Kailashben 1. Solve the following zero-sum game, i.e. find the value of the game andthe optimal strategies.1122 021/2 3 1/2/1

Given Information:The zero-sum game is given as .Objective:Solve the game by finding the value of it…

Answered: Solve the following zero-sum game, i.e.…

Linear Algebra: A Modern Introduction

4th Edition

ISBN:9781285463247

Author:David Poole

Publisher:David Poole

Chapter2: Systems Of Linear Equations

Section2.4: Applications

Problem 36EQ

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if Z = 3 (a) How many pure strategy profiles exist in this game? (b) In the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, what is the sum of the payoffs to the two players?
Consider a symmetric game with 10 players. Each player chooses among three strategies: x, y, and z. Let nx denote the number of players who choose x, ny denote the number of players who choose y, and nz denote the number of players who choose z. (So, nz = 10−nx−ny.) The payoff to a player from choosing strategy x is 10−nx (note that nx includes this player as well), strategy y is 13−2ny (again ny includes this player as well), and strategy z is 3. (a) Show that a Nash equilibrium must have at least one person choosing x and at least one person choosing y. (Hint: In a Nash equilibrium, no player can do better by doing something different.) b) Find all Nash equilibria.
A game theorist is walking down the street in his neighborhood and finds $20. Just as he picks it up, two neighborhood kids, Jane and Tim, run up to him, asking if they can have it. Because game theorists are generous by nature, he says he’s willing to let them have the $20, but only according to the following procedure: Jane and Tim are each to submit a written request as to their share of the $20. Let t denote the amount that Tim requests for himself and j be the amount that Jane requests for herself. Tim and Jane must choose j and t from the interval [0,20]. If j + t ≤ 20, then the two receive what they requested, and the remainder, 20 - j - t, is split equally between them. If, however, j + t > 20, then they get nothing, and the game theorist keeps the $20. Tim and Jane are the players in this game. Assume that each of them has a payoff equal to the amount of money that he or she receives. Find all Nash equilibria.
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In Section 5.5 we showed the following two-person, zero-sum game had a mixed strategy: Player B b1 b2 b3 a1 0 -1 2 Player A a2 5 4 -3 a3 2 3 -4 a. Which strategies are dominated? a1, a2, a3, b1, b2, b3 b. Does the game have a pure or mixed strategy?
Consider the following extensive form game: Find the subgame-perfect equilibrium for this game.
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if w = 6 (a) This game has a unique (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium ⟨t*1 , t*2 ⟩ in which t*1 = t*2 Find the value of t*1 . (If your answer is a fraction, report it in lowest terms.) (b) To which strategy t2 is the strategy t1 = 4 a best response? (If your answer is a fraction, report it in lowest terms.)
Consider the following game. Players 1 and 2 are partners in a firm. If they both invest 10 ina project, the project will achieve an income of 13 per person, so both will get net earningsof 3. If only one of them invests, the project earns only 5 per person, leading to a payoff of-5 for the person who invested and 5 for the other. If none of them invests, both get nothing.They can only choose to invest 10 or not invest at all. 1. Write down the payoff matrix of the game.2. Assume that both players only care about their own material payoffs. Suppose thesepreferences are commonly known to both players. Derive the Nash equilibrium/equilibriaof the game. Does a player’s best choice depend on the strategy chosen by the otherplayer?
Consider a new card game between 2 players: Jim (player 1) and Angella (player 2) Jim is dealt two cards : ♡8 and ♠️9 . Angella is also dealt two cards: ♢6 and ♣️6 . Now, each of the players will play 1 card both at the same time. The payoff of Jim is 4 points if he plays a card of opposite color (red/black) than Angella, and otherwise his payoff is 10 points. The payoff of Angella is 3 points if the difference of the already played card numbers is greater than 4, otherwise her payoff is 2 points. 1. Find the Best Responses for Angella.2. Find all the Nash Equilibriums of the game (if any).

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Solve the following zero-sum game, i.e. find the value of the game and the optimal strategies. 1 1 2 2 0 2 1/2 3 1/2/