this leads to a scientific revolution. There is a shift from one paradigm to another and a new

For a lengthy period of time in philosophy the concept of knowledge as justified true belief was accepted without too much debate. The Gettier problem is an issue which assails the long held idea of knowledge as justified true belief, it is the result of a small but definite gap between the concepts of justification and truth. By revamping the concept of justification the defeasibility account is able to correct some Gettier cases by narrowing the gap between knowledge and truth, but ultimately still fails to solve the problem.

The problem with this is that theoretical paradigms have no common basis; hence, paradigm-shifts cannot work out. Special Relativity and Newtonian Mechanics may seem to have the same theoretical term meaning but they don’t because the terms of ‘mass’, ‘force’, and ‘duration’ all have a different meaning to different scientists. Science in Kuhn’s opinion and from what we gather on theoretical paradigms does not provide a concrete empirical assumption on epistemology. It does not work best empirically because matters dealing with science must happen with theoretical paradigms, whose effectiveness is an issue.

Epistemology or theory of knowledge is a branch of philosophy related to the scope and nature of knowledge. The subject focuses on examining the nature of knowledge, and how it relates to beliefs, justification, and truth. Epistemology contract with the means of production of knowledge, as well as skepticism about different knowledge claims. The question is what does people Know? The core of this questions and area of study is Skepticism, in which there have been many approaches involved in trying to disprove a particular form of this school. This paper will discuss the Epistemology school of Skepticism, the contributors whom created the school; the

This could be a successful experiment, or the formulation of a set of laws. These specific achievements are what Kuhn says causes a paradigm in the narrow sense. This means that paradigms in the broad sense, include within them, paradigms in the narrow sense. When a paradigm is used, it is often associated with normal science and revolutionary science. In short, normal science is well organized. These scientists tend to approach determined important problems specifically, and assess possible situations. Similarly, they agree on what the world is like in the broad sense. Revolutionary science, on the other hand, occurs when a paradigm breaks down and is replaced with another one (77). Karl Popper, born in 1902, presents objections against Kuhn’s normal and revolutionary science arguments, and following I will explain these objections, Kuhn’s replies, and reveal the most important of them all.

According to Kuhn, a paradigm is universally recognized scientific achievements (a theory of science), which become a framework for scientific research and knowledge. It is a set of practices that defines science for a particular period of time. This paradigm provides a scientific community a model, within which it evolves. The paradigm defines what is to be observed and analyzed, what kind of questions should be asked, how they should be structured, how the results of the experiment should be interpreted, how the research should be conducted as well as equipment it should be conducted with etc.

Another point that the book addresses best is the observance of existing paradigms from scientists. Kuhn calls these as anomalies, and when they build up to validate one another, a new paradigm will emerge and the old paradigm bursts. These shifts are mostly known as scientific revolutions, which help us realize that the surroundings around us are different from what we are used to. For example, X-Rays were discovered by mistake, attesting that from an anomaly we came to discover new valuable apparatus that are necessary to the human beings nowadays, this discovery put scientists to work and understand how X-Rays could be used.