Intelligence Analysis Essay

The analysis is then given to consumers and policy makers, once it is checked by the analyst supervisor and peers. The analyst should also be ready to give a briefing on short notice. But both the analyst and the policy maker or consumer have to be aware of at all times, is that the intelligence field does not know everything. “On any given subject, the intelligence community faces what is in effect a field of rocks, and it lacks the resources to turn over every one to see what threats to national security may lurk underneath” (Pillar).

Intelligence-led policing is a growing concept shaping the way modern law enforcement agencies function in both combating crime, and in performing investigations. As the dynamics of law enforcement adapt to this concept, the need for intelligence analysts grows. What used to be a minimal, even non-existent role in traditional policing, has grown into active participation at many agencies. In order to perform effectively in these updated roles, intelligence analysts must be: Capable of research and using analytical methodologies, to include those using technology. Analysts must be critical thinkers and are capable of interpreting data. Finally, analysts must be effective in communicating through product development and timely intelligence dissemination.

In preparation for my debate on the topics of intelligence-led policing and Compstat policing, I have discovered the many advantages and disadvantages of using intelligence-led policing and Compstat policing. According to Carter & Carter (2009), intelligence-led policing is the collection of and analysis of data relating to crime, used by law enforcement in “developing tactical responses to threats and/or strategic planning related to emerging changing threats” (p. 317). When applied correctly, intelligence-led policing is a tool used for information sharing in identifying threats and developing responses to prevent those threats from reaching fruition (Carter, 2011). One of the advantages of using intelligence-led policing is its incorporation of data analysts. The role of the data analyst in the context of intelligence-led policing allows them to take specially trained analysts to take raw data from information found in reports and translate it into useful information for the officers, allowing the police to deploy resources more effectively and efficiently (Griffiths, 2016). Another advantage is its application through preventative and predictive policing (proactive policing), in which law enforcement take data and identify crucial variables such as terrorism or the emergence of criminal organizations, in hopes of stopping the problem at its roots (Carter, 2011). Terrorism is especially important and emphasized after the 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centers in

The role of intelligence in the DHS has evolved. The original role was to understand and reduce threats to the nation. The current role of intelligence is to understand and reduce the vulnerability of the nation. The change in focus from reducing threats to reducing vulnerability marks the change in concept to an all-hazards approach. The initial implementation of the DHS’s intelligence mission faced many obstacles such as lack of access to resources and raw intelligence, and conflict with other intelligence agencies (Blum 2010, np). The DHS has largely overcome these barriers and evolved into a significant intelligence

For instance, most common domestic terrorists targeted National Security are gangs and other forms of terrorists inside the US. Intelligence is a solid component of past data that stays permanent. Current intelligence is the non-stop information gathering process to complete the puzzle. Collecting and analyzing the material is what is occurring at this time. Information can be changeable and is also a brainstorming of information. Intelligence estimates is the future information that can be presented as brainpower on a major problem solving technique in our country. Intelligence analysts design endless drills on a how to manual that states explanations on circumstances such as terrorist attacks, nuclear accident, biological war, etc. let’s not forget that all these intelligence techniques are designed to protect and maintain the integrity of our president, our country, its allies and

The United States has the most capable intelligence apparatus of any country in the world. The information produced by various agencies gives the United States a substantial advantage when it comes to understanding world events, predicting and preparing for unsettled times, fielding military forces, and making a host of other political and economic decisions. From an ethical perspective, it means that the United States Intelligences information can create the risk of security for the United

When I examine recent blunders within the Intelligence Community (IC) such as the 2012 Benghazi Attack, I notice that there are significant concerns regarding the IC’s capabilities in intelligence analysis and policy support. The IC’s focus on using technical methods of analysis often fail to address cultural and political aspects that could bring perspective of how key pieces of evidence were brought to light. Thus, technical forms of analysis have a high potential to be flawed and misleading, which could also help support untested assumptions of policy makers. I am motivated to develop security policies that would diversify intelligence gathering to bring background and contextual information that would also overlap with technical analysis.

Cognitive and perceptual biases are inherent in our nature, or as Heuer defines it, “mental errors caused by our simplified information processing strategies” (1999). Subconsciously, our brains create internal shortcuts to aid in processing complex information or making decisions; often times these decisions are based off of our own previous experiences or motivations. This can sometimes lead us to interpret things differently than another person with other experiences and motivations. This can be a major issue when analyzing intelligence as it may lead people to follow a certain path rather than keep an open mind about other potential possibilities. Luckily, there are various techniques in use by intelligence agencies to help overcome these types of biases by testing analyst’s theories and ensuring that the intelligence products they build are structured and logical. Techniques to overcome biases are

To conduct effective analysis, which leads to decision-making, it is important to have an understanding of cognitive biases and how they impact the analysis provided. How does our government decide if they are going to get involved in a war? A lot of information is provided and analyzed to form the intelligence they use to arrive at their final decision. The concern with this is the amount of cognitive bias involved. Most people make decisions all day long without realizing the biases they have. When it comes to things like National Security it is imperative the agencies, committees and individuals all have an understanding of their own biases. One case of National Intelligence where you can see cognitive bias play a role is with the Iraq

In the current intelligence environment, the relationship between the analyst and the policymaker balance on a fine line between being too politicized and the policymaker being too distant in order to provide feedback to the analysis performed. Policymaker(s) depend on intelligence products from the Intelligence Community to provide information that fills in the knowledge gap. The demand for such products is constant, so each agency within the IC participates with their intelligence to contribute to the overall product. However, unlike the constant intelligence products that give regard to current issues that just scratch the surface, National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are related to prediction and estimations that are directly tied to

The challenge to an intelligence analyst, as mentioned by Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, is the lack of experimental, independent testing within a controlled environment. That does not necessarily mean that the intelligence analysis process lacks a formal process or is absent scientific methodologies. Based on Knight (2010), intelligence research identifies patterns through observation so that an analyst can develop a hypothesis to predict future events the very premise of the scientific method. However, the IC has acknowledged a scientific gap and has been migrating towards a more ?coherent scientific discipline? based on the need to improve performance of intelligence analysis (Johnston, ). Furthermore, intelligence analysts are provided with scientific methodologies at their disposal that they can use to strengthen their estimates. In the analyst?s toolkit there are a variety of techniques that can be used to strengthen processes and conform to more valid scientific methods. Heuer (1999), the author of Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH), use ACH as an eight-step procedure using basic insights from cognitive psychology, decision analysis, and the scientific method. According to Bruce, ACH attempts to eliminate cognitive bias and provide other explanations with possible outcomes through testing hypotheses in an attempt to refute or ?disconfirm? them (Bruce, 2008, p. 175). After all, the challenge to inductive inference is not in supporting a study?s conclusions, but refuting them through scientific means. Heuer?s ACH methodology attempts to reconcile this weakness and has become a recognized advancement towards this goal. In Bruce?s essay (2008), he acknowledges that had the 2002 Iraq NIE utilized this methodology, the estimate?s weighty findings should have exposed the

Introduction: Throughout the intelligence cycle there are five different phases of gathering information and making decisions on your analysis. The intelligence cycle contains 5 different phases that being planning, collection, processing exploitation, analysis, and dissemination. In the intelligence cycle we dive deep into articles pulling out every viable piece of information that may be useful in a case and do whatever it takes to get that information “no matter how it is obtained”. In the analysis of the intelligence cycle there are many different procedures that agencies follow for gathering information.

Central to threat assessment is intelligence to help develop our own targets to deter or punish state sponsors.  In this regard, the development of long-term human source intelligence [HUMINT] is often cited as a vital component in building our ability to preempt attacks. Critical to threat assessment is the need to get smarter, not just in protecting against the threat from outsiders, but smarter about the threat posed by people with legitimate access.  This includes acts of carelessness by insiders.  A chain is only as strong as its weakest link.  We need to continue our efforts to enhance our vigilance to minimize any potential threats posed by third country nationals- for example, threats posed by outsiders working at U.S. embassies and military installations overseas.

Intelligence analysts must overcome whatever biases they possess in order to give the most accurate assessments. The 20th century is replete with intelligence failures such as not foreseeing the North Korean invasion of South Korea and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, not to mention 9/11 as the 21st century began (Collier, 2010). It is imperative that analysts look at information objectively and honestly to build their assessments.

In our everyday lives, we are constantly interacting with other individuals. These interactions have an effect on our emotions. We have to learn how to identify and deal with these emotions because they have a direct effect on how we deal with issues at work. Individuals can work their way through this process by becoming aware of the importance of emotional intelligence.