Firm A with total cost function CA = 60qA and Firm B with total cost function CB = 80qB are the %3D only suppliers of a product that has market demand P = 280 – Q. Under Cournot Duopoly the equilibrium price equal to
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Q: The inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly is P = 200 − 3(Q1 + Q2) and costs…
A: Hi, thank you for the question. As per our Honor code, we are allowed to attempt only first three…
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- A6 In Changlun, Kedah, there are two bakers, Abu and Bakar. Their bread taste the same and nobody can tell the difference. Abu has constant marginal costs of RM1 per loaf of bread. Bakar has constant marginal costs of RM2 per loaf. Fixed costs are zero for both of them. The inverse demand function for bread in Changlun is p(q) = 6 – 0.01(qA + qB), where q is the total number of loaves sold per day. Find the reaction function for Abu and Bakar. What is the Cournot Nash equilibrium number of loaves of bread for each baker?A computer hardware firm sells both laptop computers and printers. Through the magic of focus groups, their pricing team determines that they have an equal number of three types of customers, and that these customers' reservation prices are as illustrated in the figure below. and a price for printers of Customer A Customer B Customer C Bundling Laptop $800 for this firm. $950 $650 Assume for simplicity that the firm has one customer of each type and that marginal cost is zero. If the firm were to charge only individual prices (not use the bundle price), what prices should it set for its laptops and printers to maximize profit? To maximize profit using individual prices, the firm should charge a price for laptops of p= Printer $100 $50 $150 p= Bundle $900 $1,000 $800 After conducting a costly study, an outside consultant claims that the company could make more money from its customers if it sold laptops and printers together as a bundle instead of separately. Is the consultant right?…What are the characteristics of EACH of the TWO marketstructures? Characteristic Perfectly competitive market and Monopoly marketBarriers to entryControl over price Number of firms
- Market demand is P = 50 -2Q. Firm has cost function TC(Q) = 5 + 2Q + Q^2. Another competitor enters market with identical cost, and theatket can be described as Cournot. What happens to the profit of both firms?Qno3 AVAC is the only pharmaceutical firm producing a Vaccine. The Demand Curve for its product is Qd = 250 – 50 P where P is Price and Q are packs of vaccines in ‘000 Total Cost Function estimated by the firm is TC = 15 + 0.5Q where Q is monthly output. Required. a). What is the market structure of AVAC? State its characteristics. b). To maximize profit, i) What will be the optimum price and how many packs of Vaccine should the firm produce and sell per month? ii). If this number of packs is produced and sold, what will be the firm’s monthly profit? c). Using available information, draw AVAC’s demand, marginal revenue and marginal cost curves in a graph and clearly label thefirm’s profit maximizing price, quantity and profit. Do you observe any welfare loss? If so, also indicate and label the area on the graph.? d). Assume all other pharmaceutical firms in the market start producing the Vaccine and the market becomes competitive. What will…Consider a homogeneous-product Cournot ollgopoly of 3 firms with cost functions TC(a) = 24, Sup- pose that the Inverse demand function Is P(Q) = 30 - Q. (a) Solve for Cournot-Nash equilibrlum. (b) Firm 1 and Firm 2 merge Into Firm A. Solve for the new Cournot-Nash equilibrlum. Provide an Intultive explanation for the decrease In the combined profit of the merged firms.
- In the aeronautical market, Boing and Airbus constitute a duopoly in the production of large airplanes. The American firm has the following cost structure C(qa) = 20 + 39a + qả, and the European firm, C(qe) 150 – P, answer the following questions. = 50 + qe + q?. If the market demand for large airplanes is given by Qp = 9a + qe = a) Interpret the cost structures of both firms b) What would be the equilibrium (quantity, price, and profit) if firms compete by quantity as in Cournot and interpret your answer. c) If they decide to form a cartel, what are the new quantities, prices, and profits? Interpret your answer using the Game Theory insights. d) Calculate now what would happen if Airbus is the leader (Stackelberg model) in terms of quantity, price, and profit and interpret your outcomes.Please no written by hand solution Considerthe following problem. There are five firms producing a homogenous good and competing in quantities simultaneously. The demand function for this good is given by D(p) = 100−p, where p denotes price. The marginal cost is the same for all firms and equals 40 Answer the following questions. (a) Compute the equilibrium quantities and profits of each firm. (b) Now suppose that two of these firms (say firms 1 and 2) want to merge. (The remaining firms stay unchanged.) Merging, however, is costly. To merge, each merging firm has to pay a fixed cost F. Determine the highest fixed cost F that the two firms would be willing to pay in order to proceed with the merger.Suppose you are employed at a monopolistic company as a research (pricing) economist and you are deriving the behavior of two markets based on demand curves given by: Di(P1) 3 50 — Pі D:(p>) — 50 — 2р2 Assume that the marginal cost is constant at $8 a unit. (a) If it can price discriminate, what price should it charge in each market in order to maximize profits? (b) If it can't price discriminate, what price should it charge?
- I alrready got the first half answered, I need the second half. JointJuice produces a prepackaged joint support supplement for relief of joint pain with 180 tablets per bottle and operates in a perfectly competitive market. Basically, all the firms in this competitive market have technologies (production and cost conditions) that are the same as JointJuice’s. Suppose JointJuice’s total cost function is given by the following where q is JointJuice’s quantity of packages per day: C(q) = 250 + 6q + 0.1q^2 The market demand function for the output in this market is given by: Q = 1848 - 2P If there are 20 identical firms in this industry, find the market equilibrium price for the prepackaged supplements. Calculate JointJuice’s optimal output level and profits given the market price for the product. If JointJuice is typical of the firms in this industry calculate the firm’s long-run equilibrium output, price, and profit level. Suppose the situation changes. JointJuice has its plant in…The market inverse demandfor salt is P(Q) = 1000−10Q. There are n firms producing salt, each with the sameconstant marginal cost c. Show that as n increases, the market gets closer to efficiency.The inverse demand for a homogenerous-product STakelberg duopoly is P=18,000-5Q. The cost structures for the leader and the follower, respectively, are CL(QL=2,000QLand CF(QF)=4000Qf. What is the follower's reaction function? Determine equilibrium output level for both leader and follower. Determine the equilibrium market price. Determin the profits of the leader and the follower. Please answer correct please asap please Don't answer by pen paper plz