Nonfiction > Francis Bacon > Advancement of Learning
Francis Bacon (1561–1626).  Advancement of Learning.  1857.
The Second Book
IT might seem to have more convenience, though it come often otherwise to pass, (excellent King,) that those which are fruitful in their generations, and have in themselves the foresight of immortality in their descendants, should likewise be more careful of the good estate of future times; unto which they know they must transmit and commend over their dearest pledges. Queen Elizabeth was a sojourner in the world in respect of her unmarried life; and was a blessing to her own times; and yet so as the impression of her good government, besides her happy memory, is not without some effect which doth survive her. 1 But to your Majesty, whom God hath already blessed with so much royal issue, worthy to continue and represent you for ever, and whose youthful and fruitful bed doth yet promise many the like renovations, it is proper and agreeable to be conversant not only in the transitory parts of good government, but in those acts also which are in their nature permanent and perpetual. Amongst the which (if affection do not transport me) there is not any more worthy than the further endowment of the world with sound and fruitful knowledge: for why should a few received authors stand up like Hercules’ Columns, beyond which there should be no sailing or discovering, since we have so bright and benign a star as your Majesty to conduct and prosper us? To return therefore where we left, it remaineth to consider of what kind those acts are, which have been undertaken and performed by kings and others for the increase and advancement of learning: wherein I purpose to speak actively without digressing or dilating.  1
  Let this ground therefore be laid, that all works are overcomen by amplitude of reward, by soundness of direction, and by the conjunction of labours. The first multiplieth endeavour, the second preventeth error, and the third supplieth the frailty of man. But the principal of these is direction: for claudus in via antevertit cursorem extra viam; [the cripple that keeps the way gets to the end of the journey sooner than the runner who goes aside;] and Salomon excellently setteth it down, If the iron be not sharp, it requireth more strength; but wisdom is that which prevaileth; signifying that the invention or election of the mean is more effectual than any inforcement or accumulation of endeavours. This I am induced to speak, for that (not derogating from the noble intention of any that have been deservers towards the state of learning) I do observe nevertheless that their works and acts are rather matters of magnificence and memory than of progression and proficience, and tend rather to augment the mass of learning in the multitude of learned men than to rectify or raise the sciences themselves.  2
  The works or acts of merit towards learning are conversant about three objects; the places of learning, the books of learning, and the persons of the learned. For as water, whether it be the dew of heaven or the springs of the earth, doth scatter and leese itself in the ground, except it be collected into some receptacle, where it may by union comfort and sustain itself; and for that cause the industry of man hath made and framed spring-heads, conduits, cisterns, and pools, which men have accustomed likewise to beautify and adorn with accomplishments of magnificence and state, as well as of use and necessity; so this excellent liquor of knowledge, whether it descend from divine inspiration or spring from human sense, would soon perish and vanish to oblivion, if it were not preserved in books, traditions, conferences, and places appointed, as universities, colleges, and schools, for the receit and comforting of the same.  3
  The works which concern the seats and places of learning are four - foundations and buildings, endowments with revenues, endowments with franchises and privileges, institutions and ordinances for government - all tending to quietness and privateness of life, and discharge of cares and troubles; much like the stations which Virgil prescribeth for the hiving of bees:
        Principio sedes apibus statioque petenda,
Quo neque sit ventis aditus, &c.
[First for thy bees a quiet station find,
And lodge them under covert of the wind. 2]
  The works touching books are two: first libraries, which are as the shrines where all the relics of the ancient saints, full of true virtue and that without delusion or imposture, 3 are preserved and reposed; secondly, new editions of authors, with more correct impressions, more faithful translations, more profitable glosses, more diligent annotations, and the like.  5
  The works pertaining to the persons of learned men (besides the advancement and countenancing of them in general) are two: the reward and designation of readers in sciences already extant and invented; and the reward and designation of writers and inquirers concerning any parts of learning not sufficiently laboured and prosecuted.  6
  These are summarily the works and acts, wherein the merits of many excellent princes and other worthy personages have been conversant. As for any particular commemorations, I call to mind what Cicero said, when he gave general thanks; Difficile non aliquem, ingratum quenquam præterire: [it were hard to remember all, and yet ungracious to forget any]. Let us rather, according to the Scriptures, look unto that part of the race which is before us than look back to that which is already attained.  7
  First therefore, amongst so many great foundations of colleges in Europe, I find it strange that they are all dedicated to professions, and none left free to arts and sciences at large. For if men judge that learning should be referred to action, they judge well; but in this they fall into the error described in the ancient fable; in which the other parts of the body did suppose the stomach had been idle, because it neither performed the office of motion, as the limbs do, nor of sense, as the head doth; but yet notwithstanding it is the stomach that digesteth and distributeth to all the rest. So if any man think philosophy and universality to be idle studies, he doth not consider that all professions are from thence served and supplied. And this I take to be a great cause that hath hindered the progression of learning, because these fundamental knowledges have been studied but in passage. For if you will have a tree bear more fruit than it hath used to do, it is not any thing you can do to the boughs, but it is the stirring of the earth and putting new mould about the roots that must work it. Neither is it to be forgotten that this dedicating of foundations and dotations to professory learning hath not only had a malign aspect and influence upon the growth of sciences, but hath also been prejudicial to states and governments. For hence it proceedeth that princes find a solitude in regard of able men to serve them in causes of estate, because there is no education collegiate which is free; where such as were so disposed might give themselves in histories, modern languages, books of policy and civil discourse, and other the like enablements unto service of estate.  8
  And because founders of colleges do plant and founders of lectures do water, it followeth well in order to speak of the defect which is in public lectures; namely, in the smallness and meanness of the salary or reward which in most places is assigned unto them; 4 whether they be lectures of arts, or of professions. For it is necessary to the progression of sciences that readers 5 be of the most able and sufficient men; as those which are ordained for generating and propagating of sciences, and not for transitory use. This cannot be, except their condition and endowment be such as may content the ablest man to appropriate his whole labour and continue his whole age in that function and attendance; and therefore must have a proportion answerable to that mediocrity or competency of advancement which may be expected from a profession or the practice of a profession. So as, if you will have sciences flourish, you must observe David’s military law, which was, That those which staid with the carriage should have equal part with those which were in the action; else will the carriages be ill attended: So readers in sciences are indeed the guardians of the stores and provisions of sciences whence men in active courses are furnished, and therefore ought to have equal entertainment with them; otherwise if the fathers in sciences be of the weakest sort or be ill-maintained,
        Et patrum invalidi referent jejunia nati:
[the poor keeping of the parents will appear in the poor constitution of the offspring.]
  Another defect I note, wherein I shall need some alchemist to help me, who call upon men to sell their books and to build furnaces; quitting and forsaking Minerva and the Muses as barren virgins, and relying upon Vulcan. But certain it is that unto the deep, fruitful, and operative study of many sciences, specially natural philosophy and physic, 6 books be not only the instrumentals; wherein also the beneficence of men hath not been altogether wanting; for we see spheres, globes, astrolabes, maps, and the like, have been provided as appurtenances to astronomy and cosmography, as well as books: we see likewise that some places instituted for physic have annexed the commodity of gardens for simples of all sorts, and do likewise command the use of dead bodies for anatomies. But these do respect but a few things. In general, there will hardly be any main proficience in the disclosing of nature, except there be some allowance for expenses about experiments; whether they be experiments appertaining to Vulcanus or Dædalus, furnace or engine, or any other kind; and therefore as secretaries and spials of princes and states bring in bills for intelligence, so you must allow the spials and intelligencers of nature to bring in their bills, or else you shall be ill advertised.  10
  And if Alexander made such a liberal assignation to Aristotle of treasure for the allowance of hunters, fowlers, fishers, and the like, that he might compile an History of nature, much better do they deserve it that travail 7 in Arts of nature. 8  11
  Another defect which I note, is an intermission or neglect in those which are governors in universities of consultation, and in princes or superior persons of visitation; to enter into account and consideration, whether the readings, exercises, and other customs appertaining unto learning, anciently begun and since continued, be well instituted or no; and thereupon to ground an amendment or reformation in that which shall be found inconvenient. For it is one of your Majesty’s own most wise and princely maxims, that in all usages and precedents, the times be considered wherein they first began; which if they were weak or ignorant, it derogateth from the authority of the usage, and leaveth it for suspect. And therefore in as much as most of the usages and orders of the universities were derived from more obscure times, it is the more requisite they be re-examined. In this kind I will give an instance or two for example sake, of things that are the most obvious and familiar. The one is a matter which though it be ancient and general, yet I hold to be an error; which is, that scholars in universities come too soon and too unripe to logic and rhetoric; arts fitter for graduates than children and novices: for these two, rightly taken, are the gravest of sciences; being the arts of arts, the one for judgment, the other for ornament; and they be the rules and directions how to set forth and dispose matter; and therefore for minds empty and unfraught with matter, and which have not gathered that which Cicero calleth sylva and supellex, stuff and variety, to begin with those arts, (as if one should learn to weigh or to measure or to paint the wind,) doth work but this effect, that the wisdom of those arts, which is great and universal, is almost made contemptible, and is degenerate into childish sophistry and ridiculous affectation. And further, the untimely learning of them hath drawn on by consequence the superficial and unprofitable teaching and writing of them, as fitteth indeed to the capacity of children. Another is a lack I find in the exercises used in the universities, which do make too great a divorce between invention and memory; for their speeches are either premeditate in verbis conceptis, where nothing is left to invention, or merely extemporal, where little is left to memory: whereas in life and action there is least use of either of these, but rather of intermixtures of premeditation and invention, notes and memory; so as the exercise fitteth not the practice, nor the image the life; and it is ever a true rule in exercises, that they be framed as near as may be to the life of practice; for otherwise they do pervert the motions and faculties of the mind, and not prepare them. The truth whereof is not obscure, when scholars come to the practices of professions, or other actions of civil life; which when they set into, this want is soon found by themselves, and sooner by others. But this part, touching the amendment of the institutions and orders of universities, I will conclude with the clause of Cæsar’s letter to Oppius and Balbus, Hoc quemadmodum fieri possit, nonnulla mihi in mentem veniunt, et multa reperiri possunt; de iis rebus rogo vos ut cogitationem suscipiatis: [how this may be done, some things occur to me and more may be thought of. I would have you take these matters into consideration.]  12
  Another defect which I note, ascendeth a little higher than the precedent. For as the proficience of learning consisteth much in the orders and institutions of universities in the same states and kingdoms, so it would be yet more advanced, if there were more intelligence mutual between the universities of Europe than now there is. We see there be many orders and foundations, which though they be divided under several sovereignties and territories, yet they take themselves to have a kind of contract, fraternity, and correspondence one with the other, insomuch as they have Provincials and Generals. 9 And surely as nature createth brotherhood in families, and arts mechanical contract brotherhoods in communalties, and the anointment of God superinduceth a brotherhood in kings and bishops; so in like manner there cannot but be a fraternity in learning and illumination, relating to that paternity which is attributed to God, who is called the Father of illuminations or lights.  13
  The last defect which I will note is, that there hath not been, or very rarely been, any public designation of writers or inquirers concerning such parts of knowledge as may appear not to have been already sufficiently laboured or undertaken; unto which point it is an inducement, to enter into a view and examination what parts of learning have been prosecuted, and what omitted; for the opinion of plenty is amongst the causes of want, and the great quantity of books maketh a shew rather of superfluity than lack; which surcharge nevertheless is not to be remedied by making no more books, but by making more good books, which, as the serpent of Moses, 10 might devour the serpents of the enchanters.  14
  The removing of all the defects formerly enumerate, except the last, and of the active part also of the last, (which is the designation of writers,) are opera basilica, [works for a king;] towards which the endeavours of a private man may be but as an image in a crossway, that may point at the way but cannot go it. But the inducing part of the latter (which is the survey of learning) may be set forward by private travel. Wherefore I will now attempt to make a general and faithful perambulation of learning, with an inquiry what parts thereof lie fresh and waste, and not improved and converted by the industry of man; to the end that such a plot made and recorded to memory may both minister light to any public designation, and also serve to excite voluntary endeavours; wherein nevertheless my purpose is at this time to note only omissions and deficiencies, and not to make any redargution of errors or incomplete prosecutions; 11 for it is one thing to set forth what ground lieth unmanured, and another thing to correct ill husbandry in that which is manured. 12  15
  In the handling and undertaking of which work I am not ignorant what it is that I do now move and attempt, nor insensible of mine own weakness to sustain my purpose; but my hope is that if my extreme love to learning carry me too far, I may obtain the excuse of affection; for that it is not granted to man to love and to be wise. But I know well I can use no other liberty of judgment than I must leave to others; and I for my part shall be indifferently glad either to perform myself or accept from another that duty of humanity, Nam qui erranti comiter monstrat viam, &c. [to put the wanderer in the right way]. I do foresee likewise that of those things which I shall enter and register as deficiencies and omissions, many will conceive and censure that some of them are already done and extant; others to be but curiosities, and things of no great use; and others to be of too great difficulty and almost impossibility to be compassed and effected. But for the two first, I refer myself to the particulars. For the last, touching impossibility, I take it those things are to be held possible which may be done by some person, though not by every one; and which may be done by many, though not by any one; and which may be done in the succession of ages, though not within the hourglass of one man’s life; and which may be done by public designation, though not by private endeavour. But notwithstanding, if any man will take to himself rather that of Salomon, Dicit piger, Leo est in via, [the slothful man saith there is a lion in the path,] than that of Virgil, Possunt quia posse videntur, [they find it possible because they think it possible,] I shall be content that my labours be esteemed but as the better sort of wishes; for as it asketh some knowledge to demand a question not impertinent, so it requireth some sense to make a wish not absurd.  16
  ¶ 13 The parts of human learning have reference to the three parts of Man’s Understanding, which is the seat of learning: History to his Memory, Poesy to his Imagination, and Philosophy to his Reason. Divine learning receiveth the same distribution; for the spirit of man is the same, though the revelation of oracle and sense be diverse: so as theology consisteth also of History of the Church; of Parables, which is divine poesy; and of holy Doctrine or precept. For as for that part which seemeth supernumerary, which is Prophecy, it is but divine history; which hath that prerogative over human, as the narration may be before the fact as well as after.  17
  Historia Litterarum. 14 History is Natural, Civil, Ecclesiastical, and Literary; whereof the three first I allow as extant, the fourth I note as deficient. For no man hath propounded to himself the general state of learning to be described and represented from age to age, as many have done the works of nature and the state civil and ecclesiastical; without which the history of the world seemeth to me to be as the statua of Polyphemus with his eye out; that part being wanting which doth most shew the spirit and life of the person. And yet I am not ignorant that in divers particular sciences, as of the jurisconsults, the mathematicians, the rhetoricians, the philosophers, there are set down some small memorials of the schools, authors, and books; and so likewise some barren relations touching the invention of arts or usages. But a just story of learning, containing the antiquities and originals of knowledges, and their sects; their inventions, their traditions; their diverse administrations and managings; their flourishings, their oppositions, decays, depressions, oblivions, removes; with the causes and occasions of them, and all other events concerning learning, throughout the ages of the world; 15 I may truly affirm to be wanting. The use and end of which work I do not so much design for curiosity, or satisfaction of those that are the lovers of learning; but chiefly for a more serious and grave purpose, which is this in few words, that it will make learned men wise in the use and administration of learning. For it is not St. Augustine’s nor Saint Ambrose works that will make so wise a divine, as ecclesiastical history thoroughly read and observed; and the same reason is of learning.  18
  Historia Naturæ Errantis. 16 History of Nature is of three sorts; of nature in course, of nature erring or varying, and of nature altered or wrought; that is, history of Creatures, history of Marvels, and history of Arts. 17 The first of these no doubt is extant, and that in good perfection; the two later are handled so weakly and unprofitably, as I am moved to note them as deficient. For I find no sufficient or competent collection of the works of nature which have a digression and deflexion from the ordinary course of generations, productions, and motions; whether they be singularities of place and region, or the strange events of time and chance, or the effects of yet unknown properties, or the instances of exception to general kinds. It is true, I find a number of books of fabulous experiments and secrets, and frivolous impostures for pleasure and strangeness. But a substantial and severe collection of the Heteroclites or Irregulars of nature, well examined and described, I find not; specially not with due rejection of fables and popular errors: for as things now are, if an untruth in nature be once on foot, what by reason of the neglect of examination and countenance of antiquity, and what by reason of the use of the opinion in similitudes and ornaments of speech, it is never called down.  19
  The use of this work, honoured with a precedent in Aristotle, 18 is nothing less than to give contentment to the appetite of curious and vain wits, as the manner of Mirabilaries is to do; but for two reasons, both of great weight; the one to correct the partiality of axioms and opinions, which are commonly framed only upon common and familiar examples; the other because from the wonders of nature is the nearest intelligence and passage towards the wonders of art: for it is no more but by following and as it were hounding Nature in her wanderings, to be able to lead her afterwards to the same place again. Neither am I of opinion, in this History of Marvels, that superstitious narrations of sorceries, witchcrafts, dreams, divinations, and the like, where there is an assurance and clear evidence of the fact, be altogether excluded. For it is not yet known in what cases, and how far, effects attributed to superstition do participate of natural causes; and therefore howsoever the practice of such things is to be condemned, yet from the speculation and consideration of them light may be taken, not only for the discerning of the offences, but for the further disclosing of nature. Neither ought a man to make scruple of entering into these things for inquisition of truth, as your Majesty hath shewed in your own example; who with the two clear eyes of religion and natural philosophy have looked deeply and wisely into these shadows, and yet proved yourself to be of the nature of the sun, which passeth through pollutions and itself remains as pure as before. But this I hold fit, that these narrations which have mixture with superstition be sorted by themselves, and not to be mingled with the narrations which are merely and sincerely natural. But as for the narrations touching the prodigies and miracles of religions, they are either not true or not natural; and therefore impertinent for the story of nature.  20
  Historia Mechanics. For History of Nature Wrought or Mechanical, I find some collections made of agriculture, and likewise of manual arts; but commonly with a rejection of experiments familiar and vulgar. For it is esteemed a kind of dishonour unto learning to descend to inquiry or meditation upon matters mechanical, except they be such as may be thought secrets, rarities, and special subtilties; which humour of vain and supercilious arrogancy is justly derided in Plato; where he brings in Hippias, a vaunting sophist, disputing with Socrates, a true and unfeigned inquisitor of truth; where the subject being touching beauty, Socrates, after his wandering manner of inductions, put first an example of a fair virgin, and then of a fair horse, and then of a fair pot well glazed, whereat Hippias was offended, and said, More than for courtesy’s sake, he did think much to dispute with any that did allege such base and sordid instances: whereunto Socrates answereth, You have reason, and it becomes you well, being a man so trim in your vestments, &c. and so goeth on in an irony. But the truth is, they be not the highest instances that give the securest information; as may be well expressed in the tale so common of the philosopher, that while he gazed upwards to the stars fell into the water; for if he had looked down he might have seen the stars in the water, but looking aloft he could not see the water in the stars. So it cometh often to pass that mean and small things discover great better than great can discover the small; and therefore Aristotle noteth well, that the nature of every thing is best seen in his smallest portions, and for that cause he inquireth the nature of a commonwealth, first in a family, and the simple conjugations of man and wife, parent and child, master and servant, which are in every cottage: even so likewise the nature of this great city of the world and the policy thereof must be first sought in mean concordances and small portions. So we see how that secret of nature, of the turning of iron touched with the loadstone towards the north, was found out in needles of iron, not in bars of iron.  21
  But if my judgment be of any weight, the use of History Mechanical is of all others the most radical and fundamental towards natural philosophy; such natural philosophy as shall not vanish in the fume of subtile, sublime, or delectable speculation, but such as shall be operative to the endowment and benefit of man’s life: for it will not only minister and suggest for the present many ingenious practices in all trades, by a connexion and transferring of the observations of one art to the use of another, when the experiences of several mysteries shall fall under the consideration of one man’s mind; but further it will give a more true and real illumination concerning causes and axioms than is hitherto attained. For like as a man’s disposition is never well known till he be crossed, nor Proteus ever changed shapes till he was straitened and held fast; so the passages and variations of nature cannot appear so fully in the liberty of nature, as in the trials and vexations of art. 19  22
  ¶ 20 For Civil History, it is of three kinds; 21 not unfitly to be compared with the three kinds of pictures or images. For of pictures or images, we see some are unfinished, some are perfect, 22 and some are defaced. So of histories we may find three kinds, Memorials, Perfect Histories, and Antiquities; for Memorials are history unfinished, or the first or rough draughts of history, and Antiquities are history defaced, or some remnants of history which have casually escaped the shipwrack of time.  23
  Memorials, or Preparatory History, are of two sorts; whereof the one may be termed Commentaries, and the other Registers. Commentaries are they which set down a continuance of the naked events and actions, without the motives or designs, the counsels, the speeches, the pretexts, the occasions, and other passages of action: for this is the true nature of a Commentary; though Cæsar, in modesty mixed with greatness, did for his pleasure apply the name of a Commentary to the best history of the world. Registers are collections of public acts, as decrees of council, judicial proceedings, declarations and letters of estate, orations, and the like, without a perfect continuance or contexture of the thread of the narration.  24
  Antiquities or Remnants of History are, as was said, tanquam tabula naufragii, [like the planks of a shipwreck;] when industrious persons by an exact and scrupulous diligence and observation, out of monuments, names, words, proverbs, traditions, private records and evidences, fragments of stories, passages of books that concern not story, and the like, do save and recover somewhat from the deluge of time.  25
  In these kinds of unperfect histories I do assign no deficience, for they are tanquam imperfecte mista, [things imperfectly compounded;] and therefore any deficience in them is but their nature. As for the corruptions and moths of history, which are Epitomes, the use of them deserveth to be banished, as all men of sound judgment have confessed; as those that have fretted and corroded the sound bodies of many excellent histories, and wrought them into base and unprofitable dregs.  26
  ¶ 23 History which may be called Just and Perfect History is of three kinds, according to the object which it propoundeth, or pretendeth to represent: for it either representeth a Time, or a Person, or an Action. The first we call Chronicles, the second Lives, and the third Narrations or Relations. Of these, although the first be the most complete and absolute kind of history and hath most estimation and glory, yet the second excelleth it in profit and use, and the third in verity and sincerity. For History of Times representeth the magnitude of actions and the public faces and deportments of persons, and passeth over in silence the smaller passages and motions of men and matters. But such being the workmanship of God, as he doth hang the greatest weight upon the smallest wires, maxima e minimis suspendens, it comes therefore to pass, that such histories do rather set forth the pomp of business than the true and inward resorts thereof. 24 But Lives, if they be well written, 25 propounding to themselves a person to represent in whom actions both greater and smaller, public and private, have a commixture, must of necessity contain a more true, native, and lively representation. So again Narrations and Relations of actions, as the War of Peloponnesus, the Expedition of Cyrus Minor, the Conspiracy of Catiline, cannot but be more purely and exactly true than Histories of Times, because they may choose an argument comprehensible within the notice and instructions of the writer: whereas he that undertaketh the story of a time, especially of any length, cannot but meet with many blanks and spaces which he must be forced to fill up out of his own wit and conjecture. 26  27
  For the History of Times, (I mean of civil history) the providence of God hath made the distribution: for it hath pleased God to ordain and illustrate two exemplar states of the world, for arms, learning, moral virtue, policy, and laws; the state of Græcia, and the state of Rome; the histories whereof occupying the middle part of time, have more ancient to them, histories which may by one common name be termed the Antiquities of the World; and after them, histories which may be likewise called by the name of Modern History. 27  28
  Now to speak of the deficiencies. As to the Heathen Antiquities of the world, it is in vain to note them for deficient. Deficient they are no doubt, consisting most of fables and fragments; but the deficience cannot be holpen; for antiquity is like fame, caput inter nubila condit, her head is muffled from our sight. For the History of the Exemplar States, it is extant in good perfection. Not but I could wish there were a perfect course of history for Græcia from Theseus to Philopœmen, (what time the affairs of Græcia drowned and extinguished in the affairs of Rome;) and for Rome from Romulus to Justinianus, who may be truly said to be ultimus Romanorum. In which sequences of story the text of Thucydides and Xenophon in the one, and the texts of Livius, Polybius, Sallustius, Cæsar, Appianus, Tacitus, Herodianus in the other, to be kept entire without any diminution at all, and only to be supplied and continued. But this is a matter of magnificence, rather to be commended than required: and we speak now of parts of learning supplemental, and not of supererogation.  29
  But for Modern Histories, whereof there are some few very worthy, but the greater part beneath mediocrity, leaving the care of foreign stories to foreign states, because I will not be curiosus in aliena republica, [a meddler in other nations’ matters,] I cannot fail to represent to your Majesty the unworthiness of the history of England in the main continuance thereof, and the partiality and obliquity of that of Scotland in the latest and largest author that I have seen; supposing that it would be honour for your Majesty and a work very memorable, if this island of Great Britain, 28 as it is now joined in monarchy for the ages to come, so were joined in one history for the times passed; after the manner of the sacred history, which draweth down the story of the Ten Tribes and of the Two Tribes as twins together. And if it shall seem that the greatness of this work may make it less exactly performed, there is an excellent period of a much smaller compass of time, as to the story of England; that is to say, from the Uniting of the Roses to the Uniting of the Kingdoms; a portion of time, wherein to my understanding, there hath been the rarest varieties that in like number of successions of any hereditary monarchy hath been known. For it beginneth with the mixed adeption of a crown, by arms and title; an entry by battle, an establishment by marriage; and therefore times answerable, like waters after a tempest, full of working and swelling, though without extremity of storm; but well passed through by the wisdom of the pilot, being one of the most sufficient kings of all the number. Then followeth the reign of a king, whose actions, howsoever conducted, 29 had much intermixture with the affairs of Europe, balancing and inclining them variably; in whose time also began that great alteration in the state ecclesiastical, an action which seldom cometh upon the stage: then the reign of a minor: then an offer of a usurpation, though it was but as febris ephemera, [a diary ague:] then the reign of a queen matched with a foreigner: then of a queen that lived solitary and unmarried, and yet her government so masculine as it had greater impression and operation upon the states abroad than it any ways received from thence: 30 and now last, this most happy and glorious event, that this island of Britain, divided from all the world, should be united in itself; and that oracle of rest given to Æneas, Antiquam exquirite matrem, [seek out your ancient mother,] should now be performed and fulfilled upon the nations of England and Scotland, being now reunited in the ancient mother name of Britain, as a full period of all instability and peregrinations: so that as it cometh to pass in massive bodies, that they have certain trepidations and waverings before they fix and settle; so it seemeth that by the providence of God this monarchy, before it was to settle in your Majesty and your generations, (in which I hope it is now established for ever,) it had these prelusive changes and varieties.  30
  For Lives, I do find strange that these times have so little esteemed the virtues of the times, as that the writings of lives should be no more frequent. For although there be not many sovereign princes or absolute commanders, and that states are most collected into monarchies, yet are there many worthy personages that deserve better than dispersed report or barren elogies. For herein the invention of one of the late poets 31 is proper, and doth well enrich the ancient fiction: for he feigneth that at the end of the thread or web of every man’s life there was a little medal containing the person’s name, and that Time waited upon the shears, and as soon as the thread was cut, caught the medals and carried them to the river of Lethe; and about the bank there were many birds flying up and down, that would get the medals and carry them in their beak a little while, and then let them fall into the river: only there were a few swans, which if they got a name, would carry it to a temple where it was consecrate. And although many men more mortal in their affections than in their bodies, do esteem desire of name and memory but as a vanity and ventosity,
        Animi nil magnæ laudis egentes;
[souls that have no care for praise;] which opinion cometh from that root, non prius laudes contempsimus, quam laudanda facere desivimus; [men hardly despise praise till they have ceased to deserve it;] yet that will not alter Salomon’s judgment, Memoria justi cum laudibus, at impiorum nomen putrescet; [the memory of the just is blessed; but the name of the wicked shall rot;] the one flourisheth, the other either consumeth to present oblivion, or turneth to an ill odour. And therefore in that style or addition, which is and hath been long well received and brought in use, felicis memoriæ, piæ memoriæ, bonæ memoriæ, [of happy, of pious, of good memory,] we do acknowledge that which Cicero saith, borrowing it from Demosthenes, that bona fama propria possessio defunctorum; 32 [good fame is all that a dead man can possess;] which possession I cannot but note that in our times it lieth much waste, and that therein there is a deficience.
  For Narrations and Relations of particular actions, there were also to be wished a greater diligence therein; for there is no great action but hath some good pen which attends it. And because it is an ability not common to write a good history, as may well appear by the small number of them; yet if particularity of actions memorable were but tolerably reported as they pass, the compiling of a complete History of Times might be the better expected, when a writer should arise that were fit for it: for the collection of such relations might be as a nursery garden, whereby to plant a fair and stately garden when time should serve.  32
  ¶ 33 There is yet another portion of history which Cornelius Tacitus maketh, which is not to be forgotten, specially with that application which he accoupleth it withal, Annals and Journals: appropriating to the former matters of estate, and to the later acts and accidents of a meaner nature. For giving but a touch of certain magnificent buildings, he addeth, Cum ex dignitate populi Romani repertum sit, res illustres annalibus, talia diurnis urbis actis mandare: [that it had been thought suitable to the dignity of the Roman people to enter in their annals only matters of note and greatness; leaving such things as these to the journal records of the city.] So as there is a kind of contemplative heraldry, as well as civil. And as nothing doth derogate from the dignity of a state more than confusion of degrees; so it doth not a little embase the authority of an history, to intermingle matters of triumph or matters of ceremony or matters of novelty with matters of state. But the use of a Journal hath not only been in the history of times, 34 but likewise in the history of persons, and chiefly of actions; for princes in ancient time had, upon point of honour and policy both, journals kept of what passed day by day: for we see the Chronicle which was read before Ahasuerus, 35 when he could not take rest, contained matter of affairs indeed, but such as had passed in his own time, and very lately before: but the Journal of Alexander’s house expressed every small particularity, even concerning his person and court; 36 and it is yet an use well received in enterprises memorable, as expeditions of war, navigations, and the like, to keep diaries of that which passeth continually.  33
  ¶ 37 I cannot likewise be ignorant of a form of writing which some grave and wise men have used, containing a scattered history of those actions which they have thought worthy of memory, with politic discourse and observation thereupon; not incorporate into the history, but separately, and as the more principal in their intention; which kind of Ruminated History I think more fit to place amongst books of policy, whereof we shall hereafter speak, than amongst books of history; 38 for it is the true office of history to represent the events themselves together with the counsels, and to leave the observations and conclusions thereupon to the liberty and faculty of every man’s judgment. But mixtures are things irregular, whereof no man can define.  34
  So also is there another kind of history manifoldly mixed, and that is History of Cosmography: being compounded of natural history, in respect of the regions themselves; of history civil, in respect of the habitations, regiments, and manners of the people; and the mathematics, in respect of the climates and configurations towards the heavens: which part of learning of all others in this latter time hath obtained most proficience. For it may be truly affirmed to the honour of these times, and in a virtuous emulation with antiquity, that this great building of the world had never through-lights made in it, till the age of us and our fathers; for although they had knowledge of the antipodes,
        Nosque ubi primus equis oriens afflavit anhelis,
Illic sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper:
[And while on us the fresh East breathes from far,
For them the red West lights her evening star:]
yet that might be by demonstration, and not in fact; and if by travel, it requireth the voyage but of half the globe. But to circle the earth, as the heavenly bodies do, was not done nor enterprised till these later times: and therefore these times may justly bear in their word, not only plus ultra, in precedence of the ancient non ultra, and imitabile fulmen in precedence of the ancient non imitabile fulmen,
        Demens qui nimbos et non imitabile fulmen, &c.
but likewise imitabile cœlum; in respect of the many memorable voyages, after the manner of heaven, about the globe of the earth.
  And this proficience in navigation and discoveries may plant also an expectation of the further proficience and augmentation of all sciences; because it may seem they are ordained by God to be coevals, that is, to meet in one age. For so the prophet Daniel speaking of the latter times foretelleth, Plurimi pertransibunt, et multiplex erit scientia: [many shall pass to and fro, and knowledge shall be multiplied:] as if the openness and through passage of the world and the increase of knowledge were appointed to be in the same ages; as we see it is already performed in great part; the learning of these later times not much giving place to the former two periods or returns of learning, the one of the Grecians, the other of the Romans.  36
  ¶ 39 History Ecclesiastical receiveth the same divisions with History Civil: but further in the propriety thereof may be divided into History of the Church, by a general name; History of Prophecy; and History of Providence. The first describeth the times of the militant church; whether it be fluctuant, as the ark of Noah; or movable, as the ark in the wilderness; or at rest, as the ark in the temple; that is, the state of the church in persecution, in remove, and in peace. This part I ought in no sort to note as deficient; only I would that the virtue and sincerity of it were according to the mass and quantity. But I am not now in hand with censures, but with omissions.  37
  Historia Prophetica. The second, which is History of Prophecy, consisteth of two relatives, the prophecy and the accomplishment; and therefore the nature of such a work ought to be, that every prophecy of the scripture be sorted with the event fulfilling the same, throughout the ages of the world; both for the better confirmation of faith, and for the better illumination of the church touching those parts of prophecies which are yet unfulfilled; allowing nevertheless that latitude which is agreeable and familiar unto divine prophecies; being of the nature of their author, with whom a thousand years are but as one day; and therefore are not fulfilled punctually at once, but have springing and germinant accomplishment throughout many ages, though the height or fulness of them may refer to some one age. This is a work which I find deficient, but is to be done with wisdom, sobriety, and reverence, or not at all.  38
  The third, which is History of Providence, containeth that excellent correspondence which is between God’s revealed will and his secret will; which though it be so obscure as for the most part it is not legible to the natural man; no, nor many times to those that behold it from the tabernacle; yet at some times it pleaseth God, for our better establishment and the confuting of those which are as without God in the world, to write it in such text and capital letters that, as the prophet saith, he that runneth by may read it; 40 that is, mere sensual persons, which hasten by God’s judgments and never bend or fix their cogitations upon them, are nevertheless in their passage and race urged to discern it. Such are the notable events and examples of God’s judgments, chastisements, deliverances, and blessings. And this is a work which hath passed through the labour of many, 41 and therefore I cannot present as omitted.  39
  ¶ 42 There are also other parts of learning which are Appendices to history. For all the exterior proceedings of man consist of words and deeds; whereof history doth properly receive and retain in memory the deeds, and if words, yet but as inducements and passages to deeds; so are there other books and writings, which are appropriate to the custody and receit of words only; which likewise are of three sorts; Orations, Letters, and Brief Speeches or Sayings. Orations are pleadings, speeches of counsel; laudatives, invectives, apologies, reprehensions; orations of formality or ceremony, and the like. Letters are according to all the variety of occasions; advertisements, advices, directions, propositions, petitions, commendatory, expostulatory, satisfactory, of compliment, of pleasure, of discourse, and all other passages of action. And such as are written from wise men are, of all the words of man, in my judgment the best; for they are more natural than orations and public speeches, and more advised than conferences or present speeches. So again letters of affairs from such as manage them or are privy to them are of all others the best instructions for history, and to a diligent reader the best histories in themselves. For Apophthegms, it is a great loss of that book of Cæsar’s; for as his history and those few letters of his which we have and those apophthegms which were of his own excel all men’s else, so I suppose would his collection of Apophthegms have done; for as for those which are collected by others, either I have no taste in such matters, or else their choice hath not been happy. 43 But upon these three kinds of writings I do not insist, because I have no deficiences to propound concerning them.  40
  Thus much therefore concerning History; which is that part of learning which answereth to one of the cells, domiciles, or offices of the mind of man; which is that of the Memory.  41
  ¶ 44 POESY is a part of learning in measure of words for the most part restrained, but in all other points extremely licensed, and doth truly refer to the Imagination; which, being not tied to the laws of matter, may at pleasure join that which nature hath severed, and sever that which nature hath joined, and so make unlawful matches and divorces of things: Pictoribus atque poetis, &c. [Painters and Poets have always been allowed to take what liberties they would.] It is taken in two senses, in respect of words or matter. In the first sense it is but a character of style, and belongeth to arts of speech, and is not pertinent for the present. 45 In the later, it is (as hath been said) one of the principal portions of learning, and is nothing else but Feigned History, which may be styled as well in prose as in verse.  42
  The use of this Feigned History hath been to give some shadow of satisfaction to the mind of man in those points wherein the nature of things doth deny it; the world being in proportion inferior to the soul; by reason whereof there is agreeable to the spirit of man a more ample greatness, a more exact goodness, and a more absolute variety, than can be found in the nature of things. Therefore, because the acts or events of true history have not that magnitude which satisfieth the mind of man, poesy feigneth acts and events greater and more heroical; because true history propoundeth the successes and issues of actions not so agreeable to the merits of virtue and vice, therefore poesy feigns them more just in retribution, and more according to revealed providence; because true history representeth actions and events more ordinary and less interchanged, therefore poesy endueth them with more rareness, and more unexpected and alternative variations. So as it appeareth that poesy serveth and conferreth to magnanimity, morality, and to delectation. And therefore it was ever thought to have some participation of divineness, because it doth raise and erect the mind, by submitting the shews of things to the desires of the mind; whereas reason doth buckle and bow the mind unto the nature of things. And we see that by these insinuations and congruities with man’s nature and pleasure, joined also with the agreement and consort it hath with music, it hath had access and estimation in rude times and barbarous regions, where other learning stood excluded.  43
  The division of poesy which is aptest in the propriety thereof, (besides those divisions which are common unto it with history, as feigned chronicles, feigned lives; and the appendices of history, as feigned epistles, feigned orations, and the rest;) is into Poesy Narrative, Representative, and Allusive. The Narrative is a mere imitation of history, with the excesses before remembered; choosing for subject commonly wars and love, rarely state, and sometimes pleasure or mirth. 46 Representative is as a visible history, and is an image of actions as if they were present, as history is of actions in nature as they are, (that is) past. Allusive or Parabolical is a narration applied only to express some special purpose or conceit. 47 Which later kind of parabolical wisdom was much more in use in the ancient times, as by the fables of Æsop and the brief sentences of the Seven and the use of hieroglyphics may appear. And the cause was, for that it was then of necessity to express any point of reason which was more sharp or subtile than the vulgar in that manner; because men in those times wanted both variety of examples and subtilty of conceit: and as hieroglyphics were before letters, so parables were before arguments: and nevertheless now and at all times they do retain much life and vigour, because reason cannot be so sensible, nor examples so fit.  44
  But there remaineth yet another use of Poesy Parabolical, opposite to that which we last mentioned: for that tendeth to demonstrate and illustrate that which is taught or delivered, and this other to retire and obscure it; that is when the secrets and mysteries of religion, policy, or philosophy are involved in fables or parables. Of this in divine poesy we see the use is authorized. In heathen poesy we see the exposition of fables doth fall out sometimes with great felicity; as in the fable that the giants being overthrown in their war against the gods, the Earth their mother in revenge thereof brought forth Fame:
        Illam Terra parens, irâ irritata deorum,
Extremam, ut perhibent, Cœo Enceladoque sororem
expounded that when princes and monarchs have suppressed actual and open rebels, then the malignity of people (which is the mother of rebellion) doth bring forth libels and slanders and taxations of the state, which is of the same kind with rebellion, but more feminine. So in the fable that the rest of the gods having conspired to bind Jupiter, Pallas called Briareus with his hundred hands to his aid: expounded that monarchies need not fear any curbing of their absoluteness by mighty subjects, as long as by wisdom they keep the hearts of the people, who will be sure to come in on their side. So in the fable that Achilles was brought up under Chiron the Centaur, who was part a man and part a beast: expounded ingeniously but corruptly by Machiavel, that it belongeth to the education and discipline of princes to know as well how to play the part of a lion in violence and the fox in guile, as of the man in virtue and justice. 48 Nevertheless in many the like encounters, I do rather think that the fable was first, and the exposition devised, than that the moral was first, and thereupon the fable framed. For I find it was an ancient vanity in Chrysippus, that troubled himself with great contention to fasten the assertions of the Stoics upon the fictions of the ancient poets. But yet that all the fables and fictions of the poets were but pleasure and not figure, I interpose no opinion. Surely of those poets which are now extant, even Homer himself, (notwithstanding he was made a kind of Scripture by the later schools of the Grecians,) yet I should without any difficulty pronounce that his fables had no such inwardness in his own meaning; but what they might have upon a more original tradition, is not easy to affirm; for he was not the inventor of many of them. 49
  In this third part of learning, which is poesy, I can report no deficience. For being as a plant that cometh of the lust of the earth, without a formal seed, it hath sprung up and spread abroad more than any other kind. But to ascribe unto it that which is due; for the expressing of affections, passions, corruptions, and customs, we are beholding to poets more than to the philosophers’ works; and for wit and eloquence not much less than to orators’ harangues. 50 But it is not good to stay too long in the theatre. Let us now pass on to the judicial place or palace of the mind, which we are to approach and view with more reverence and attention.  46
  ¶ 51 The knowledge of man is as the waters, some descending from above, and some springing from beneath; the one informed by the light of nature, the other inspired by divine revelation. The light of nature consisteth in the notions of the mind and the reports of the senses; for as for knowledge which man receiveth by teaching, it is cumulative and not original; as in a water that besides his own spring-head is fed with other springs and streams. So then according to these two differing illuminations or originals, knowledge is first of all divided into Divinity and Philosophy.  47
  In Philosophy, the contemplations of man do either penetrate unto God, or are circumferred to Nature, or are reflected or reverted upon Himself. Out of which several inquiries there do arise three knowledges, Divine philosophy, Natural philosophy, and Human philosophy or Humanity. For all things are marked and stamped with this triple character, of the power of God, the difference of nature, and the use of man. But because the distributions and partitions of knowledge are not like several lines that meet in one angle, and so touch but in a point; but are like branches of a tree that meet in a stem, which hath a dimension and quantity of entireness and continuance, before it come to discontinue and break itself into arms and boughs; therefore it is good, before we enter into the former distribution, to erect and constitute one universal science, by the name of Philosophia Prima, Primitive or Summary Philosophy, as the main and common way, before we come where the ways part and divide themselves; which science whether I should report as deficient or no, I stand doubtful. For I find a certain rhapsody of Natural Theology, and of divers parts of Logic; and of that part of Natural Philosophy which concerneth the Principles, and of that other part of Natural Philosophy which concerneth the Soul or Spirit; all these strangely commixed and confused; but being examined, it seemeth to me rather a depredation of other sciences, advanced and exalted unto some height of terms, 52 than any thing solid or substantive of itself. Nevertheless I cannot be ignorant of the distinction which is current, that the same things are handled but in several respects; as for example, that logic considereth of many things as they are in notion, and this philosophy as they are in nature; the one in appearance, the other in existence. But I find this difference better made than pursued. For if they had considered Quantity, Similitude, Diversity, and the rest of those Extern Characters of things, as philosophers, and in nature, their inquiries must of force have been of a far other kind than they are. For doth any of them, in handling Quantity, speak of the force of union, how and how far it multiplieth virtue? Doth any give the reason, why some things in nature are so common and in so great mass, and others so rare and in so small quantity? Doth any, in handling Similitude and Diversity, assign the cause why iron should not move to iron, which is more like, but move to the loadstone, which is less like? Why in all diversities of things there should be certain participles in nature, which are almost ambiguous to which kind they should be referred? But there is a mere and deep silence touching the nature and operation of those Common Adjuncts of things, as in nature; and only a resuming and repeating of the force and use of them in speech or argument. Therefore, because in a writing of this nature I avoid all subtility, my meaning touching this original or universal philosophy is thus, in a plain and gross description by negative: That it be a receptacle for all such profitable observations and axioms as fall not within the compass of any of the special parts of philosophy or sciences, but are more common and of a higher stage.  48
  Philosophia Prima, sive de Fontibus Scientiarum. Now that there are many of that kind need not be doubted. For example; is not the rule, Si inæqualibus æqualia addas, omnia erunt inæqualia, [if equals be added to unequals, the wholes will be unequal,] an axiom as well of justice as of the mathematics? 53 And is there not a true coincidence between commutative and distributive justice, and arithmetical and geometrical proportion? Is not that other rule, Quæ in eodem tertio conveniunt, et inter se conveniunt, [things that are equal to the same are equal to each other,] a rule taken from the mathematics, but so potent in logic as all syllogisms are built upon it? Is not the observation, Omnia mutantur, nil interit, [all things change, but nothing is lost,] a contemplation in philosophy thus, That the quantum of nature is eternal? in natural theology thus, That it requireth the same omnipotence to make somewhat nothing, which at the first made nothing somewhat? according to the scripture, Didici quod omnia opera quæ fecit Deus perseverent in perpetuum; non possumus eis quicquam addere nec auferre: [I know that whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever; nothing can be put to it, nor anything taken from it]. Is not the ground, which Machiavel wisely and largely discourseth concerning governments, that the way to establish and preserve them is to reduce them ad principia, 54 a rule in religion and nature 55 as well as in civil administration? Was not the Persian Magic a reduction or correspondence of the principles and architectures of nature to the rules and policy of governments? Is not the precept of a musician, to fall from a discord or harsh accord upon a concord or sweet accord, alike true in affection? Is not the trope of music, to avoid or slide from the close or cadence, common with the trope of rhetoric of deceiving expectation? Is not the delight of the quavering upon a stop in music the same with 56 the playing of light upon the water?
        Splendet tremulo sub lumine pontus:
[Beneath the trembling light glitters the sea.]
Are not the organs of the senses of one kind with the organs of reflexion, the eye with a glass, the ear with a cave or strait determined and bounded? 57 Neither are these only similitudes, as men of narrow observation may conceive them to be, but the same footsteps of nature, treading or printing upon several subjects or matters. This science therefore (as I understand it) I may justly report as deficient; for I see sometimes the profounder sort of wits, in handling some particular argument, will now and then draw a bucket of water out of this well for their present use; but the springhead thereof seemeth to me not to have been visited, being of so excellent use both for the disclosing of nature and the abridgment of art.
  ¶ 58 This science being therefore first placed as a common parent, like unto Berecynthia, which had so much heavenly issue,
        Omnes cœlicolas, omnes supera alta tenetes:
[All dwellers in the heaven and upper sky:]
we may return to the former distribution of the three philosophies; Divine, Natural, and Human. And as concerning Divine Philosophy or Natural Theology, it is that knowledge or rudiment of knowledge concerning God which may be obtained by the contemplation of his creatures; which knowledge may be truly termed divine in respect of the object, and natural in respect of the light. The bounds of this knowledge are, that it sufficeth to convince atheism, but not to inform religion: and therefore there was never miracle wrought by God to convert an atheist, because the light of nature might have led him to confess a God: but miracles have been wrought to convert idolaters and the superstitious, because no light of nature extendeth to declare the will and true worship of God. For as all works do shew forth the power and skill of the workman, and not his image; so it is of the works of God; which do shew the omnipotency and wisdom of the maker, but not his image: and therefore therein the heathen opinion differeth from the sacred truth; for they supposed the world to be the image of God, and man to be an extract or compendious image of the world; but the Scriptures never vouchsafe to attribute to the world that honour, as to be the image of God, but only the work of his hands; neither do they speak of any other image of God, but man. Wherefore by the contemplation of nature to induce and inforce the acknowledgment of God, and to demonstrate his power, providence, and goodness, is an excellent argument, and hath been excellently handled by divers. But on the other side, out of the contemplation of nature, or ground of human knowledges, to induce any verity or persuasion concerning the points of faith, is in my judgment not safe: Da fidei quæ fidei sunt: [give unto Faith that which is Faith’s]. For the Heathen themselves conclude as much in that excellent and divine fable of the golden chain: That men and gods were not able to draw Jupiter down to the earth; but contrariwise, Jupiter was able to draw them up to heaven. So as we ought not to attempt to draw down or submit the mysteries of God to our reason; but contrariwise to raise and advance our reason to the divine truth. So as in this part of knowledge touching divine philosophy, I am so far from noting any deficience, as I rather note an excess: whereunto I have digressed, because of the extreme prejudice which both religion and philosophy hath received and may receive by being commixed together; as that which undoubtedly will make an heretical religion, and an imaginary and fabulous philosophy.
  Otherwise it is of the nature of angels and spirits, which is an appendix of theology both divine and natural, and is neither inscrutable nor interdicted; for although the Scripture saith, Let no man deceive you in sublime discourse touching the worship of angels, pressing into that he knoweth not, &c. yet notwithstanding if you observe well that precept, it may appear thereby that there be two things only forbidden, adoration of them, and opinion fantastical of them; either to extol them further than appertaineth to the degree of a creature, or to extol a man’s knowledge of them further than he hath ground. But the sober and grounded inquiry which may arise out of the passages of holy Scriptures, or out of the gradations of nature, is not restrained. So of degenerate and revolted spirits, the conversing with them or the employment of them is prohibited, much more any veneration towards them. But the contemplation or science of their nature, their power, their illusions, either by Scripture or reason, is a part of spiritual wisdom. For so the apostle saith, We are not ignorant of his stratagems; and it is no more unlawful to inquire the nature of evil spirits than to enquire the force of poisons in nature, or the nature of sin and vice in morality. But this part touching angels and spirits, I cannot note as deficient, for many have occupied themselves in it; I may rather challenge it, in many of the writers thereof, as fabulous and fantastical.  51
  ¶ 59 Leaving therefore Divine Philosophy or Natural Theology (not Divinity or Inspired Theology, which we reserve for the last of all, as the haven and sabbath of all man’s contemplations), we will now proceed to Natural Philosophy. If then it be true that Democritus said, That the truth of nature lieth hid in certain deep mines and caves; and if it be true likewise that the Alchemists do so much inculcate, that Vulcan is a second nature, and imitateth that dexterously and compendiously which nature worketh by ambages and length of time; it were good to divide natural philosophy into the mine and the furnace, and to make two professions or occupations of natural philosophers, some to be pioneers and some smiths; some to dig, and some to refine and hammer. And surely I do best allow of a division of that kind, though in more familiar and scholastical terms; namely, that these be the two parts of natural philosophy,—the Inquisition of Causes, and the Production of Effects; Speculative, and Operative; Natural Science, and Natural Prudence. For as in civil matters there is a wisdom of discourse and a wisdom of direction; so is it in natural. And here I will make a request, that for the latter (or at least for a part thereof) I may revive and reintegrate the misapplied and abused name of Natural Magic; which in the true sense is but Natural Wisdom, or Natural Prudence; taken according to the ancient acception, purged from vanity and superstition. 60 Now although it be true, and I know it well, that there is an intercourse between Causes and Effects, so as both these knowledges, Speculative and Operative, have a great connexion between themselves; yet because all true and fruitful Natural Philosophy hath a double scale or ladder, ascendent and descendent; ascending from experiments to the invention of causes, and descending from causes to the invention of new experiments; therefore I judge it most requisite that these two parts be severally considered and handled.  52
  ¶ 61 Natural Science or Theory is divided into Physic and Metaphysic: wherein I desire it may be conceived that I use the word Metaphysic in a differing sense from that that is received: and in like manner I doubt not but it will easily appear to men of judgment that in this and other particulars, wheresoever my conception and notion may differ from the ancient, yet I am studious to keep the ancient terms. For hoping well to deliver myself from mistaking by the order and perspicuous expressing of that I do propound, I am otherwise zealous and affectionate to recede as little from antiquity, either in terms or opinions, as may stand with truth and the proficience of knowledge. And herein I cannot a little marvel at the philosopher Aristotle, that did proceed in such a spirit of difference and contradiction towards all antiquity; undertaking not only to frame new words of science at pleasure, but to confound and extinguish all ancient wisdom; insomuch as he never nameth or mentioneth an ancient author or opinion, but to confute and reprove; wherein for glory, and drawing followers and disciples, he took the right course. For certainly there cometh to pass and hath place in human truth, that which was noted and pronounced in the highest truth: Veni in nomine Patris, nec recipitis me; si quis venerit in nomine suo, eum recipietis; [I have come in my Father’s name, and ye receive me not; if one come in his own name, him ye will receive]. But in this divine aphorism (considering to whom it was applied, namely to Antichrist, the highest deceiver,) we may discern well that the coming in a man’s own name, without regard of antiquity or paternity, is no good sign of truth; although it be joined with the fortune and success of an Eum recipietis. But for this excellent person 62 Aristotle, I will think of him that he learned that humour of his scholar, with whom it seemeth he did emulate, the one to conquer all opinions, as the other to conquer all nations. Wherein nevertheless, it may be, he may at some men’s hands that are of a bitter disposition get a like title as his scholar did;
        Felix terrarum prædo, non utile mundo
Editus exemplum, &c.
[a fortunate robber, who made prize of nations]; so
        Felix doctrinæ prædo,
[a fortunate robber, who made prize of learning]. But to me on the other side that do desire, as much as lieth in my pen, to ground a sociable intercourse 63 between antiquity and proficience, it seemeth best to keep way with antiquity usque ad aras, [as far as may be without violating higher obligations;] and therefore to retain the ancient terms, though I sometimes alter the uses and definitions; according to the moderate proceeding in civil government, where although there be some alteration, yet that holdeth which Tacitus wisely noteth, eadem magistratuum vocabula, [the name of the magistracies are not changed].
  To return therefore to the use and acception of the term Metaphysic, as I do now understand the word: It appeareth by that which hath been already said, that I intend Philosophia Prima, Summary Philosophy, and Metaphysic, which heretofore have been confounded as one, to be two distinct things. For the one I have made as a parent or common ancestor to all knowledge, and the other I have now brought in as a branch or descendent of Natural Science. It appeareth likewise that I have assigned to Summary Philosophy the common principles and axioms which are promiscuous and indifferent to several sciences. I have assigned unto it likewise the inquiry touching the operation of the relative and adventive characters of essences, as Quantity, Similitude, Diversity, Possibility, and the rest; with this distinction and provision; that they be handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not logically. It appeareth likewise that Natural Theology, which heretofore hath been handled confusedly with Metaphysic, I have inclosed and bounded by itself. It is therefore now a question, what is left remaining for Metaphysic; wherein I may without prejudice preserve thus much of the conceit of antiquity, that Physic should contemplate that which is inherent in matter and therefore transitory, and Metaphysic that which is abstracted and fixed. And again that Physic should handle that which supposeth in nature only a being and moving, 64 and Metaphysic should handle that which supposeth further in nature a reason, understanding, and platform. 65 But the difference, perspicuously expressed, is most familiar and sensible. For as we divided Natural Philosophy in general into the Inquiry of Causes and Productions of Effects; so that part which concerneth the Inquiry of Causes we do subdivide, according to the received and sound division of Causes; the one part, which is Physic, enquireth and handleth the Material and Efficient Causes; and the other, which is Metaphysic, handleth the Formal and Final Causes.  54
  Physic (taking it according to the derivation, and not according to our idiom for Medicine,) is situate in a middle term or distance between Natural History and Metaphysic. For Natural History describeth the variety of things; Physic, the causes, but variable or respective causes; and Metaphysic, the fixed and constant causes.
        Limus ut hic durescit, et hæc ut cera liquescit,
Uno eodemque igni:
[As the same fire which makes the soft clay hard
Makes hard wax soft:]
Fire is the cause of induration, but respective to clay; fire is the cause of colliquation, but respective to wax; but fire is no constant cause either of induration or colliquation. So then the physical causes are but the efficient and the matter. Physic hath three parts; whereof two respect nature united or collected, the third contemplateth nature diffused or distributed. Nature is collected either into one entire total, or else into the same principles or seeds. So as the first doctrine is touching the Contexture or Configuration of things, as de mundo, de universitate rerum. The second is the doctrine concerning the Principles or Originals of things. The third is the doctrine concerning all Variety and Particularity of things, whether it be of the differing substances, or their differing qualities and natures; whereof there needeth no enumeration, this part being but as a gloss or paraphrase, that attendeth upon the text of Natural History. 66 Of these three I cannot report any as deficient. In what truth or perfection they are handled, I make not now any judgment: but they are parts of knowledge not deserted by the labour of man.
  Metaphysica, sive De Formis et Finibus Rerum. For Metaphysic, we have assigned unto it the inquiry of Formal and Final Causes; which assignation, as to the former of them, may seem to be nugatory and void, because of the received and inveterate opinion that the inquisition of man is not competent to find out essential forms or true differences: of which opinion we will take this hold; that the invention of Forms is of all other parts of knowledge the worthiest to be sought, if it be possible to be found. As for the possibility, they are ill discoverers that think there is no land when they can see nothing but sea. But it is manifest that Plato in his opinion of Ideas, as one that had a wit of elevation situate as upon a cliff, did descry that forms were the true object of knowledge; but lost the real fruit of his opinion, by considering of forms as absolutely abstracted from matter, and not confined and determined by matter; and so turning his opinion upon Theology, wherewith all his natural philosophy is infected. But if any man shall keep a continual watchful and severe eye upon action, operation, and the use of knowledge, he may advise and take notice what are the Forms, the disclosures whereof are fruitful and important to the state of man. For as to the Forms of substances—Man only except, of whom it is said, Formavit hominem de limo terræ, et spiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitæ, [He formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life,] and not as of all other creatures, Producant aquæ, producat terra, [let the waters bring forth, let the earth bring forth,]—the Forms of Substances I say (as they are now by compounding and transplanting multiplied) are so perplexed, as they are not to be enquired; 67 no more than it were either possible or to purpose to seek in gross the forms of those sounds which make words, which by composition and transposition of letters are infinite. But on the other side, to enquire the form of those sounds or voices which make simple letters is easily comprehensible, and being known, induceth and manifesteth the forms of all words, which consist and are compounded of them. In the same manner to enquire the Form of a lion, of an oak, of gold, nay of water, of air, is a vain pursuit: but to enquire the Forms of sense, of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, of gravity and levity, of density, of tenuity, of heat, of cold, and all other natures and qualities, which like an alphabet are not many, and of which the essences (upheld by matter) of all creatures do consist; to enquire I say the true forms of these, is that part of Metaphysic which we now define of. Not but that Physic doth make inquiry and take consideration of the same natures: but how? Only as to the Material and Efficient Causes of them, and not as to the Forms. For example; if the cause of Whiteness in snow or froth be enquired, and it be rendered thus, that the subtile intermixture of air and water is the cause, it is well rendered; but nevertheless, is this the Form of Whiteness? No; but it is the Efficient, which is ever but vehiculum formæ, [the carrier of the Form]. 68 This part of Metaphysic I do not find laboured and performed; whereat I marvel not, because I hold it not possible to be invented by that course of invention which hath been used; in regard that men (which is the root of all error) have made too untimely a departure and too remote a recess from particulars.  56
  But the use of this part of Metaphysic which I report as deficient, is of the rest the most excellent in two respects; the one, because it is the duty and virtue of all knowledge to abridge the infinity of individual experience as much as the conception of truth will permit, and to remedy the complaint of vita brevis, ars longa, [life is short and art is long;] which is performed by uniting the notions and conceptions of sciences. 69 For knowledges are as pyramides, whereof history is the basis: so of Natural Philosophy the basis is Natural History; the stage next the basis is Physic; the stage next the vertical point is Metaphysic. As for the vertical point, Opus quod operatur Deus à principio usque ad finem, [the work which God worketh from the beginning to the end,] the Summary Law of Nature, we know not whether man’s inquiry can attain unto it. But these three be the true stages of knowledge; and are to them that are depraved no better than the giants’ hills, [Pelion, Ossa, and Olympus, piled upon each other,]
        Ter sunt conati imponere Pelio Ossam,
Scilicet atque Ossæ frondosum involvere Olympum:
but to those which refer all things to the glory of God, they are as the three acclamations, Sancte, sancte, sancte; holy in the description or dilatation of his works, holy in the connexion or concatenation of them, and holy in the union of them in a perpetual and uniform law. And therefore the speculation was excellent in Parmenides and Plato, although but a speculation in them, That all things by scale did ascend to unity. So then always that knowledge is worthiest, which is charged with least multiplicity; which appeareth to be Metaphysic; as that which considereth the Simple Forms or Differences of things, which are few in number, and the degrees and co-ordinations whereof make all this variety. The second respect which valueth and commendeth this part of Metaphysic, is that it doth enfranchise the power of man unto the greatest liberty and possibility of works and effects. For Physic carrieth men in narrow and restrained ways, subject to many accidents of impediments, imitating the ordinary flexuous courses of nature; but latæ undique sunt sapientibus viæ: to sapience (which was anciently defined to be rerum divinarum et humanarum scientia, [the knowledge of things human and divine],) there is ever a choice of means. For physical causes give light to new invention in simili materia; but whosoever knoweth any form, knoweth the utmost possibility of superinducing that nature upon any variety of matter, and so is less restrained in operation, either to the basis of the Matter, or the condition of the Efficient: which kind of knowledge Salomon likewise, though in a more divine sense, elegantly describeth: Non arctabuntur gressus tui, et currens non habebis offendiculum; [thy steps shall not be straitened; thou shalt run and not stumble]. The ways of sapience are not much liable either to particularity or chance. 70
  The second part of Metaphysic is the inquiry of final causes, which I am moved to report not as omitted, but as misplaced. 71 And yet if it were but a fault in order, I would not speak of it; for order is matter of illustration, but pertaineth not to the substance of sciences: but this misplacing hath caused a deficience, or at least a great improficience in the sciences themselves. For the handling of final causes mixed with the rest in physical inquiries, hath intercepted the severe and diligent inquiry of all real and physical causes, and given men the occasion to stay upon these satisfactory and specious causes, to the great arrest and prejudice of further discovery. For this I find done not only by Plato, who ever anchoreth upon that shore, but by Aristotle, Galen, and others, which do usually likewise fall upon these flats of discoursing causes. For to say that the hairs of the eye-lids are for a quickset and fence about the sight; or that the firmness of the skins and hides of living creatures is to defend them from the extremities of heat or cold; or that the bones are for the columns or beams, whereupon the frames of the bodies of living creatures are built; or that the leaves of trees are for protecting of the fruit; or that the clouds are for watering of the earth; or that the solidness of the earth is for the station and mansion of living creatures, and the like, is well enquired and collected in Metaphysic; but in Physic they are impertinent. Nay, they are indeed but remoras and hindrances to stay and slug the ship from further sailing, and have brought this to pass, that the search of the Physical Causes hath been neglected and passed in silence. And therefore the natural philosophy of Democritus and some others, who did not suppose a mind or reason in the frame of things, but attributed the form thereof able to maintain itself to infinite essays or proofs of nature, which they term fortune, seemeth to me (as far as I can judge by the recital and fragments which remain unto us) in particularities of physical causes more real and better enquired than that of Aristotle and Plato; whereof both intermingled final causes, the one as a part of theology, and the other as a part of logic, which were the favourite studies respectively of both those persons. Not because those final causes are not true, and worthy to be enquired, being kept within their own province; but because their excursions into the limits of physical causes hath bred a vastness and solitude in that track. For otherwise keeping their precincts and borders, men are extremely deceived if they think there is an enmity or repugnancy at all between them. For the cause rendered, that the hairs about the eye-lids are for the safeguard of the sight, doth not impugn the cause rendered, that pilosity is incident to orifices of moisture; Muscosi fontes, [the mossy springs,] &c. Nor the cause rendered, that the firmness of hides is for the armour of the body against extremities of heat or cold, doth not impugn the cause rendered, that contraction of pores is incident to the outwardest parts, in regard of their adjacence to foreign or unlike bodies; and so of the rest: both causes being true and compatible, the one declaring an intention, the other a consequence only. Neither doth this call in question or derogate from divine providence, but highly confirm and exalt it. For as in civil actions he is the greater and deeper politique, that can make other men the instruments of his will and ends and yet never acquaint them with his purpose, so as they shall do it and yet not know what they do, than he that imparteth his meaning to those he employeth; so is the wisdom of God more admirable, when nature intendeth one thing and providence draweth forth another, than if he had communicated to particular creatures and motions the characters and impressions of his providence. And thus much for Metaphysic; the later part whereof I allow as extant, but wish it confined to his proper place.  58
  ¶ 72 Nevertheless there remaineth yet another part of Natural Philosophy, which is commonly made a principal part, and holdeth rank with Physic special and Metaphysic; which is Mathematic; but I think it more agreeable to the nature of things and to the light of order to place it as a branch of Metaphysic; for the subject of it being Quantity; not Quantity indefinite, which is but a relative and belongeth to philosophia prima (as hath been said,) but Quantity determined or proportionable; it appeareth to be one of the Essential Forms of things; as that that is causative in nature of a number of effects; insomuch as we see in the schools both of Democritus and of Pythagoras, that the one did ascribe figure to the first seeds of things, and the other did suppose numbers to be the principles and originals of things: and it is true also that of all other forms (as we understand forms) it is the most abstracted and separable from matter, and therefore most proper to Metaphysic; which hath likewise been the cause why it hath been better laboured and enquired than any of the other forms, which are more immersed into matter. For it being the nature of the mind of man (to the extreme prejudice of knowledge) to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities, as in a champion region, and not in the inclosures of particularity; the Mathematics of all other knowledge were the goodliest fields to satisfy that appetite. But for the placing of this science, it is not much material: 73 only we have endeavoured in these our partitions to observe a kind of perspective, that one part may cast light upon another.  59
  The Mathematics are either Pure or Mixed. To the Pure Mathematics are those sciences belonging which handle Quantity Determinate, merely severed from any axioms of natural philosophy; and these are two, Geometry and Arithmetic; the one handling Quantity continued, and the other dissevered. Mixed hath for subject some axioms or parts of natural philosophy, and considereth Quantity determined, as it is auxiliary and incident unto them. For many parts of nature can neither be invented with sufficient subtilty, nor demonstrated with sufficient perspicuity nor accommodated unto use with sufficient dexterity, without the aid and intervening of the Mathematics: of which sort are Perspective, Music, Astronomy, Cosmography, Architecture, Enginery, and divers others. In the Mathematics I can report no deficience, except it be that men do not sufficiently understand this excellent use of the Pure Mathematics, in that they do remedy and cure many defects in the wit and faculties intellectual. For if the wit be too dull, they sharpen it; if too wandering, they fix it; if too inherent in the sense, they abstract it. So that as tennis is a game of no use in itself, but of great use in respect it maketh a quick eye and a body ready to put itself into all postures; so in the Mathematics, that use which is collateral and intervenient is no less worthy than that which is principal and intended. 74 And as for the Mixed Mathematics, I may only make this prediction, that there cannot fail to be more kinds of them, as nature grows further disclosed. Thus much of Natural Science, or the part of nature Speculative.  60
  Naturalis Magia, sive Physica Operativa Major. Inventarium Opum humanarum. 75 For Natural Prudence, or the part Operative of Natural Philosophy, we will divide it into three parts, Experimental, Philosophical, and Magical; 76 which three parts active have a correspondence and analogy with the three parts Speculative, Natural History, Physic, and Metaphysic. For many operations have been invented, sometimes by a casual incidence and occurrence, sometimes by a purposed experiment; and of those which have been found by an intentional experiment, some have been found out by varying or extending the same experiment, some by transferring and compounding divers experiments the one into the other, which kind of invention an empiric may manage. 77 Again, by the knowledge of physical causes there cannot fail to follow many indications and designations of new particulars, if men in their speculation will keep one eye upon use and practice. But these are but coastings along the shore, premendo littus iniquum: for it seemeth to me there can hardly be discovered any radical or fundamental alterations and innovations in nature, either by the fortune and essays of experiments, or by the light and direction of physical causes. If therefore we have reported Metaphysic deficient, it must follow that we do the like of Natural Magic, which hath relation thereunto. For as for the Natural Magic whereof now there is mention in books, containing certain credulous and superstitious conceits and observations of Sympathies and Antipathies and hidden proprieties, and some frivolous experiments, strange rather by disguisement than in themselves; it is as far differing in truth of nature from such a knowledge as we require, as the story of king Arthur of Britain, or Hugh of Bourdeaux, differs from Cæsar’s commentaries in truth of story. For it is manifest that Cæsar did greater things de vero than those imaginary heroes were feigned to do. But he did them not in that fabulous manner. Of this kind of learning the fable of Ixion was a figure, who designed to enjoy Juno, the goddess of power; and instead of her had copulation with a cloud, of which mixture were begotten centaurs and chimeras. So whosoever shall entertain high and vaporous imaginations instead of a laborious and sober inquiry of truth, shall beget hopes and beliefs of strange and impossible shapes. And therefore we may note in these sciences which hold so much of imagination and belief, as this degenerate Natural Magic, Alchemy, Astrology, and the like, that in their propositions the description of the means is ever more monstrous than the pretence or end. For it is a thing more probable, that he that knoweth well the natures of Weight, of Colour, of Pliant and Fragile in respect of the hammer, of Volatile and Fixed in respect of the fire, and the rest, may superinduce upon some metal the nature and form of gold by such mechanique as belongeth to the production of the natures afore rehearsed, than that some grains of the medicine projected should in a few moments of time turn a sea of quicksilver or other material into gold. So it is more probable, that he that knoweth the nature of arefaction, the nature of assimilation of nourishment to the thing nourished, the manner of increase and clearing of spirits, the manner of the depredations which spirits make upon the humours and solid parts, shall by ambages of diets, bathings, anointings, medicines, motions, and the like, prolong life or restore some degree of youth or vivacity, than that it can be done with the use of a few drops or scruples of a liquor or receit. To conclude therefore, the true Natural Magic, which is that great liberty and latitude of operation which dependeth upon the knowledge of Forms, I may report deficient, as the relative thereof is. To which part, if we be serious and incline not to vanities and plausible discourse, besides the deriving and deducing the operations themselves from Metaphysic, there are pertinent two points of much purpose, the one by way of preparation, the other by way of caution. The first is, that there be made a Calendar resembling an inventory 78 of the estate of man, containing all the inventions (being the works or fruits of nature or art) which are now extant and whereof man is already possessed; out of which doth naturally result a note, what things are yet held impossible, or not invented; which calendar will be the more artificial and serviceable, if to every reputed impossibility you add what thing is extant which cometh the nearest in degree to that impossibility; to the end that by these optatives and potentials man’s inquiry may be the more awake in deducing direction of works from the speculation of causes. And secondly, that these experiments be not only esteemed which have an immediate and present use, but those principally which are of most universal consequence for invention of other experiments, and those which give most light to the invention of causes; for the invention of the mariner’s needle, which giveth the direction, is of no less benefit for navigation than the invention of the sails, which give the motion. 79  61
   80 Thus have I passed through Natural Philosophy, and the deficiencies thereof; wherein if I have differed from the ancient and received doctrines, and thereby shall move contradiction; for my part, as I affect not to dissent, so I purpose not to contend. If it be truth,
        Non canimus surdis, respondent omnia sylvæ:
[All as we sing the listening woods reply:]
the voice of nature will consent, whether the voice of man do or no. And as Alexander Borgia was wont to say of the expedition of the French for Naples, that they came with chalk in their hands to mark up their lodgings, and not with weapons to fight; so I like better that entry of truth which cometh peaceably with chalk to mark up those minds which are capable to lodge and harbour it, than that which cometh with pugnacity and contention.
  Continuatio Problematum in Natura. Catalogus Falsitatum grassantium in historia Naturæ. De Antiquis Philosophiis.  81 But there remaineth a division of Natural Philosophy according to the report of the inquiry, and nothing concerning the matter or subject; and that is Positive and Considerative; when the inquiry reporteth either an Assertion or a Doubt. These doubts or non liquets are of two sorts, Particular and Total. For the first, we see a good example thereof in Aristotle’s Problems, which deserved to have had a better continuance, but so nevertheless as there is one point whereof warning is to be given and taken. The registering of doubts hath two excellent uses: the one, that it saveth philosophy from errors and falsehoods; when that which is not fully appearing is not collected into assertion, whereby error might draw error, but reserved in doubt: the other, that the entry of doubts are as so many suckers or spunges to draw use 82 of knowledge; insomuch as that which if doubts had not preceded a man should never have advised but passed it over without note, by the suggestion and solicitation of doubts is made to be attended and applied. But both these commodities do scarcely countervail and inconvenience which will intrude itself, if it be not debarred; which is, that when a doubt is once received men labour rather how to keep it a doubt still than how to solve it, and accordingly bend their wits. 83 Of this we see the familiar example in lawyers and scholars, both which if they have once admitted a doubt, it goeth ever after authorised for a doubt. But that use of wit and knowledge is to be allowed, which laboureth to make doubtful things certain, and not those which labour to make certain things doubtful. Therefore these calendars of doubts I commend as excellent things, so that there be this caution used, that when they be throughly sifted and brought to resolution, they be from thenceforth omitted, discarded, and not continued to cherish and encourage men in doubting. To which calendar of doubts or problems, I advise be annexed another calendar, as much or more material which is a calendar of popular errors: I mean chiefly, in natural history 84 such as pass in speech and conceit, and are nevertheless apparently detected and convicted of untruth; that man’s knowledge be not weakened nor imbased by such dross and vanity. As for the doubts or non liquets general or in total, I understand those differences of opinions touching the principles of nature and the fundamental points of the same, which have caused the diversity of sects, schools, and philosophies; as that of Empedocles, Pythagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, and the rest. 85 For although Aristotle, as though he had been of the race of the Ottomans, thought he could not reign except the first thing he did he killed all his brethren; yet to those that seek truth and not magistrality, it cannot but seem a matter of great profit to see before them the several opinions touching the foundations of nature; not for any exact truth that can be expected in those theories; for as the same phænomena in astronomy are satisfied by the received astronomy of the diurnal motion and the proper motions of the planets with their eccentrics and epicycles, and likewise by the theory of Copernicus who supposed the earth to move; and the calculations are indifferently agreeable to both; so the ordinary face and view of experience is many times satisfied by several theories and philosophies; whereas to find the real truth requireth another manner of severity and attention. For as Aristotle saith that children at the first will call every woman mother, but afterward they come to distinguish according to truth; so experience, if it be in childhood, will call every philosophy mother, but when it cometh to ripeness it will discern the true mother. So as in the mean time it is good to see the several glosses and opinions upon nature, whereof it may be every one in some one point hath seen clearer than his fellows. Therefore I wish some collection to be made painfully and understandingly de antiquis philosophiis, out of all the possible light which remaineth to us of them. 86 Which kind of work I find deficient. But here I must give warning, that it be done distinctly and severely; 87 the philosophies of every one throughout by themselves; and not by titles packed and faggoted up together, as hath been done by Plutarch. For it is the harmony of a philosophy in itself which giveth it light and credence; whereas if it be singled and broken, it will seem more foreign and dissonant. For as when I read in Tacitus the actions of Nero or Claudius, with circumstances of times, inducements, and occasions, I find them not so strange; but when I read them in Suetonius Tranquillus gathered into titles and bundles, and not in order of time, they seem more monstrous and incredible; so is it of any philosophy reported entire, and dismembered by articles. Neither do I exclude opinions of latter times to be likewise represented in this calendar of sects of philosophy, as that of Theophrastus Paracelsus, eloquently reduced into an harmony by the pen of Severinus the Dane; and that of Telesius, and his scholar Donius, being as a pastoral philosophy, full of sense but of no great depth; and that of Fracastorius, who though he pretended not to make any new philosophy, yet did use the absoluteness of his own sense upon the old; and that of Gilbertus our countryman, who revived, with some alterations and demonstrations, the opinions of Xenophanes; 88 and any other worthy to be admitted.  63
  Thus have we now dealt with two of the three beams of man’s knowledge; that is Radius Directus, which is referred to nature, Radius Refractus, which is referred to God, and cannot report truly because of the inequality of the medium. There resteth Radius Reflexus, whereby Man beholdeth and contemplateth himself.  64
  ¶ 89 We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us, which is the knowledge of ourselves; which deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the intention of man, so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the continent of nature. And generally let this be a rule, that all partitions of knowledges be accepted rather for lines and veins, than for sections and separations; and that the continuance and entireness of knowledge be preserved. For the contrary hereof hath made particular sciences to become barren, shallow, and erroneous; while they have not been nourished and maintained from the common fountain. So we see Cicero the orator complained of Socrates and his school, that he was the first that separated philosophy and rhetoric; whereupon rhetoric became an empty and verbal art. So we may see that the opinion of Copernicus touching the rotation of the earth, 90 which astronomy itself cannot correct because it is not repugnant to any of the phænomena, yet natural philosophy may correct. So we see also that the science of medicine, if it be destituted and forsaken by natural philosophy, it is not much better than an empirical practice. With this reservation therefore we proceed to Human Philosophy or Humanity, which hath two parts: the one considereth man segregate, or distributively; the other congregate, or in society. So as Human Philosophy is either Simple and Particular, or Conjugate and Civil. Humanity Particular consisteth of the same parts whereof man consisteth; that is, of knowledges which respect the Body, and of knowledges that respect the Mind. But before we distribute so far, it is good to constitute. For I do take the consideration in general and at large of Human Nature to be fit to be emancipate and made a knowledge by itself; not so much in regard of those delightful and elegant discourses which have been made of the dignity of man, 91 of his miseries, of his state and life, and the like adjuncts of his common and undivided nature; but chiefly in regard of the knowledge concerning the sympathies and concordances between the mind and body, which, being mixed, cannot be properly assigned to the sciences of either.  65
  This knowledge hath two branches: for as all leagues and amities consist of mutual Intelligence and mutual Offices, so this league of mind and body hath these two parts; how the one discloseth the other, and how the one worketh upon the other; Discovery, and Impression. The former of these hath begotten two arts, both of Prediction or Prenotion; whereof the one is honoured with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other of Hippocrates. And although they have of later time been used to be coupled with superstitious and fantastical arts, yet being purged and restored to their true state, they have both of them a solid ground in nature, and a profitable use in life. The first is Physiognomy, which discovereth the disposition of the mind by the lineaments of the body. The second is the Exposition of Natural Dreams, which discovereth the state of the body by the imaginations of the mind. In the former of these I note a deficience. 92 For Aristotle hath very ingeniously and diligently handled the factures of the body, but not the gestures of the body, which are no less comprehensible by art, and of greater use and advantage. For the Lineaments of the body do disclose the disposition and inclination of the mind in general; but the Motions of the countenance and parts do not only so, but do further disclose the present humour and state of the mind and will. For as your Majesty saith most aptly and elegantly, As the tongue speaketh to the ear, so the gesture speaketh to the eye. And therefore a number of subtile persons, whose eyes do dwell upon the faces and fashions of men, do well know the advantage of this observation, as being most part of their ability; neither can it be denied but that it is a great discovery of dissimulations, and a great direction in business.  66
  The latter branch, touching Impression, hath not been collected into art, but hath been handled dispersedly; and it hath the same relation or antistrophe that the former hath. For the consideration is double: Either how, and how far the humours and affects 93 of the body do alter or work upon the mind; or again, how and how far the passions or apprehensions of the mind do alter or work upon the body. The former of these hath been inquired and considered as a part and appendix of Medicine, but much more as a part of Religion or Superstition. For the physician prescribeth cures of the mind in phrensies and melancholy passions; and pretendeth also to exhibit medicines to exhilarate the mind, to confirm the courage, to clarify the wits, to corroborate the memory, and the like; but the scruples and superstitions of diet and other regiment of the body in the sect of the Pythagoreans, in the heresy of the Manicheans, and in the law of Mahomet, do exceed. So likewise the ordinances in the Ceremonial Law, interdicting the eating of the blood and the fat, distinguishing between beasts clean and unclean for meat, are many and strict. Nay the faith itself being clear and serene from all clouds of Ceremony, yet retaineth the use of fastings, abstinences, and other macerations and humiliations of the body, as things real, and not figurative. 94 The root and life of all which prescripts is, (besides the ceremony, 95) the consideration of that dependency which the affections of the mind are submitted unto upon the state and disposition of the body. And if any man of weak judgment do conceive that this suffering of the mind from the body doth either question the immortality or derogate from the sovereignty of the soul, he may be taught in easy instances, that the infant in the mother’s womb is compatible with the mother 96 and yet separable; and the most absolute monarch is sometimes led by his servants and yet without subjection. As for the reciprocal knowledge, which is the operation of the conceits and passions of the mind upon the body, we see all wise physicians in the prescriptions of their regiments to their patients do ever consider accidentia animi, as of great force to further or hinder remedies or recoveries; and more specially it is an inquiry of great depth and worth concerning Imagination, how and how far it altereth the body proper of the imaginant. For although it hath a manifest power to hurt, it followeth not it hath the same degree of power to help; no more than a man can conclude, that because there be pestilent airs, able suddenly to kill a man in health, therefore there should be sovereign airs, able suddenly to cure a man in sickness. But the inquisition of this part is of great use, though it needeth, as Socrates said, a Delian diver, being difficult and profound. But unto all this knowledge de communi vinculo, of the concordances between the mind and the body, that part of inquiry is most necessary, which considereth of the seats and domiciles which the several faculties of the mind do take and occupate in the organs of the body; which knowledge hath been attempted, and is controverted, and deserveth to be much better enquired. For the opinion of Plato, who placed the understanding in the brain, animosity (which he did unfitly call anger, having a greater mixture with pride) in the heart, and concupiscence or sensuality in the liver, deserveth not to be despised; but much less to be allowed. 97 So then we have constituted (as in our own wish and advice) the inquiry touching human nature entire, as a just portion of knowledge to be handled apart.  67
  ¶ 98 The knowledge that concerneth man’s body is divided as the good of man’s body is divided, unto which it referreth. The good of man’s body is of four kinds, Health, Beauty, Strength, and Pleasure: so the knowledges are Medicine, or art of Cure; art of Decoration, which is called Cosmetic; art of Activity, which is called Athletic; and art Voluptuary, which Tacitus truly calleth eruditus luxus, [educated luxury]. This subject of man’s body is of all other things in nature most susceptible of remedy; but then that remedy is most susceptible of error. For the same subtilty of the subject doth cause large possibility and easy failing; and therefore the inquiry ought to be the more exact.  68
  To speak therefore of Medicine, and to resume that we have said, ascending a little higher: the ancient opinion that man was Microcosmus, an abstract or model of the world, hath been fantastically strained by Paracelsus and the alchemists, as if there were to be found in man’s body certain correspondences and parallels, which should have respect to all varieties of things, as stars, planets, minerals, which are extant in the great world. But thus much is evidently true, that of all substances which nature hath produced, man’s body is the most extremely compounded. For we see herbs and plants are nourished by earth and water; beasts for the most part by herbs and fruits; man by the flesh of beasts, birds, fishes, herbs, grains, fruits, water, and the manifold alterations, dressings, and preparations of these several bodies, before they come to be his food and aliment. Add hereunto that beasts have a more simple order of life, and less change of affections to work upon their bodies; whereas man in his mansion, sleep, exercise, passions, hath infinite variations; and it cannot be denied but that the Body of man of all other things is of the most compounded mass. The Soul on the other side is the simplest of substances, as is well expressed,
                        Purumque reliquit
Æthereum sensum atque auraï simplicis ignem:
                [Pure and unmixed
The etherial sense is left—mere air and fire.
So that it is no marvel though the soul so placed enjoy no rest, if that principle be true, that Motus rerum est rapidus extra locum, placidus in loco: [things move rapidly to their place and calmly in their place]. But to the purpose. This variable composition of man’s body hath made it as an instrument easy to distemper; and therefore the poets did well to conjoin Music and Medicine in Apollo: because the office of medicine is but to tune this curious harp of man’s body and to reduce it to harmony. So then the subject being so variable hath made the art by consequent more conjectural; and the art being conjectural hath made so much the more place to be left for imposture. For almost all other arts and sciences are 99 judged by acts or masterpieces, 100 as I may term them, and not by the successes and events. The lawyer is judged by the virtue of his pleading, and not by the issue of the cause. The master in this ship is judged by the directing his course aright, and not by the fortune of the voyage. But the physician, and perhaps the politique, hath no particular acts demonstrative of his ability, but is judged most by the event; which is ever but as it is taken: for who can tell, if a patient die or recover, or if a state be preserved or ruined, whether it be art or accident? And therefore many times the impostor is prized, and the man of virtue taxed. Nay, we see [the 101] weakness and credulity of men is such, as they will often refer a montabank 102 or witch before a learned physician. And therefore the poets were clear-sighted in discerning this extreme folly, when they made Æsculapius and Circe brother and sister, both children of the sun, as in the verses,
        Ipse repertorem medicinæ talis et artis
Fulmine Phœbigenam Stygias detrusit ad undas:
[Apollo’s son from whom that art did grow
Jove struck with thunder to the shades below].
And again,
        Dives inaccessos ubi Solis filia lucos, &c.
[Now by the shelves of Circe’s coast they run,—
Circe the rich, the daughter of the sun. 103]
For in all times, in the opinion of the multitude, witches and old women and impostors have had a competition with physicians. And what followeth? Even this, that physicians say to themselves, as Salomon expresseth it upon a higher occasion; If it befal to me as befalleth to the fools, why should I labour to be more wise? And therefore I cannot much blame physicians, that they use commonly to intend some other art or practice, which they fancy, more than their profession. For you shall have of them antiquaries, poets, humanists, statesmen, merchants, divines, and in every of these better seen than in their profession; and no doubt upon this ground, that they find that mediocrity and excellency in their art maketh no difference in profit or reputation towards their fortune; for the weakness of patients and sweetness of life and nature of hope 104 maketh men depend upon physicians with all their defects. But nevertheless these things which we have spoken of are courses begotten between a little occasion and a great deal of sloth and default; for if we will excite and awake our observation, we shall see in familiar instances what a predominant faculty the subtilty of spirit 105 hath over the variety of matter or form. Nothing more variable than faces and countenances; yet men can bear in memory the infinite distinctions of them; nay, a painter with a few shells of colours, and the benefit of his eye and habit of his imagination, can imitate them all that ever have been, are, or may be, if they were brought before him. Nothing more variable than voices; yet men can likewise discern them personally; nay, you shall have a buffon or pantomimus will express as many as he pleaseth. Nothing more variable than the differing sounds of words; yet men have found the way to reduce them to a few simple letters. So that it is not the insufficiency or incapacity of man’s mind, but it is the remote standing or placing thereof, that breedeth these mazes and incomprehensions: for as the sense afar off is full of mistaking but is exact at hand, so is it of the understanding; the remedy whereof is not to quicken or strengthen the organ, but to go nearer to the object; and therefore there is no doubt but if the physicians will learn and use the true approaches and avenues of nature, they may assume as much as the poet saith:
        Et quoniam variant morbi, variabimus artes;
  Mille mali species, mille salutis erunt:
[varying their arts according to the variety of diseases,—for a thousand forms of sickness a thousand methods of cure]. Which that they should do, the nobleness of their art doth deserve; well shadowed by the poets, in that they made Æsculapius to be the son of the Sun, the one being the fountain of life, the other as the second stream; but infinitely more honoured by the example of our Saviour, who made the body of man the object of his miracles, as the soul was the object of his doctrine. For we read not that ever he vouchsafed to do any miracle about honour, or money (except that one for giving tribute to Cæsar), but only about the preserving, sustaining, and healing the body of man.
  Medicine is a science which hath been (as we have said) more professed than laboured, and yet more laboured than advanced; the labour having been, in my judgment, rather in circle than in progression. For I find much iteration, but small addition. It considereth causes of diseases, with the occasions or impulsions; the diseases themselves, with the accidents; and the cures, with the preservations. 106 The deficiencies which I think good to note, being a few of many, and those such as are of a more open and manifest nature, I will enumerate, and not place.  70
  Narrationes medicinales. The first is the discontinuance of the ancient and serious diligence of Hippocrates, which used to set down a narrative of the special cases of his patients, and how they proceeded, and how they were judged by recovery or death. Therefore having an example proper in the father of the art, I shall not need to allege an example foreign, of the wisdom of the lawyers, who are careful to report new cases and decisions for the direction of future judgments. This continuance of Medicinal History I find deficient; which I understand neither to be so infinite as to extend to every common case, nor so reserved as to admit none but wonders: for many things are new in the manner, which are not new in the kind; and if men will intend to observe, they shall find much worthy to observe.  71
  Anatomia comparata. In the inquiry which is made by Anatomy I find much deficience: for they inquire of the parts, and their substances, figures, and collocations; but they inquire not of the diversities of the parts, 107 the secrecies of the passages, and the seats or nestling of the humours, nor much of the footsteps and impressions of diseases: the reason of which omission I suppose to be, because the first inquiry may be satisfied in the view of one or a few anatomies; but the latter, being comparative and casual, must arise from the view of many. And as to the diversity of parts, there is no doubt but the facture or framing of the inward parts is as full of difference as the outward, and in that is the cause continent of many diseases; which not being observed, they quarrel many times with the humours, which are not in fault; the fault being in the very frame and mechanic of the part, which cannot be removed by medicine alterative, but must be accommodate and palliate by diets and medicines familiar. And for the passages and pores, it is true which was anciently noted, that the more subtile of them appear not in anatomies, because they are shut and latent in dead bodies, though they be open and manifest in live: which being supposed, though the inhumanity of anatomia vivorum [anatomy of the living subject] was by Celsus justly reproved; yet in regard of the 108 great use of this observation, the inquiry needed not by him so slightly to have been relinquished altogether, or referred to the casual practices of surgery; but might have been well diverted upon the dissection of beasts alive, which notwithstanding the dissimilitude of their parts, may sufficiently satisfy this inquiry. And for the humours, they are commonly passed over in anatomies as purgaments; whereas it is most necessary to observe what cavities, nests, and receptacles the humours do find in the parts, with the differing kind of the humour so lodged and received. And as for the footsteps of diseases, and their devastations of the inward parts, imposthumations, exulcerations, discontinuations, putrefactions, consumptions, contractions, extensions, convulsions, dislocations, obstructions, repletions, together with all preternatural substances, as stones, carnosities, excrescences, worms, and the like; they ought to have been exactly observed by multitude of anatomies and the contribution of men’s several experiences, and carefully set down both historically according to the appearances, and artificially with a reference to the diseases and symptoms which resulted from them, in case where the anatomy is of a defunct patient; whereas now upon opening of bodies they are passed over slightly and in silence.  72
  Inquisitio ulterior de Morbis insanabilibus. In the inquiry of diseases, they do abandon the cures of many, some as in their nature incurable, and others as past the period of cure; so that Sylla and the triumvirs never proscribed so many men to die, as they do by their ignorant edicts; whereof 109 numbers do escape with less difficulty than they did in the Roman proscriptions. Therefore I will not doubt to note as a deficience, that they inquire not the perfect cures of many diseases, or extremities of diseases, but pronouncing them incurable do enact a law of neglect, and exempt ignorance from discredit.  73
  De Euthanasia exteriore. Nay further, I esteem it the office of a physician not only to restore health, but to mitigate pain and dolors; and not only when such mitigation may conduce to recovery, but when it may serve to make a fair and easy passage: for it is no small felicity which Augustus Cæsar was wont to wish to himself, that same Euthanasia; and which was specially noted in the death of Antoninus Pius, whose death was after the fashion and semblance of a kindly and pleasant sleep. So it is written of Epicurus, that after his disease was judged desperate, he drowned his stomach and senses with a large draught and ingurgitation of wine; whereupon the epigram was made, Hinc stygias ebrius hausit aquas; he was not sober enough to taste any bitterness of the Stygian water. But the physicians contrariwise do make a kind of scruple and religion to stay with the patient after the disease is deplored; whereas, in my judgment, they ought both to enquire the skill and to give the attendances for the facilitating and assuaging of the pains and agonies of death.  74
  Medicinæ Experimentales. In the consideration of the Cures of diseases, I find a deficience in the receipts of propriety, respecting the particular cures of diseases: 110 for the physicians have frustrated the fruit of tradition and experience by their magistralities, in adding and taking out and changing quid pro quo in their receipts, at their pleasures; commanding so over the medicine as the medicine cannot command over the disease. For except it be treacle and mithridatum, and of late diascordium, 111 and a few more, they tie themselves to no receipts severely and religiously: for as to the confections of sale which are in the shops, they are for readiness and not for propriety; for they are upon general intentions of purging, opening, comforting, altering, and not much appropriate to particular diseases: and this is the cause why empirics and old women are more happy many times in their cures than learned physicians, because they are more religious in holding their medicines. Therefore here is the deficience which I find, that physicians have not, partly out of their own practice, partly out of the constant probations reported in books, and partly out of the traditions of empirics, set down and delivered over certain experimental medicines for the cure of particular diseases, besides their own conjectural and magistral descriptions. For as they were the men of the best composition in the state of Rome, which either being consuls inclined to the people, or being tribunes inclined to the senate; so in the matter we now handle, they be the best physicians, which being learned incline to the traditions of experience, or being empirics incline to the methods of learning.  75
  Imitatio Naturæ in Balneis et Aquis Medicinalibus. In preparation of Medicines, I do find strange, specially considering how mineral medicines have been extolled, and that they are safer for the outward than inward parts, that no man hath sought to make an imitation by art of Natural Baths and Medicinable Fountains; which nevertheless are confessed to receive their virtues from minerals: and not so only, but discerned and distinguished from what particular mineral they receive tincture, as sulphur, vitriol, steel, or the like; which nature if it may be reduced to compositions of art, both the variety of them will be increased, and the temper of them will be more commanded. 112  76
  Filum Medicinale, sive de vicibus Medicinarum. But lest I grow to be more particular than is agreeable either to my intention or to proportion, I will conclude this part with the note of one deficience more, which seemeth to me of greatest consequence; which is, that the prescripts in use are too compendious to attain their end: for, to my understanding, it is a vain and flattering opinion to think any medicine can be so sovereign or so happy, as that the receit or use of it can work any great effect upon the body of man. It were a strange speech which spoken, or spoken oft, should reclaim a man from a vice to which he were by nature subject. It is order, pursuit, sequence, and interchange of application, which is mighty in nature; which although it require more exact knowledge in prescribing and more precise obedience in observing, yet is recompensed with the magnitude of effects. And although a man would think, by the daily visitations of the physicians, that there were a pursuance in the cure; yet let a man look into their prescripts and ministrations, and he shall find them but inconstancies and every day’s devices, without any settled providence or project. Not that every scrupulous or superstitious prescript is effectual, no more than every straight way is the way to heaven; but the truth of the direction must precede severity of observance. 113  77
  For Cosmetic, it hath parts civil, and parts effeminate: for cleanness of body was ever esteemed to proceed from a due reverence to God, to society, and to ourselves. 114 As for artificial decoration, it is well worthy of the deficiencies which it hath; being neither fine enough to deceive, nor handsome to use, nor wholesome to please. 115  78
  For Athletic, I take the subject of it largely; that is to say, for any point of ability whereunto the body of man may be brought, whether it be of activity or of patience; whereof activity hath two parts, strength and swiftness; and patience likewise hath two parts, hardness against wants and extremities, and indurance of pain or torment: whereof we see the practices in tumblers, in savages, 116 and in those that suffer punishment: nay, if there be any other faculty which falls not within any of the former divisions, as in those that dive, that obtain a strange power of containing respiration, and the like, I refer it to this part. Of these things the practices are known, but the philosophy that concerneth them is not much enquired; the rather, I think, because they are supposed to be obtained either by an aptness of nature, which cannot be taught, or only by continual custom, which is soon prescribed; which though it be not true, yet I forbear to note any deficiencies; for the Olympian Games are down long since, and the mediocrity of these things is for use; as for the excellency of them, it serveth for the most part but for mercenary ostentation.  79
  For Arts of Pleasure Sensual, the chief deficience in them is of laws to repress them. 117 For as it hath been well observed that the arts which flourish in times while virtue is in growth, are military; and while virtue is in state, are liberal; and while virtue is in declination, are voluptuary; so I doubt that this age of the world is somewhat upon the descent of the wheel. With arts voluptuary I couple practices joculary; for the deceiving of the senses is one of the pleasures of the senses. As for games of recreation, I hold them to belong to civil life and education. 118 And thus much of that particular Human Philosophy which concerns the Body, which is but the tabernacle of the mind.  80
  ¶ 119 For Human Knowledge which concerns the Mind, it hath two parts; the one that enquireth of the substance or nature of the soul or mind, the other that enquireth of the faculties or functions thereof. Unto the first of these, the considerations of the original of the soul, whether it be native or adventive, and how far it is exempted from laws of matter, and of the immortality thereof, and many other points, do appertain: which have been not more laboriously enquired than variously reported; so as the travail therein taken seemeth to have been rather in a maze than in a way. But although I am of opinion that this knowledge may be more really and soundly enquired, even in nature, than it hath been; yet I hold that in the end it must be bounded by religion, or else it will be subject to deceit and delusion; for as the substance of the soul in the creation was not extracted out of the mass of heaven and earth by the benediction of a producat, but was immediately inspired from God; so it is not possible that it should be (otherwise than by accident) subject to the laws of heaven and earth, which are the subject of philosophy; and therefore the true knowledge of the nature and state of the soul, must come by the same inspiration that gave the substance. 120 Unto this part of knowledge touching the soul there be two appendices; which, as they have been handled, have rather vapoured forth fables than kindled truth; Divination and Fascination.  81
  Divination hath been anciently and fitly divided into artificial and natural; whereof artificial is when the mind maketh a prediction by argument, concluding upon signs and tokens; natural is when the mind hath a presention by an internal power, without the inducement of a sign. Artificial is of two sorts; either when the argument is coupled with a derivation of causes, which is rational; or when it is only grounded upon a coincidence of the effect, which is experimental: whereof the later for the most part is superstitious; such as were the heathen observations upon the inspection of sacrifices, the flights of birds, the swarming of bees; and such as was the Chaldean Astrology, and the like. For artificial divination, the several kinds thereof are distributed amongst particular knowledges. The Astronomer hath his predictions, as of conjunctions, aspects, eclipses, and the like. The Physician hath his predictions, of death, of recovery, of the accidents and issues of diseases. The Politique hath his predictions; O urbem venalem, et cito perituram, si emptorem invenerit! [a city in which all things are for sale and which will fall to the first purchaser,] which stayed not long to be performed, in Sylla first, and after in Cæsar. So as these predictions are now impertinent, and to be referred over. But the divination which springeth from the internal nature of the soul, is that which we now speak of; which hath been made to be of two sorts, primitive and by influxion. Primitive is grounded upon the supposition that the mind, when it is withdrawn and collected into itself and not diffused into the organs of the body, hath some extent and latitude of prenotion; which therefore appeareth most in sleep, in extasies, and near death; and more rarely in waking apprehensions; and is induced and furthered by those abstinences and observances which make the mind most to consist in itself. By influxion, is grounded upon the conceit that the mind, as a mirror or glass, should take illumination from the foreknowledge of God and spirits; unto which the same regiment doth likewise conduce. For the retiring of the mind within itself is the state which is most susceptible of divine influxions; save that it is accompanied in this case with a fervency and elevation (which the ancients noted by fury), and not with a repose and quiet, as it is in the other.  82
  Fascination is the power and act of imagination, intensive upon other bodies than the body of the imaginant: for of that we spake in the proper place: wherein the school of Paracelsus and the disciples of pretended Natural Magic have been so intemperate, as they have exalted the power of the imagination to be much one with the power of miracle-working faith; others that draw nearer to probability, calling to their view the secret passages of things, and especially of the contagion that passeth from body to body, 121 do conceive it should likewise be agreeable to nature that there should be some transmissions and operations from spirit to spirit, without the mediation of the senses; whence the conceits have grown (now almost made civil) of the Mastering Spirit, and the force of confidence, and the like. Incident unto this is the inquiry how to raise and fortify the imagination; for if the imagination fortified have power, then it is material to know how to fortify and exalt it. And herein comes in crookedly and dangerously a palliation of a great part of Ceremonial Magic. For it may be pretended that Ceremonies, Characters, and Charms, do work not by any tacit or sacramental contract with evil spirits, but serve only to strengthen the imagination of him that useth it; as images are said by the Roman Church 122 to fix the cogitations and raise the devotions of them that pray before them. But for mine own judgment, if it be admitted that imagination hath power, and that Ceremonies fortify imagination, and that they be used sincerely and intentionally for that purpose; 123 yet I should hold them unlawful, as opposing to that first edict which God gave unto man, In sudore vultus comedes panem tuum, [in the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread]. For they propound those noble effects which God hath set forth unto man to be bought at the price of labour, to be attained by a few easy and slothful observances. Deficiences in these knowledges I will report none, other than the general deficience, that it is not known how much of them is verity and how much vanity. 124  83
  ¶ 125 The knowledge which respecteth the Faculties of the Mind of man is of two kinds; the one respecting his Understanding and Reason, and the other his Will, Appetite, and Affection; whereof the former produceth Position or Decree, the later Action or Execution. It is true that the Imagination is an agent or nuncius in both provinces, both the judicial and the ministerial. For Sense sendeth over to Imagination before Reason have judged: and Reason sendeth over to Imagination before the Decree can be acted; for Imagination ever precedeth Voluntary Motion: saving that this Janus of Imagination hath differing faces; for the face towards Reason hath the print of Truth, but the face towards Action hath the print of Good; which nevertheless are faces,
        Quales decet esse sororum,—
[sister-faces]. Neither is the Imagination simply and only a messenger; but is invested with or at leastwise usurpeth no small authority in itself, besides the duty of the message. For it was well said by Aristotle, That the mind hath over the body that commandment, which the lord hath over a bondman; but that reason hath over the imagination that commandment which a magistrate hath over a free citizen; who may come also to rule in his turn. For we see that in matters of Faith and Religion we raise our Imagination above our Reason; 126 which is the cause why Religion sought ever access to the mind by similitudes, types, parables, visions, dreams. And again in all persuasions that are wrought by eloquence and other impression of like nature, which do paint and disguise the true appearance of things, the chief recommendation unto Reason is from the Imagination. 127 Nevertheless, because I find not any science that doth properly or fitly pertain to the Imagination, I see no cause to alter the former division. For as for Poesy, it is rather a pleasure or play of imagination, than a work or duty thereof. And if it be a work, we speak not now of such parts of learning as the Imagination produceth, but of such sciences as handle and consider of the Imagination; no more than we shall speak now of such knowledges as Reason produceth, (for that extendeth to all philosophy,) but of such knowledges as do handle and inquire of the faculty of Reason: so as Poesy had his true place. 128 As for the power of the Imagination in nature, and the manner of fortifying the same, we have mentioned it in the doctrine De Anima, whereunto most fitly it belongeth. And lastly, for Imaginative or Insinuative Reason, which is the subject of Rhetoric, we think it best to refer it to the Arts of Reason. So therefore we content ourselves with the former division, that Human Philosophy which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man hath two parts Rational and Moral.
  The part of Human Philosophy which is rational, is of all knowledges, to the most wits, the least delightful; and seemeth but a net of subtility and spinosity. For as it was truly said, that knowledge is pabulum animi, [the food of the mind;] so in the nature of men’s appetite to this food, most men are of the taste and stomach of the Israelites in the desert, that would fain have returned ad ollas carnium, [to the flesh-pots,] and were weary of manna; which, though it were celestial, yet seemed less nutritive and comfortable. So generally men taste well knowledges that are drenched in flesh and blood, Civil History, Morality, Policy, about the which men’s affections, praises, fortunes, do turn and are conversant; but this same lumen siccum, [this dry light,] doth parch and offend most men’s watery and soft natures. But to speak truly of things as they are in worth, Rational Knowledges are the keys of all other arts; for as Aristotle saith aptly and elegantly, That the hand is the Instrument of Instruments, and the mind is the Form of Forms: so these be truly said to be the Art of Arts: neither do they only direct, but likewise confirm and strengthen; even as the habit of shooting doth not only enable to shoot a nearer shoot, but also to draw a stronger bow.  85
  The Arts Intellectual are four in number; divided according to the ends whereunto they are referred: for man’s labour is to invent 129 that which is sought or propounded; or to judge that which is invented; or to retain that which is judged; or to deliver over that which is retained. So as the arts must be four; Art of Inquiry or Invention; Art of Examination or Judgment; Art of Custody or Memory; and Art of Elocution or Tradition.  86
  ¶ 130 Invention is of two kinds, much differing; the one, of Arts and Sciences; and the other, of Speech and Arguments. The former of these I do report deficient; which seemeth to me to be such a deficience as if in the making of an inventory touching the estate of a defunct it should be set down that there is no ready money. For as money will fetch all other commodities, so this knowledge is that which should purchase all the rest. And like as the West-Indies had never been discovered if the use of the mariner’s needle had not been first discovered, though the one be vast regions and the other a small motion; so it cannot be found strange if sciences be no further discovered, if the art itself of invention and discovery hath been passed over.  87
  That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my judgment standeth plainly confessed: for first, Logic doth not pretend to invent Sciences or the Axioms of Sciences, but passeth it over with a cuique in sua arte credendum, [the knowledge that pertains to each art must be taken on trust from those that profess it]. And Celsus acknowledgeth it 131 gravely, speaking of the empirical and dogmatical sects of physicians, That medicines and cures were first found out, and then after the reasons and causes were discoursed; and not the causes first found out, and by light from them the medicines and cures discovered. And Plato in his Theætetus 132 noteth well, That particulars are infinite, and the higher generalities give no sufficient direction; and that the pith of all sciences, which maketh the arts-man differ from the inexpert, is in the middle propositions, which in every particular knowledge are taken from tradition and experience. And therefore we see that they which discourse of the inventions and originals of things, refer them rather to chance than to art, and rather to beasts, birds, fishes, serpents, than to men.
        Dictamnum genetrix Cretæa carpit ab Ida,
Puberibus caulem foliis et flore comantem
Purpureo: non illa feris incognita capris
Gramina, cum tergo volucres hæsere sagittæ.
[A sprig of dittany his mother brought,
Gathered by Cretan Ide; a stalk it is
Of woolly leaf, crested with purple flower;
Which well the wild-goat knows when in his side
Sticks the winged shaft.]
So that it was no marvel (the manner of antiquity being to consecrate inventors) that the Ægyptians had so few human idols in their temples, but almost all brute:
        Omnigenumque Deum monstra, et latrator Anubis,
Contra Neptunum et Venerem, contraque Minervam, &c.
[All kinds and shapes of Gods, a monstrous host,
The dog Anubis foremost, stood arrayed
’Gainst Neptune, Venus, Pallas, &c.]
And if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, and ascribe the first inventions to men, yet you will rather believe that Prometheus first struck the flints, and marvelled at the spark, than that when he first struck the flints he expected the spark; and therefore we see the West-Indian Prometheus had no intelligence with the European, because of the rareness with them of flint, that gave the first occasion. 133 So as it should seem that hitherto men are rather beholden to a wild goat for surgery, or to a nightingale for music, or to the Ibis for some part of physic, 134 or to the pot lid that flew open for artillery, or generally to chance or any thing else, than to Logic, for the invention of arts and sciences. Neither is the form of invention which Virgil describeth much other:
        Ut varias usus meditando extunderet artes
[that practice with meditation might by degrees hammer out the arts]. For if you observe the words well, it is no other method than that which brute beasts are capable of, and do put in use; which is a perpetual intending or practising some one thing, urged and imposed by an absolute necessity of conservation of being: for so Cicero saith very truly, Usus uni rei deditus et naturam et artem sæpe vincit: [practice applied constantly to one thing will often do more than either nature or art can]. And therefore if it be said of men,
                        Labor omnia vincit
Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas,
            [Stern labour masters all,
And want in poverty importunate,]
it is likewise said of beasts, Quis psittaco docuit suum [Greek]? [who taught the parrot to say how d’ye do?] Who taught the raven in a drowth to throw pebbles into an hollow tree where she spied water, that the water might rise so as she might come to it? Who taught the bee to sail through such a vast sea of air, and to find the way from a field in flower a great way off to her hive? Who taught the ant to bite every grain of corn that she burieth in her hill, lest it should take root and grow? Add then the word extundere, which importeth the extreme difficulty, and the word paulatim, which importeth the extreme slowness, and we are where we were, even amongst the Ægyptians’ gods; there being little left to the faculty of Reason, and nothing to the duty or Art, for matter of invention.
  Secondly, the induction which the logicians speak of, and which seemeth familiar with Plato, 135 whereby the Principles of sciences may be pretended to be invented, and so the middle propositions by derivation from the principles,—their form of induction, I say, is utterly vicious and incompetent: wherein their error is the fouler, because it is the duty of Art to perfect and exalt Nature; but they contrariwise have wronged, abused, and traduced nature. For he that shall attentively observe how the mind doth gather this excellent dew of knowledge, like unto that which the poet speaketh of, Aërei mellis cœlestia dona, [the gift of heaven, aërial honey,] distilling and contriving it out of particulars natural and artificial, as the flowers of the field and garden, shall find that the mind of herself by nature doth manage and act an induction much better than they describe it. For to conclude upon an enumeration of particulars without instance contradictory is no conclusion, but a conjecture; for who can assure (in many subjects) upon those particulars which appear of a side, that there are not other on the contrary side which appear not? As if Samuel should have rested upon those sons of Issay 136 which were brought before him, and failed of David, which was in the field. And this form (to say truth) is so gross, as it had not been possible for wits so subtile as have managed these things to have offered it to the world, but that they hasted to their theories and dogmaticals, and were imperious and scornful toward particulars; which their manner was to use but as lictores and viatores, for sergeants and whifflers, ad summovendam turbam, to make way and make room for their opinions, rather than in their true use and service. Certainly it is a thing may touch a man with a religious wonder, to see how the footsteps of seducement are the very same in divine and human truth: for as in divine truth man cannot endure to become as a child; so in human, they reputed the attending the Inductions (whereof we speak) as if it were a second infancy or childhood.  89
  Thirdly, allow some Principles or Axioms were rightly induced, yet nevertheless certain it is that Middle Propositions cannot be deduced from them in subject of nature 137 by Syllogism, that is, by touch and reduction of them to principles in a middle term. It is true that in sciences popular, as moralities, laws, and the like, yea and divinity (because it pleaseth God to apply himself to the capacity of the simplest), that form may have use; and in natural philosophy likewise, by way of argument or satisfactory reason, quæ assensum parit, operis effœta est, [which procures assent but can do no work:] but the subtilty of nature and operations will not be enchained in those bonds: for Arguments consist of Propositions, and Propositions of Words; and Words are but the current tokens or marks of Popular Notions of things; which notions, if they be grossly and variably collected out of particulars, it is not the laborious examination either of consequences of arguments or of the truth of propositions, that can ever correct that error; being (as the physicians speak) in the first digestion: and therefore it was not without cause, that so many excellent philosophers became Sceptics and Academics, and denied any certainty of knowledge or comprehension, and held opinion that the knowledge of man extended only to appearances and probabilities. It is true that in Socrates it was supposed to be but a form of irony, Scientiam dissimulando simulavit, [an affectation of knowledge under pretence of ignorance:] for he used to disable his knowledge, to the end to enhance his knowledge; 138 like the humour of Tiberius in his beginnings, that would reign, but would not acknowledge so much; 139 and in the later Academy, which Cicero embraced, this opinion also of acatalepsia (I doubt) was not held sincerely: for that all those which excelled in copie of speech seem to have chosen that sect, as that which was fittest to give glory to their eloquence and variable discourses; being rather like progresses of pleasure than journeys to an end. But assuredly many scattered in both Academies did hold it in subtilty and integrity. But here was their chief error; they charged the deceit upon the Senses; which in my judgment (notwithstanding all their cavillations) are very sufficient to certify and report truth, though not always immediately, yet by comparison, 140 by help of instrument, and by producing and urging such things as are too subtile for the sense to some effect comprehensible by the sense, and other like assistance. But they ought to have charged the deceit upon the weakness 141 of the intellectual powers, and upon the manner of collecting and concluding upon the reports of the senses. This I speak not to disable the mind of man, but to stir it up to seek help: for no man, be he never so cunning or practised, can make a straight line or perfect circle by steadiness of hand, which may be easily done by help of a ruler or compass. 142  90
  Experientia literata, et interpretatio Naturæ. This part of invention, concerning the invention of sciences, I purpose (if God give me leave) hereafter to propound; having digested it into two parts; whereof the one I term Experientia literata, and the other Interpretatio Naturæ: 143 the former being but a degree and rudiment of the latter. But I will not dwell too long, nor speak too great upon a promise.  91
  ¶ 144 The invention of speech or argument is not properly an invention: for to invent is to discover that we know not, and not to recover or resummon that which we already know; and the use of this invention is no other but out of the knowledge whereof our mind is already possessed, to draw forth or call before us that which may be pertinent to the purpose which we take into our consideration. So as, to speak truly, it is no Invention, but a Remembrance or Suggestion, with an application; which is the cause why the schools do place it after judgment, as subsequent and not precedent. Nevertheless, because we do account it a Chase as well of deer in an inclosed park as in a forest at large, and that it hath already obtained the name, let it be called invention: so as it be perceived and discerned, that the scope and end of this invention is readiness and present use of our knowledge, and not addition or amplification thereof.  92
  To procure this ready use of knowledge there are two courses, Preparation and Suggestion. 145 The former of these seemeth scarcely a part of Knowledge, consisting rather of diligence than of any artificial erudition. And herein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the sophists near his time, saying, they did as if one that professed the art of shoe-making should not teach how to make up a shoe, but only exhibit in a readiness a number of shoes of all fashions and sizes. But yet a man might reply, that if a shoe-maker should have no shoes in his shop, but only work as he is bespoken, he should be weakly customed. But our Saviour, speaking of Divine Knowledge, saith, that the kingdom of heaven is like a good householder, that bringeth forth both new and old store; and we see the ancient writers of rhetoric do give it in precept, that pleaders should have the Places whereof they have most continual use ready handled in all the variety that may be; as that, to speak for the literal interpretation of the law against equity, and contrary; and to speak for presumptions and inferences against testimony, and contrary. And Cicero himself, being broken unto it by great experience, delivereth it plainly, that whatsoever a man shall have occasion to speak of, (if he will take the pains) he may have it in effect premeditate, and handled in thesi; so that when he cometh to a particular, he shall have nothing to do but to put to names and times and places, and such other circumstances of individuals. We see likewise the exact diligence of Demosthenes; who, in regard of the great force that the entrance and access into causes hath to make a good impression, had ready framed a number of prefaces for orations and speeches. All which authorities and precedents may overweigh Aristotle’s opinion, that would have us change a rich wardrobe for a pair of shears.  93
  But the nature of the collection of this provision or preparatory store, though it be common both to logic and rhetoric, yet having made an entry of it here, where it came first to be spoken of, I think fit to refer over the further handling of it to rhetoric.  94
  The other part of Invention, which I term Suggestion, doth assign and direct us to certain marks or places, which may excite our mind to return and produce such knowledge as it hath formerly collected, to the end we may make use thereof. Neither is this use (truly taken) only to furnish argument to dispute probably with others, but likewise to minister unto our judgment to conclude aright within ourselves. Neither may these Places serve only to apprompt our invention, but also to direct our inquiry. For a faculty of wise interrogating is half a knowledge. For as Plato saith, Whosoever seeketh, knoweth that which he seeketh for in a general notion; else how shall he know it when he hath found it? And therefore the larger 146 your Anticipation is, the more direct and compendious is your search. But the same Places which will help us what to produce of that which we know already, will also help us, if a man of experience were before us, what questions to ask; or if we have books and authors to instruct us, what points to search and revolve: so as I cannot report 147 that this part of invention, which is that which the schools call Topics, is deficient.  95
  Nevertheless Topics are of two sorts, general and special. The general we have spoken to; but the particular hath been touched by some, but rejected generally as inartificial and variable. But leaving the humour which hath reigned too much in the schools, (which is to be vainly subtile in a few things which are within their command, and to reject the rest,) I do receive particular Topics, that is places or directions of invention and inquiry in every particular knowledge, as things of great use; being mixtures of Logic with the matter of sciences; for in these it holdeth, Ars inveniendi adolescit cum inventis, [every act of discovery advances the art of discovery;] for as in going of a way we do not only gain that part of the way which is passed, but we gain the better sight of that part of the way which remaineth; so every degree of proceeding in a science giveth a light to that which followeth; which light if we strengthen, by drawing it forth into questions or places of inquiry, we do greatly advance our pursuit.  96
  ¶ 148 Now we pass unto the arts of Judgment, which handle the natures of Proofs and Demonstrations; which as to Induction hath a coincidence with Invention; for in all inductions, whether in good or vicious form, the same action of the mind which inventeth, judgeth; all one as in the sense; but otherwise it is in proof by syllogism; for the proof being not immediate but by mean, the invention of the mean is one thing, and the judgment of the consequence is another; the one exciting only, the other examining. Therefore for the real and exact form of judgment we refer ourselves to that which we have spoken of Interpretation of Nature.  97
  For the other judgment by Syllogism, as it is a thing most agreeable to the mind of man, so it hath been vehemently end excellently laboured. For the nature of man doth extremely covet to have somewhat in his understanding fixed and immoveable, and as a rest and support of the mind. And therefore as Aristotle endeavoureth to prove that in all motion there is some point quiescent; and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable of Atlas (that stood fixed and bare up the heaven from falling) to be meant of the poles or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the conversion is accomplished; so assuredly men have a desire to have an Atlas or axle-tree within to keep them from fluctuation, which is like to a perpetual peril of falling; therefore men did hasten to set down some Principles about which the variety of their disputations might turn.  98
  So then this art of Judgment is but the reduction of propositions to principles in a middle term: the Principles to be agreed by all and exempted from argument; the Middle Term to be elected at the liberty of every man’s invention; the Reduction to be of two kinds, direct and inverted; the one when the proposition is reduced to the principle, which they term a Probation ostensive; the other when the contradictory of the proposition is reduced to the contradictory of the principle, which is that which they call per incommodum, or pressing an absurdity; the number of middle terms to be 149 as the proposition standeth degrees more or less removed from the principle.  99
  But this art hath two several methods of doctrine; the one by way of direction, the other by way of caution: the former frameth and setteth down a true form of consequence, by the variations and deflexions from which errors and inconsequences may be exactly judged; toward the composition and structure of which form, it is incident to handle the parts thereof, which are propositions, and the parts of propositions, which are simple words; 150 and this is that part of logic which is comprehended in the Analytics.  100
  The second method of doctrine was introduced for expedite use and assurance sake; discovering the more subtile forms of sophisms and illaqueations with their redargutions, which is that which is termed Elenches. For although in the more gross sorts of fallacies it happeneth (as Seneca maketh the comparison well) as in juggling feats, which though we know not how they are done, yet we know well it is not as it seemeth to be; yet the more subtile sort of them doth not only put a man besides his answer, but doth many times abuse his judgment.  101
  This part concerning Elenches 151 is excellently handled by Aristotle in precept, but more excellently by Plato in example, not only in the persons of the Sophists, but even in Socrates himself; who professing to affirm nothing, but to infirm that which was affirmed by another, hath exactly expressed all the forms of objection, fallace, 152 and redargution. And although we have said that the use of this doctrine is for redargution, yet it is manifest the degenerate and corrupt use is for caption and contradiction; 153 which passeth for a great faculty, and no doubt is of very great advantage: though the difference be good which was made between orators and sophisters, that the one is as the greyhound, which hath his advantage in the race, and the other as the hare, which hath her advantage in the turn, so as it is the advantage of the weaker creature.  102
  But yet further, this doctrine of Elenches hath a more ample latitude and extent than is perceived; namely, unto divers parts of knowledge; whereof some are laboured and other omitted. For first, I conceive (though it may seem at first somewhat strange) that that part which is variably referred sometimes to Logic, sometimes to Metaphysic, touching the common adjuncts of essences, is but an elenche; 154 for the great sophism of all sophisms being equivocation or ambiguity of words and phrase, specially of such words as are most general and intervene in every inquiry, it seemeth to me that the true and fruitful use (leaving vain subtilties and speculations) of the inquiry of majority, minority, priority, posteriority, identity, diversity, possibility, act, totality, parts, existence, privation, and the like, are but wise cautions against ambiguities of speech. So again the distribution of things into certain tribes, which we call categories or predicaments, are but cautions against the confusion of definitions and divisions.  103
  Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by the strength of the impression and not by the subtilty of the illaqueation; not so much perplexing the reason as overruling it by power of the imagination. But this part I think more proper to handle when I shall speak of Rhetoric. 155  104
  But lastly, there is yet a much more important and profound kind of fallacies in the mind of man, which I find not observed or enquired at all, and think good to place here, as that which of all others appertaineth most to rectify judgment: the force whereof is such, as it doth not dazzle or snare the understanding in some particulars, but doth more generally and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. 156 For the mind of man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the beams of things should reflect according to their true incidence; nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full of superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced. For this purpose, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by the general nature of the mind, 157 beholding them in an example or two; as first, in that instance which is the root of all superstition, namely, That to the nature of the mind of all men it is consonant for the affirmative or active to affect more than the negative or privative: so that a few times hitting or presence, countervails oft-times failing or absence; 158 as was well answered by Diagoras to him that shewed him in Neptune’s temple the great number of pictures of such as had escaped shipwrack and had paid their vows to Neptune, saying, Advise now, you that think it folly to invocate Neptune in tempest: Yea but (saith Diagoras) where are they painted that are drowned? Let us behold it in another instance, namely, That the spirit of man, being of an equal and uniform substance, doth usually suppose and feign in nature a greater equality and uniformity than is in truth. Hence it cometh that the mathematicians cannot satisfy themselves, except they reduce the motions of the celestial bodies to perfect circles, rejecting spiral lines, and labouring to be discharged of eccentrics. Hence it cometh, that whereas there are many things in nature as it were monodica, 159 sui juris, [singular, and like nothing but themselves;] yet the cogitations of man do feign unto them relatives, parallels, and conjugates, whereas no such thing is; as they have feigned an element of Fire, to keep square with Earth, Water, and Air, and the like: nay, it is not credible, till it be opened, what a number of fictions and fancies the similitude of human actions and arts, 160 together with the making of man communis mensura, have brought into Natural Philosophy; not much better than the heresy of the Anthropomorphites, bred in the cells of gross and solitary monks, and the opinion of Epicurus, answerable to the same in heathenism, who supposed the gods to be of human shape. And therefore Velleius the Epicurian 161 needed not to have asked, why God should have adorned the heavens with stars, as if he had been an Ædilis, one that should have set forth some magnificent shews or plays. For if that great work-master had been of an human disposition, he would have cast the stars into some pleasant and beautiful works and orders, like the frets in the roofs of houses; whereas one can scarce find a posture in square or triangle or straight line amongst such an infinite number; so differing an harmony there is between the spirit of Man and the spirit of Nature.  105
  Let us consider again the false appearances imposed upon us by every man’s own individual nature and custom, 162 in that feigned supposition that Plato maketh of the cave: for certainly if a child were continued in a grot or cave under the earth until maturity of age, and came suddenly abroad, he would have strange and absurd imaginations; so in like manner, although our persons live in the view of heaven, yet our spirits are included in the caves of our own complexions and customs; which minister unto us infinite errors and vain opinions, if they be not recalled to examination. 163 But hereof we have given many examples in one of the errors, or peccant humours, which we ran briefly over in our first book.  106
  Elenchi magni, sive de Idolis animi humani, nativis et adventitiis. And lastly, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by words, 164 which are framed and applied according to the conceit and capacities of the vulgar sort: and although we think we govern our words, and prescribe it well Loquendum ut vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes, [a man should speak like the vulgar, and think like the wise;] yet certain it is that words, as a Tartar’s bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert the judgment; so as it is almost necessary in all controversies and disputations to imitate the wisdom of the Mathematicians, in setting down in the very beginning the definitions of our words and terms, that others may know how we accept and understand them, and whether they concur with us or no. 165 For it cometh to pass for want of this, that we are sure to end there where we ought to have begun, which is in questions and differences about words. To conclude therefore, it must be confessed that it is not possible to divorce ourselves from these fallacies and false appearances, because they are inseparable from our nature and condition of life; so yet nevertheless the caution of them (for all elenches, as was said, are but cautions) doth extremely import the true conduct of human judgment. The particular elenches or cautions against these three false appearances I find altogether deficient.  107
  De Analogia Demonstrationum. There remaineth one part of judgment of great excellency, which to mine understanding is so slightly touched, as I may report that also deficient; which is the application of the differing kinds of proofs to the differing kinds of subjects; for there being but four kinds of demonstrations, that is, by the immediate consent of the mind or sense; by induction; by sophism; and by congruity, which is that which Aristotle calleth demonstration in orb or circle, and not a notioribus; 166 every of these hath certain subjects in the matter of sciences, in which respectively they have chiefest use; and certain other, from which respectively they ought to be excluded: and the rigour and curiosity in requiring the more severe proofs in some things, and chiefly the facility in contenting ourselves with the more remiss proofs in others, hath been amongst the greatest causes of detriment and hindrance to knowledge. The distributions and assignations of demonstrations, according to the analogy of sciences, I note as deficient.  108
  ¶ 167 The custody or retaining of knowledge is either in Writing or Memory; whereof Writing hath two parts, the nature of the character, and the order of the entry. For the art of characters, or other visible notes of words or things, it hath nearest conjugation with grammar, and therefore I refer it to the due place. 168 For the disposition and collocation of that knowledge which we preserve in writing, it consisteth in a good digest of common-places; wherein I am not ignorant of the prejudice imputed to the use of common-place books, as causing a retardation of reading, and some sloth or relaxation of memory. But because it is but a counterfeit thing in knowledges to be forward and pregnant, except a man be deep and full, I hold the entry of common-places to be a matter of great use and essence in studying; as that which assureth copie of invention, and contracteth judgment to a strength. But this is true, that of the methods of common-places that I have seen, there is none of any sufficient worth; all of them carrying merely the face of a school, and not of a world; and referring to vulgar matters and pedantical divisions without all life or respect to action.  109
  For the other principal part of the custody of knowledge, which is Memory, I find that faculty in my judgment weakly enquired of. An art there is extant of it; but it seemeth to me that there are better precepts than that art, and better practices of that art than those received. It is certain the art (as it is) may be raised to points of ostentation prodigious: but in use (as it is now managed) it is barren; not burdensome nor dangerous to natural memory, as is imagined, but barren; that is, not dexterous to be applied to the serious use of business and occasions. And therefore I make no more estimation of repeating a great number of names or words upon once hearing, or the pouring forth of a number of verses or rhymes ex tempore, or the making of a satirical simile of every thing, or the turning of every thing to a jest, or the falsifying or contradicting of every thing by cavil, or the like, (whereof in the faculties of the mind there is great copie, and such as by device and practice may be exalted to an extreme degree of wonder,) than I do of the tricks of tumblers, funambuloes, baladines; the one being the same in the mind that the other is in the body; matters of strangeness without worthiness.  110
  This art of Memory is but built upon two intentions; the one Prenotion, the other Emblem. Prenotion dischargeth the indefinite seeking of that we would remember, and directeth us to seek in a narrow compass; that is, somewhat that hath congruity with our place of memory. Emblem reduceth conceits intellectual to images sensible, which strike the memory more; out of which axioms may be drawn much better practique than that in use; and besides which axioms, there are divers moe touching help of memory, not inferior to them. 169 But I did in the beginning distinguish, not to report those things deficient, which are but only ill managed.  111
  ¶ 170 There remaineth the fourth kind of Rational Knowledge, which is transitive, concerning the expressing or transferring our knowledge to others; which I will term by the general name of Tradition or Delivery. Tradition hath three parts; the first concerning the organ of tradition; the second concerning the method of tradition; and the third concerning the illustration of tradition. 171  112
  For the organ of tradition, it is either Speech or Writing: for Aristotle saith well, Words are the images of cogitations, and letters are the images of words; but yet it is not of necessity that cogitations be expressed by the medium of words. For whatsoever is capable of sufficient differences, 172 and those perceptible by the sense, is in nature competent to express 173 cogitations. And therefore we see in the commerce of barbarous 174 people that understand not one another’s language, and in the practice of divers that are dumb and deaf, that men’s minds are expressed in gestures, though not exactly, yet to serve the turn. And we understand further 175 that it is the use of China and the kingdoms of the high Levant to write in Characters Real, which express neither letters nor words in gross, but Things or Notions; insomuch as countries and provinces, which understand not one another’s language, can nevertheless read one another’s writings, because the characters are accepted more generally than the languages do extend; and therefore they have a vast multitude of characters; as many, I suppose, as radical words. 176  113
  De Notis Rerum. These Notes of Cogitations are of two sorts; the one when the note hath some similitude or congruity with the notion; the other ad placitum, having force only by contract or acceptation. Of the former sort are Hieroglyphics and Gestures. For as to Hieroglyphics, (things of ancient use, and embraced chiefly by the Ægyptians, one of the most ancient nations,) they are but as continued impresses and emblems. And as for Gestures, they are as transitory Hieroglyphics, and are to Hieroglyphics as words spoken are to words written, in that they abide not; but they have evermore, as well as the other, an affinity with the things signified: as Periander, being consulted with how to preserve a tyranny newly usurped, bid the messenger attend and report what he saw him do; and went into his garden and topped all the highest flowers; signifying, that it consisted in the cutting off and keeping low of the nobility and grandes. 177 Ad placitum are the Characters Real before mentioned, and Words: although some have been willing by curious inquiry, or rather by apt feigning, to have derived imposition of names from reason and intendment; a speculation elegant, and, by reason it searcheth into antiquity, reverent; but sparingly mixed with truth, and of small fruit. 178 This portion of knowledge, touching the Notes of Things and cogitations in general, I find not enquired, but deficient. And although it may seem of no great use, considering that words and writings by letters do far excel all the other ways; yet because this part concerneth as it were the mint of knowledge, (for words are the tokens current and accepted for conceits, as moneys are for values, and that it is fit men be not ignorant that moneys may be of another kind than gold and silver,) I thought good to propound it to better enquiry.  114
  Concerning Speech and Words, the consideration of them hath produced the science of Grammar: for man still striveth to reintegrate himself in those benedictions, from which by his fault he hath been deprived; and as he hath striven against the first general curse by the invention of all other arts, so hath he sought to come forth of the second general curse (which was the confusion of tongues) by the art of Grammar: whereof the use in a mother 179 tongue is small; in a foreign tongue more; but most in such foreign tongues as have ceased to be vulgar tongues, and are turned only to learned tongues. The duty of it is of two natures; the one popular, 180 which is for the speedy and perfect attaining languages, as well for intercourse of speech as for understanding of authors; the other philosophical, examining the power and nature of words as they are the footsteps and prints of reason: which kind of analogy between words and reason is handled sparsim, brokenly, though not entirely; 181 and therefore I cannot report it deficient, though I think it very worthy to be reduced into a science by itself.  115
  Unto Grammar also belongeth, as an appendix, the consideration of the Accidents of Words; which are measure, sound, and elevation or accent, and the sweetness and harshness of them; whence hath issued some curious observations in Rhetoric, but chiefly Poesy, as we consider it in respect of the verse and not of the argument: wherein though men in learned tongues do tie themselves to the ancient measures, yet in modern languages it seemeth to me as free to make new measures of verses as of dances; for a dance is a measured pace, as a verse is a measured speech. 182 In these things the sense is better judge than the art;
                        Cœnæ fercula nostræ
Mallem convivis quam placuisse cocis:
[the dinner is to please the guests that eat it, not the cook that dresses it.] And of the servile expressing antiquity in an unlike and an unfit subject, it is well said, Quod tempore antiquum videtur, id incongruitate est maxime novum; [there is nothing more new than an old thing that has ceased to fit].
  For Ciphers, they are commonly in letters or alphabets, but may be in words. The kinds of Ciphers (besides the simple ciphers with changes and intermixtures of nulls and non-significants) are many, according to the nature or rule of the infolding; Wheel-ciphers, Key-ciphers, Doubles, &c. But the virtues of them, whereby they are to be preferred, are three; that they be not laborious to write and read; that they be impossible to decipher; and, in some cases, that they be without suspicion. The highest degree whereof is to write omnia per omnia; which is undoubtedly possible, with a proportion quintuple at most of the writing infolding to the writing infolded, and no other restraint whatsoever. 183 This art of Ciphering, hath for relative an art of Deciphering; by supposition 184 unprofitable; but, as things are, of great use. For suppose that ciphers were well managed, there be multitudes of them which exclude the discipherer. But in regard of the rawness and unskilfulness of the hands through which they pass, the greatest matters are many times carried in the weakest ciphers.  117
  In the enumeration of these private and retired arts, it may be thought I seek to make a great muster-roll of sciences; naming them for shew and ostentation, and to little other purpose. But let those which are skilful in them judge whether I bring them in only for appearance, or whether in that which I speak of them (though in few words) there be not some seed of proficience. And this must be remembered, that as there be many of great account in their countries and provinces, which when they come up to the Seat of the Estate are but of mean rank and scarcely regarded; so these arts being here placed with the principal and supreme sciences, seem petty things; yet to such as have chosen them to spend their studies in them, 185 they seem great matters.  118
  ¶ 186 For the Method of Tradition, I see it hath moved a controversy in our time. 187 But as in civil business, if there be a meeting and men fall at words there is commonly an end of the matter for that time and no proceeding at all; so in learning, where there is much controversy there is many times little inquiry. For this part of knowledge of Method seemeth to me so weakly enquired as I shall report it deficient.  119
  Method hath been placed, and that not amiss, in Logic, as a part of Judgment: for as the doctrine of Syllogisms comprehendeth the rules of judgment upon that which is invented, so the doctrine of Method containeth the rules of judgment upon that which is to be delivered; for judgment precedeth Delivery, as it followeth Invention. 188 Neither is the method or the nature of the tradition material only to the use of knowledge, but likewise to the progression of knowledge: for since the labour and life of one man cannot attain to perfection of knowledge, the wisdom of the Tradition is that which inspireth the felicity of continuance and proceeding. And therefore the most real diversity of method is of method referred to Use, and method referred to Progression; whereof the one may be termed Magistral, and the other of Probation. 189  120
  The later whereof seemeth to be via deserta et interclusa, [a way that is abandoned and stopped up]. For as knowledges are now delivered, there is a kind of contract of error between the deliverer and the receiver: for he that delivereth knowledge desireth to deliver it in such form as may be best believed, and not as may be best examined; and he that receiveth knowledge desireth rather present satisfaction than expectant inquiry; and so rather not to doubt than not to err: glory making the author not to lay open his weakness, and sloth making the disciple not to know his strength.  121
  De Methodo sincera, sive ad filios Scientiarum. 190 But knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be spun on, ought to be delivered and intimated, 191 if it were possible, in the same method wherein it was invented; and so is it possible of knowledge induced. But in this same anticipated and prevented knowledge, no man knoweth how he came to the knowledge which he hath obtained. But yet, nevertheless, secundum majus et minus, a man may revisit and descend unto the foundations of his knowledge and consent; and so transplant it into another as it grew in his own mind. For it is in knowledges as it is in plants: if you mean to use the plant, it is no matter for the roots; but if you mean to remove it to grow, then it is more assured to rest upon roots than slips. So the delivery of knowledges (as it is now used) is as of fair bodies of trees without the roots; good for the carpenter, but not for the planter; but if you will have sciences grow, it is less matter for the shaft or body of the tree, so you look well to the taking up of the roots. Of which kind of delivery the method of the mathematiques, in that subject, hath some shadow; but generally I see it neither put in use nor put in inquisition, and therefore note it for deficient.  122
  Another diversity of Method there is, which hath some affinity with the former, used in some cases by the discretion of the ancients, but disgraced since by the impostures of many vain persons, who have made it as a false light for their counterfeit merchandises; and that is, Enigmatical and Disclosed. 192 The pretence whereof 193 is to remove the vulgar capacities from being admitted to the secrets of knowledges, and to reserve them to selected auditors, or wits of such sharpness as can pierce the veil.  123
  Another diversity of Method, whereof the consequence is great, is the delivery of knowledge in Aphorisms, or in Methods; wherein we may observe that it hath been too much taken into custom, out of a few Axioms or observations upon any subject to make a solemn and formal art; filling it with some discourses, and illustrating it with examples, and digesting it into a sensible Method; but the writing in Aphorisms hath many excellent virtues, whereto the writing in Method doth not approach.  124
  For first, it trieth the writer, whether he be superficial or solid: for Aphorisms, except they should be ridiculous, cannot be made but of the pith and heart of sciences; for discourse of illustration is cut off; recitals of examples are cut off; discourse of connexion and order is cut off; descriptions of practice are cut off; so there remaineth nothing to fill the Aphorisms but some good quantity of observation: and therefore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt, to write Aphorisms, but he that is sound and grounded. But in Methods,
                Tantum series juncturaque pollet,
Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris,
[the arrangement and connexion and joining of the parts has so much effect,] as a man shall make a great shew of an art, which if it were disjointed would come to little. Secondly, Methods are more fit to win consent or belief, but less fit to point to action; for they carry a kind of demonstration in orb or circle, one part illuminating another, and therefore satisfy; but particulars, being dispersed, do best agree with dispersed directions. And lastly, Aphorisms, representing a knowledge broken, do invite men to enquire farther; whereas Methods, carrying the shew of a total, do secure men, as if they were at furthest.
  Another diversity of Method, which is likewise of great weight, is the handling of knowledge by Assertions and their Proofs, or by Questions and their Determinations; the latter kind whereof, if it be immoderately followed, is as prejudicial to the proceeding of learning, as it is to the proceeding of an army to go about to besiege every little fort or hold. For if the field be kept and the sum of the enterprise pursued, those smaller things will come in of themselves: indeed 194 a man would not leave some important piece enemy at his back. In like manner, the use of confutation in the delivery of sciences ought to be very sparing; and to serve to remove strong preoccupations and prejudgments, and not to minister and excite disputations and doubts.  126
  Another diversity of Methods is according to the subject or matter which is handled; for there is a great difference in delivery of the Mathematics, which are the most abstracted of knowledges, and Policy, which is the most immersed: and howsoever contention hath been moved touching an uniformity of method in multiformity of matter, yet we see how that opinion, besides the weakness of it, hath been of ill desert towards learning, as that which taketh the way to reduce learning to certain empty and barren generalities; being but the very husks and shells of sciences, all the kernel being forced out and expulsed with the torture and press of the method; 195 and therefore as I did allow well of particular Topics for invention, so I do allow likewise of particular Methods of tradition.  127
  Another diversity of judgment 196 in the delivery and teaching of knowledge is according unto the light and presuppositions of that which is delivered; for that knowledge which is new and foreign from opinions received, is to be delivered in another form than that that is agreeable 197 and familiar; and therefore Aristotle, when he thinks to tax Democritus, doth in truth commend him, where he saith If we shall indeed dispute, and not follow after similitudes, &c. For those whose conceits are seated in popular opinions, need only but to prove or dispute; but those whose conceits are beyond popular opinions, have a double labour; the one to make themselves conceived, and the other to prove and demonstrate; so that it is of necessity with them to have recourse to similitudes and translations to express themselves. And therefore in the infancy of learning, and in rude times, when those conceits which are now trivial were then new, the world was full of Parables and Similitudes; for else would men either have passed over without mark or else rejected for paradoxes that which was offered, before they had understood or judged. So in divine learning we see how frequent Parables and Tropes are: 198 for it is a rule, That whatsoever science is not consonant to presuppositions, must pray in aid of similitudes.  128
  De prudentia Traditionis. There be also other diversities of Methods, vulgar and received; as that of Resolution or Analysis, of Constitution or Systasis, of Concealment or Cryptic, 199 &c. which I do allow well of; though I have stood upon those which are least handled and observed. All which I have remembered to this purpose, because I would erect and constitute one general inquiry, which seems to me deficient, touching the Wisdom of Tradition.  129
  But unto this part of knowledge concerning Method doth further belong not only the Architecture of the whole frame of a work, but also the several beams and columns thereof; not as to their stuff, but as to their quantity and figure; and therefore Method considereth not only the disposition of the Argument or Subject, but likewise the Propositions; not as to their truth or matter, but as to their limitation and manner. For herein Ramus merited better a great deal in reviving the good rules of Propositions, [Greek], &c. 200 than he did in introducing the canker of Epitomes; 201 and yet (as it is the condition of human things that, according to the ancient fables, The most precious things have the most pernicious keepers;) it was so, that the attempt of the one made him fall upon the other. 202 For he had need be well conducted that should design to make Axioms convertible, if he make them not withal circular, and non-promovent, or incurring into themselves: but yet the intention was excellent.  130
  De productione Axiomatum. The other considerations of Method concerning Propositions are chiefly touching the utmost propositions, which limit the dimensions of sciences; for every knowledge may be fitly said, besides the profundity, (which is the truth and substance of it, that makes it solid,) to have a longitude and a latitude; accounting the latitude towards other sciences, and the longitude towards action; that is, from the greatest generality to the most particular precept: the one giveth rule how far one knowledge ought to intermeddle within the province of another, which is the rule they call [Greek]; 203 the other giveth rule unto what degree of particularity a knowledge should descend: which latter I find passed over in silence, being in my judgment the more material; for certainty there must be somewhat left to practice; 204 but how much is worthy the inquiry. We see remote and superficial generalities do but offer knowledge to scorn of practical men; and are no more aiding to practice, than an Ortelius’ universal map is to direct the way between London and York. The better sort of rules have been not unfitly compared to glasses of steel unpolished, where you may see the images of things, but first they must be filed: so the rules will help, if they be laboured and polished by practice. But how crystalline they may be made at the first, and how far forth they may be polished aforehand, is the question; the inquiry whereof seemeth to me deficient.  131
  There hath been also laboured and put in practice a method, which is not a lawful method, but a method of imposture; which is to deliver knowledges in such manner, as men may speedily come to make a shew of learning who have it not: such was the travail of Raymundus Lullius, in making that art which bears his name; not unlike to some books of Typocosmy which have been made since; being nothing but a mass of words of all arts, to give men countenance that those which use the terms might be thought to understand the art; which collections are much like a fripper’s or broker’s shop, that hath ends of every thing, but nothing of worth.  132
  ¶ 205 Now we descend to that part which concerneth the Illustration of Tradition, comprehended in that science which we call Rhetoric, or Art of Eloquence; a science excellent, and excellently well laboured. For although in true value it is inferior to wisdom, as it is said by God to Moses, when he disabled himself for want of this faculty, Aaron shall be thy speaker, and thou shalt be to him as God; yet with people it is the more mighty: for so Salomon saith, Sapiens corde appellabitur prudens, sed dulcis eloquio majora reperiet, [the wise in heart shall be called prudent, but he that is sweet of speech shall compass greater things;] signifying that profoundness of wisdom will help a man to a name or admiration, but that it is eloquence that prevaileth in an active life. And as to the labouring of it, the emulation of Aristotle with the rhetoricians of his time, and the experience of Cicero, hath made them in their works of Rhetorics exceed themselves. Again, the excellency of examples of eloquence in the orations of Demosthenes and Cicero, added to the perfection of the precepts of eloquence, hath doubled the progression in this art; and therefore the deficiencies which I shall note will rather be in some collections which may as handmaids attend the art, than in the rules or use of the art itself.  133
  Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about the roots of this science, as we have done of the rest: The duty and office of Rhetoric is to apply Reason to Imagination 206 for the better moving of the will. For we see Reason is disturbed in the administration thereof by three means; by Illaqueation or Sophism, which pertains to Logic; by Imagination or Impression, 207 which pertains to Rhetoric; and by Passion or Affection, which pertains to Morality. 208 And as in negotiation with others men are wrought by cunning, by importunity, and by vehemency; so in this negotiation within ourselves men are undermined by Inconsequences, solicited and importuned by Impressions or Observations, and transported by Passions. Neither is the nature of man so unfortunately built, as that those powers and arts should have force to disturb reason, and not to establish and advance it: for the end of Logic is to teach a form of argument to secure reason, and not to entrap it; the end of Morality is to procure the affections to obey 209 reason, and not to invade it; the end of Rhetoric is to fill the imagination to second reason, and not to oppress it: for these abuses of arts come in but ex obliquo, for caution.  134
  And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, though springing out of a just hatred to the rhetoricians of his time, to esteem of Rhetoric but as a voluptuary art, resembling it to cookery, that did mar wholesome meats, and help unwholesome by variety of sauces to the pleasure of the taste. For we see that speech is much more conversant in adorning that which is good than in colouring that which is evil; for there is no man but speaketh more honestly than he can do or think: and it was excellently noted by Thucydides in Cleon, 210 that because he used to hold on the bad side in causes of estate, therefore he was ever inveighing against eloquence and good speech; knowing that no man can speak fair of courses sordid and base. And therefore as Plato said elegantly, That virtue, if she could be seen, would move great love and affection; so seeing that she cannot be shewed to the Sense by corporal shape, the next degree is to shew her to the Imagination in lively representation: for to shew her to Reason only in subtilty of argument, was a thing ever derided in Chrysippus and many of the Stoics; who thought to thrust virtue upon men by sharp disputations and conclusions, which have no sympathy with the will of man.  135
  Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient to reason, it were true there should be no great use of persuasions and insinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and proofs; but in regard of the continual mutinies and seditions of the affections,
                Video meliora, proboque;
Deteriora sequor:
[whereby they who not only see the better course, but approve it also, nevertheless follow the worse,] reason would become captive and servile, if Eloquence of Persuasions did not practise and win the Imagination from the Affection’s part, and contract a confederacy between the Reason and Imagination against the Affections. For the affections themselves carry ever an appetite to good, as reason doth; the difference is, that the affection beholdeth merely the present; reason beholdeth the future and sum of time; and therefore the present filling the imagination more, reason is commonly vanquished; but after that force of eloquence and persuasion hath made things future and remote appear as present, then upon the revolt of the imagination reason prevaileth.
  De prudentia Sermonis privati. We conclude therefore, that Rhetoric can be no more charged with the colouring of the worst part, than Logic with Sophistry, or Morality with Vice. 211 For we know the doctrines of contraries are the same, though the use be opposite. It appeareth also that Logic differeth from Rhetoric, not only as the fist from the palm, the one close the other at large; but much more in this, that Logic handleth reason exact and in truth, and Rhetoric handleth it as it is planted in popular opinions and manners. And therefore Aristotle doth wisely place Rhetoric as between Logic on the one side and moral or civil knowledge on the other, as participating of both: for the proofs and demonstrations of Logic are toward all men indifferent and the same; but the proofs and persuasions of Rhetoric ought to differ according to the auditors:
        Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion:
[to be in the woods an Orpheus, among the dolphins an Arion:] which application, in perfection of idea, ought to extend so far, that if a man should speak of the same thing to several persons, he should speak to them all respectively and several ways: though this politic part of eloquence in private speech it is easy for the greatest orators to want, whilst by the observing their well-graced forms of speech they leese the volubility of application: and therefore it shall not be amiss to recommend this to better inquiry; 212 not being curious whether we place it here, or in that part which concerneth policy.
  Colores boni et mali, simplicis et comparati. Now therefore will I descend to the deficiencies, which (as I said) are but attendances: 213 and first, I do not find the wisdom and diligence of Aristotle well pursued, who began to make a collection of the popular signs and colours of good and evil, both simple and comparative, which are as the Sophisms of Rhetoric (as I touched before). For example:
Quod laudatur, bonum: quod vituperatur, malum.
Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces.
Malum est, malum est, inquit emptor: sed cum recesserit, tum gloriabitur. 214
  The defects in the labour of Aristotle are three: one, that there be but a few of many; another, that their Elenches are not annexed: 215 and the third, that he conceived but a part of the use of them: for their use is not only in probation, but much more in impression. For many forms are equal in signification which are differing in impression; as the difference is great in the piercing of that which is sharp and that which is flat, though the strength of the percussion be the same; for there is no man but will be a little more raised by hearing it said, Your enemies will be glad of this:
        Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridæ:
than by hearing it said only, This is evil for you.
  Secondly, I do resume also that which I mentioned before touching Provision or Preparatory store for the furniture of speech and readiness of invention; which appeareth to be of two sorts; the one in resemblance to a shop of pieces unmade up, the other to a shop of things ready made up; both to be applied to that which is frequent and most in request: the former of these I will call Antitheta, and the latter Formulæ.  140
  Antitheta Rerum. Antitheta are Theses argued pro et contra; wherein men may be more large and laborious: but (in such as are able to do it) to avoid prolixity of entry, I wish the seeds of the several arguments to be cast up into some brief and acute sentences; not to be cited, but to be as skeins or bottoms of thread, to be unwinded at large when they come to be used; supplying authorities and examples by reference.
Non est interpretatio, sed divinatio, quæ recedit a literâ.
Cum receditur a literâ, judex transit in legislatorem.
Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus qui interpretatur singula. 216
  Formulæ 217 are but decent and apt passages or conveyances of speech, which may serve indifferently for differing subjects; as of preface, conclusion, digression, transition, excusation, &c. For as in buildings there is great pleasure and use in the well-casting of the stair-cases, entries, doors, windows, and the like; so in speech the conveyances and passages are of special ornament and effect.
So may we redeem the faults passed, and prevent the inconveniences future.
  ¶ 218 There remain two appendices touching the tradition of knowledge, the one Critical, the other Pedantical. 219 For all knowledge is either delivered by teachers, or attained by men’s proper endeavours: and therefore as the principal part of tradition of knowledge concerneth chiefly writing 220 of books, so the relative part thereof concerneth reading of books. Whereunto appertain incidently these considerations. The first is concerning the true correction and edition of authors; wherein nevertheless rash diligence hath done great prejudice. For these critics have often presumed that that which they understand not is false set down: as the Priest that where he found it written of St. Paul, Demissus est per sportam, [he was let down in a basket,] mended his book, and made it Demissus est per portam, [he was let out by the gate;] because sporta was an hard word, and out of his reading; 221 and surely their errors, though they be not so palpable and ridiculous, are yet of the same kind. And therefore as it hath been wisely noted, the most corrected copies are commonly the least correct.  143
  The second is concerning the exposition and explication of authors, which resteth in annotations and commentaries: wherein it is over usual to blanch the obscure places, and discourse upon the plain.  144
  The third is concerning the times, which in many cases give great light to true interpretations. 222  145
  The fourth is concerning some brief censure and judgment of the authors; that men thereby may make some election unto themselves what books to read.  146
  And the fifth is concerning the syntax and disposition of studies; that men may know in what order or pursuit to read. 223  147
  For Pedantical knowledge, it containeth that difference of Tradition which is proper for youth; whereunto appertain divers considerations of great fruit.  148
  As first, the timing and seasoning of knowledges; as with what to initiate them, and from what for a time to refrain them.  149
  Secondly, the consideration where to begin with the easiest and so proceed to the more difficult; and in what courses 224 to press the more difficult and then to turn them to the more easy: for it is one method to practise swimming with bladders, and another to practise dancing with heavy shoes.  150
  A third is the application of learning according unto the propriety of the wits; for there is no defect in the faculties intellectual but seemeth to have a proper cure contained in some studies: as for example, if a child be bird-witted, that is, hath not the faculty of attention, the Mathematics giveth a remedy thereunto; for in them, if the wit be caught away but a moment, one is new to begin. And as sciences have a propriety towards faculties for cure and help, so faculties or powers have a sympathy towards sciences for excellency or speedy profiting; and therefore it is an inquiry of great wisdom, what kinds of wits and natures are most apt and proper for what sciences.  151
  Fourthly, the ordering of exercises is matter of great consequence to hurt or help: for as is well observed by Cicero, men in exercising their faculties, if they be not well advised, do exercise their faults and get ill habits as well as good; so as there is a great judgment to be had in the continuance and intermission of exercises. It were too long to particularise a number of other considerations of this nature, things but of mean appearance, but of singular efficacy. For as the wronging or cherishing of seeds or young plants is that that is most important to their thriving; and as it was noted that the first six kings being in truth as tutors of the state of Rome in the infancy thereof, was the principal cause of the immense greatness of that state which followed: so the culture and manurance of minds in youth hath such a forcible (though unseen) operation, as hardly any length of time or contention of labour can countervail it afterwards. And it is not amiss to observe also how small and mean faculties gotten by education, yet when they fall into great men or great matters, do work great and important effects; whereof we see a notable example in Tacitus of two stage-players, Percennius and Vibulenus, who by their faculty of playing put the Pannonian armies into an extreme tumult and combustion. For there arising a mutiny amongst them upon the death of Augustus Cæsar, Blæsus the lieutenant had committed some of the mutiners; which were suddenly rescued; whereupon Vibulenus got to be heard speak, which he did in this manner:—These poor innocent wretches, appointed to cruel death, you have restored to behold the light. But who shall restore my brother to me, or life unto my brother? that was sent hither in message from the legions of Germany to treat of the common cause, and he hath murdered him this last night by some of his fencers and ruffians, that he hath about him for his executioners upon soldiers. Answer, Blæsus, what is done with his body? The mortalest enemies do not deny burial. When I have performed my last duties to the corpse with kisses, with tears, command me to be slain besides him; so that these my fellows, for our good meaning and our true hearts to the legions, may have leave to bury us. 225 With which speech he put the army into an infinite fury and uproar; whereas truth was he had no brother, neither was there any such matter, but he played it merely as if he had been upon the stage.  152
  But to return: we are now come to a period of Rational Knowledges; wherein if I have made the divisions other than those that are received, yet would I not be thought to disallow all those divisions which I do not use. For there is a double necessity imposed upon me of altering the divisions. The one, because it differeth in end and purpose, to sort together those things which are next in nature, and those things which are next in use. For if a secretary of state should sort his papers, it is like in his study or general cabinet he would sort together things of a nature, as treaties, instructions, &c. but in his boxes or particular cabinet he would sort together those that he were like to use together, though of several natures; so in this general cabinet of knowledge it was necessary for me to follow the divisions of the nature of things; whereas if myself had been to handle any particular knowledge, I would have respected the divisions fittest for use. The other, because the bringing in of the deficiencies did by consequence alter the partitions of the rest: for let the knowledge extant (for demonstration sake) be fifteen; let the knowledge with the deficiencies be twenty; the parts of fifteen are not the parts of twenty; for the parts of fifteen are three and five; the parts of twenty are two, four, five, and ten. So as these things are without contradiction, and could not otherwise be.  153
  ¶ 226 We proceed now to that knowledge which considereth of the Appetite 227 and Will of Man; whereof Salomon saith, Ante omnia, fili, custodi cor tuum; nam inde procedunt actiones vitæ: [keep thy heart with all diligence, for thereout come the actions of thy life]. In the handling of this science, those which have written seem to me to have done as if a man that professeth to teach to write did only exhibit fair copies of alphabets and letters joined, without giving any precepts or directions for the carriage of the hand and framing of the letters. So have they made good and fair exemplars and copies, carrying the draughts and portraitures of Good, Virtue, Duty, Felicity; propounding them well described as the true objects and scopes of man’s will and desires; but how to attain these excellent marks, and how to frame and subdue the will of man to become true and conformable to these pursuits, they pass it over altogether, or slightly and unprofitably. For it is not the disputing that moral virtues are in the mind of man by habit and not by nature, or the distinguishing that generous spirits are won by doctrines and persuasions, and the vulgar sort by reward and punishment, 228 and the like scattered glances and touches, that can excuse the absence of this part.  154
  The reason of this omission I suppose to be that hidden rock whereupon both this and many other barks of knowledge have been cast away; which is, that men have despised to be conversant in ordinary and common matters; the judicious direction whereof nevertheless is the wisest doctrine (for life consisteth not in novelties nor subtilities); but contrariwise they have compounded sciences chiefly of a certain resplendent or lustrous mass of matter, chosen to give glory either to the subtility of disputations or to the eloquence of discourses. But Seneca giveth an excellent check to eloquence; Nocet illis eloquentia, quibus non rerum cupiditatem facit, sed sui: [eloquence does mischief when it draws men’s attention away from the matter to fix it on itself]. Doctrines should be such as should make men in love with the lesson, and not with the teacher; being directed to the auditor’s benefit, and not to the author’s commendation: and therefore those are of the right kind which may be concluded as Demosthenes concludes his counsel, Quæ si feceritis, non oratorem duntaxat in præsentia laudabitis, sed vosmetipsos etiam non ita multo post statu rerum vestrarum meliore: [if you follow this advice you will do a grace to yourselves no less than to the speaker,—to him by your vote to-day, to yourselves by the improvement which you will presently find in your affairs.]  155
  Neither needed men of so excellent parts to have despaired of a fortune which the poet Virgil promised himself, (and indeed obtained,) who got as much glory of eloquence, wit, and learning in the expressing of the observations of husbandry, as of the heroical acts of Æneas:—
        Nec sum animi dubius, verbis ea vincere magnum
Quam sit, et angustis his addere rebus honorem.
[How hard the task alas full well I know
With charm of words to grace a theme so low.]
  And surely if the purpose be in good earnest not to write at leisure that which men may read at leisure, but really to instruct and suborn action and active life, these Georgics of the mind, concerning the husbandry and tillage thereof, are no less worthy than the heroical descriptions of Virtue, Duty, and Felicity. Wherefore the main and primitive division of moral knowledge seemeth to be into the Exemplar or Platform of Good, and the Regiment or Culture of the Mind; the one describing the nature of good, the other prescribing rules how to subdue, apply, and accommodate the will of man thereunto.  157
  The doctrine touching the Platform or Nature of Good considereth it either Simple or Compared; either the kinds of good, or the degrees of good: in the later whereof those infinite disputations which were touching the supreme degree thereof, which they term felicity, beatitude, or the highest good, the doctrines concerning which were as the heathen divinity, are by the Christian faith discharged. And as Aristotle saith, That young men may be happy, but not otherwise but by hope; so we must all acknowledge our minority, and embrace the felicity which is by hope of the future world.  158
  Freed therefore and delivered from this doctrine of the philosophers’ heaven, whereby they feigned a higher elevation of man’s nature than was, (for we see in what height of style Seneca writeth, Vere magnum, habere fragilitatem hominis, securitatem Dei, [it is true greatness to have in one the frailty of a man and the security of a God,]) we may with more sobriety and truth receive the rest of their inquiries and labours. Wherein for the Nature of Good Positive or Simple, they have set it down excellently, in describing the forms of Virtue and Duty, with their situations and postures, in distributing them into their kinds, parts, provinces, actions, and administrations, and the like: nay farther, they have commended them to man’s nature and spirit with great quickness of argument and beauty of persuasions; yea, and fortified and intrenched them (as much as discourse can do) against corrupt and popular opinions. Again, for the Degrees and Comparative Nature of Good, they have also excellently handled it in their triplicity of Good, in the comparisons between a contemplative and an active life, in the distinction between virtue with reluctation and virtue secured, in their encounters between honesty and profit, in their balancing of virtue with virtue, and the like; so as this part deserveth to be reported for excellently laboured. 229  159
  Notwithstanding, if before they had comen to the popular and received notions of virtue and vice, pleasure and pain, and the rest, they had stayed a little longer upon the inquiry concerning the roots of good and evil, and the strings of those roots, they had given, in my opinion, a great light to that which followed; and specially if they had consulted with nature, they had made their doctrines less prolix and more profound; which being by them in part omitted and in part handled with much confusion, we will endeavour to resume and open in a more clear manner.  160
  There is formed in every thing a double nature of good: the one, as every thing is a total or substantive in itself; the other, as it is a part or member of a greater body; whereof the later is in degree the greater and the worthier, because it tendeth to the conservation of a more general form. Therefore we see the iron in particular sympathy moveth to the loadstone; but yet if it exceed a certain quantity, it forsaketh the affection to the loadstone, and like a good patriot moveth to the earth, which is the region and country of massy bodies; so may we go forward, and see that water and massy bodies move to the centre of the earth; but rather than to suffer a divulsion in the continuance of nature, they will move upwards from the centre of the earth, forsaking their duty to the earth in regard of their duty to the world. This double nature of good, and the comparative thereof, is much more engraven upon man, if he degenerate not; unto whom the conservation of duty to the public ought to be much more precious than the conservation of life and being: according to that memorable speech of Pompeius Magnus, when being in commission of purveyance for a famine at Rome, and being dissuaded with great vehemency and instance by his friends about him that he should not hazard himself to sea in an extremity of weather, he said only to them, Necesse est ut eam, non ut vivam: [it is needful that I go, not that I live]. But it may be truly affirmed that there was never any philosophy, religion, or other discipline, which did so plainly and highly exalt the good which is communicative, and depress the good which is private and particular, as the Holy Faith; well declaring, that it was the same God that gave the Christian law to men, who gave those laws of nature to inanimate creatures that we spake of before; for we read that the elected saints of God have wished themselves anathematized and razed out of the book of life, in an ecstasy of charity and infinite feeling of communion.  161
  This being set down and strongly planted, doth judge and determine most of the controversies wherein Moral Philosophy is conversant. For first it decideth the question touching the preferment of the contemplative or active life, and decideth it against Aristotle. For all the reasons which he bringeth for the contemplative are private, and respecting the pleasure and dignity of a man’s self, (in which respects no question the contemplative life hath the pre-eminence:) not much unlike to that comparison which Pythagoras made for the gracing and magnifying of philosophy and contemplation; who being asked what he was, answered, That if Hiero were ever at the Olympian games, he knew the manner, that some came to try their fortune for the prizes, and some came as merchants to utter their commodities, and some came to make good cheer and meet their friends, and some came to look on; and that he was one of them that came to look on. But men must know, that in this theatre of man’s life it is reserved only for God and Angels to be lookers on. Neither could the like question ever have been received in the church, notwithstanding their Pretiosa in oculis Domini mors sanctorum ejus, [precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of his saints,] by which place they would exalt their civil death and regular professions, but upon this defence, that the monastical life is not simple 230 contemplative, but performeth the duty either of incessant prayers and supplications, which hath been truly esteemed as an office in the church, or else of writing or taking 231 instructions for writing concerning the law of God, as Moses did when he abode so long in the mount. And so we see Henoch the seventh from Adam, who was the first Contemplative and walked with God, yet did also endow the church with prophecy, which St. Jude citeth. But for contemplation which should be finished in itself without casting beams upon society, assuredly divinity knoweth it not.  162
  It decideth also the controversies between Zeno and Socrates, and their schools and successions on the one side, who placed felicity in virtue simply or attended; the actions and exercises whereof do chiefly embrace and concern society; and on the other side, 232 the Cyrenaics and Epicureans, who placed it in pleasure, and made virtue (as it is used in some comedies of errors, wherein the mistress and the maid change habits,) to be but as a servant, without which pleasure cannot be served and attended; and the reformed school of the Epicureans, which placed it in serenity of mind and freedom from perturbation; as if they would have deposed Jupiter again, and restored Saturn and the first age, when there was no summer nor winter, spring nor autumn, but all after one air and season; and Herillus, 233 which placed felicity in extinguishment of the disputes of the mind, making no fixed nature of good and evil, esteeming things according to the clearness of the desires, or the reluctation; 234 which opinion was revived in the heresy of the Anabaptists, measuring things according to the motions of the spirit, and the constancy or wavering of belief: all which are manifest to tend to private repose and contentment, and not to point of society.  163
  It censureth also the philosophy of Epictetus, which presupposeth that felicity must be placed in those things which are in our power, lest we be liable to fortune and disturbance: as if it were not a thing much more happy to fail in good and virtuous ends for the public, than to obtain all that we can wish to ourselves in our proper fortune; as Consalvo said to his soldiers, shewing them Naples, and protesting he had rather die one foot forwards than to have his life secured for long by one foot of retreat; whereunto the wisdom of that heavenly leader hath signed, who hath affirmed that a good conscience is a continual feast: shewing plainly that the conscience of good intentions, howsoever succeeding, is a more continual joy to nature than all the provision which can be made for security and repose.  164
  It censureth likewise that abuse of philosophy which grew general about the time of Epictetus, in converting it into an occupation or profession; as if the purpose had been, not to resist and extinguish perturbations, but to fly and avoid the causes of them, and to shape a particular kind and course of life to that end; introducing such a health of mind, as was that health of body of which Aristotle speaketh of Herodicus, who did nothing all his life long but intend his health: whereas if men refer themselves to duties of society, as that health of body is best which is ablest to endure all alterations and extremities, so likewise that health of mind is most proper 235 which can go through the greatest temptations and perturbations. So as Diogenes’ opinion is to be accepted, who commended not them which abstained, but them which sustained, and could refrain their mind in præcipitio, and could give unto the mind (as is used in horsemanship) the shortest stop or turn.  165
  Lastly, it censureth the tenderness and want of application 236 in some of the most ancient and reverend philosophers and philosophical men, that did retire too easily from civil business, for avoiding of indignities and perturbations; whereas the resolution of men truly moral ought to be such as the same Consalvo said the honour of a soldier should be, e telâ crassiore, [of a stouter web,] and not so fine as that every thing should catch in it and endanger it.  166
  ¶ 237 To resume Private or Particular Good, it falleth into the division of Good Active and Passive: for this difference of Good (not unlike to that which amongst the Romans was expressed in the familiar or household terms of Promus and Condus) is formed also in all things; and is best disclosed in the two several appetites in creatures, the one to preserve or continue themselves, and the other to dilate or multiply themselves; whereof the later seemeth to be the worthier. For in nature, the heavens, which are the more worthy, are the agent; and the earth, which is the less worthy, is the patient. In the pleasures of living creatures, that of generation is greater than that of food. In divine doctrine, Beatius est dare quam accipere: [it is more blessed to give than to receive]. And in life, there is no man’s spirit so soft, but esteemeth the effecting of somewhat that he hath fixed in his desire more than sensuality. Which priority of the Active Good is much upheld by the consideration of our estate to be mortal and exposed to fortune; for if we might have a perpetuity and certainty in our pleasures, the state 238 of them would advance their price; but when we see it is but Magni æstimamus mori tardius, [we think it a great matter to be a little longer in dying,] and Ne glorieris de crastino, nescis partum diei, [boast not thyself of to-morrow, thou knowest not what the day may bring forth,] it maketh us to desire to have somewhat secured and exempted from time; which are only our deeds and works; as it is said Opera eorum sequuntur eos: [their works follow them]. The pre-eminence likewise of this Active Good is upheld by the affection which is natural in man towards variety and proceeding; which in the pleasures of the sense (which is the principal part of Passive Good) can have no great latitude: Cogita quamdiu eadem feceris; cibus, somnus, ludus; per hunc circulum curritur; mori velle non tantum fortis, aut miser, aut prudens, sed etiam fastidiosus potest: [if you consider, says Seneca, how often you do the same thing over and over; food sleep exercise, and then food sleep exercise again, and so round and round; you will think that there needs neither fortitude nor misery nor wisdom to reconcile a man to death; one might wish to die for mere weariness of being alive]. But in enterprises, pursuits, and purposes of life, there is much variety; whereof men are sensible with pleasure in their inceptions, progressions, recoils, reintegrations, approaches, and attainings to their ends: so as it was well said, Vita sine proposito languida et vaga est: [life without an object to pursue is a languid and tiresome thing]. Neither hath this Active Good any 239 identity with the good of society, though in some case it hath an incidence into it: for although it do many times bring forth acts of beneficence, yet it is with a respect private to a man’s own power, glory, amplification, continuance; as appeareth plainly when it findeth a contrary subject. For that gigantine state of mind which possesseth the troublers of the world, such as was Lucius Sylla, and infinite other in smaller model, who would have all men happy or unhappy as they were their friends or enemies, and would give form to the world, according to their own humours, (which is the true Theomachy,) pretendeth and aspireth to active good, 240 though it recedeth furthest from good of society, which we have determined to be the greater.  167
  To resume Passive Good, it receiveth a subdivision of Conservative and Perfective. For let us take a brief review of that which we have said: we have spoken first of the Good of Society, the intention whereof embraceth the form of Human Nature, whereof we are members and portions, and not our own proper and individual form; we have spoken of Active Good, and supposed it as a part of Private and Particular Good; and rightly; 241 for there is impressed upon all things a triple desire or appetite proceeding from love to themselves; one of preserving and continuing their form; another of advancing and perfecting their form; and a third of multiplying and extending their form upon other things; whereof the multiplying or signature of it upon other things is that which we handled by the name of Active Good. So as there remaineth the conserving of it, and perfecting or raising of it; which later is the highest degree of Passive Good. For to preserve in state is the less, to preserve with advancement is the greater. So in man,
        Igneus est ollis vigor, et cœlestis origo. 242
[The living fire that glows those seeds within
Remembers its celestial origin.]
His approach or assumption to divine or angelical nature is the perfection of his form; the error or false imitation of which good is that which is the tempest of human life; while man, upon the instinct of an advancement formal and essential, is carried to seek an advancement local. For as those which are sick, and find no remedy, do tumble up and down and change place, as if by a remove local they could obtain a remove internal; so is it with men in ambition, when failing of the mean to exalt their nature, they are in a perpetual estuation to exalt their place. So then Passive Good is, as was said, either Conservative or Perfective.
  To resume the good of Conservation or Comfort, which consisteth in the fruition of that which is agreeable to our natures; it seemeth to be most pure and natural of pleasures, but yet the softest and lowest. And this also receiveth a difference, which hath neither been well judged of nor well enquired. For the good of fruition or contentment is placed either in the sincereness of the fruition, or in the quickness and vigour of it; the one superinduced by the equality, the other by vicissitude; the one having less mixture of evil, the other more impression of good. Whether of these is the greater good, is a question controverted; but whether man’s nature may not be capable of both, is a question not enquired.  169
  The former question being debated between Socrates and a Sophist, Socrates placing felicity in an equal and constant peace of mind, and the Sophist in much desiring and much enjoying, they fell from argument to ill words: the Sophist saying that Socrates’ felicity was the felicity of a block or stone; and Socrates saying that the Sophist’s felicity was the felicity of one that had the itch, who did nothing but itch and scratch. And both these opinions do not want their supports. For the opinion of Socrates is much upheld by the general consent even of the Epicures themselves, that virtue beareth a great part in felicity; and if so, certain it is that virtue hath more use in clearing perturbations than in compassing desires. The Sophist’s opinion is much favoured by the assertion we last spake of, that good of advancement is greater than good of simple preservation; because every obtaining a desire hath a shew of advancement, 243 as motion though in a circle hath a shew of progression.  170
  But the second question, decided the true way, maketh the former superfluous. For can it be doubted but that there are some who take more pleasure in enjoying pleasures than some other, and yet nevertheless are less troubled with the loss or leaving of them? so as this same Non uti ut non appetas, non appetere ut non metuas, sunt animi pusilli et diffidentis: [to abstain from the use of a thing that you may not feel a want of it; to shun the want that you may not fear the loss of it; are the precautions of pusillanimity and cowardice 244]. And it seemeth to me, that most of the doctrines of the philosophers are more fearful and cautionary than the nature of things requireth. So have they increased the fear of death in offering to cure it. For when they would have a man’s whole life to be but a discipline or preparation to die, they must needs make men think that it is a terrible enemy against whom there is no end of preparing. Better saith the poet:
        Qui finem vitæ extremum inter munera ponat
[the end of life is to be counted among the boons of nature]. So have they sought to make men’s minds too uniform and harmonical, by not breaking them sufficiently to contrary motions: the reason whereof I suppose to be, because they themselves were men dedicated to a private, free, and unapplied course of life. For as we see, upon the lute or like instrument, a ground, though it be sweet and have shew of many changes, yet breaketh not the hand to such strange and hard stops and passages, as a set song or voluntary; much after the same manner was the diversity between a philosophical and a civil life. 245 And therefore men are to imitate the wisdom of jewellers; who, if there be a grain or a cloud or an ice which may be ground forth without taking too much of the stone, they help it; but if it should lessen and abate the stone too much, they will not meddle with it: so ought men so to procure serenity as they destroy not magnanimity.
  Having therefore deduced the Good of Man which is Private and Particular as far as seemeth fit, we will now return to that good of man which respecteth and beholdeth society, which we may term Duty; because the term of Duty is more proper to a mind well framed and disposed towards others, as the term of Virtue is applied to a mind well formed and composed in itself; though neither can a man understand Virtue without some relation to society, nor Duty without an inward disposition. This part may seem at first to pertain to science civil and politic; but not if it be well observed. For it concerneth the regiment and government of every man over himself, and not over others. And as in architecture the direction of framing the posts, beams, and other parts of building, is not the same with the manner of joining them and erecting the building; and in mechanicals, the direction how to frame an instrument or engine, is not the same with the manner of setting it on work and employing it; and yet nevertheless in expressing of the one you incidently express the aptness towards the other; so the doctrine of conjugation of men in society differeth from that of their conformity thereunto. 246  172
  This part of Duty is subdivided into two parts; the common duty of every man, as a man or member of a state; the other, the respective or special duty of every man, in his profession, vocation, and place. The first of these is extant and well laboured, as hath been said. The second likewise I may report rather dispersed than deficient; which manner of dispersed writing in this kind of argument I acknowledge to be best. For who can take upon him to write of the proper duty, virtue, challenge, and right of every several vocation, profession and place? For although sometimes a looker on may see more than a gamester, and there be a proverb more arrogant than sound, That the vale best discovereth the hill; yet there is small doubt but that men can write best and most really and materially in their own professions; and that the writing of speculative men of active matter for the most part doth seem to men of experience, as Phormio’s argument of the wars seemed to Hannibal, to be but dreams and dotage. Only there is one vice which accompanieth them that write in their own professions, that they magnify them in excess. But generally it were to be wished (as that which would make learning indeed solid and fruitful) that active men would or could become writers.  173
  In which kind I cannot but mention, honoris causa, your Majesty’s excellent book touching the duty of a king: a work richly compounded of divinity, morality, and policy, with great aspersion of all other arts; and being in mine opinion one of the most sound and healthful writings that I have read; not distempered in the heat of invention, nor in the coldness of negligence; not sick of dizziness, 247 as those are who leese themselves in their order; nor of convulsions, 248 as those which cramp in matters impertinent; not savouring of perfumes and paintings, as those do who seek to please the reader more than nature 249 beareth; and chiefly well disposed in the spirits thereof, being agreeable to truth and apt for action; and far removed from that natural infirmity, whereunto I noted those that write in their own professions to be subject, which is, that they exalt it above measure. For your Majesty hath truly described, not a king of Assyria or Persia in their extern glory, but a Moses or a David, pastors of their people. Neither can I ever leese out of my remembrance what I heard your Majesty in the same sacred spirit of government deliver in a great cause of judicature, which was, That Kings ruled by their laws as God did by the laws of nature, and ought as rarely to put in use their supreme prerogative as God doth his power of working miracles. And yet notwithstanding, in your book of a free monarchy, you do well give men to understand, that you know the plenitude of the power and right of a King, as well as the circle of his office and duty. Thus have I presumed to allege this excellent writing of your Majesty, as a prime or eminent example of tractates concerning special and respective duties; wherein I should have said as much, if it had been written a thousand years since. Neither am I moved with certain courtly decencies, which esteem it flattery to praise in presence. No, it is flattery to praise in absence; that is, when either the virtue is absent, or the occasion is absent; and so the praise is not natural, but forced, either in truth or in time. But let Cicero be read in his oration pro Marcello, which is nothing but an excellent table of Cæsar’s virtue, and made to his face; besides the example of many other excellent persons, wiser a great deal than such observers; 250 and we will never doubt, upon a full occasion, to give just praises to present or absent.  174
  But to return: there belongeth further to the handling of this part 251 touching the duties of professions and vocations, a Relative or opposite, touching the frauds, cautels, impostures, and vices of every profession; which hath been likewise handled: but how? rather in a satire and cynically, than seriously and wisely: for men have rather sought by wit to deride and traduce much of that which is good in professions, than with judgment to discover and sever that which is corrupt. For, as Salomon saith, He that cometh to seek after knowledge with a mind to scorn and censure, shall be sure to find matter for his humour, but no matter for his instruction: Quærenti derisori scientiam ipsa se abscondit; sed studioso fit obviam. But the managing of this argument with integrity and truth, which I note as deficient, seemeth to me to be one of the best fortifications for honesty and virtue that can be planted. For as the fable goeth of the Basilisk, that if he see you first you die for it, but if you see him first he dieth; so is it with deceits and evil arts; which if they be first espied they leese their life, but if they prevent they endanger. So that we are much beholden to Machiavel and others, that write what men do and not what they ought to do. For it is not possible to join serpentine wisdom with the columbine innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the serpent; his baseness and going upon his belly, his volubility and lubricity, his envy and sting, and the rest; that is, all forms and natures of evil. For without this, virtue lieth open and unfenced. Nay an honest man can do no good upon those that are wicked to reclaim them, without the help of the knowledge of evil. For men of corrupted minds presuppose that honesty groweth out of simplicity of manners, and believing of preachers, school-masters, and men’s exterior language: so as, except you can make them perceive that you know the utmost reaches of their own corrupt opinions, they despise all morality. Non recipit stultus verba prudentiæ, nisi ea dixeris quæ versantur in corde ejus: [the fool will not listen to the words of the wise, unless you first tell him what is in his own heart]. 252  175
  Unto this part touching Respective Duty doth also appertain the duties between husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant: so likewise the laws of friendship and gratitude, the civil bond of companies, colleges, and politic bodies, of neighbourhood, and all other proportionate duties; not as they are parts of government and society, but as to the framing of the mind of particular persons.  176
  The knowledge concerning good respecting Society doth handle it also not simply alone, but comparatively; whereunto belongeth the weighing of duties between person and person, case and case, particular and public: as we see in the proceeding 253 of Lucius Brutus against his own sons, which was so much extolled; yet what was said?
        Infelix, utcunque ferent ea facta 254 minores:
[unhappy man! whatever judgment posterity shall pass upon that deed, &c.]. So the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both sides. Again, we see when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper certain whose opinions they meant to feel, whether they were fit to be made their associates, and cast forth the question touching the killing of a tyrant being an usurper, they were divided in opinion; some holding that servitude was the extreme of evils, and others that tyranny was better than a civil war: and a number of the like cases there are of comparative duty. Amongst which that of all others is the most frequent, where the question is of a great deal of good to ensue of a small injustice. Which Jason of Thessalia determined against the truth: Aliqua sunt injuste facienda, ut multa juste fieri possint: [that there may be justice in many things there must be injustice in some]. But the reply is good, Authorem præsentis justitiæ habes, sponsorem futuræ non habes: [the justice that is to be done now is in your power, but where is your security for that which is to be done hereafter?] Men must pursue things which are just in present, and leave the future to the divine Providence. So then we pass on from this general part touching the exemplar and description of good.
  ¶ 255 De Cultura Animi. Now therefore that we have spoken of this fruit of life, it remaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth thereunto; without which part the former seemeth to be no better than a fair image or statua, which is beautiful to contemplate, but is without life and motion: whereunto Aristotle himself subscribeth in these words: Necesse est scilicet de virtute dicere, et quid sit, et ex quibus gignatur. Inutile enim fere fuerit virtutem quidem nosse, acquirendæ autem ejus modos et vias ignorare. Non enim de virtute tantum, qua specie sit, quærendum est, sed et quomodo sui copiam faciat: utrumque enim volumus, et rem ipsam nosse, et ejus compotes fieri: hoc autem ex voto non succedet, nisi sciamus et ex quibus et quomodo: [it is necessary to determine concerning Virtue not only what it is but whence it proceeds. For there would be no use in knowing Virtue without knowing the ways and means of acquiring it. For we have to consider not only what it is, but how it is to be had. For we want both to know virtue and to be virtuous; which we cannot be without knowing both the whence and the how]. In such full words and with such iteration doth he inculcate this part. So saith Cicero in great commendation of Cato the second, that he had applied himself to philosophy non ita disputandi causa, sed ita vivendi: [not that he might talk like a philosopher, but that he might live like one]. And although the neglect of our times, wherein few men do hold any consultations touching the reformation of their life, (as Seneca excellently saith, De partibus vitæ quisque deliberat, de summâ nemo,) [every man takes thought about the parts of his life, no man about the whole,] may make this part seem superfluous; yet I must conclude with that aphorism of Hippocrates, Qui gravi morbo correpti dolores non sentiunt, iis mens ægrotat; [they that are sick and yet feel no pain are sick in their minds;] they need medicine not only to assuage the disease but to awake the sense. And if it be said that the cure of men’s minds belongeth to sacred Divinity, it is most true: but yet Moral Philosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise servant and humble handmaid. For as the Psalm saith, that the eyes of the handmaid look perpetually towards the mistress, and yet no doubt many things are left to the discretion of the handmaid to discern of the mistress’ will; so ought Moral Philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines of Divinity, and yet so as it may yield of herself (within due limits) many sound and profitable directions.  178
  This part therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I cannot but find exceeding strange that it is not reduced to written inquiry; the rather because it consisteth of much matter wherein both speech and action is often conversant, and such wherein the common talk of men (which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass) is wiser than their books. It is reasonable therefore that we propound it in the more particularity, both for the worthiness, and because we may acquit ourselves for reporting it deficient; which seemeth almost incredible, and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those themselves that have written. We will therefore enumerate some heads or points thereof, that it may appear the better what it is, and whether it be extant.  179
  First therefore, in this, as in all things which are practical, we ought to cast up our account, what is in our power and what not; for the one may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by way of application only. The husbandman cannot command neither the nature of the earth nor the seasons of the weather; no more can the physician the constitution of the patient nor the variety of accidents. So in the culture and cure of the mind of man, two things are without our command; points of nature, and points of fortune; for to the basis of the one, and the conditions of the other, our work is limited and tied. In these things therefore it is left unto us to proceed by application:
        Vincenda est omnis fortuna ferendo:
[all fortune may be overcome by endurance or suffering;] and so likewise,
        Vincenda est omnis natura ferendo:
[all nature may be overcome by suffering]. But when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull and neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering, which draweth and contriveth use and advantage out of that which seemeth adverse and contrary; which is that properly which we call Accommodating or Applying. 256 Now the wisdom of application resteth principally in the exact and distinct knowledge of the precedent state or disposition unto which we do apply: for we cannot fit a garment, except we first take measure of the body.
  So then the first article of this knowledge is to set down sound and true distributions and descriptions of the several characters and tempers of men’s natures and dispositions, specially having regard to those differences which are most radical in being the fountains and causes of the rest, or most frequent in concurrence or commixture; 257 wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in passage, the better to describe the mediocrities of virtues, that can satisfy this intention; for if it deserve to be considered, that there are minds which are proportioned to great matters, and others to small, (which Aristotle handleth or ought to have handled by the name of Magnanimity,) doth it not deserve as well to be considered, that there are minds proportioned to intend many matters, and others to few? 258 So that some can divide themselves, others can perchance do exactly well, but it must be but in few things at once; and so there cometh to be a narrowness of mind, as well as a pusillanimity. And again, that some minds are proportioned to that which may be dispatched at once, or within a short return of time; others to that which begins afar off, and is to be won with length of pursuit;
        Jam tum tenditque fovetque:
[he begins to attend and nurse his project while it is yet in the cradle;] so that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity; which is commonly also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So further deserved it to be considered by Aristotle, that there is a disposition in conversation (supposing it in things which do in no sort touch or concern a man’s self) to soothe and please, and a disposition contrary to contradict and cross; and deserveth it not much better to be considered, that there is a disposition, not in conversation or talk but in matter of more serious nature, (and supposing it still in things merely indifferent,) to take pleasure in the good of another, and a disposition contrariwise to take distaste at the good of another; which is that property 259 which we call good-nature or ill-nature, benignity or malignity? And therefore I cannot sufficiently marvel that this part of knowledge touching the several characters of natures and dispositions should be omitted both in morality and policy, considering it is of so great ministery and suppeditation to them both. A man shall find in the traditions of astrology some pretty and apt divisions of men’s natures, according to the predominances of the planets; lovers of quiet, lovers of action, lovers of victory, lovers of honour, lovers of pleasure, lovers of arts, lovers of change, and so forth. A man shall find in the wisest sort of these Relations which the Italians make touching Conclaves, the natures of the several Cardinals handsomely and lively painted forth. A man shall meet with in every day’s conference the denominations of sensitive, dry, formal, real, humorous, certain, huomo di prima impressione, huomo di ultima impressione, and the like: 260 and yet nevertheless this kind of observations wandereth in words, but is 261 not fixed in inquiry. For the distinctions are found (many of them), but we conclude no precepts upon them; wherein our fault is the greater, because both history, poesy, and daily experience are as goodly fields where these observations grow; whereof we make a few posies to hold in our hands, but no man bringeth them to the confectionary, that receits might be made of them for use of life. 262
  Of much like kind are those impressions of nature, which are imposed upon the mind by the sex, by the age, by the region, by health and sickness, by beauty and deformity, and the like, which are inherent and not extern; and again those which are caused by extern fortune; as sovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches, want, magistracy, privateness, prosperity, adversity, constant fortune, variable fortune, rising per saltum, per gradus, and the like. And therefore we see that Plautus maketh it a wonder to see an old man beneficent; benignitas hujus ut adolescentuli est: [he is as generous as if he were a young man:] St. Paul concludeth that severity of discipline was to be used to the Cretans, Increpa eos dure, [rebuke them sharply,] upon the disposition of their country; Cretenses semper mendaces, malæ bestiæ, ventres pigri: [the Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, slow bellies:] Sallust noteth that it is usual with Kings to desire contradictories; Sed plerumque regiæ voluntates, ut vehementes sunt, sic mobiles, sæpeque ipsæ sibi adversæ: [royal desires, as they are violent, so are they changeable, and often incompatible with each other:] Tacitus observeth how rarely raising of the fortune mendeth the disposition; Solus Vespasianus mutatus in melius: [Vespasian the only one of the emperors that changed for the better:] Pindarus maketh an observation that great and sudden fortune for the most part defeateth men; 263 Qui magnam felicitatem concoquere non possunt: [that cannot digest great felicity:] so the Psalm showeth it is more easy to keep a measure in the enjoying 264 of fortune than in the increase of fortune; Divitiæ si affluant, nolite cor apponere: [if riches increase set not your heart upon them]. These observations and the like I deny not but are touched a little by Aristotle as in passage in his Rhetorics, and are handled in some scattered discourses; but they were never incorporate into Moral Philosophy, to which they do essentially appertain; as the knowledge of the diversity of grounds and moulds doth to agriculture, and the knowledge of the diversity of complexions and constitutions doth to the physician; except we mean to follow the indiscretion of empirics, which minister the same medicines to all patients.  182
  Another article of this knowledge is the inquiry touching the affections; for as in medicining of the body it is in order first to know the divers complexions and constitutions, secondly the diseases, and lastly the cures; so in medicining of the mind, after knowledge of the divers characters of men’s natures, it followeth in order to know the diseases and infirmities of the mind, which are no other than the perturbations and distempers of the affections. For as the ancient politiques 265 in popular estates were wont to compare the people to the sea and the orators to the winds, because as the sea would of itself be calm and quiet if the winds did not move and trouble it, so the people would be peaceable and tractable if the seditious orators did not set them in working and agitation; so it may be fitly said, that the mind in the nature thereof would be temperate and stayed, if the affections, as winds, did not put it into tumult and perturbation. And here again I find strange, as before, that Aristotle should have written divers volumes of Ethics, and never handled the affections, which is the principal subject thereof; and yet in his Rhetorics, where they are considered but collaterally and in a second degree (as they may be moved by speech), he findeth place for them, and handleth them well for the quantity; but where their true place is, he pretermitteth them. For it is not his disputations about pleasure and pain that can satisfy this inquiry, no more than he that should generally handle the nature of light can be said to handle the nature of colours; for pleasure and pain are to the particular affections as light is to particular colours. Better travails I suppose had the Stoics taken in this argument, as far as I can gather by that which we have at second hand: but yet it is like it was after their manner, rather in subtilty of definitions (which in a subject of this nature are but curiosities) than in active and ample descriptions and observations. So likewise I find some particular writings of an elegant nature touching some of the affections; as of anger, of comfort upon adverse accidents, 266 of tenderness of countenance, 267 and other. But the poets and writers of histories are the best doctors of this knowledge; where we may find painted forth with great life, how affections are kindled and incited; and how pacified and refrained; and how again contained from act and further degree; how they disclose themselves, how they work, how they vary, how they gather and fortify, 268 how they are inwrapped one within another, and how they do fight and encounter one with another, and other the like particularities: amongst the which this last is of special use in moral and civil matters; how (I say) to set affection against affection, and to master one by another; even as we used to hunt beast with beast and fly bird with bird, which otherwise percase we could not so easily recover: upon which foundation is erected that excellent use of præmium and pœna, whereby civil states consist; employing the predominant affections of fear and hope, for the suppressing and bridling the rest. For as in the government of states it is sometimes necessary to bridle one faction with another, so it is in the government within.  183
  Now come we to those points which are within our own command, and have force and operation upon the mind to affect the will and appetite and to alter manners: wherein they ought to have handled custom, exercise, habit, education, example, imitation, emulation, company, friends, praise, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, studies: these as 269 they have determinate use in moralities, from these the mind suffereth, and of these are such receipts and regiments compounded and described, as may seem to recover or preserve the health and good estate of the mind, as far as pertaineth to human medicine: of which number we will visit 270 upon some one or two as an example of the rest, because it were too long to prosecute all; and therefore we do resume Custom and Habit to speak of.  184
  The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent opinion, that of those things which consist by nature nothing can be changed by custom; using for example, that if a stone be thrown ten thousand times up, it will not learn to ascend; and that by often seeing or hearing, we do not learn to see or hear the better. For though this principle be true in things wherein nature is peremptory, (the reason whereof we cannot now stand to discuss,) yet it is otherwise in things wherein nature admitteth a latitude. For he might see that a strait glove will come more easily on with use, and that a wand will by use bend otherwise than it grew, and that by use of the voice we speak louder and stronger, and that by use of enduring heat or cold we endure it the better, and the like: which later sort have a nearer resemblance unto that subject of manners he handleth than those instances which he allegeth. But allowing his conclusion, that virtues and vices consist in habit, he ought so much the more to have taught the manner of superinducing that habit: for there be many precepts of the wise ordering the exercises of the mind, as there is of ordering the exercises of the body; whereof we will recite a few.  185
  The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the first either too high a strain or too weak: for if too high, in a diffident 271 nature you discourage; in a confident nature you breed an opinion of facility, and so a sloth; and in all natures you breed a further expectation than can hold out, and so an insatisfaction 272 on the end: if too weak of the other side, you may not look to perform and overcome any great task.  186
  Another precept is, to practise all things chiefly at two several times, the one when the mind is best disposed, the other when it is worst disposed; that by the one you may gain a great step, by the other you may work out the knots and stonds of the mind, and make the middle times the more easy 273 and pleasant.  187
  Another precept is, that which Aristotle mentioneth by the way, which is to bear ever towards the contrary extreme of that whereunto we are by nature inclined: like unto the rowing against the stream, or making a wand straight by bending 274 him contrary to his natural crookedness.  188
  Another precept is, that the mind is brought to any thing better, and with more sweetness and happiness, if that whereunto you pretend be not first in the intention, but tanquam aliud agendo, because of the natural hatred of the mind against necessity and constraint. Many other axioms there are touching the managing of Exercise and Custom; which being so conducted, doth prove indeed another nature; but being governed by chance, doth commonly prove but an ape of nature, and bringeth forth that which is lame and counterfeit.  189
  So if we should handle books and studies, and what influence and operation they have upon manners, are there not divers precepts of great caution and direction appertaining thereunto? Did not one of the fathers in great indignation call Poesy vinum dæmonum, because it increaseth temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions? Is not the opinion of Aristotle worthy to be regarded, wherein he saith that young men are no fit auditors of moral philosophy, 275 because they are not settled from the boiling heat of their affections, nor attempered with time and experience? And doth it not hereof come, that those excellent books and discourses of the ancient writers (whereby they have persuaded unto virtue most effectually, by representing her in state and majesty, and popular opinions against virtue in their parasites’ coats, fit to be scorned and derided,) are of so little effect towards honesty of life, because they are not read and revolved by men in their mature and settled years, but confined almost to boys and beginners? But is it not true also, that much less young men are fit auditors of matters of policy, till they have been throughly seasoned in religion and morality; lest their judgments be corrupted, and made apt to think that there are no true differences of things, but according to utility and fortune; as the verse describes it, Prosperum et felix scelus virtus vocatur; [a crime that is successful is called a virtue;] and again, Ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit, hic diadema; [the same crime is rewarded in one man with a gibbet and in another with a crown;] which the poets do speak satirically, and in indignation on virtue’s behalf; but books of policy do speak it seriously and positively; for so it pleaseth Machiavel to say, that if Cæsar had been overthrown he would have been more odious than ever was Catiline; as if there had been no difference but in fortune, between a very fury of lust and blood, and the most excellent spirit (his ambition reserved) of the world? Again, is there not a caution likewise to be given of the doctrines of moralities themselves (some kinds of them,) lest they make men too precise, arrogant, incompatible; as Cicero saith of Cato, In Marco Catone hæc bona quæ videmus divina et egregia, ipsius scitote esse propria; quæ nonnunquam requirimus, ea sunt omnia non a naturâ, sed a magistro: [his excellencies were his own, his defects came from the school-master]? Many other axioms and advices there are touching those proprieties and effects which studies do infuse and instil into manners. And so likewise is there touching the use of all those other points, of company, fame, laws, and the rest, which we recited in the beginning in the doctrine of morality.  190
  But there is a kind of Culture of the Mind that seemeth yet more accurate and elaborate than the rest, and is built upon this ground; that the minds of all men are at some times in a state more perfect, and at other times in a state more depraved. The purpose therefore of this practice 276 is to fix and cherish the good hours of the mind, and to obliterate and take forth the evil. The fixing of the good hath been practised by two means; vows or constant resolutions; and observances or exercises; which are not to be regarded so much in themselves, as because they keep the mind in continual obedience. The obliteration of the evil hath been practised by two means; some kind of redemption or expiation of that which is past; and an inception or account de novo for the time to come. But this part seemeth sacred and religious, and justly; for all good Moral Philosophy (as was said) is but a handmaid to religion.  191
  Wherefore we will conclude with that last point which is of all other means the most compendious and summary, and again the most noble and effectual, to the reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate; which is the electing and propounding unto a man’s self good and virtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his compass to attain. For if these two things be supposed, that a man set before him honest and good ends, and again that he be resolute, constant, and true unto them, it will follow that he shall mould himself into all virtue at once. And this is indeed like the work of nature; whereas the other course is like the work of the hand. For as when a carver makes an image, he shapes only that part whereupon he worketh; as if he be upon the face, that part which shall be the body is but a rude stone still, till such times as he comes to it; but contrariwise when nature makes a flower or living creature, she formeth rudiments of all the parts at one time; so in obtaining virtue by habit, while a man practiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to fortitude, nor the like; but when he dedicateth and applieth himself to good ends, look what virtue soever the pursuit and passage towards those ends doth commend unto him, he is invested of a precedent disposition to conform himself thereunto; which state of mind Aristotle doth excellently express himself, that it ought not to be called virtuous, but divine: his words are these: Immanitati autem consentaneum est opponere eam, quæ supra humanitatem est, heroicam sive divinam virtutem: and a little after, Nam ut feræ neque vitium neque virtus est, sic neque Dei: sed hic quidem status altius quiddam virtute est, ille aliud quiddam a vitio: [that which answers to the brutal degree of vice is the heroical or divine degree of virtue.… For as neither virtue nor vice can be predicated of a brute, so neither can it of a God: the divine condition being something higher than virtue, the brutal something different from vice]. And therefore we may see what celsitude of honour Plinius Secundus attributeth to Trajan in his funeral oration, 277 where he said, that men needed to make no other prayers to the gods, but that they would continue as good lords to them as Trajan had been; as if he had not been only an imitation of divine nature, but a pattern of it. But these be heathen and profane passages, having but a shadow of that divine state of mind which religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto, by imprinting upon their souls Charity, which is excellently called the bond of Perfection, because it comprehendeth and fasteneth all virtues together. And as 278 it is elegantly said by Menander of vain love, which is but a false imitation of divine love, Amor melior sophista lœvo ad humanam vitam, that love teacheth a man to carry himself better than the sophist or preceptor, which he calleth left-handed, because with all his rules and preceptions he cannot form a man so dexterously, nor with that facility to prize himself and govern himself, as love can do; so certainly if a man’s mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work him suddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrine of morality can do, which is but a sophist in comparison of the other. Nay further, as Xenophon observed truly that all other affections, though they raise the mind, yet they do it by distorting and uncomeliness of ecstasies or excesses; but only love doth exalt the mind, and nevertheless at the same instant doth settle and compose it; so in all other excellencies, though they advance nature, yet they are subject to excess; only charity admitteth no excess: for so we see, aspiring to be like God in power, the angels transgressed and fell; Ascendam, et ero similis Altissimo; [I will ascend and be like unto the Highest:] by aspiring to be like God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell; Eritis sicut Dii, scientes bonum et malum; [ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil;] but by aspiring to a similitude of God in goodness or love, neither man nor angel ever transgressed or shall transgress. For unto that imitation we are called: Diligite inimicos vestros, benefacite eis qui oderunt vos, et orate pro persequentibus et calumniantibus vos, ut sitis filii Patris vestri qui in cœlis est, qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos et malos, et pluit super justos et injustos; [love your enemies, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you; that ye may be the children of your Father which is in Heaven, who maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust]. So in the first platform of the divine nature itself, the heathen religion speaketh thus, Optimus Maximus, [Best and Greatest:] and the sacred Scriptures thus, Misericordia ejus super omnia opera ejus, [his mercy is over all his works].  192
  Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral knowledge, concerning the Culture and Regiment of the Mind; wherein if any man, considering the parts thereof which I have enumerated, do judge that my labour is but to collect into an Art or Science that which hath been pretermitted by others as matter of common sense and experience, he judgeth well. But as Philocrates sported with Demosthenes, You may not marvel (Athenians,) that Demosthenes and I do differ, for he drinketh water, and I drink wine; and like as we read of an ancient parable of the two gates of sleep,
        Sunt geminæ somni portæ: quarum altera fertur
Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris:
Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto,
Sed falsa ad cœlum mittunt insomnia manes:
[Two gates there are of sleep; of horn the one,
By which the true shades pass; of ivory
Burnished and white the other, but through it
Into the upper world false dreams are sent:]
so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a sure maxim in knowledge, that the more pleasant liquor (of wine) is the more vaporous, and the braver gate (of ivory) sendeth forth the falser dreams. 279
  But we have now concluded that general part of Human Philosophy, which contemplateth man segregate, and as he consisteth of body and spirit. Wherein we may further note, that there seemeth to be a relation or conformity between the good of the mind and the good of the body. For as we divided the good of the body into health, beauty, strength, and pleasure; so the good of the mind, inquired in rational and moral knowledges, 280 tendeth to this, to make the mind sound, and without perturbation; beautiful, and graced with decency; and strong and agile for all duties of life. These three, as in the body so in the mind, seldom meet, and commonly sever. For it is easy to observe that many have strength of wit and courage, but have neither health from perturbations, nor any beauty or decency in their doings: some again have an elegancy and fineness of carriage, which have neither soundness of honesty, nor substance of sufficiency: and some again have honest and reformed minds, that can neither become themselves nor manage business: and sometimes two of them meet, and rarely all three. As for pleasure, we have likewise determined that the mind ought not to be reduced to stupid, but to retain pleasure; confined rather in the subject of it, than in the strength and vigour of it. 281  194
  ¶ 282 CIVIL Knowledge is conversant about a subject which of all others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to axiom. Nevertheless, as Cato the censor said, That the Romans were like sheep, for that a man might better drive a flock of them, than one of them; for in a flock, if you could get but some few go right, the rest would follow: so in that respect moral philosophy is more difficile than policy. Again, moral philosophy propoundeth to itself the framing of internal goodness; but civil knowledge requireth only an external goodness; for that as to society sufficeth; and therefore it cometh oft to pass that there be evil times in good governments: for so we find in the holy story, when the kings were good, yet it is added, Sed adhuc populus non direxerat 283 cor suum ad Dominum Deum patrum suorum; [but as yet the people had not turned their hearts towards the Lord God of their fathers]. Again, States, as great engines, move slowly, and are not so soon put out of frame: for as in Egypt the seven good years sustained the seven bad, so governments for a time well grounded do bear out errors following: but the resolution of particular persons is more suddenly subverted. These respects do somewhat qualify the extreme difficulty of civil knowledge.  195
  This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three summary actions of society; which are Conversation, Negotiation, and Government. For man seeketh in society comfort, use, and protection: and they be three wisdoms of divers natures, which do often sever; wisdom of the behaviour, wisdom of business, and wisdom of state.  196
  The wisdom of Conversation ought not to be over much affected, but much less despised; for it hath not only an honour in itself, but an influence also into business and government. 284 The poet saith,
        Nec vultu destrue verba tuo:
a man may destroy the force of his words with his countenance: so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero; recommending to his brother affability and easy access; Nil interest habere ostium apertum, vultum clausum; it is nothing won to admit men with an open door, and to receive them with a shut and reserved countenance. So we see Atticus, before the first interview between Cæsar and Cicero, the war depending, did seriously advise Cicero touching the composing and ordering of his countenance and gesture. And if the government of the countenance be of such effect, much more is that of the speech, and other carriage appertaining to conversation; the true model whereof seemeth to me well expressed by Livy, though not meant for this purpose; Ne aut arrogans videar, aut obnoxius; quorum alterum est alienæ libertatis obliti, alterum suæ: the sum of behaviour is to retain a man’s own dignity, without intruding upon the liberty of others. On the other side, if behaviour and outward carriage be intended too much, first it may pass into affection, 285 and then quid deformius quam scenam in vitam transferre, [what more unseemly than to be always playing a part;] to act a man’s life? But although it proceed not to that extreme, yet it consumeth time, and employeth the mind too much. And therefore as we use to advise young students from company keeping, by saying, Amici fures temporis, [friends are thieves of time;] so certainly the intending of the discretion of behaviour is a great thief of meditation. Again, such as are accomplished in that honor 286 of urbanity please themselves in name, 287 and seldom aspire to higher virtue; whereas those that have defect in it do seek comeliness by reputation: for where reputation is, almost every thing becometh; but where that is not, it must be supplied by puntos and compliments. Again, there is no greater impediment of action than an over-curious observance of decency, and the guide of decency, which is time and season. For as Salomon saith, Qui respicit ad ventos, non seminat; et qui respicit ad nubes, non metet; [he that looketh to the winds doth not sow, and he that regardeth the clouds shall not reap:] a man must make his opportunity, as oft as find it. To conclude; Behaviour seemeth to me as a garment of the mind, and to have the conditions of a garment. For it ought to be made in fashion; it ought not to be too curious; it ought to be shaped so as to set forth any good making of the mind, and hide any deformity; and above all, it ought not to be too strait or restrained for exercise or motion. But this part of civil knowledge hath been elegantly handled, and therefore I cannot report it for deficient.
  ¶ 288 The wisdom touching Negotiation or Business hath not been hitherto collected into writing, to the great derogation of learning and the professors of learning. For from this root springeth chiefly that note or opinion, which by us is expressed in adage to this effect, that there is no great concurrence between learning and wisdom. For of the three wisdoms which we have set down to pertain to civil life, for wisdom of Behaviour, it is by learned men for the most part despised, as an inferior to virtue and an enemy to meditation; for wisdom of Government, they acquit themselves well when they are called to it, but that happeneth to few; but for the wisdom of Business, wherein man’s life is most conversant, there be no books of it, except some few scattered advertisements, that have no proportion to the magnitude of this subject. For if books were written of this as the other, I doubt not but learned men with mean experience would far excel men of long experience without learning, and outshoot them in their own bow.  198
  Neither needeth it at all to be doubted that this knowledge should be so variable as it falleth not under precept; for it is much less infinite than science of Government, which we see is laboured and in some part reduced. Of this wisdom it seemeth some of the ancient Romans in the saddest and wisest times were professors; for Cicero reporteth that it was then 289 in use for senators that had name and opinion for general wise men, as Coruncanius, Curius, Lælius, and many others, to walk at certain hours in the Place, and to give audience to those that would use their advice; and that the particular citizens would resort unto them, and consult with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the employing of a son, or of a purchase or bargain, or of an accusation, and every other occasion incident to man’s life; so as there is a wisdom of counsel and advice even in private causes, arising out of an universal insight into the affairs of the world; which is used indeed upon particular cases 290 propounded, but is gathered by general observation of causes of like nature. For so we see in the book which Q. Cicero 291 writeth to his brother De petitione consulatus (being the only book of business that I know written by the ancients), although it concerned a particular action then on foot, yet the substance thereof consisteth of many wise and politic axioms, which contain not a temporary but a perpetual direction in the case of popular elections. But chiefly we may see in those aphorisms which have place amongst divine writings, composed by Salomon the king, of whom the Scriptures testify that his heart was as the sands of the sea, encompassing the world and all worldly matters; we see, I say, not a few profound and excellent cautions, precepts, positions, extending to much variety of occasions; whereupon we will stay awhile, offering to consideration some number of examples. 292  199
  Sed et cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur ne accommodes aurem tuam, ne forte audias servum tuum maledicentem tibi. [Hearken not unto all words that are spoken, lest thou hear thy servant curse thee.] Here is commended the provident stay of inquiry of that which we would be loth to find: 293 as it was judged great wisdom in Pompeius Magnus that he burned Sertorius’ papers unperused.  200
  Vir sapiens si cum stulto contenderit, sive irascatur sive rideat, non inveniet requiem. [A wise man if he contend with a fool, whether he be angry or whether he laugh, shall find no rest.] Here is described the great disadvantage which a wise man hath in undertaking a lighter person than himself; which is such an engagement as whether a man turn the matter to jest, or turn it to heat, or howsoever he change copy, he can no ways quit himself well of it.  201
  Qui delicatè a pueritia nutrit servum suum, postea sentiet eum contumacem. [He that delicately bringeth up his servant from a child shall have him become froward at the length.] Here is signified, that if a man begin too high a pitch in his favours, it doth commonly end in unkindness and unthankfulness.  202
  Vidisti virum velocem in opere suo? Coram regibus stabit, nec erit inter ignobiles. [Seest thou a man that is quick in his business? He shall stand before kings; his place shall not be among mean men.] Here is observed that, of all virtues for rising to honour, quickness of dispatch is the best; for superiors many times love not to have those they employ too deep or too sufficient, but ready and diligent.  203
  Vidi cunctos viventes qui ambulant sub sole, cum adolescente secundo qui consurgit pro eo. [I beheld all the living which walk under the sun, with the second youth that shall stand in his place.] Here is expressed that which was noted by Sylla first, and after him by Tiberius: Plures adorant solem orientem quam occidentem vel meridianum, 294 [there be more than worship the rising sun than the sun setting or at mid-day].  204
  Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te, locum tuum ne demiseris; quia curatio faciet cessare peccata maxima. [If the spirit of the ruler rise up against thee, leave not thy place; for observance will remove great offences.] Here caution is given that upon displeasure, retiring is of all courses the unfittest; for a man leaveth things at worst, and depriveth himself of means to make them better.  205
  Erat civitas parva, et pauci in ea viri: venit contra eam rex magnus, et vadavit eam, intruxitque munitiones per gyrum, et perfecta est obsidio: inventusque est in ea vir pauper et sapiens, et liberavit eam per sapientiam suam; et nullus deinceps recordatus est hominis illius pauperis. [There was a little city and few men within it; and there came a great king against it and besieged it and raised great bulwarks round about it: and there was found in it a poor wise man, and he by his wisdom delivered the city; yet no man remembered that same poor man.] Here the corruption 295 of states is set forth, that esteem not virtue or merit longer than they have use of it.  206
  Mollis responsio frangit iram. [A soft answer defeateth wrath.] Here is noted that silence or rough answer exasperateth; but an answer present and temperate pacifieth.  207
  Iter pigrorum quasi sepes spinarum. [The way of the slothful is as an hedge of thorns.] Here is lively represented how laborious sloth proveth in the end; for when things are deferred till the last instant and nothing prepared beforehand, every step findeth a brier or an impediment, which catcheth or stoppeth.  208
  Melior est finis orationis quam principium. [Better is the end of a speech than the beginning thereof.] Here is taxed the vanity of formal speakers, that study more about prefaces and inducements than upon the conclusions and issues of speech.  209
  Qui cognoscit in judicio faciem, non bene facit; iste et pro buccella panis deseret veritatem. [He that respecteth persons in judgment doth not well; even for a piece of bread will that man depart from the truth.] Here is noted, that a judge were better be a briber than a respecter of persons; for a corrupt judge offendeth not so lightly 296 as a facile.  210
  Vir pauper calumnians pauperes similis est imbri vehementi, in quo paratur fames. [A poor man that beareth witness against the poor is like a sweeping rain which leaveth no food.] Here is expressed the extremity of necessitous extortions, figured in the ancient fable of the full and the hungry horse-leech.  211
  Fons turbatus pede, et vena corrupta, est justus cadens coram impio. [A righteous man falling down before the wicked is as a troubled fountain and a corrupt spring.] Here is noted, that one judicial and exemplar iniquity in the face of the world, doth trouble the fountains of justice more than many particular injuries passed over by connivance.  212
   297 Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre et a matre, et dicit hoc non esse peccatum, particeps est homicidii. [Whoso robbeth his father and his mother, and saith it is no transgression, is the companion of a destroyer.] Here is noted, that whereas men in wronging their best friends use to extenuate their fault, as if they might presume or be bold upon them, it doth contrariwise indeed aggravate their fault, and turneth it from injury to impiety.  213
  Noli esse amicus homini iracundo, nec ambulato cum homine furioso. [Make no friendship with an angry man, neither go with a furious man.] Here caution is given, that in the election of our friends we do principally avoid those which are impatient, as those that will espouse us to many factions and quarrels.  214
  Qui conturbat domum suam, possidebit ventum. [He that troubleth his own house shall inherit the wind.] Here is noted, that in domestical separations and breaches men do promise to themselves quieting of their mind and contentment; but still they are deceived of their expectation, and it turneth to wind.  215
  Filius sapiens lætificat patrem: filius vero stultus mœstitia est matri suæ. [A wise son maketh a glad father, but a foolish son is the heaviness of his mother.] Here is distinguished, that fathers have most comfort of the good proof of their sons; but mothers have most discomfort of their ill proof, because women have little discerning of virtue, but of fortune. 298  216
  Qui celat delictum, quærit amicitiam; sed qui altero sermone repetit, separat fœderatos. [He that covereth a transgression seeketh love, but he that repeateth a matter separateth very friends.] Here caution is given, that reconcilement is better managed by an amnesty, and passing over that which is past, than by apologies and excusations.  217
  In omni opere bono erit abundantia; ubi autem verba sunt plurima, ibi frequenter egestas. [In every good work there shall be abundance, but where there are many words there is penury.] Here is noted that words and discourse abound most where there is idleness and want.  218
  Primus in sua causa justus; sed venit altera pars, et inquirit in eum. [He that is first in his own cause seemeth just; but the other party cometh and searcheth him.] Here is observed, that in all causes the first tale possesseth much; in sort 299 that the prejudice thereby wrought will be hardly removed, except some abuse or falsity in the information be detected.  219
   300 Verba bilinguis quasi simplicia, et ipsa perveniunt ad interiora ventris. [The words of the double-tongued man which seem artless are they that go down to the innermost parts of the belly.] Here is distinguished, that flattery and insinuation which seemeth set and artificial sinketh not far; but that entereth deep which hath shew of nature, liberty, and simplicity.  220
  Qui erudit derisorem, ipse sibi injuriam facit; et qui arguit impium, sibi maculam generat. [He that reproveth a scorner doth himself wrong, and he that rebuketh a wicked man getteth himself a blot.] Here caution is given how we tender reprehension to arrogant and scornful natures, whose manner is to esteem it for contumely, and accordingly to return it.  221
  Da sapienti occasionem, et addetur ei sapientia. [Give opportunity to a wise man, and he will be yet wiser.] Here is distinguished the wisdom brought into habit, and that which is but verbal and swimming only in conceit; for the one upon the occasion presented is quickened and redoubled, the other is amazed and confused.  222
  Quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium, sic corda hominum manifesta sunt prudentibus. [As the face of one that looketh upon the water is reflected therein, so the hearts of men are manifest unto the wise.] Here the mind of a wise man is compared to a glass, wherein the images of all diversity of natures and customs are represented; from which representation proceedeth that application,
        Qui sapit, innumeris moribus aptus erit:
[a wise man will know how to apply himself to all sorts of characters].
  Thus have I staid somewhat longer upon these sentences politic of Salomon than is agreeable to the proportion of an example; led with a desire to give authority to this part of knowledge, which I noted as deficient, by so excellent a precedent; and have also attended them with brief observations, such as to my understanding offer no violence to the sense, though I know they may be applied to a more divine use: but it is allowed even in divinity, that some interpretations, yea and some writings, have more of the Eagle than others. But taking them as instructions for life, they might have received large discourse, if I would have broken them and illustrated them by deducements and examples.  224
  Neither was this in use only with the Hebrews; but it is generally to be found in the wisdom of the more ancient times, that as men found out any observation that they thought was good for life, they would gather it and express it in parable or aphorism or fable. But for fables, they were vicegerents and supplies where examples failed: now that the times abound with history, the aim is better when the mark is alive. And therefore the form of writing which of all others is fittest for this variable argument of negotiation and occasions is that which Machiavel chose wisely and aptly for government; namely, discourse upon histories or examples. For knowledge drawn freshly and in our view out of particulars, knoweth the way best to particulars again. And it hath much greater life for practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example, than when the example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no point of order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance. For when the example is the ground, being set down in an history at large, it is set down with all circumstances, which may sometimes control the discourse thereupon made and sometimes supply it, as a very pattern for action; 301 whereas the examples alleged for the discourse’s sake are cited succinctly and without particularity, and carry a servile aspect toward the discourse which they are brought in to make good.  225
  But this difference is not amiss to be remembered, that as history of Times is the best ground for discourse of government, such as Machiavel handleth, so histories of Lives is the most proper for discourse of business, as 302 more conversant in private actions. Nay there is a ground of discourse for this purpose fitter than them both, which is discourse upon letters, such as are wise and weighty, as many are of Cicero ad Atticum and others. For letters have a great 303 and more particular representation of business than either Chronicles or Lives. Thus have we spoken both of the matter and form of this part of civil knowledge touching Negotiation, 304 which we note to be deficient.  226
  But yet there is another part of this part, which differeth as much from that whereof we have spoken as sapere and sibi sapere, [to be wise and to be wise for oneself,] the one moving as it were to the circumference, the other to the centre. For there is a wisdom of counsel, and again there is a wisdom of pressing a man’s own fortune; and they do sometimes meet, and often sever. For many are wise in their own ways that are weak for government or counsel; like ants, which is a wise creature for itself, but very hurtful for the garden. This wisdom the Romans did take much knowledge of: 305 Nam pol sapiens (saith the comical poet) fingit fortunam sibi, [the wise man fashions his fortune for himself;] and it grew to an adage, Faber quisque fortunæ propriæ, [every man has tools to make his own fortune with,] and Livy attributeth it to Cato the first, In hoc viro tanta vis animi et ingenii inerat, ut quocunque loco natus esset, sibi ipse fortunam facturus videretur, [such was his force of mind and genius that in whatever state he had been born he would have made himself a fortune].  227
  This conceit or position 306 if it be too much declared and professed, hath been thought a thing impolitic and unlucky; as was observed in Timotheus the Athenian; who having done many great services to the estate in his government, and giving an account thereof to the people as the manner was, did conclude every particular with this clause, and in this fortune had no part. And it came so to pass that he never prospered in any thing he took in hand afterward: for this is too high and too arrogant, savouring of that which Ezekiel saith of Pharaoh, Dicis, Fluvius est meus, et ego feci memet ipsum, [thou sayest the river is mine, and I made myself;] or of that which another prophet speaketh, that men offer sacrifices to their nets and snares; and that which the poet expresseth,
        Dextra mihi Deus, et telum quod missile 307 libro,
Nunc adsint!
[my right hand and my spear are the God I trust in]. For these confidences were ever unhallowed, and unblessed. And therefore those that were great politiques indeed ever ascribed their successes to their felicity, and not to their skill or virtue. For so Sylla surnamed himself Felix, not Magnus, [the Fortunate, not the Great]. So Cæsar said 308 to the master of the ship, Cæsarem portas et fortunam ejus, [you carry Cæsar and his fortune].
  Faber Fortunæ, sive de Ambitu vitæ. But yet nevertheless these positions, Faber quisque fortunæ suæ; Sapiens dominabitur astris; Invia virtuti nulla est via; [every man should be the maker of his own fortune; the wise man will command his stars; nothing impossible to virtue:] and the like, being taken and used as spurs to industry, and not as stirrups to insolency, rather for resolution than for the presumption or outward declaration, have been ever thought sound and good, and are no question imprinted in the greatest minds; who are so sensible of this opinion as they can scarce contain it within. As we see in Augustus Cæsar, (who was rather diverse from his uncle than inferior in virtue, 309) how when he died, he desired his friends about him to give him a Plaudite; as if he were conscient to himself that he had played his part well upon the stage. This part of knowledge we do report also as deficient: not but that it is practised too much, but it hath not been reduced to writing. And therefore lest it should seem to any that it is not comprehensible by axiom, it is requisite, as we did in the former, that we set down some heads or passages of it.  229
  Wherein it may appear at the first a new and unwonted argument to teach men how to raise and make their fortune; a doctrine wherein every man perchance will be ready to yield himself a disciple, till he see the difficulty: for Fortune layeth as heavy impositions as Virtue; and it is as hard and severe a thing to be a true politique, as to be truly moral. But the handling hereof concerneth learning greatly, both in honour and in substance: in honour, because pragmatical men may not go away with an opinion that learning is like a lark, that can mount and sing and please herself, and nothing else; but may know that she holdeth as well of the hawk, that can soar aloft, and can also descend and strike upon the prey: in substance, because it is the perfect law of inquiry of truth, that nothing be in the globe of matter, which should not be likewise in the globe of crystal, or form; that is that there be not any thing in being and action, which should not be drawn and collected into contemplation and doctrine. Neither doth learning admire or esteem of this architecture of fortune otherwise than as of an inferior work: for no man’s fortune can be an end worthy of his being, and many times the worthiest men do abandon their fortune willingly for better respects: but nevertheless fortune as an organ of virtue and merit deserveth the consideration.  230
  First therefore, the precept which I conceive to be most summary towards the prevailing in fortune, is to obtain that window which Momus did require, who seeing in the frame of man’s heart such angles and recesses, found fault there was not a window to look into them; that is, to procure good informations of particulars touching persons, their natures, their desires and ends, their customs and fashions, their helps and advantages, and whereby they chiefly stand; so again their weaknesses and disadvantages, and where they lie most open and obnoxious; their friends, factions, dependances; and again their opposites, enviers, competitors, their moods and times, Sola viri molles aditus et tempora noras; their principles, rules, and observations, and the like: and this not only of persons, but of actions; what are on foot from time to time, and how they are conducted, favoured, opposed; and how they import, and the like. For the knowledge of present actions is not only material in itself, but without it also the knowledge of persons is very erroneous: for men change with the actions; and whiles they are in pursuit they are one, and when they return to their nature they are another. These informations of particulars touching persons and actions are as the minor propositions in every active syllogism; for no excellency of observations (which are as the major propositions) can suffice to ground a conclusion, if there be error and mistaking in the minors.  231
  That this knowledge is possible, Salomon is our surety; who saith, Consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda; sed vir prudens exhauriet illud, [counsel in the heart of man is like deep water; but a man of understanding will draw it out]. And although the knowledge itself falleth not under precept, because it is of individuals, yet the instructions for the obtaining of it may.  232
  We will begin therefore with this precept, according to the ancient opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are slowness of belief and distrust; that more trust be given to countenances and deeds than to words; and in words, rather to sudden passages and surprised words, than to set and purposed words. Neither let that be feared which is said, fronti nulla fides, [no trusting to the face:] which is meant of a general outward behaviour, and not of the private and subtile motions and labours of the countenance and gesture; which as Q. Cicero elegantly saith, is animi janua, the gate of the mind. None more close than Tiberius, and yet Tacitus saith of Gallus, Etenim vultu offensionem conjectaverat, [he had seen displeasure in his countenance]. So again, noting the differing character and manner of his commending Germanicus and Drusus in the senate, he saith touching his fashion wherein he carried his speech of Germanicus, thus; Magis in speciem adornatis verbis, quam ut penitus sentire videretur, [it was in words too laboured and specious to be taken for what he really felt;] but of Drusus thus; Paucioribus, sed intentior, et fida oratione, [he said less, but more earnestly, and in a style of sincerity;] and in another place, speaking of his character of speech when he did any thing that was gracious and popular, he saith that in other things he was velut eluctantium verborum, [of a kind of struggling speech;] but then again, solutius loquebatur quando subveniret, [he spoke with more freedom when he was speaking in a man’s favour]. So that there is no such artificer of dissimulation, nor no such commanded countenance (vultus jussus) that can sever from a feigned tale some of these fashions, either a more slight and careless fashion, or more set and formal, or more tedious and wandering, or coming from a man more drily and hardly.  233
  Neither are deeds such assured pledges, as that they may be trusted without a judicious consideration of their magnitude and nature: Fraus sibi in parvis fidem præstruit, ut majore emolumento fallat, [it is a trick of treachery to win itself credit at the first by fidelity in small things, that being thereupon trusted in greater it may deceive with more advantage;] and the Italian thinketh himself upon the point to be bought and sold, when he is better used than he was wont to be without manifest cause. For small favours, they do but lull men asleep, both as to caution and as to industry, and are as Demosthenes calleth them, Alimenta socordiæ, [sops to feed sloth]. So again we see how false the nature of some deeds are, in that particular which Mutianus practised upon Antonius Primus, upon that hollow and unfaithful reconcilement which was made between them; whereupon Mutianus advanced many of the friends of Antonius: simul amicis ejus præfecturas et tribunatus largitur, [making them prefects and tribunes:] wherein under pretence to strengthen him, he did desolate him, and won from him his dependances.  234
  As for words, (though they be like waters to physicians, full of flattery and uncertainty,) yet they are not to be despised, specially with the advantage of passion and affection. For so we see Tiberius upon a stinging and incensing speech of Agrippina came a step forth of his dissimulation, when he said, You are hurt because you do not reign; of which Tacitus saith, Audita hæc raram occulti pectoris vocem elicuere; correptamque Græco versu admonuit, ideo lædi quia non regnaret, [these words drew from Tiberius the voice, so rarely heard, of his secret heart: he retorted upon her with a Greek verse, that she was hurt, &c.]. And therefore the poet doth elegantly call passions tortures, that urge men to confess their secrets:
        Vino tortus et ira.
And experience sheweth, there are few men so true to themselves and so settled, but that, sometimes upon heat, sometimes upon bravery, sometimes upon kindness, sometimes upon trouble of mind and weakness, they open themselves; specially if they be put to it with a counter-dissimulation, according to the proverb of Spain, Di mentira, y sacaras verdad, Tell a lie and find a truth.
  As for the knowing of men which is at second hand from reports; men’s weaknesses 310 and faults are best known from their enemies, their virtues and abilities from their friends, their customs and times from their servants, their conceits and opinions from their familiar friends with whom they discourse most. General fame is light, and the opinions conceived by superiors or equals 311 are deceitful; for to such men are more masked: Verior fama e domesticis emanat, [the truer kind of report comes from those who see them at home].  236
  But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is by their natures and ends; wherein the weakest sort of men are best interpreted by their natures, and the wisest by their ends. 312 For it was both pleasantly and wisely said (though I think very untruly) by a nuncio of the pope, returning from a certain nation where he served as lieger; whose opinion being asked touching the appointment of one to go in his place, he wished that in any case they did not send one that was too wise; because no very wise man would ever imagine what they in that country were like to do. And certainly it is an error frequent for men to shoot over, and to suppose deeper ends and more compass reaches than are: the Italian proverb being elegant, and for the most part true:
        Di danari, di senno, e di fede,
C’è nè manco che non credi:
There is commonly less money, less wisdom, and less good faith, than men do account upon.
  But Princes upon a far other reason are best interpreted by their natures, and private persons by their ends; for princes being at the top of human desires, they have for the most part no particular ends whereto they aspire, 313 by distance from which a man might take measure and scale of the rest of their actions and desires; which is one of the causes that maketh their hearts more inscrutable. 314 Neither is it sufficient to inform ourselves in men’s ends and natures of the variety of them only, but also of the predominancy, what humour reigneth most, and what end is principally sought. For so we see, when Tigellinus saw himself outstripped by Petronius Turpilianus in Nero’s humours of pleasures, metus ejus rimatur, 315 he wrought upon Nero’s fears, whereby he brake the other’s neck.  238
  But to all this part of inquiry the most compendious way resteth in three things. The first, to have general acquaintance and inwardness with those which have general acquaintance and look most into the world; and specially according to the diversity of business and the diversity of persons, to have privacy and conversation with some one friend at least which is perfect and well intelligenced in every several kind. The second is to keep a good mediocrity in liberty of speech and secrecy; in most things liberty; secrecy where it importeth; for liberty of speech inviteth and provoketh liberty to be used again, and so bringeth much to a man’s knowledge; and secrecy, on the other side, induceth trust and inwardness. The last is the reducing of a man’s self to this watchful and serene habit, as to make account and purpose, in every conference and action, as well to observe as to act. For as Epictetus would have a philosopher in every particular action to say to himself, Et hoc volo, et etiam institutum servare, [I would do this and keep my course too;] so a politic man in every thing should say to himself, Et hoc volo, ac etiam aliquid addiscere, [I would do it and also learn something from it]. 316 I have stayed the longer upon this precept of obtaining good information, because it is a main part by itself, which answereth to all the rest. But, above all things, caution must be taken that men have a good stay and hold of themselves, and that this much knowledge do not draw on much meddling; for nothing is more unfortunate than light and rash intermeddling in many matters; so that this variety of knowledge tendeth in conclusion but only to this, to make a better and freer choice of those actions which may concern us, and to conduct them with the less error and the more dexterity.  239
  The second precept concerning this knowledge is, for men to take good information touching their own person, and well to understand themselves: knowing that, as St. James saith, though men look oft in a glass, yet they do suddenly forget themselves; wherein as the divine glass is the word of God, so the politic glass is the state of the world or times wherein we live; in the which we are to behold ourselves.  240
  For men ought to take an unpartial view of their own abilities and virtues; and again of their wants and impediments; accounting these with the most, and those other with the least; and from this view and examination to frame the considerations following.  241
  First, to consider how the constitution of their nature sorteth with the general state of the times; which if they find agreeable and fit, then in all things to give themselves more scope and liberty; but if differing and dissonant, then in the whole course of their life to be more close, retired, and reserved: as we see in Tiberius, who was never seen at a play and came not into the senate in twelve of his last years; whereas Augustus Cæsar lived ever in men’s eyes, which Tacitus observeth: Alia Tiberio morum via, [Tiberius’s ways were different]. 317  242
  Secondly, to consider how their nature sorteth with professions and courses of life, and accordingly to make election, if they be free; and, if engaged, to make the departure at the first opportunity: as we see was done by duke Valentine, that was designed by his father to a sacerdotal profession, but quitted it soon after in regard of his parts and inclination; being such nevertheless, as a man cannot tell well whether they were worse for a prince or for a priest.  243
  Thirdly, to consider how they sort with those whom they are like to have competitors and concurrents, and to take that course wherein there is most solitude, and themselves like to be most eminent: as Cæsar Julius did, who at first was an orator or pleader; but when he saw the excellency of Cicero, Hortensius, Catulus, and others, for eloquence, and saw there was no man of reputation for the wars but Pompeius, upon whom the state was forced to rely, he forsook his course begun toward a civil and popular greatness, and transferred his designs to a martial greatness.  244
  Fourthly, in the choice of their friends and dependances, to proceed according to the composition of their own nature; as we may see in Cæsar, all whose friends and followers were men active and effectual, but not solemn or of reputation. 318  245
  Fifthly, to take special heed how they guide themselves by examples, in thinking they can do as they see others do; whereas perhaps their natures and carriages are far differing; in which error it seemeth Pompey was, of whom Cicero saith, that he was wont often to say, Sylla potuit, ego non potero? [Sylla could do it, why not I?] wherein he was much abused, the natures and proceedings of himself and his example being the unlikest in the world; the one being fierce, violent, and pressing the fact; the other solemn, and full of majesty and circumstance, and therefore the less effectual.  246
  But this precept touching the politic knowledge of ourselves hath many other branches whereupon we cannot insist.  247
  Next to the well understanding and discerning of a man’s self, there followeth the well opening and revealing 319 a man’s self; wherein we see nothing more usual than for the more able man to make the less shew. For there is a great advantage in the well setting forth of a man’s virtues, fortunes, merits; and again in the artificial covering of a man’s weaknesses, defects, disgraces; staying upon the one, sliding from the other; cherishing the one by circumstances, gracing the other by exposition, and the like: wherein we see what Tacitus saith of Mutianus, who was the greatest politique of his time, Omnium quæ dixerat feceratque arte quâdam ostentator, [having a certain art of displaying to advantage all he said and did;] which requireth indeed some art, lest it turn tedious and arrogant; but yet so as ostentation (though it be to the first degree of vanity) seemeth to me rather a vice in manners than in policy: for as it is said, Audacter calumniare, 320 semper aliquid hæret, [slander boldly, there is ever some that sticks;] so, except it be in a ridiculous degree of deformity, Audacter te vendita, semper aliquid hæret, [put forward your own pretensions boldly—something always sticks]. For it will stick with the more ignorant and inferior sort of men, though men of wisdom and rank do smile at it and despise it; and yet the authority won with many doth countervail the disdain of a few. But if it be carried with decency and government, as with a natural, pleasant, and ingenious 321 fashion; or at times when it is mixed with some peril and unsafety, (as in military persons;) or at times when others are most envied; or with easy and careless passage to it and from it, without dwelling too long or being too serious; or with an equal freedom of taxing a man’s self as well as gracing himself; or by occasion of repelling or putting down others’ injury or insolency; it doth greatly add to reputation: and surely not a few solid natures, that want this ventosity and cannot sail in the height of the winds, are not without some prejudice and disadvantage by their moderation.  248
  But for these flourishes and enhancements of virtue, as they are not perchance unnecessary, so it is at least necessary that virtue be not disvalued and imbased under the just price; which is done in three manners: by offering and obtruding a man’s self; wherein men think he is rewarded, when he is accepted: by doing too much; 322 which will not give that which is well done leave to settle, and in the end induceth satiety: and by finding too soon the fruit of a man’s virtue, in commendation, applause, honour, favour; wherein if a man be pleased with a little, let him hear what is truly said, Cave ne insuetus rebus majoribus videaris, si hæc te res parva sicuti magna delectat, [if he take so much delight in a little thing, he will be thought unused to greater things].  249
  But the covering of defects is of no less importance than the valuing of good parts; which may be done likewise in three manners; by Caution, by Colour, and by Confidence. Caution is when men do ingeniously and discreetly avoid to be put into those things for which they are not proper: whereas contrariwise bold and unquiet spirits will thrust themselves into matters without difference, and so publish and proclaim all their wants. Colour is when men make a way for themselves to have a construction made of their faults or wants as proceeding from a better cause, or intended for some other purpose: for of the one it is well said, Sæpe latet vitium proximitate boni, [a vice will often hide itself under the shadow of a neighbouring virtue;] and therefore whatsoever want a man hath, he must see that he pretend the virtue that shadoweth it; as if he be dull, he must affect gravity; if a coward, mildness; and so the rest: for the second, a man must frame some probable cause why he should not do his best, and why he should dissemble his abilities; and for that purpose must use to dissemble those abilities which are notorious in him, 323 to give colour that his true wants are but industries and dissimulations. For Confidence, it is the last 324 but the surest remedy; namely, to depress and seem to despise whatsoever a man cannot attain; observing the good 325 principle of the merchants, who endeavour to raise the price of their own commodities, and to beat down the price of others. But there is a confidence that passeth 326 this other; which is, to face out a man’s own defects, in seeming to conceive that he is best in those things wherein he is failing; and, to help that again, to seem on the other side that he hath least opinion of himself in those things wherein he is best: like as we shall see it commonly in poets, that if they shew their verses, and you except to any, they will say that that line cost them more labour than any of the rest; and presently will seem to disable and suspect rather some other line, which they know well enough to be the best in the number. But above all, in this righting and helping of a man’s self in his own carriage, he must take heed he shew not himself dismantled and exposed to scorn and injury, by too much dulceness, goodness, and facility of nature, but shew some sparkles of liberty, spirit, and edge: which kind of fortified carriage, with a ready rescuing 327 of a man’s self from scorns, is sometimes of necessity imposed upon men by somewhat in their person or fortune; 328 but it ever succeedeth with good felicity. 329  250
  Another precept of this knowledge is, by all possible endeavour to frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to occasion; for nothing hindereth men’s fortunes so much as this Idem manebat neque idem decebat, [continuing the same when the same is no longer fit:] men are where they were, when occasions turn: and therefore to Cato, whom Livy maketh such an architect of fortune, he addeth that he had versatile ingenium, [a wit that could turn well]. And thereof it cometh that these grave solemn wits, which must be like themselves and cannot make departures, have more dignity than felicity. But in some it is nature to be somewhat viscous and inwrapped, and not easy to turn. In some it is a conceit that is almost a nature, which is, that men can hardly make themselves believe that they ought to change their course, when they have found good by it in former experience. For Machiavel noted wisely, how Fabius Maximus would have been temporizing still, according to his old bias, when the nature of the war was altered and required hot pursuit. In some other it is want of point and penetration in their judgment, that they do not discern when things have a period, but come in too late after the occasion; as Demosthenes compareth the people of Athens to country fellows when they play in a fence school, that if they have a blow, then they remove their weapon to that ward, and not before. In some other it is a lothness to leese labours passed, and a conceit that they can bring about occasions to their ply; 330 and yet in the end, when they see no other remedy, then they come to it with disadvantage; as Tarquinius, that gave for the third part of Sibylla’s books the treble price, when he might at first have had all three for the simple. But from whatsoever root or cause this restiveness of mind proceedeth, it is a thing most prejudicial; and nothing is more politic than to make the wheels of our mind concentric and voluble with the wheels of fortune.  251
   331 Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some affinity with that we last spake of, but with difference, is that which is well expressed, Fatis accede Deisque, [take the way which the Fates and the Gods offer;] that men do not only turn with the occasions but also run with the occasions, and not strain their credit or strength to over hard or extreme points, but choose in their actions that which is most passable: for this will preserve men from foil, not occupy them too much about one matter, win opinion of moderation, please the most, 332 and make a shew of a perpetual felicity in all they undertake; which cannot but mightily increase reputation.  252
  Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have some repugnancy with the former two, but not as I understand it; and it is that which Demosthenes uttereth in high terms; Et quemadmodum receptum est, ut exercitum ducat imperator, sic et a cordatis viris res ipsæ ducendæ; ut quæ ipsis videntur, ea gerantur, et non ipsi eventus persequi cogantur; [as the captain leads the army, so should wise men lead affairs; they should get that done which they think good to be done, and not be forced to follow at the heels of events]. For if we observe, we shall find two differing kinds of sufficiency in managing of business: some can make use of occasions aptly and dexterously, but plot little; some can urge and pursue their own plots well, but cannot accommodate nor take in; 333 either of which is very unperfect without the other.  253
  Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good mediocrity in the declaring or not declaring a man’s self: for although depth of secrecy, and making way qualis est via navis in mari, [like the way of a ship through the water,] (which the French calleth sourdes menées, when men set things in work without opening themselves at all,) be sometimes both prosperous and admirable; yet many times Dissimulatio errores parit qui dissimulatorem ipsum illaqueant, [dissimulation breeds mistakes in which the dissembler himself is caught]. And therefore we see the greatest politiques have in a natural and free manner professed their desires, rather than been reserved and disguised in them. For so we see that Lucius Sylla made a kind of profession, that he wished all men happy or unhappy as they stood his friends or enemies. So Cæsar, when he went first into Gaul, made no scruple to profess that he had rather be first in a village than second at Rome. So again as soon as he had begun the war, we see what Cicero saith of him; Alter (meaning of Cæsar) non recusat, sed quodammodo postulat, ut (ut est) sic appelletur tyrannus, [he does not refuse, but in a manner demands, to be called what he is—tyrant]. So we may see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus Cæsar in his very entrance into affairs, when he was a dearling of the senate, yet in his harangues to the people would swear Ita parentis honores consequi liceat, [as I hope to attain my father’s honours;] which was no less than the tyranny, save that, to help it he would stretch forth his hand towards a statue of Cæsar’s that was erected in the place: and 334 men laughed and wondered and said Is it possible? or Did you ever hear the like? 335 and yet thought 336 he meant no hurt, he did it 337 so handsomely and ingenuously. And all these were prosperous: whereas Pompey, who tended to the same end but in a more dark and dissembling manner, as Tacitus saith of him, Occultior non melior, [having his intentions better concealed but not better,] wherein Sallust concurreth, ore probo, animo inverecundo, [an honest tongue but a shameless mind,] made it his design by infinite secret engines to cast the state into an absolute anarchy and confusion, that the state might cast itself into his arms for necessity and protection, and so the sovereign power be put upon him, and he never seen in it: and when he had brought it (as he thought) to that point, when he was chosen consul alone, as never any was, yet he could make no great matter of it, because men understood him not; but was fain in the end to go the beaten track of getting arms into his hands, by colour of the doubt of Cæsar’s designs: so tedious, casual, and unfortunate are these deep dissimulations; whereof it seemeth Tacitus made this judgment, that they were a cunning of an inferior form in regard of true policy; attributing the one to Augustus, the other to Tiberius, where speaking of Livia he saith, Et cum artibus mariti simulatione filii bene composita, [that she was of a happy composition, uniting the arts of her husband with the dissimulation of her son;] for surely the continual habit of dissimulation is but a weak and sluggish cunning, and not greatly politic.  254
  Another precept of this Architecture of Fortune is to accustom our minds to judge of the proportion or value of things as they conduce and are material to our particular ends; and that to do substantially, and not superficially. For we shall find the logical part (as I may term it) of some men’s minds good, but the mathematical part erroneous; that is, they can well judge of consequences, but not of proportions and comparison; 338 preferring things of shew and sense before things of substance and effect. So some fall in love with access to princes, others with popular fame and applause, supposing they are things of great purchase; when in many cases they are but matters of envy, peril, and impediment. So some measure things according to the labour and difficulty or assiduity which are spent about them; and think if they be ever moving, that they must needs advance and proceed; as Cæsar saith in a despising manner of Cato the second, when he describeth how laborious and indefatigable he was to no great purpose; Hæc omnia magno studio agebat. So in most things men are ready to abuse themselves in thinking the greatest means 339 to be best, when it should be the fittest.  255
  As for the true marshalling of men’s pursuits towards their fortune as they are more or less material, I hold them to stand thus. First the amendment of their own minds; for the remove of the impediments of the mind will sooner clear the passages of fortune, than the obtaining fortune will remove the impediments of the mind. In the second place I set down wealth and means; which I know most men would have placed first, because of the general use which it beareth towards all variety of occasions. But that opinion I may condemn with like reason as Machiavel doth that other, that moneys were the sinews of the wars; whereas (saith he) the true sinews of the wars are the sinews of men’s arms, that is, a valiant, populous, and military nation; and he voucheth aptly the authority of Solon, who when Crœsus shewed him his treasury of gold said to him, that if another came that had better iron he would be master of his gold. In like manner it may be truly affirmed that it is not moneys that are the sinews of fortune, but it is the sinews and steel of men’s minds, wit, courage, audacity, resolution, temper, industry, and the like. In third 340 place I set down reputation, because of the peremptory tides and currents it hath; which if they be not taken in their due time are seldom recovered, it being extreme hard to play an after-game of reputation. And lastly I place honour, which is more easily won by any of the other three, much more by all, than any of them can be purchased by honour. To conclude this precept, as there is order and priority in matter, so is there in time, the preposterous placing whereof is one of the commonest errors; while men fly to their ends when they should intend their beginnings, and do not take things in order of time as they come on, but marshal them according to greatness and not according to instance; not observing the good precept, Quod nunc instat agamus,
        [Despatch we now what stands us now upon].
  Another precept of this knowledge is, not to embrace any matters which do occupy too great a quantity of time, but to have that sounding in a man’s ears, Sed fugit interea, fugit irreparabile tempus, [while he is making ready to do it the time for doing it is gone;] and that is the cause why those which take their course of rising by professions of burden, as lawyers, orators, painful divines, and the like, are not commonly so politic for their own fortune, 341 otherwise than in their ordinary way, because they want time to learn particulars, to wait occasions, and to devise plots. 342  257
  Another precept of this knowledge is to imitate nature which doth nothing in vain; which surely a man may do, if he do well interlace his business, and bend not his mind too much upon that which he principally intendeth. 343 For a man ought in every particular action so to carry the motions of his mind, and so to have one thing under another, as if he cannot have that he seeketh in the best degree, yet to have it in a second, or so in a third; and if he can have no part of that which he purposed, yet to turn the use of it to somewhat else; 344 and if he cannot make any thing of it for the present, yet to make it as a seed of somewhat in time to come; and if he can contrive no effect or substance from it, yet to win some good opinion by it, or the like; so that he should exact an account 345 of himself, of every action to reap somewhat, and not to stand amazed and confused if he fail of that he chiefly meant: for nothing is more impolitic than to mind actions wholly one by one; for he that doth so leeseth infinite occasions which intervene, and are many times more proper and propitious for somewhat that he shall need afterwards, than for that which he urgeth for the present; and therefore men must be perfect in that rule, Hæc oportet facere, et illa non omittere, [these things ought ye to do, and not to leave the other undone].  258
  Another precept of this knowledge is, not to engage a man’s self peremptorily in any thing, though it seem not liable to accident; but ever to have a window to fly out at, or a way to retire; 346 following the wisdom in the ancient fable of the two frogs, which consulted when their plash was dry whither they should go; and the one moved to go down into a pit, because it was not likely the water would dry there; but the other answered, True, but if it do, how shall we get out again?  259
  Another precept of this knowledge is that ancient precept of Bias, construed not to any point of perfidiousness but only to caution and moderation, Et ama tanquam inimicus futurus, et odi tanquam amaturus, [love your friend as you would love one who may hereafter be your enemy; hate your enemy as one who may hereafter be your friend;] for it utterly betrayeth all utility for men to embark themselves too far in unfortunate friendships, troublesome spleens, and childish and humorous envies or emulations.  260
  But I continue this beyond the measure of an example; led, because I would not have such knowledges which I note as deficient to be thought things imaginative or in the air, or an observation or two much made of; but things of bulk and mass, whereof an end is hardlier made than a beginning. It must be likewise conceived, that in these points which I mention and set down, they are far from complete tractates of them, but only as small pieces for patterns. And lastly, no man I suppose will think that I mean fortunes are not obtained without all this ado; for I know they come tumbling into some men’s laps; and a number obtain good fortunes by diligence in a plain way, little intermeddling, and keeping themselves from gross errors.  261
  But as Cicero, when he setteth down an Idea of a perfect Orator, doth not mean that every pleader should be such; and so likewise, when a Prince or a Courtier hath been described by such as have handled those subjects, the mould hath used to be made according to the perfection of the art, and not according to common practice: so I understand it that it ought to be done in the description of a Politic man; I mean politic for his own fortune.  262
  But it must be remembered all this while, that the precepts which we have set down are of that kind which may be counted and called bonæ artes, [honest arts]. As for evil arts, if a man would set down for himself that principle of Machiavel, that a man seek not to attain virtue itself, but the appearance only thereof; because the credit of virtue is a help, but the use of it is cumber; or that other of his principles, that he presuppose that men are not fitly to be wrought otherwise but by fear, and therefore that he seek to have every man obnoxious, low, and in strait, which the Italians call seminar spine, to sow thorns; or that other principle contained in the verse which Cicero citeth, Cadant amici, dummodo inimici intercidant, [down with friends so enemies go down with them,] as the Triumvirs, which sold every one to other the lives of their friends for the deaths of their enemies; or that other protestation of L. Catilina, to set on fire and trouble states, to the end to fish in droumy waters, and to unwrap their fortunes; Ego si quid in fortunis meis excitatum sit incendium, id non aqua sed ruina restinguam, [if my fortunes be set on fire I will put it out not with water but with demolition:] or that other principle of Lysander that children are to be deceived with comfits, and men with oaths: and the like evil and corrupt positions, whereof (as in all things) there are more in number than of the good: certainly with these dispensations from the laws of charity and integrity the pressing of a man’s fortune may be more hasty and compendious. But it is in life as it is in ways; the shortest way is commonly the foulest, and surely the fairer way is not much about.  263
  But men if they be in their own power and do bear and sustain themselves, and be not carried away with a whirlwind or tempest of ambition, ought in the pursuit of their own fortune to set before their eyes not only that general map of the world, that all things are vanity and vexation of spirit, but many other more particular cards and directions: chiefly that, that Being without well-being is a curse and the greater being the greater curse, and that all virtue is most rewarded and all wickedness most punished in itself: according as the poet saith excellently:
        Quæ vobis, quæ digna, viri pro laudibus istis
Præmia posse rear solvi? pulcherrima primum
Dii moresque dabunt vestri:
[What recompence, O friends, can I hold out
Worthy such deeds? The best is that ye have,—
God’s blessing and your proper nobleness:]
and so of the contrary. And secondly they ought to look up to the eternal providence and divine judgment, which often subverteth the wisdom of evil plots and imaginations, according to that Scripture, He hath conceived mischief, and shall bring forth a vain thing. And although men should refrain themselves from injury and evil arts, yet this incessant and sabbathless pursuit of a man’s fortune leaveth not tribute which we owe to God of our time; who (we see) demandeth a tenth of our substance, and a seventh, which is more strict, of our time: and it is to small purpose to have an erected face towards heaven, and a perpetual grovelling spirit upon earth, eating dust as doth the serpent; Atque affigit humo divinæ particulam auræ, [fixing to earth the etherial spark divine]. And if any man flatter himself that he will employ his fortune well though he should obtain it ill, as was said concerning Augustus Cæsar, and after of Septimius Severus, that either they should never have been born or else they should never have died, they did so much mischief in the pursuit and ascent of their greatness, and so much good when they were established; yet these compensations and satisfactions are good to be used, but never good to be purposed. And lastly, it is not amiss for men in their race toward their fortune to cool themselves a little with that conceit which is elegantly expressed by the emperor Charles the fifth in his instructions to the king his son, that fortune hath somewhat of the nature of a woman, that if she be too much wooed she is the farther off. But this last is but a remedy for those whose tastes are corrupted: let men rather build upon that foundation which is as a corner-stone of divinity and philosophy, wherein they join close, namely that same Primum quærite. For divinity saith, Primum quærite regnum Dei, et ista omnia adjicientur vobis, [seek ye first the kingdom of God, and all these things shall be added unto you:] and philosophy saith, Primum quærite bona animi, cætera aut aderunt aut non oberunt, [seek ye first the good things of the mind, all other good things will either come or not be wanted]. And although the human foundation hath somewhat of the sand, 347 as we see in M. Brutus when he brake forth into that speech,
        Te colui, Virtus, ut rem; at tu nomen inane es;
[I took thee, Virtue, for a reality, but I find thee an empty name;] yet the divine foundation is upon the rock. But this may serve for a taste of that knowledge which I noted as deficient.
  ¶ 348 Concerning Government, it is a part of knowledge secret and retired, in both these respects in which things are deemed secret; for some things are secret because they are hard to know, and some because they are not fit to utter. We see all governments are obscure and invisible.
                    Totamque infusa per artus
Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.
[In every pore diffused the great mind works,
Stirs all the mass, and thro’ the huge frame lives.]
Such is the description of governments. We see the government of God over the world is hidden, insomuch as it seemeth to participate of much irregularity and confusion. The government of the Soul in moving the Body is inward and profound, and the passages thereof hardly to be reduced to demonstration. Again, the wisdom of antiquity (the shadows whereof are in the poets) in the description of torments and pains, next unto the crime of rebellion which was the Giants’ offence, doth detest the offence of futility, 349 as in Sisyphus and Tantalus. But this was meant of particulars: nevertheless even unto the general rules and discourses of policy and government there is due a reverent and reserved handling.
  But contrariwise in the governors towards the governed all things ought, as far as the frailty of man permitteth, to be manifest and revealed. For so it is expressed in the Scriptures touching the government of God, that this globe, which seemeth to us a dark and shady body, is in the view of God as crystal: Et in conspectu sedis tanquam mare vitreum simile crystallo, [and before the Throne there was a sea of glass, like unto crystal]. So unto princes and states, and specially towards wise senates and councils, the natures and dispositions of the people, their conditions and necessities, their factions and combinations, their animosities and discontents, ought to be, in regard of the variety of their intelligences, the wisdom of their observations, and the height of their station where they keep sentinel, in great part clear and transparent. Wherefore, considering that I write to a king that is a master of this science, and is so well assisted, I think it decent to pass over this part in silence, as willing to obtain the certificate which one of the ancient philosophers aspired unto; who being silent, when others contended to make demonstration of their abilities by speech, desired it might be certified for his part, that there was one that knew how to hold his peace.  266
  De prudentia legislatoria, sive de fontibus Juris. Notwithstanding, for the more public part of government, which is Laws, I think good to note only one deficience; which is, that all those which have written of laws, have written either as philosophers or as lawyers, and none as statesmen. As for the philosophers, they make imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths; and their discourses are as the stars, which give little light because they are so high. For the lawyers, they write according to the states where they live, what is received law, and not what ought to be law: for the wisdom of a lawmaker is one, and of a lawyer is another. For there are in nature certain fountains of justice, whence all civil laws are derived but as streams; and like as waters do take tinctures and tastes from the soils through which they run, so do civil laws vary according to the regions and governments where they are planted, though they proceed from the same fountains. Again, the wisdom of a lawmaker consisteth not only in a platform of justice, but in the application thereof; taking into consideration by what means laws may be made certain, and what are the causes and remedies of the doubtfulness and incertainty of law; by what means laws may be made apt and easy to be executed, and what are the impediments and remedies in the execution of laws; what influence laws touching private right of meum and tuum have into the public state, and how they may be made apt and agreeable; how laws are to be penned and delivered, whether in Texts or in Acts; brief or large; with preambles or without; how they are to be pruned and reformed from time to time; and what is the best means to keep them from being too vast in volumes or too full of multiplicity and crossness; how they are to be expounded, when upon causes emergent and judicially discussed, and when upon responses and conferences touching general points or questions; how they are to be pressed, rigorously or tenderly; how they are to be mitigated by equity and good conscience; and whether discretion and strict law are to be mingled in the same courts or kept apart in several courts; again, how the practice, profession, and erudition of law is to be censured and governed; and many other points touching the administration, and (as I may term it) animation of laws. Upon which I insist the less, because I purpose (if God give me leave), having begun a work of this nature in aphorisms, 350 to propound it hereafter noting it in the mean time for deficient.  267
  And for your Majesty’s laws of England, I could say much of their dignity, and somewhat of their defect; but they cannot but excel the civil laws in fitness for the government: for the civil law was non hos quæsitum munus in usus; it was not made for the countries which it governeth. Hereof I cease to speak, because I will not intermingle matter of action with matter of general learning. 351  268
  THUS have I concluded this portion of learning touching Civil Knowledge; and with civil knowledge have concluded Human Philosophy; and with human philosophy, Philosophy in General. And being now at some pause, looking back into that I have passed through, this writing seemeth to me, (si nunquam fallit imago) as far as a man can judge of his own work, not much better than that noise or sound which musicians make while they are tuning their instruments; which is nothing pleasant to hear, but yet is a cause why the music is sweeter afterwards. So have I been content to tune the instruments of the muses, that they may play that have better hands. And surely, when I set before me the condition of these times, in which learning hath made her third visitation or circuit, in all the qualities thereof; as the excellency and vivacity of the wits of this age; the noble helps and lights which we have by the travails of ancient writers; the art of printing, which communicateth books to men of all fortunes; the openness of the world by navigation, which hath disclosed multitudes of experiments, and a mass of natural history; the leisure wherewith these times abound, not employing men so generally in civil business, as the states of Græcia did in respect of their popularity, and the state of Rome in respect of the greatness of their monarchy; the present disposition of these times at this instant to peace; 352 the consumption of all that ever can be said in controversies of religion, which have so much diverted men from other sciences; the perfection of your Majesty’s learning, which as a phœnix may call whole vollies of wits to follow you; and the inseparable propriety of time, which is ever more and more to disclose truth; I cannot but be raised to this persuasion, that this third period of time will far surpass that of the Græcian and Roman learning: only if men will know their own strength and their own weakness both; and take one from the other light of invention, and not fire of contradiction; and esteem of the inquisition of truth as of an enterprise, and not as of a quality or ornament; and employ wit and magnificence to things of worth and excellency, and not to things vulgar and of popular estimation. As for my labours, if any man shall please himself or others in the reprehension of them, they shall make that ancient and patient request, Verbera sed audi, [strike me if you will, only hear me;] let men reprehend them, so they observe and weigh them. For the appeal is (lawful though it may be it shall not be needful) from the first cogitations of men to their second, and from the nearer times to the times further off. Now let us come to that learning, which both the former times were not so blessed as to know, sacred and inspired Divinity, the Sabaoth and port of all men’s labours and peregrinations.  269
  ¶ 353 THE prerogative of God extendeth as well to the reason as to the will of man; so that as we are to obey his law though we find a reluctation in our will, so we are to believe his word though we find a reluctation in our reason. For if we believe only that which is agreeable to our sense, we give consent to the matter and not to the author; which is no more than we would do towards a suspected and discredited witness; but that faith which was accounted to Abraham for righteousness was of such a point as whereat Sarah laughed, who therein was an image of natural reason.  270
  Howbeit (if we will truly consider it) more worthy it is to believe than to know as we now know. For in knowledge man’s mind suffereth from sense, but in belief it suffereth from spirit, such one as it holdeth for more authorised than itself, 354 and so suffereth from the worthier agent. Otherwise it is of the state of man glorified; for then faith shall cease, and we shall know as we are known.  271
  Wherefore we conclude that sacred Theology (which in our idiom we call Divinity) is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God, and not upon the light of nature: for it is written, Cœli enarrant gloriam Dei, [the Heavens declare the glory of God,] but it is not written, Cœli enarrant voluntatem Dei, [the Heavens declare the will of God,] but of that it is said, Ad legem et testimonium: si non fecerint secundum verbum istud, &c., [to the law and to the testimony: if they do not according to this word, &c.]. This holdeth not only in those points of faith which concern the great mysteries of the Deity, of the Creation, of the Redemption, but likewise those which concern the law moral truly interpreted: Love your enemies: do good to them that hate you: be like to your heavenly Father, that suffereth his rain to fall upon the just and unjust. To this it ought to be applauded, Nec vox hominem sonat: it is a voice beyond the light of nature. So we see the heathen poets, when they fall upon a libertine passion, do still expostulate with laws and moralities, as if they were opposite and malignant to nature: Et quod natura remittit, invida jura negant, [what Nature suffers envious laws forbid]. So said Dendamis the Indian unto Alexander’s messengers, That he had heard somewhat of Pythagoras and some other of the wise men of Græcia, and that he held them for excellent men: but that they had a fault, which was that they had in too great reverence and veneration a thing they called law and manners. So it must be confessed that a great part of the law moral is of that perfection, whereunto the light of nature cannot aspire. How then is it that man is said to have by the light and law of nature some notions and conceits of virtue and vice, justice and wrong, good and evil? Thus; because the light of nature is used in two several senses; the one, that which springeth from reason, sense, induction, argument, according to the laws of heaven and earth; the other, that which is imprinted upon the spirit of man by an inward instinct, according to the law of conscience, which is a sparkle of the purity of his first estate: in which later sense only he is participant of some light and discerning touching the perfection of the moral law: but how? sufficient to check the vice, but not to inform the duty. So then the doctrine of religion, as well moral as mystical, is not to be attained but by inspiration and revelation from God.  272
  The use notwithstanding of reason in spiritual things, and the latitude thereof, is very great and general: for it is not for nothing that the apostle calleth religion our reasonable service of God; insomuch as the very ceremonies and figures of the old law were full of reason and signification, much more than the ceremonies of idolatry and magic, that are full of non-significants and surd characters. But most specially the Christian Faith, as in all things so in this, deserveth to be highly magnified; holding and preserving the golden mediocrity in this point between the law of the Heathen and the law of Mahumet, which have embraced the two extremes. For the religion of the Heathen had no constant belief or confession, but left all to the liberty of argument; and the religion of Mahumet on the other side interdicteth argument altogether: the one having the very face of error, and the other of imposture: whereas the Faith doth both admit and reject disputation with difference.  273
  The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts: the former, in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us revealed; the other, in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction thereupon. The former extendeth to the mysteries themselves; but how? by way of illustration, and not by way of argument. The later consisteth indeed of probation and argument. In the former we see God vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity, in the expressing of his mysteries in sort as may be sensible unto us; and doth grift 355 his revelations and holy doctrine upon the notions of our reason, and applieth his inspirations to open our understanding, as the form of the key to the ward of the lock: 356 for the later, there is allowed us an use of reason and argument secondary and respective, although not original and absolute. For after the articles and principles of religion are placed, and exempted from examination of reason, it is then permitted unto us to make derivations and inferences from and according to the analogy of them, for our better direction. In nature this holdeth not; for both the principles are examinable by induction, though not by a medium or syllogism; and besides, those principles or first positions have no discordance with that reason which draweth down and deduceth the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth not in religion alone, but in many knowledges both of greater and smaller nature, namely wherein there are not only posita but placita; for in such there can be no use of absolute reason. We see it familiarly in games of wit, as chess, or the like; the draughts and first laws of the game are positive, but how? merely ad placitum, and not examinable by reason; but then how to direct our play thereupon with best advantage to win the game, is artificial and rational. So in human laws there be many grounds and maxims which are placita juris, positive upon authority and not upon reason, and therefore not to be disputed: but what is most just, not absolutely, but relatively and according to those maxims, that affordeth a long field of disputation. Such therefore is that secondary reason which hath place in divinity, which is grounded upon the placets of God.  274
  De usu legitimo rationis humanæ in divinis. Here therefore I note this deficience, that there hath not been to my understanding sufficiently enquired and handled the true limits and use of reason in spiritual things, as a kind of divine dialectic: which for that it is not done, it seemeth to me a thing usual, by pretext of true conceiving that which is revealed, to search and mine into that which is not revealed; and by pretext of enucleating inferences and contradictories, to examine that which is positive; the one sort falling into the error of Nicodemus, demanding to have things made more sensible than it pleaseth God to reveal them; Quomodo possit homo nasci cum sit senex? [how can a man be born when he is old?] the other sort into the error of the disciples, which were scandalized at a show of contradiction; Quid est hoc quod dicit nobis? Modicum, et non videbitis me; et iterum, modicum, et videbitis me, &c. [what is this that he saith unto us? a little while and ye shall not see me, and again a little while and ye shall see me, &c.]  275
  Upon this I have insisted the more in regard of the great and blessed use thereof; for this point well laboured and defined of would in my judgment be an opiate to stay and bridle not only the vanity of curious speculations, wherewith the schools labour, but the fury of controversies, wherewith the church laboureth. For it cannot but open men’s eyes, to see that many controversies do merely pertain to that which is either not revealed or positive; and that many others do grow upon weak and obscure inferences or derivations: which latter sort, if 357 men would revive the blessed style of that great doctor of the Gentiles, would be carried thus, Ego, non Dominus, [I, not the Lord,] and again, Secundum consilium meum, [according to my counsel;] in opinions and counsels, and not in positions and oppositions. But men are now over-ready to usurp the style Non ego, sed Dominus, [not I, but the Lord;] and not so only, but to bind it with the thunder and denunciation of curses and anathemas, to the terror of those which have not sufficiently learned out of Salomon that the causeless curse shall not come. 358  276
  Divinity hath two principal parts; the matter informed or revealed, and the nature of the information or revelation: and with the later we will begin, 359 because it hath most coherence with that which we have now last handled. The nature of the information consisteth of three branches; the limits of the information, the sufficiency of the information, and the acquiring or obtaining the information. Unto the limits of the information belong these considerations; how far forth particular persons continue to be inspired; how far forth the church is inspired; and how far forth reason may be used: the last point whereof I have noted as deficient. Unto the sufficiency of the information belong two considerations; what points of religion are fundamental, and what perfective, being matter of further building and perfection upon one and the same foundation; and again, how the gradations of light according to the dispensation of times are material to the sufficiency of belief.  277
  De gradibus unitatis in Civitate Dei. Here again I may rather give it in advice than note it as deficient, that the points fundamental, and the points of further perfection only, ought to be with piety and wisdom distinguished: a subject tending to much like end as that I noted before; for as that other were likely to abate the number of controversies, so this is like to abate the heat of many of them. We see Moses when he saw the Israelite and the Ægyptian fight, he did not say, Why strive you? but drew his sword and slew the Ægyptian: but when he saw the two Israelites fight, he said, You are brethren, why strive you? If the point of doctrine be an Ægyptian, it must be slain by the sword of the Spirit, and not reconciled; but if it be an Israelite, though in the wrong, then, Why strive you? We see of the fundamental points, our Saviour penneth the league thus, He that is not with us, is against us; but of points not fundamental, thus, He that is not against us, is with us. So we see the coat of our Saviour was entire without seam, and so is the doctrine of the Scriptures in itself; but the garment of the Church was of divers colours, and yet not divided. We see the chaff may and ought to be severed from the corn in the ear, but the tares may not be pulled up from the corn in the field: so as it is a thing of great use well to define what and of what latitude those points are, which do make men merely aliens and disincorporate from the Church of God. 360  278
  For the obtaining of the information, it resteth upon the true and sound interpretation of the Scriptures, which are the fountains of the water of life. The interpretations of the Scriptures 361 are of two sorts; methodical, and solute or at large. For this divine water, which excelleth so much that of Jacob’s well, is drawn forth much in the same kind as natural water useth to be out of wells and fountains; either it is first forced up into a cistern, and from thence fetched and derived for use; or else it is drawn and received in buckets and vessels immediately where it springeth. The former sort whereof, though it seem to be the more ready, yet in my judgment is more subject to corrupt. 362 This is that method which hath exhibited unto us the scholastical divinity; whereby divinity hath been reduced into an art, as into a cistern, and the streams of doctrine or positions fetched and derived from thence.  279
  In this men have sought three things, a summary brevity, a compacted strength, and a complete perfection; whereof the two first they fail to find, and the last they ought not to seek. For as to brevity, we see in all summary methods, while men purpose to abridge they give cause to dilate. For the sum or abridgment by contraction becometh obscure, the obscurity requireth exposition, and the exposition is deduced into large commentaries, or into common places and titles, which grow to be more vast than the original writings whence the sum was at first extracted. So we see the volumes of the schoolmen are greater much than the first writings of the fathers, whence the Master of the Sentences 363 made his sum or collection. So in like manner the volumes of the modern doctors of the civil law exceed those of the ancient jurisconsults, of which Tribonian compiled the digest. 364 So as this course of sums and commentaries is that which doth infallibly make the body of sciences more immense in quantity, and more base in substance.  280
  And for strength, it is true that knowledges reduced into exact methods have a shew of strength, in that each part seemeth to support and sustain the other; but this is more satisfactory than substantial; like unto buildings which stand by architecture and compaction, which are more subject to ruin than those that are built more strong in their several parts, though less compacted. But it is plain that the more you recede from your grounds the weaker do you conclude; and as in nature the more you remove yourself from particulars the greater peril of error you do incur, so much more in divinity the more you recede from the Scriptures by inferences and consequences, the more weak and dilute are your positions.  281
  And as for perfection or completeness in divinity, it is not to be sought; which makes this course of artificial divinity the more suspect. For he that will reduce a knowledge into an art, will make it round and uniform: but in divinity many things must be left abrupt and concluded with this: O altitudo sapientiæ et scientiæ Dei! quam incomprehensibilia sunt judicia ejus, et non investigabiles viæ ejus! [O the depth of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!] So again the apostle saith, Ex parte scimus, [we know in part,] and to have the form of a total where there is but matter for a part, cannot be without supplies by supposition and presumption. And therefore I conclude, that the true use of these Sums and Methods hath place in institutions or introductions preparatory unto knowledge; but in them, or by deducement from them, to handle the main body and substance of a knowledge, is in all sciences prejudicial, and in divinity dangerous.  282
  As to the interpretation of the Scriptures solute and at large, there have been divers kinds introduced and devised; some of them rather curious and unsafe, than sober and warranted. Notwithstanding thus much must be confessed, that the Scriptures, being given by inspiration and not by human reason, do differ from all other books in the author; which by consequence doth draw on some difference to be used by the expositor. For the inditer of them did know four things which no man attains to know; which are, the mysteries of the kingdom of glory; the perfection of the laws of nature; the secrets of the heart of man; and the future succession of all ages. 365 For as to the first, it is said, He that presseth into the light, shall be oppressed of the glory: and again, No man shall see my face and live. To the second, When he prepared the heavens I was present, when by law and compass he inclosed the deep. To the third, Neither was it needful that any should bear witness to him of Man, for he knew well what was in Man. And to the last, From the beginning are known to the Lord all his works.  283
  From the former two 366 of these have been drawn certain senses and expositions of Scriptures, which had need be contained within the bounds of sobriety; the one anagogical, and the other philosophical. But as to the former, man is not to prevent his time: Videmus nunc per speculum in ænigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem: [now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face:] wherein nevertheless there seemeth to be a liberty granted, as far forth as the polishing of this glass, or some moderate explication of this ænigma. But to press too far into it, cannot but cause a dissolution and overthrow of the spirit of man. For in the body there are three degrees of that we receive into it; Aliment, Medicine, and Poison; whereof aliment is that which the nature of man can perfectly alter and overcome: medicine is that which is partly converted by nature, and partly converteth nature; and poison is that which worketh wholly upon nature, without that that nature can in any part work upon it. So in the mind whatsoever knowledge reason cannot at all work upon and convert, is a mere intoxication, and endangereth a dissolution of the mind and understanding.  284
  But for the latter, 367 it hath been extremely set on foot of late time by the school of Paracelsus, and some others, that have pretended to find the truth of all natural philosophy in the Scriptures; scandalizing and traducing all other philosophy as heathenish and profane. But there is no such enmity between God’s word and his works. Neither do they give honour to the Scriptures, as they suppose, but much imbase them. For to seek heaven and earth in the word of God, whereof it is said, Heaven and earth shall pass, but my word shall not pass, is to seek temporary things amongst eternal: and as to seek divinity in philosophy is to seek the living amongst the dead, so to seek philosophy in divinity is to seek the dead amongst the living: 368 neither are the pots or lavers whose place was in the outward part of the temple to be sought in the holiest place of all, where the ark of the testimony was seated. And again, the scope or purpose of the Spirit of God is not to express matters of nature in the Scriptures, otherwise than in passage, and for application to man’s capacity and to matters moral or divine. And it is a true rule, Authoris aliud agentis parva authoritas; [what a man says incidentally about matters which are not in question has little authority;] for it were a strange conclusion, if a man should use a similitude for ornament or illustration sake, borrowed from nature or history according to vulgar conceit, as of a Basilisk, an Unicorn, a Centaur, a Briareus, an Hydra, or the like, that therefore he must needs be thought to affirm the matter thereof positively to be true. To conclude therefore, these two interpretations, the one by reduction or ænigmatical, the other philosophical or physical, which have been received and pursued in imitation of the rabbins and cabalists, are to be confined with a Noli altum sapere, sed time, [be not overwise, but fear.]  285
  But the two later points, known to God and unknown to man, touching the secrets of the heart, and the successions of time, doth make a just and sound difference between the manner of the exposition of the Scriptures, and all other books. For it is an excellent observation which hath been made upon the answers of our Saviour Christ to many of the questions which were propounded to him, how that they are impertinent to the state of the question demanded; the reason whereof is, because not being like man, which knows man’s thoughts by his words, but knowing man’s thoughts immediately, he never answered their words, but their thoughts: 369 much in the like manner it is with the Scriptures, which being written to the thoughts of men, and to the succession of all ages, with a foresight of all heresies, contradictions, differing estates of the church, yea and particularly of the elect, are not to be interpreted only according to the latitude of the proper sense of the place, and respectively towards that present occasion whereupon the words were uttered; or in precise congruity or contexture with the words before or after; or in contemplation of the principal scope of the place; but have in themselves, not only totally or collectively, but distributively in clauses and words, infinite springs and streams of doctrine to water the church in every part; 370 and therefore as the literal sense is as it were the main stream or river; so the moral sense chiefly, and sometimes the allegorical or typical, are they whereof the church hath most use: not that I wish men to be bold in allegories, or indulgent or light in allusions; but that I do much condemn that interpretation of the Scripture which is only after the manner as men use to interpret a profane book.  286
  Emanationes Scripturarum in docirinas positivas. In this part touching the exposition of the Scriptures, I can report no deficience; but by way of remembrance this I will add: In perusing books of divinity, I find many 371 books of controversies; and many of common places and treatises; 372 a mass of positive divinity, as it is made an art; a number of sermons and lectures, and many prolix commentaries upon the Scriptures, with harmonies and concordances: but that form of writing in divinity, which in my judgment is of all others most rich and precious, is positive divinity collected upon particular texts of Scriptures in brief observations; not dilated into common places, not chasing after controversies, not reduced into method of art; a thing abounding in sermons, which will vanish, but defective in books, which will remain; and a thing wherein this age excelleth. For I am persuaded, and I may speak it with an Absit invidia verbo, [meaning no offence,] and no ways in derogation of antiquity, but as in a good emulation between the vine and the olive, that if the choice and best of those observations upon texts of Scriptures which have been made dispersedly in sermons within this your Majesty’s island 373 of Britain by the space of these forty years and more (leaving out the largeness of exhortations and applications thereupon) had been set down in a continuance, it had been the best work in divinity which had been written since the apostles’ times. 374  287
  The matter informed by divinity is of two kinds; matter of belief and truth of opinion, and matter of service and adoration; which is also judged and directed by the former; the one being as the internal soul of religion, and the other as the external body thereof. And therefore the heathen religion was not only a worship of idols, but the whole religion was an idol in itself; for it had no soul, that is, no certainty of belief or confession; as a man may well think, considering the chief doctors of their church were the poets; and the reason was, because the heathen gods were no jealous gods, but were glad to be admitted into part, as they had reason. Neither did they respect the pureness of heart, so they might have external honour and rites.  288
  But out of these two do result and issue four main branches of divinity; Faith, Manners, Liturgy, and Government. Faith containeth the doctrine of the nature of God, of the attributes of God, and of the works of God. The nature of God consisteth of three persons in unity of Godhead. The attributes of God are either common to the Deity, or respective to the persons. The works of God summary are two, that of the Creation, and that of the Redemption; and both these works, as in total they appertain to the unity of the Godhead, so in their parts they refer to the three persons: that of the Creation, in the mass of the matter to the Father; in the disposition of the form to the Son; and in the continuance and conservation of the being to the Holy Spirit: so that of the Redemption, in the election and counsel to the Father; in the whole act and consummation to the Son; and in the application to the Holy Spirit; for by the Holy Ghost was Christ conceived in flesh, and by the Holy Ghost are the elect regenerate in spirit. This work likewise we consider either effectually in the elect; or privately 375 in the reprobate; or according to appearance in the visible church.  289
  For Manners, the doctrine thereof is contained in the law, which discloseth sin. The law itself is divided, according to the edition thereof, into the law of Nature, the law Moral, and the law Positive; and according to the style, into Negative and Affirmative, Prohibitions and Commandments. Sin, in the matter and subject thereof, is divided according to the commandments; in the form thereof, it referreth to the three persons in Deity: sins of Infirmity against the Father, whose more special attribute is Power; sins of Ignorance against the Son, whose attribute is Wisdom; and sins of Malice against the Holy Ghost, whose attribute is Grace or Love. In the motions of it, it either moveth to the right hand or to the left; either to blind devotion, or to profane and libertine transgression; either in imposing restraint where God granteth liberty, or in taking liberty where God imposeth restraint. In the degrees and progress of it, it divideth itself into thought, word, or act. And in this part I commend much the deducing of the law of God to cases of conscience; for that I take indeed to be a breaking, and not exhibiting whole, of the bread of life. But that which quickeneth both these doctrines of faith and manners, is the elevation and consent of the heart; whereunto appertain books of exhortation, holy meditation, Christian resolution, and the like.  290
  For the Liturgy or service, it consisteth of the reciprocal acts between God and man; which, on the part of God, are the preaching of the word and the sacraments, which are seals to the covenant, or as the visible word; and on the part of man, 376 invocation of the name of God, and under the law, sacrifices, which were as visible prayers or confessions: but now the adoration being in spiritu et veritate, [in spirit and in truth,] there remaineth only vituli labiorum, [offerings of the lips;] although the use of holy vows of thankfulness and retribution may be accounted also as sealed petitions.  291
  And for the Government of the church, it consisteth of the patrimony of the church, the franchises of the church, and the offices and jurisdictions of the church, and the laws of the church directing the whole; all which have two considerations, the one in themselves, the other how they stand compatible and agreeable to the civil estate.  292
  This matter of divinity is handled either in form of instruction of truth, or in form of confutation of falsehood. The declinations from religion, besides the privative, 377 which is atheism and the branches thereof, are three; Heresies, Idolatry, and Witchcraft; Heresies, when we serve the true God with a false worship; Idolatry, when we worship false gods, supposing them to be true; and Witchcraft, when we adore false gods, knowing them to be wicked and false. For so your Majesty doth excellently well observe, that Witchcraft is the height of Idolatry. And yet we see though these be true degrees, Samuel teacheth us that they are all of a nature, when there is once a receding from the word of God; for so he saith, Quasi peccatum ariolandi est repugnare, et quasi scelus idololatriæ nolle acquiescere; [rebellion is as the sin of Witchcraft, and Stubbornness as the crime of Idolatry].  293
  These things I have passed over so briefly because I can report no deficience concerning them: for I can find no space or ground that lieth vacant and unsown in the matter of divinity; so diligent have men been, either in sowing of good seed or in sowing of tares.  294
  THUS have I made as it were a small Globe of the Intellectual World, as truly and faithfully as I could discover; with a note and description of those parts which seem to me not constantly occupate, or not well converted by the labour of man. In which, if I have in any point receded from that which is commonly received, it hath been with a purpose of proceeding in melius, and not in aliud; a mind of amendment and proficience, and not of change and difference. For I could not be true and constant to the argument I handle, if I were not willing to go beyond others; but yet not more willing than to have others go beyond me again: which may the better appear by this, that I have propounded my opinions naked and unarmed, not seeking to preoccupate the liberty of men’s judgments by confutations. For in any thing which is well set down, I am in good hope that if the first reading move an objection, the second reading will make an answer. And in those things wherein I have erred, I am sure I have not prejudiced the right by litigious arguments; which certainly have this contrary effect and operation, that they add authority to error, and destroy the authority of that which is well invented: for question is an honour and preferment to falsehood, as on the other side it is a repulse to truth. But the errors I claim and challenge to myself as mine own. The good, it any be, is due tanquam adeps sacrificii, [as the fat of the sacrifice,] to be incensed to the honour, first of the Divine Majesty, and next of your Majesty, to whom on earth I am most bounden.  295
Note 1. This last clause is omitted in the translation. See Book One, note 12. [back]
Note 2. Dryden. [back]
Note 3. This clause is omitted in the De Augmentis. See Book One, note 12. [back]
Note 4. In the De Augmentis he adds præsertim apud nos. [back]
Note 5. i. e. lecturers. [back]
Note 6. i. e. medicine. [back]
Note 7. travailes in the original, and also in edd. 1629 and 1633. [back]
Note 8. i. e. in working upon and altering nature by art. The meaning is expressed more clearly in the translation: majus quiddam debetur iis qui non in saltibus naturæ pererrant, sed in labyrinthis artium viam aperiunt: the compiler of a history of nature being likened to a wanderer through the woods, the “traveller in arts and nature” to one who makes his way through a labyrinth. [back]
Note 9. Præfectos (alios provinciales, alios generales) quibus omnes parent.—De Aug. [back]
Note 10. Not Moses, but Aaron. Ex. i. 17.—R. L. E. [back]
Note 11. infelicitates.—De Aug. [back]
Note 12. i. e. cultivated. [back]
Note 13. De Aug. ii. 1. The substance of the following paragraph will be found considerably expanded in the first chapter of the Descriptio Globi Intellectualis, and set forth much more clearly and orderly in the first chapter of the second book of the De Augmentis; which begins here; the previous observations being introductory. As it may be convenient to the reader to have the means of referring at once to the corresponding passages of the more finished work, I shall mark with a ¶ the places where the several chapters begin; adding (where the case admits of it) some notice, more or less complete, of the differences between the two. See Preface, p. 255. [back]
Note 14. De Aug. ii. 4. In the translation the divisions are altered: History being divided into Natural and Civil,—History of Nature and History of Man; and Literary and Ecclesiastical History being considered as separate departments of the latter. See chap. 2. paragraph 1. This alteration induces an alteration in the order of treatment; the precedence being given to the History of Nature, which is the subject of the second chapter. [back]
Note 15. The description of the required history is set forth much more particularly in the translation; and the whole paragraph rewritten and enlarged. [back]
Note 16. De Aug. ii. 2. [back]
Note 17. This division is retained in the translation, but the exposition of it is extended into a long paragraph. [back]
Note 18. De Miris Auscultationibus; which is now however generally admitted to be not Artistotle’s.—R. L. E. See De Aug. ii. 2. Mr. Blakesley is of opinion that the nucleus of it was probably Artistotle’s, but that it has been added to by subsequent writers. [back]
Note 19. A paragraph is added in the translation, to say that not the mechanical arts only but also the practical part of the liberal sciences, as well as many crafts which have not grown into formal arts (such, he means, as hunting, fishing, &c.), are to be included in the History Mechanical. [back]
Note 20. De Aug. ii. 6. The 3rd chapter, concerning the two uses of natural history, and the 5th concerning the dignity and difficulty of civil history, have nothing corresponding to them here. [back]
Note 21. “I am not altogether ignorant in the laws of history and of the kinds. The same hath been taught by many, but by no man better and with greater brevity than by that excellent learned gentleman Sir Francis Bacon.”—Ralegh: Preface to the History of the World.—R. L. E. [back]
Note 22. parfite in the original; the form in which the word was commonly written in Bacon’s time. [back]
Note 23. De Aug. ii. 7. [back]
Note 24. And even (he adds in the translation) where they attempt to give the counsels and motives, yet still out of the same love of dignity and greatness they introduce into men’s actions more gravity and wisdom than they really have; insomuch that you may find a truer picture of human life in some satires than in such histories. [back]
Note 25. i. e. not mere eulogies. The translation adds: “neque enim de elogiis et hujusmodi commemorationibus jejunis loquimur.” [back]
Note 26. On the other hand it must be confessed (he reminds us in the translation,—I give only the general import of the passage, which is of considerable length) that relations of this kind, especially if published near the time to which they refer, are in one respect of all narratives the most to be suspected; being commonly written either in favour or in spite. But then again it seldom happens that they are all on one side, so that the extreme views of each party being represented, an honest and judicious historian may, when the violence of faction has cooled down with time, find the truth among them. [back]
Note 27. This paragraph and the next are omitted in the translation, and their place supplied by a general complaint that very many particular histories are still wanting; much to the injury in honour and reputation of the kingdoms and commonwealths which they concern. [back]
Note 28. Spelt Brittanie in the original; Brittany in edd. 1629 and 1633. [back]
Note 29. The distinction between the father and the son is more clearly marked in the translation. Of Henry VII. he says qui unus inter antecessores reges consilio enituit; of Henry VIII.’s actions, licet magis impetu quam consilio administratæ. Had Bacon gone on with his history of Henry VIII. it would have been curious to contrast the portrait of the son governing more by passion than policy, with that of the father governing by policy without passion. [back]
Note 30. This last clause is omitted in the De Augmentis. See Book One, note 12. [back]
Note 31. Ariosto, Orlando Furioso; at the end of the 34th and the beginning of the 35th books. [back]
Note 32. Compare Cicero, Philippic. 9. 5., with the opening of the [Greek]. 1389–10. [back]
Note 33. De Aug. ii. 9. Between this paragraph and the last there is introduced in the translation a chapter on the advantages and disadvantages of histories of the world, as distinguished from histories of particular countries. [back]
Note 34. time in the original and also in edd. 1629 and 1633. The translation omits this clause. [back]
Note 35. Esther, vi. 1. [back]
Note 36. Not that greater matters were excluded; but great and small were entered promiscuously as they occurred. (Neque enim sicut annales tantum gravia, ita diaria tantum levia complexa sunt; sed omnia promiscue et cursim diariis excipiebantur, seu majoris seu minoris momenti.) [back]
Note 37. De Aug. ii. 10. [back]
Note 38. This remark is omitted in the translation, and another substituted, to the effect that this kind of ruminated history is an excellent thing, provided it be understood that the matter in hand is not history but observations upon history (modo hujusmodi scriptor hoc agat et hoc æ agere confiteatur); for in a regular history the narrative ought not, he says, to be interrupted by comments of this kind. It should be pregnant with politic precepts, but the writer should not play the midwife. [back]
Note 39. De Aug. ii. 11. [back]
Note 40. Habak. ii. 2. Mr. Ellis has remarked in his note on the corresponding passage in the De Augmentis that this expression, now so familiar and almost proverbial, is in fact a misquotation of the text and a misrepresentation of the meaning of the prophet. “Write the vision and make it plain upon the tables that he may run that readeth it.” It would be a curious inquiry, who first made this mistake. [back]
Note 41. In the translation he says, “sane in calamos nonnullorum piorum virorum incidit, sed non sine partium studio.” Indeed it is difficult to see how, without partiality, such a history of Providence could be written at all. For take any signal calamity and look at it in its historical character only,—who shall say whether it is a chastisement or a martyrdom? a judgment upon the sinner, or a trial of the saint? [back]
Note 42. De Aug. ii. 12. [back]
Note 43. Some further remarks upon the value and use of Apophthegms are introduced in the De Augmentis: of these, a translation will be given in my preface to Bacon’s own collection of Apophthegms. [back]
Note 44. De Aug. ii. 13. The arrangement is partly altered in the translation, and much new matter introduced: among the rest, a whole paragraph concerning the true use and dignity of dramatic poetry, as a vehicle of moral instruction; which is connected in a striking manner with the remark that men in bodies are more open to impressions than when alone. [back]
Note 45. A sentence is added in the translation to explain that under this head satires, elegies, epigrams, and odes are included. [back]
Note 46. The last clause of this sentence is omitted in the translation. [back]
Note 47. This obscure sentence is explained in the translation to mean that Parabolic Poesy is historia cum typo, quæ intellectualia deducit ad sensum,—typical history, by which ideas that are objects of the Intellect are represented in forms that are objects of the Sense. [back]
Note 48. The Prince, c. 18. As two of the animals are the same it is possible that Macchiavelli was thinking of what was said of Boniface VIII. by the predecessor whom he forced to abdicate,—that he came in like a fox, would reign like a lion, and die like a dog.—R. L. E. [back]
Note 49. For these examples there is substituted in the translation a full exposition of the three fables of Pan, Perseus, and Dionysus. And it is worth observing that, upon the question whether there was really a mystic sense at the bottom of the ancient fables, Bacon expresses in the translation a more decided inclination to the affirmative than he does here. [back]
Note 50. This sentence is omitted in the translation. [back]
Note 51. De Aug. iii. 1. The order of this chapter is changed in the translation, and a good deal added. [back]
Note 52. Et sublimitate quadam sermonis hominum qui se ipsos admirari amant tanquam in vertice scientiarum collocatam.—De Aug. The substance of the rest of this paragraph, till we come to the last sentence, is transferred to the end of the chapter in the De Augmentis and set forth more fully and clearly. [back]
Note 53. This clause is printed out of its place both in the original and in the editions of 1629 and 1633; being inserted after the next sentence. It is obviously an error of the printer; but worth noticing as evidence of the imperfection of the arrangements then made for correcting the press. I am inclined to think that in Bacon’s time the proofsheets were never revised by the author.

  In the translation we are told that the axiom holds with regard to distributive justice only. (Eadem in Ethicis obtinet quatenus ad justitiam distributivam: siquidem in justitiâ commutativa, ut paria imparibus tribuantur ratio æquitatis postulat; at in distributiva, nisi imparia imparibus præstentur, iniquitas fuerit maxima.) Equal measure distributed to unequal conditions produces an unequal result; a truth of which many striking illustrations are furnished by the operation of our own laws as between the rich and the poor, when the same penalty inflicted for the same offence falls heavily on the one and lightly on the other. In matter of commutation,—as in a question, for instance, of compensation for property destroyed,—this of course does not hold. The coincidence between commutative and distributive jutice and arithmetical and geometrical proportion is not alluded to in the translation. But this may have been by accident; the translator perhaps not having observed where the misplaced sentence was meant to come in. [back]
Note 54. Discorsi, iii. 1. [back]
Note 55. The translation says in physicis, omitting the word religion. [back]
Note 56. So ed. 1633. The original and the ed. 1629 have which. [back]
Note 57. Some other instances are added in the translation. [back]
Note 58. So ed. 1633. The original and the ed. 1629 have which. [back]
Note 59. De Aug. iii. 3. [back]
Note 60. This request is omitted in the translation. [back]
Note 61. De Aug. iii. 4. [back]
Note 62. viro tam eximio certe, et ob acumen ingenii mirabili.—De Aug. [back]
Note 63. entercourse in the original,—the form of the word commonly used by Bacon. [back]
Note 64. The translation adds “and natural necessity.” [back]
Note 65. ideam. [back]
Note 66. On this branch of the subject there is a large addition of ten or twelve pages in the De Augmentis. [back]
Note 67. Or at least (adds the translation) the enquiry must be put off till forms of simpler nature have been discovered. [back]
Note 68. A sentence is added here in the translation; see note on Valerius Terminus, c. 11. [back]
Note 69. i. e. collecting them into axioms more general, applicable to all the individual varieties: (axiomata scientiarum in magis generalia, et quæ omni materiæ rerum individuarum competant, colligendo et uniendo). [back]
Note 70. i. e. neither confined to particular methods, nor liable to be defeated by accidental obstructions. (Nec angustiis nec obicibus obnoxias esse.) [back]
Note 71. i. e. placed in the department of Physic instead of Metaphysic. (Solent enim inquiri inter Physica, non inter Metaphysica.) [back]
Note 72. De Aug. iii. 6. Observe that in translating this part of the work Bacon has not only made great additions, but changed the order. [back]
Note 73. In the De Augmentis he concludes by placing it as an appendex and auxillary to Natural Philosophy, in order to mark more distinctly its proper function; which he complains that the mathematicians are apt to forget, and to exalt it, as the logicians exalt logic, above the sciences which it is its business to serve. [back]
Note 74. The whole of this passage relating to the use of pure mathematics in the training of the intellect is omitted in the translation; and the omission has been represented as indicating a change in Bacon’s opinion either as to the value of this particular study in that respect, or as to the expediency of encouraging any study which is “useful only to the mind” of the student. This conjecture is hardly reconcilable however with the fact that the same recommendation of mathematics as a cure for certain defects of the intellect is repeated both in a later chapter of the De Augmentis on Studies as published in 1625. Nor is there any difficulty in accounting for the omission of it here. When Bacon wrote the Advancement in 1605, he had no deficiency to report in the department of Mathematics: he could not name any branch of the study which had not been properly pursued, and merely took the opportunity of observing by the way that the study of the pure mathematics had a collateral and indicental value as an instrument of education: an observation very good and just in itself, but not at all to the purpose of the argument. When he revised the work in 1622 he knew more about mathematics, and was able to point out certain deficiencies which were very much to the purpose,—especially as to the doctrine of Solids in Geometry and of Series in Arithmetic; and in introducing a relevant observation he naturally struck out the irrelevant one. [back]
Note 75. De Aug. iii. 5. [back]
Note 76. In the translation the name Natural Prudence is omitted; the part operative is divided into two parts, instead of three; viz. Mechanic and Magic; and the whole exposition is much altered and enlarged. [back]
Note 77. Being a matter of ingenuity and sagacity, rather than philosophy (quæ magis ingeniosa res est et sagax, quam philosophica). This is in fact the Experientia Literata of which we hear more further on. [back]
Note 78. This is the Inventary which (as I think) was to be contained in the tenth chapter of the Valerius Terminus. See my note on Mr. Ellis’s preface. [back]
Note 79. This example is omitted in the translation, to make room for a better (with which Bacon was probably not acquainted in 1605)—the artificial congelation of water; an experiment which he especially valued as giving light as to the secret process of condensation. [back]
Note 80. The passage corresponding to this paragraph concludes the third book of the De Augmentis. That which follows is transferred to the middle of the fourth chapter. [back]
Note 81. The substance of this paragraph will be found in the middle of the fourth chapter of the third book of the De Augmentis (Vol. I. p. 561.). [back]
Note 82. i. e. increase. (quæ incrementa scientiæ perpetuo ad se sugant et alliciant.) [back]
Note 83. This is explained in the translation by adding that the recognition of the doubt has the effect of raising champions to maintain each side, and so keeping it up. [back]
Note 84. vel in Historia Naturali, vel in Dogmatibus.—De Aug. [back]
Note 85. In the translation Empedocles is omitted; and Philolaus, Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, added. [back]
Note 86. Such (according to the translation) as the Lives of the ancient Philosophers, Plutarch’s collection of placita, Plato’s quotations, Aristotle’s confutations, and the scattered notices in Lactantius, Philo, Philostratus, &c. [back]
Note 87. So both in the original and in ed. 1633; perhaps a misprint for “severally.” Ed. 1629 has severedly. The translation has distinctè only. [back]
Note 88. This passage is considerably altered in the translation, and the differences are worth noticing as bearing upon the course of Bacon’s reading and the development of his views in the interval. After the notice of Paracelsus the translation proceeds “or of Telesius of Consentium, who revived the philosophy of Parmenides and so turned the arms of the Peripatetics against themselves; or of Patricius the Venetian, who sublimated the fumes of the Platonists; or of our countryman Gilbert, who set up again the doctrines of Philolaus.” The names of Donius, Fracastorius, and Xenophanes are entriely omitted. I do not know whether Mr. Ellis’s attention had been directed to these changes. [back]
Note 89. De Aug. iv. 1. The whole of this chapter is much altered and enlarged; rewritten rather than translated. [back]
Note 90. The translation adds, quæ nunc quoque invaluit. [back]
Note 91. In the De Augmentis this part is numbered among the Desiderata. The miseries of man, he says, have been well set forth both by philosophers ant theologians; but of what he calls the triumphs of man, (that is, instances of the highest perfection which the human faculties, mental or bodily, have exhibited,) he wishes a collection to be made from history; and gives a page or two of anecdotes by way of example. [back]
Note 92. With regard to the latter, of which nothing more is said here, he observes in the De Augmentis that the treatment it has received is full of follies, and not grounded upon the most solid basis,—which is that when the same sensation is produced in the sleeper by an internal cause which is usually the effect of some external act, he will dream of that act; as in the case of nightmare, where the sensation of oppression on the stomach created by the fumes of indigestion makes a man dream that his body is oppressed by a weight superimposed. [back]
Note 93. temperamentum.—De Aug. [back]
Note 94. tanquam rerum non mere ritualium sed etiam fructuosarum.—De Aug. [back]
Note 95. The translation adds, “and the exercise of obedience.” [back]
Note 96. i. e. suffers together with the mother: simul cum matribus affectibus compatitur. [back]
Note 97. Neither (he adds in the translation) is that other arrangement free from error, which places the several intellectual faculties, Imagination, Reason, and Memory, in the several ventricles of the brain. [back]
Note 98. De Aug. iv. 2. [back]
Note 99. So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original omits are. [back]
Note 100. virtute sua et functione.—De Aug. [back]
Note 101. the omitted both in the original and in edd. 1629 and 1633. [back]
Note 102. This is the spelling of the old editions; and ought apparently to be revived by those who believe that our orthography is the guardian of our etymologies. [back]
Note 103. Dryden. [back]
Note 104. The translation adds et amicorum commendatio. [back]
Note 105. i. e. of the understanding: intellectûs subtilitas et acumen. [back]
Note 106. Here the translation departs widely from the original. The parts, or offices, into which Medicine is divided in the De Augmentis are: 1. the preservation of health; 2. the cure of diseases; 3. the prolongation of life: with regard to the first of which Bacon complains that physicians have treated it in several respects unskilfully or imperfectly; and with regard to the last that they have not recognised the prolongation of natural life as a principal part of their science, being satisfied if they can prevent it from being shortened by diseases. Under the second he includes the whole doctrine of diseases,—the causes, the symptoms, and the remedies, all in fact that is here included under the general head of Medicine,—and so strikes again into the text. [back]
Note 107. i. e. they inquire of the parts, &c., of the human body in general, but not of the diversities of the parts in different bodies,—of simple, but not of comparative, anatomy. This whole paragraph is much enlarged in the translation, and the order changed. [back]
Note 108. So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original omits the. [back]
Note 109. i. e. of whom nevertheless: quorum tamen plurimi &c.—De Aug. [back]
Note 110. i. e. the particular medicines proper for particular diseases, as distinguished from “general intentions.” [back]
Note 111. In the translation he adds “the confection of Alkermes.” [back]
Note 112. So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has commended. [back]
Note 113. The latter part of this paragraph is considerably enlarged in the translation, rather however by way of explanation than addition, till he comes to the end; when in closing his account of the Desiderata in the science of curing diseases, he adds that there is however one other remaining which is of more consequence than all the rest—namely that of a true and active Natural Philosophy for the Science of Medicine to be built upon.

  Between this paragraph and the next is interposed a long passage upon the prolongation of life, of which there are no traces at all here. [back]
Note 114. To whom (he adds in the translation) we owe no less reverence—nay even more—than to others. So in the New Atlantis, “and they say (i. e. the people of Bensalem) that the reverence of a man’s self is, next to Religion, the chiefest bridle of all vices.” [back]
Note 115. So all the editions. He must have meant to write, “handsome to please, nor wholesome to use.”

  By artificial decoration he means painting the face, as we learn from the translation; where he expresses wonder that this prava consuetudo fucandi is not prohibited by the laws, along with sumptuous apparel and lovelocks. [back]
Note 116. The translation adds “in the stupendous strength shown by maniacs.” [back]
Note 117. Here we have an important addition in the translation. Whether when he wrote the Advancement of Learning Bacon had forgotten Painting and Music or meant to find another place for them, I cannot say; but in the De Augmentis he includes them among the Artes Voluptariæ, which he cannot have intended to do when he wrote this sentence. The passage in which they are introduced is to this effect:—The arts of pleasure, he says, are as many as the senses themselves are. To the eye belongs Painting, with innumerable other arts of magnificience in matter of Buildings, Gardens, Dresses, Vases, Gems, &c.; to the ear Music, with its various apparatus of voices, wind, and strings; and of all the sensual arts those which relate to Sight and Hearing are accounted the most liberal; for as these two senses are the purest and most chaste, so the sciences which belong to them are the most learned; both being waited upon by the Mathematics, and one having some relation to memory and demonstrations, the other to manners and affections of the mind. The rest of the sensual pleasures, with the arts appertaining to them, are held in less honour, as being nearer akin to luxury and magnificence. Unguents, perfumes, delicacies of the table, and especially stimulants of lust, stand more in need of a censor to repress than a master to teach them; and as it has been well observed, &c. [back]
Note 118. This observation is omitted in the translation; and a new paragraph is introduced, stating that everything which relates to the body of man (though there be some which do not properly belong to either of the three offices above mentioned, viz. the preservation of health, the cure of diseases, and the prolongation of life) is to be considered as included in Medicine. [back]
Note 119. De Aug. iv. 3. [back]
Note 120. In the translation a new division is introduced which does not appear to be distinctly recognised here—the human soul being divided into Rational and Irrational; the one divine and peculiar to humanity, the other (which is merely its instrument) being of the earth and common to man and brute; and the remark in the text is confined to the first of these only. The other soul, which he calls the anima sensibilis sive producta, is represented as a fit subject of physical enquiry, in its nature and substance as well as in its faculties; though the enquiry has not been well pursued with regard to either. Concerning the doctrine of the Duality of the Soul see Mr. Ellis’s General Introduction. § 14. [back]
Note 121. In the translation he adds “the irradiations of the senses, and the conveyance of magnetic virtues.” [back]
Note 122. In the translation, the words “said by the Roman church” are omitted, and in Religione usus imaginum.…invaluit are substituted. See Book One, note 12. [back]
Note 123. i. e. as a physical remedy, without any thought of inviting thereby the assistance of spirits,—as explained in the translation. [back]
Note 124. This sentence is omitted in the translation altogether; and the chapter concludes with a notice at considerable length of two Desiderata not mentioned here; the doctrince of Voluntary Motion, and the doctrine of Sense and the Sensible. [back]
Note 125. De Aug. v. 1. [back]
Note 126. Not, (he adds in the translation,) that the divine illumination resides in the Imagination,—its seat being rather in the very citadel of the mind and understanding;—but that the divine grace uses the motions of the Imagination as an instrument of illumination, just as it uses the motions of the will as an instrument of virtue. [back]
Note 127. This is better explained in the translation; where it is observed that the arts of speech by which men’s minds are soothed, inflamed, or carried away, consist in exciting the Imagination till it gets the better of the Reason. [back]
Note 128. This whole sentence is omitted in the translation; the reason for not altering the former division being stated simply thus: Nam Phantasia scientias fere non parit; siquidem Poesis (quæ a principio Phantasiæ attributa est) pro lusu potius ingenii quam pro scientia habenda. Poesy, which belongs properly to Imagination, is not to be considered as a part of knowledge; and the two other offices of the Imagination belong, one to the doctrine de anima, the other to Rhetoric. There is no occasion therefore to make a place for Imagination among the parts of knowledge which concern the faculties of the human mind. [back]
Note 129. It may perhaps be worth while to observe that Bacon uses the word invent simply as equivalent to invenire—to find out. [back]
Note 130. De Aug. v. 2. [back]
Note 131. See note on Nov. Org. i. 73. [back]
Note 132. Instead of “Plato in his Theætetus noteth” the translation has Plato non semel innuit. See note Vol. I. p. 617. [back]
Note 133. This curious passage, which is omitted in the De Augmentis, must refer to what Bacon had read in Ramusio of the way in which the natives of the West Indian islands kindled their fires, by rubbing pieces of wood together. Several passages in Bacon’s writings show that he was a reader of Ramusio. See Ramusio, vol. iii. p. 103. a. for Oviedo’s description of the method.

  In reality the coincidence between the customary mode of kindling fire in the West Indies and the superstitious usages of Europe is remarkable. The latter seem to point back to a time when the use of steel and flint was unknown. The Noth-feuer of the Germans was kindled by rubbing pieces of wood together. This fire, originally connected with the worship of Fro, was lighted when cattle were threatened with murrain, and they were made to pass through it. Dr. Jamieson in his Scottish Dictionary mentions precisely the same practice at a comparatively recent period in Scotland in a case in which the murrain had done great mischief. The long continuance of this practice is a sort of illustration of Spinosa’s bitter remark that Superstition is the child of Adversity, there being no man, he observes, who in prosperity does not think himself wise enough to take care of himself. See Spinosa, Tract. Theol. Politicus, chap. i.: and for the German superstition Wolf’s Die Deutsche Götterlehre, pp. 27. 83.

  The holy fire of Vesta, according to Festus (in voce Ignis), was rekindled when it had been allowed to go out, by friction of two pieces of wood. Plutarch’s statement that the rays of the sun concentrated by reflexion were employed for the purpose seems improbable, and is apparently founded on a misconception or mistranslation of some earlier account of the matter. Pliny mentions, but without reference to Vesta, this mode of kindling fire, and states that the best combination is laurel wood with ivy.—R. L. E.

  It is worth observing that though the passage in the text is omitted in the De Augmentis, the substance of it is retained in the Cogitata et Visa. Nam ideo in ignis invento Prometheum Novæ Indiæ ab Europæo dissensisse, quod apud eos silicis non est copia.—J. S. [back]
Note 134. pro lavationibus intestinorum.—De Aug. [back]
Note 135. This reference to Plato is omitted in the translation, as well as the allusion to the derivation of the middle propositions. The induction in question is merely described as “the form of induction which Logic proposes, whereby to discover and prove the principles of sciences.” [back]
Note 136. So in all three editions. The De Augmentis has Isai. [back]
Note 137. in rebus naturalibus, quæ participant ex materiâ.—De Aug. [back]
Note 138. i. e. pretended not to know what it was plain he knew, that he might be thought to know likewise what he knew not—renunciando scilicet iis quæ manifesto sciebat ut eo modo ea etiam quæ nesciebat scire putaretur. [back]
Note 139. This allusion to Tiberius is omitted in the translation. [back]
Note 140. There is nothing about comparison in the translation. [back]
Note 141. In the translation he adds contumacy—tum erroribus tum contumaciæ (quæ rebus ipsis morigera esse recusat)—and also pravis demonstrationibus; an insertion which (though the observation is implied perhaps in the English) I have thought worth noticing; because these pravæ demonstrationes were Idols of the Theatre, of which in the Advancement of Learning there is no mention. [back]
Note 142. This it is then (he adds, writing eighteen years later) which I have in hand, and am labouring with mighty effort to accomplish—namely to make the mind of man by help of art a match for the nature of things,—to discover an art of Indication and Direction whereby all other arts with their axioms and works may be detected and brought to light. [back]
Note 143. The one being the method of inquiry which proceeds from one experiment to another by a kind of natural sagacity; the other that which proceeds from experiments to axioms, and thence by the light of the axioms to new experiments. Aut enim defertur indicium ab experimentis ad experimenta, aut ab experimentis ad axiomata quæ et ipsa nova experimenta designent. Of this Experientia literata there follows in the De Augmentis an exposition at considerable length; in which the several methods of experimenting are described, with illustrations. And this concludes the chapter, the exposition of the other part, the Interpretatio Naturæ, being reserved for the Novum Organum. [back]
Note 144. De Aug. v. 3. [back]
Note 145. In the translation he calls these respectively Promptuaria and Topica: the one being a collection of arguments such as you are likely to want, laid up ready for use; the other a system of directions to help you in looking for the thing you want to find. [back]
Note 146. amplior et certior.—De Aug. [back]
Note 147. Thus the sentence stands both in the original and in the editions of 1629 and 1633; though I do not understand the connexion between it and the sentence preceding. Possibly an intermediate sentence has dropped out, or some alteration has been inadvertently made which disturbs the construction. In the translation the arrangement of the whole passage is changed, and all is made clear. He begins by dividing Topics into two kinds, General and Particular. The General (he says) has been sufficiently handled in Logic, and therefore he leaves it with a passing remark (illud tamen obiter monendum videtur) to the effect of that in the text; “neither is this use,” &c. down to “search and revolve.” But Particular Topics, he proceeds, are more to the purpose and of great value, and have not received the attention they deserve. He then goes on to explain at length what he means; repeating the observations in the next paragraph with some amplification and greater clearness, and then giving a specimen of the thing, in a series of Particular Topics or articles of inquiry concerning Heavy and Light; with which the chapter concludes. With regard to the importance of these Topicæ as a part of Bacon’s method of inquiry—an importance so considerable that he meant to devote a special work to the subject,—see my prefaces to the Parasceve (Vol. I. p. 388.) and to the Topica Inquisitionis de Luce et Lumine (Vol. II. p. 315.). [back]
Note 148. De Aug. v. 4. [back]
Note 149. i. e. to be more or fewer. [back]
Note 150. This clause is omitted in the translation; and a new observation is introduced in its place; viz. that though this direction contains in itself a kind of Elenche or confutation (for the straight indicates the crooked), yet it is safest to employ Elenches (that is, Elenches properly so called) as monitors, for the better detection of fallacies by which the judgment would otherwise be ensnared. [back]
Note 151. In the translation the Doctrine of Elenches is divided into three kinds—Elenchos Sophismatum, Elenchos Hermeniæ, Elenchos imaginum sive Idolorum: i. e. Cautions against Sophisms, against ambiguity of words, against Idols or false appearances; and it is to the first only that the observation which follows is applied. [back]
Note 152. So in all the editions; and not (I think) a misprint for fallacie, but another word, formed not from fallacia but from fallax. Compare “Colours of Good and Evil,” § 1. “The fallax of this colour,” &c. [back]
Note 153. i. e. the true use is to answer sophistical arguments, the corrupt use to invent sophistical objections. [back]
Note 154. This is the part which in the translation he calls Elenchos Hermeniæ; and explains much more clearly and fully. [back]
Note 155. This paragraph is omitted altogether in the translation. [back]
Note 156. Here we have the doctrines of Idols, in its earliest form; the names not being yet given, and the Idols of the Theatre not yet introduced into the company. For the history of this doctrine see preface to the Novum Organum, note C. In the De Augmentis the names are given, and the fourth kind mentioned, though only to be set aside as not belonging to the present argument. The exposition of the three first is also considerably fuller than here, though not nearly so full as in the Novum Organum, to which we are referred. [back]
Note 157. These are the Idols of the Tribe. [back]
Note 158. which (he adds in the translation) is the root of all superstition and vain credulity, in matters of astrology, dreams, omens, &c. [back]
Note 159. So the word is spelt throughout Bacon’s writings, as observed by Mr. Ellis, Vol. I. p. 165. The introduction here of sui juris as the Latin equivalent seems to show that the error arose from a mistake as to the etymology of the Greek word. [back]
Note 160. i. e. the supposed resemblance between the arts and actions of Man and the operations of Nature: naturalium operationum ad similitudinem actionum humanarum reductio: hoc ipsum inquam, quod putetur talia Naturam facere qualia Homo facit. [back]
Note 161. So in the original: the word being pronounced in Bacon’s time EpicÚrian. See Walker on Shakespeare’s versification, p. 211. [back]
Note 162. These are the Idols of the Cave. [back]
Note 163. i. e. if they be not corrected by the continual contemplation of nature at large: si e specu sua raro tantum et ad breve aliquod tempus prodeant, et non in contemplatione naturæ perpetuo, tanquam sub dio, morentur.

  It may be worth observing that Bacon guards himself against being supposed to represent the full intention of Plato’s parable, by adding in a parenthesis missa illa exquisita parabolæ subtilitate. [back]
Note 164. These are the Idols of the Market-place. [back]
Note 165. It might seem from this that Bacon thought the premising of definitions would be a sufficient remedy for the evil. But in the translation he changes the sentence and expressly warns us that it is not: for the definition themselves, he says, are made of words; and though we think to remove ambiguities by the use of technical terms, &c., yet all is not enough, and we must look for a remedy which goes deeper. [back]
Note 166. non a notioribus scilicet, sed tanquam de plano.—De Aug. [back]
Note 167. De Aug. v. 5. [back]
Note 168. All this is omitted in the translation. The art of retaining knowledge is divided into two doctrines: viz. concerning the helps (adminicula) of memory, and concerning Memory itself. The only help of memory which is mentioned is writing; concerning which, after remarking that without this help the memory cannot be trusted to deal with matters of length and requiring exactness, especially such as the interpretation of nature, he insists upon the value of a good digest of common-places even in the old and popular sciences, and so proceeds as in the text. [back]
Note 169. The nature and use of these prænotions and emblems is explained and illustrated in the translation by several examples; but the substance of the observation is not altered. [back]
Note 170. De Aug. vi. 1. [back]
Note 171. In the De Augmentis, tradition (in these three last cases) is translated sermo: which appears to be used in the general sense of communication. [back]
Note 172. i. e. sufficient to explain the variety of notions. [back]
Note 173. i. e. to convey the cogitations of one man to another (fiere posse vehiculum cogitationum de homine in hominem), and so to be an organ of tradition (traditivæ). [back]
Note 174. Barbarous is omitted in the translation: the thing being equally seen in civilised people who know no common language. [back]
Note 175. notissimum fieri jam cœpit. [back]
Note 176. This observation is transferred in the De Augmentis to the next paragraph, and applied generally to all systems of writing in Characters Real. [back]
Note 177. So in the original; and I believe always in Bacon; the Spanish word being still treated as a foreigner, and the accent falling no doubt upon the first syllable. [back]
Note 178. The substance of this remark is introduced in the translation in another place. Here it is merely said that Characters Real have nothing emblematic in them; but are merely surds, framed ad placitum and silently agreed upon by custom. [back]
Note 179. in another tongue ed. 1605; in mother tongue edd. 1629 and 1633. The translation has in linguia quibusque vernaculis. [back]
Note 180. In the translation he substitutes literary for popular. [back]
Note 181. Here are introduced in the translation some interesting remarks on the subject of the analogy between words and reason; in which it is worth observing among other things, that Bacon appears to have changed his opinion as to the nature of Cæsar’s book De Analogia, since he wrote the first book of the Advancement. See above p. 311. There he describes it as “a grammatical philosophy, wherein he did labour to make this same vox ad placitum to become vox ad licitum, and to reduce custom of speech to congruity of speech, and took as it were the picture of words from the life of reason.” Here he says he has doubted whether that book of Cæsar’s treated of such a grammatical philosophy as he is speaking of, but that he rather suspects it contained nothing very high or subtile, but only precepts for the formation of a chaste and perfect style, free from vulgarity and affectation. [back]
Note 182. This observation is omitted in the translation, and instead we have a censure of the attempts (made not long before Bacon’s time) to force the modern languages into the ancient measures; measures (he says) which are incompatible with the frame of the languages themselves, and not less offensive to the ear. But this censure may perhaps be considered as a developement of the remark which concludes this paragraph, and which is also omitted. Certainly there is no English metre which represents the metrical effect of the Virgilian hexameter worse than the English hexameter as people write it now: and if any one would try to write it so as to represent the metrical effect truly, by attending to the distinction between accent and quantity, and distributing them according to the same laws, he would find the truth of Bacon’s remarks that ipsæ linguæ fabrica respuit; the English language does not supply the materials. [back]
Note 183. In the De Augmentis he gives a specimen of a cipher by which this feat of writing omnia per omnia (that is of conveying any words you please under cover of any other words you please, provided only that they contain not less than five times as many letters) may be accomplished; a cipher invented, he says, by himself when he was at Paris. [back]
Note 184. i. e. if things were as they might be: attamen præcautione solerti fieri possit inutilis. [back]
Note 185. qui operam illis præcipue impenderint.—De Aug. The original edition and that of 1629 have “to spend their labours studies in them,”—which is also the reading of the edition 1633, except that it has a comma after “labours.” “Labours and studies” is the reading of modern editions; but I think it is more likely that one of the words was meant to be substituted for the other. [back]
Note 186. De Aug. vi. 2. [back]
Note 187. Besides Ramus himself and Carpentier, one of the principal persons in this controversy was the Cardinal D’Ossat, of whom some account will be found in De Thou’s memoirs.—R. L. E. [back]
Note 188. So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has Inventions. [back]
Note 189. Called Initiativa in the translation; and explained to mean the method which discloses the inner mysteries of science; and distinguished from the other not as more secret but as more profound; the one announcing the results of enquiry, the other exhibiting the method and process which led to them. [back]
Note 190. In the translation he gives it the additional name of Traditio Lampadis; alluding to the transmission of the lighted torch from one to another in the Greek torch-race. See Preface to Nov. Org. p. 87. note. [back]
Note 191. So in all the editions; but probably a misprint for insinuated. The translation has insinuanda. [back]
Note 192. In the translation he calls the latter exoterica, the former acroamatica; and explains that the affinity between the acroamatica and the initiativa lies in this only—that each addresses itself to a select audience; for in themselves (re ipsa) they are acroamatica, one more obscure; the “vulgar capacities” being excluded in the one case by the necessary subtilty of the argument, in the other by an affected obscurity in the exposition. Concerning the latter method, see Preface to the Novum Organum, note B. [back]
Note 193. i. e. of the enigmatical method. [back]
Note 194. i. e. “although indeed:” (illud tamen inficias non iverim, &c.) [back]
Note 195. This observation is introduced in the translation at the beginning of the chapter, and applied particularly to the method of dichotomies; which are not mentioned, I think by name in the Advancement. [back]
Note 196. i. e. a diversity of method to be used with judgment. (Sequitur aliud methodi discrimen in tradendis scientiis cum judicio adhibendum.) This may perhaps be an error of the press or of the transcriber, some words having accidentally dropped out. It may however be merely an effect of hasty composition, of which there are many evidences in this part of the work. [back]
Note 197. i. e. in accordance with received opinions. (Opinionibus jam pridem imbibitis et receptis affinis.) [back]
Note 198. This allusion to divine learning is omitted in the translation. [back]
Note 199. In the translation he adds Diæretica and Homerica, and observes that he does not dwell upon these because they have been rightly invented and distributed. [back]
Note 200. That they should be true generally, primarily, and essentially.—R. L. E. [back]
Note 201. Instead of “the canker of Epitomes,” the translation substitutes “his peculiar method and dichotomies.” [back]
Note 202. The attempt to amend propositions cast him upon those epitomes and shallows of knowledge, as they are called in the translation—epitomas illas et scientiarum vada. [back]
Note 203. This is omitted in the translation. “The rule they call [Greek]” is the rule that propositions should be true essentially. [back]
Note 204. For we must not fall into the error of Antoninus Pius (he adds in the translation)—to become Cymini Sectores, multiplying divisions to the last degree of minuteness. [back]
Note 205. De Aug. vi. 3. [back]
Note 206. Rhetoric being to the Imagination what Logic is to the Understanding.—De Aug. [back]
Note 207. In the translation he substitutes per præstigias verborum; false impressions produced by words on the imagination. [back]
Note 208. i. e. moral philosophy. (Ethica.) [back]
Note 209. In the translation he says ut rationi militent; to fight on the side of reason. [back]
Note 210. In the translation he says, more correctly, “it was noted by Thucydides as a censure passed upon Cleon” (tale quidpiam solitum fuisse objici Cleoni); for the observation is made by Diodotus in his answer to Cleon’s speech, iii. 42. [back]
Note 211. The last clause is omitted in the translation. I do not know why. For according to Bacon’s doctrine, expounded originally in the Meditationes Sacræ upon the text non accipit stultus verba prudentiæ nisi ea dixeris quæ versantur in corde ejus, and repeated here a little further on,—namely, that a man can neither protect his own virtue against evil arts, nor reclaim others from vice, without the help of the knowledge of evil,—Morality has a relation to Vice exactly corresponding with that of Logic to Sophistry; unless it be maintained that the Logician ought to be prepared to practice Sophistry as well as to detect and defeat it. [back]
Note 212. Being a thing which the more it is considered the more it will be valued (rem certe quam quo attentius quis recogitet, eo pluris faciet). [back]
Note 213. and which are all of the nature of collections for store (pertinent omnia ad prompluariam). [back]
Note 214. SOPHISM.—That which people praise is good, that which they blame is bad.

  ELENCHE.—He praises his wares who wants to get them off his hands.

    It is naught, it is naught, sayeth the buyer; but when he is gone he will vaunt. [back]
Note 215. In the translation, instead of the single example given above, he inserts a collection of twelve, by way of specimen; each having the elenche annexed and completely explained. This collection is a translation, with corrections and additions, of the English tract entitled “Colours of Good and Evil,” which was printed along with the Essays in 1597, and will be found in this edition among the literary works. [back]
Note 216. FOR THE WORDS OF THE LAW.—Interpretation which departs from the letter, is not interpretation but divination.

  When the letter is departed from the Judge becomes the Lawgiver.

  FOR THE INTENTION OF THE LAW.—The sense according to which each word is to be interpreted must be collected from all the words together.

  Of these antitheta a large collection will be found in the De Augmentis, set forth by way of specimen in the manner here recommended. [back]
Note 217. Of these formulæ—or formulæ minores as he afterwards called them—three other examples are given in the De Augmentis, all from Cicero. Bacon’s own speeches and narrative writings would supply many very good ones. [back]
Note 218. De Aug. vi. 4. [back]
Note 219. Pædagogica, in the translation. [back]
Note 220. in writing, in the original; and also in the editions 1629 and 1633. The translation has in lectione librorum consistit. [back]
Note 221. For this illustration, which as reflecting upon a Priest might have been offensive at Rome, another is substituted in the De Augmentis, which is “not so palpable and ridiculous.” A striking instance of the same kind occurs in two recent editions of this very work. In an edition of the Advancement of Learning, published by J. W. Parker in 1852, Orosius is substituted for Osorius in the passage (p. 283.), “Then grew the flowing and watery vein of Osorius, the Portugal Bishop, to be in price;” with the following note: “All the editions have Osorius, which however must be a mere misprint. He was not a Portuguese, but a Spaniard, born at Tarragona, nor indeed ever a bishop. He was sent by St. Augustine on a mission to Jerusalem, and is supposed to have died in Africa in the earlier part of the fifth century.” In the following year Mr. H. Bohn published a translation of the De Augmentis, which is little more than a reprint of Shaw’s translation, revised and edited by Mr. Joseph Devey. In this edition Orosius is silently substituted for Osorius in the same passage, with this note: “Neither a Portuguese, nor a bishop, but a Spanish monk born at Tarragona, and sent by St. Augustine on a mission to Jerusalem in the commencement of the fifth century.” The mistake is the more remarkable because the passage in Bacon refers obviously and unmistakably to the period of the Reformation. [back]
Note 222. This point is omitted in the translation, except in so far as it is involved in an observation which is added under the next head—viz. that editors besides giving “some brief censure and judgment of their authors” should compare them with other writers on the same subjects. But I am inclined to suspect that the omission was accidental; for the truth is, that without constant reference to the times and circumstances in which he wrote hardly any author can be properly understood. [back]
Note 223. This point is also omitted in the translation; perhaps as included in the “censure and judgment;” which (he adds) is as it were the Critic’s chair; an office ennobled in his time by some great men, majores certe nostro judicio quam pro modulo criticorum,—men above the stature of critics. [back]
Note 224. So all the editions: probably a misprint for cases. [back]
Note 225. The last clause does not give the exact meaning of the original, from which it may seem that Bacon was reporting the speech from memory; unless it be that a line has accidentally dropped out. By inserting after “fellows” the words “seeing us put to death for no crime, but only for,” &c. the sense would be represented with sufficient accuracy.

  In the translation, this passage relating to “Pedantical knowledge,”—that is the knowledge which concerns the instruction of youth,—is considerably enlarged, and a distinct opinion is expressed upon many of the points which are here only noticed as worthy of enquiry. He begins by recommending the schools of the Jesuits as the best model,—an opinion which he had already intimated in the first book of the Advancement. He approves of a collegiate education both for boys and young men, as distinguished from a private education under masters. He wishes compendiums to be avoided, and the system which, aiming at precocity, produces overconfidence and a mere shew of proficiency. He would encourage independence of mind, and if any one shews a taste for studies which lie out of the regular course, and can find time to pursue them, he would by no means have him restrained. Of the two methods mentioned in the text, one beginning with the easiest tasks, the other with the most difficult, he recommends a judicious intermixture, as best for the advancement of the powers both of mind and body. With regard to the “application of learning according unto the propriety of the wits,” he observes (besides its use as a corrective of mental defects) that masters ought to attend to it for the guidance of the parents in choosing their sons’ course of life; and also because a man will advance so much faster in studies for which he has a natural aptitude than in any others. With regard to the “ordering of exercises” he recommends the system of intermissions. (Itaque tutius est intermittere exercitia et subinde repetere, quam assidue continuare et urgere.) Lastly he would decidedly have the art of acting (actio theatralis) made a part of the education of youth. The Jesuits, he says, do not despise it; and he thinks they are right; for though it be of ill repute as a profession (si sit professoria, infamis est) yet as a part of discipline it is of excellent use. It strengthens the memory, it regulates the tone and effect of the voice and pronunciation, it teaches a decent carriage of the countenance and gesture, it begets no small degree of confidence, and accustoms young men to bear being looked at. In Bacon’s time, when masques acted by young gentlemen of the Universities or Inns of Court were the favourite entertainment of princes, these things were probably better attended to than they are now—and he could have pointed no doubt to many living examples in illustration of his remark. The examples which modern experience supplies are all of the negative kind, but not therefore the less significant. The art of speaking, of recitation, even of reading aloud, is not now taught at all; and the consequence is, that even among men otherwise accomplished not many will be found who can either speak a speech of their own, or recite the speech of another, or read a book aloud, so as to be listened to with pleasure in a mixed company for a quarter of an hour together. [back]
Note 226. De Aug. vii. 1. [back]
Note 227. In the translation the word Appetite is omitted: and the Will is described as governed by right reason, seduced by apparent good, having the passions for spurs, the organs and voluntary motions for ministers. [back]
Note 228. Or the giving it in precept (he adds in the translation) that if you would rectify the mind you must bend it like a wand in the direction contrary to its inclinations. [back]
Note 229. Well by the ancient philosophers, but still better (according to the translation) by the divines in their discussions of moral duties and virtues, cases of conscience, sins, &c. [back]
Note 230. Edd. 1629 and 1633 have simply. [back]
Note 231. So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has in taking. In the translation the words “taking instructions for writing” are omitted; as applicable, I suppose, to the case of Moses only, not of the Church; and multo in otio substituted. [back]
Note 232. Et reliquas complures sectas et scholas, ex altera parte: veluti, &c. All the opinions which are about to be cited belong to “the other side”—i. e. the side opposed to that of Zeno and Socrates; a point which from the careless composition of the English is not immediately clear. [back]
Note 233. The translation has “and lastly that exploded school of Pyrrho and Herillus.” [back]
Note 234. That is, esteeming those actions good which are attended with clearness and composure of mind, those bad which proceed with dislike and reluctation—(actiones pro bonis aut malis habentes, prout ex animo, motu puro et irrefracto, aut contra cum aversatione et reluctatione, prodirent). [back]
Note 235. i. e. that mind is to be considered truly and properly healthy—(animus ille demum vere et propria sanus et validus censendus est). [back]
Note 236. meaning what we should now rather call want of compliance or accommodation—(ineptitudinem ad morigerandum). [back]
Note 237. De Aug. vii. 2. [back]
Note 238. i. e. the stability. (securitas et mora.) [back]
Note 239. So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has and. [back]
Note 240. i. e. apparent good of the individual—(bonum activum individuale saltem apparens). [back]
Note 241. This passage, from for let us take &c. to rightly, is omitted in the translation; and the argument proceeds more clearly without it. [back]
Note 242. The connexion of this with the preceding sentence is made clearer in the translation by the remark that there are found throughout the universe certain nobler natures which inferior natures recognise as their origin and towards which they aspire. [back]
Note 243. i. e. towards the perfection of nature; only a shew of advancement, however, not necessarily a real one—(quia rerum cupitarum adeptiones naturam videantur sensim perficere; quod licet vere non faciant, tamen, &c.). [back]
Note 244. Compare Shakespeare’s sonnet—
  I cannot chuse
But weep to have that which I fear to lose. [back]
Note 245. This illustration is omitted in the translation. [back]
Note 246. i. e. of the conformation of men to the business of society—(quæ eos reddit ad hujusmodi societatis commoda conformes et bene affectos). [back]
Note 247. Dusinesse in the original. Businesse in edd. 1629 and 1633. Vertigine in De Aug. [back]
Note 248. The words “convulsion” and “cramp” seem to describe a forced and abrupt style; an idea not implied in the words of the translation, which may be retranslated thus: “not distracted in digressions, as those which wind about to take in matters impertinent”—(ut illa quæ nihil ad rhombum sunt expatiatione aliqua flexuosa complectatur). [back]
Note 249. i. e. the nature of the argument.—(qui lectorum potius delectationi quam argumenti naturæ inserviunt). [back]
Note 250. In the translation he merely adds the single example of Pliny the younger in his Panegyric on Trajan. When he wrote the Advancement of Learning, he appears to have been under the impression that Pliny’s Panegyric was spoken after Trajan’s death. See below, p. 442. [back]
Note 251. So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has partie. [back]
Note 252. In the translation this is set down as a desideratum under the title of Satira Seria sive tractatus de interioribus rerum. [back]
Note 253. in animadversione illa severa et atroci.—De Aug. [back]
Note 254. Fata both in the Advancement and in the De Augmentis. [back]
Note 255. De Aug. vii. 3. [back]
Note 256. These observations are omitted in the translation, and the whole passage is rewritten, though rather with a view of expressing the meaning more clearly than of altering it. [back]
Note 257. It is remarkable that the observations which follow, down to “benignity or malignity,” are entirely omitted in the translation. [back]
Note 258. So all the editions: a second intend having probably dropped out accidentally. [back]
Note 259. properly both in the original, and in edd. 1629 and 1633. [back]
Note 260. This sentence is omitted in the translation; perhaps from the difficulty of finding equivalent terms in Latin; but the substance of the observation is contained in the remark (transplanted from a former paragraph) that in this matter the common talk of men is wiser than their books. [back]
Note 261. as both in the original and in edd. 1629 and 1633. [back]
Note 262. In place of this we have in the translation a passage of considerable length recommending the wiser sort of historians as supplying the best material for this kind of treatise; not only in the formal character which they commonly give of any principal personage on recording his death, but still more in the occasional observations interwoven into the body of the narrative, when in relating any of his actions they introduce some remark upon his nature and disposition. Bacon instances the character of Africanus and the elder Cato as drawn by Livy; of Tiberius, Claudius, and Nero, in Tacitus; of Septimius Severus, in Herodian; of Louis XI. in Philip de Comines; of Ferdinand, Maximilian, Leo, and Clement, in Guicciardini. (His own Henry VII. would have furnished another instance, as good as any.) Of these he would have a full and careful analysis made, exhibiting not the entire character, but the several features and individual peculiarities of mind and disposition which make it up, (imaginum ipsarum lineæ et ductus magis simplices,) with their connexion and bearing one upon another:—a kind of moral and mental anatomy, as a basis for a system of moral and mental medicine. He prefers the historians to the poets for this purpose, because in the poets the characters are commonly drawn with exaggeration. [back]
Note 263. animos plerumque enervare et solvere.—De Aug. [back]
Note 264. statu.—De Aug. [back]
Note 265. So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has in politiques. [back]
Note 266. This is omitted in the translation. [back]
Note 267. This I suppose is what the French call mauvaise honte. The translation is De inutili verecundia, which is the Latin rendering of [Greek], the title of a tract by Plutarch. [back]
Note 268. This is omitted in the translation. [back]
Note 269. So in all the editions. Perhaps it should be are. (Hæc enim sunt illa quæ regnant in moralibus.) If as be right, we should probably read, far from these &c. [back]
Note 270. So the original. Edd. 1629 and 1633 have insist: perhaps rightly. The translation has unum aut alterum deligemus in quibus paullulum immorabimur. [back]
Note 271. So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has different. [back]
Note 272. And thence a discouragement—(id quod animum semper dejicit et confundit). [back]
Note 273. So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has easily. Possibly Bacon wrote run more easily. The translation has facile et placide delabentur. This part of the original edition is carelessly printed. [back]
Note 274. So ed. 1633. The original has bynding, and ed. 1629 binding. [back]
Note 275. Not of moral but of political philosophy. See Mr. Ellis’s note, Vol. I. p. 739. That in the passage there quoted from Troilus and Cressida the observation and the error were both derived directly from the Advancement of Learning admits of little doubt. But how came Virgilio Malvezzi, in his Discorsi sopra Cornelio Tacito published in 1622, to make the same mistake? “E non è discordante da questa mia opinione Aristotele, il qual dice, che i giovani non sono buoni ascultatori delle morali.” I quote from ed. 1635. The passage occurs in the address to the reader, p. 3. [back]
Note 276. i. e. method of culture (hujus culturæ intentio et institutum). [back]
Note 277. The words “funeral oration” are omitted in the translation. It was not a funeral oration, but a Panegyric spoken in Trajan’s presence. See above, p. 430. [back]
Note 278. So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original omits as. [back]
Note 279. The allusion to Philocrates and Demosthenes and to the difference between wine and water is omitted in the translation; probably because Bacon had since used the same illustration in an opposite sense (see Nov. Org. i. 123.), taking the wine to represent his own philosophy, with its variety of material and elaborate processes of manufacture, and the water to represent the popular philosophy of his time which was content with what came; and the present passage reads the clearer and better for the omission. After “he judgeth well,” yet let him remember (he says) that the object I am in pursuit of is not beauty and fair appearance, but utility and truth; and let him a little call to mind the meaning of that ancient parable, Sunt geminæ somni portæ, &c. Great no doubt is the magnificence of the ivory gate, but the true dreams pass by the gate of horn. [back]
Note 280. i. e. considered with reference to reason and morals—(si juxta moralis doctrinæ scita illud contemplemur). [back]
Note 281. For in a mind properly disposed, the act and exercise of virtue ought to be accompanied with a sense of pleasure; as is more clearly expressed in the translation. There are some, he says, who have both health, beauty, and strength of mind; and so perform their duties well; but, from a kind of Stoical severity and insensibility, take no pleasure in them (sed tamen Stoica quadam tristitia et stupiditate præditi, virtutis quidem actiones exercent, gaudiis non perfruuntur). [back]
Note 282. De Aug. viii. 1. [back]
Note 283. dixerat in the original and also in edd. 1629 and 1633. direxerat.—De Aug. [back]
Note 284. In the translation he compares the value of Conversation in business to that of action in oratory. [back]
Note 285. So the original. Edd. 1629 and 1633 have affectation; which is the more modern form of the word. But the other was I think the more common when the Advancement was written. [back]
Note 286. howr in original; hour in ed. 1633. Ed. 1629 has forme; which is the reading of all the modern editions. But fourme could not easily be mistaken for howr, whereas honor carelessly written would be hardly distinguishable from it. The translation also, though the expression is altered, preserves the idea of honour. Qui primas adeo in urbanitate obtinent et ad hanc rem unam quasi nati videntur. [back]
Note 287. So both the original and ed. 1633. Ed. 1629 has “in it;” which has been followed by modern editors. The translation has ut sibi ipsis in illa sola complaceant. If name be the right word (which I doubt) the meaning must be that they are satisfied with the good report which it procures them. Perhaps it should be “please themselves in the same.” [back]
Note 288. De Aug. viii. 2. [back]
Note 289. i. e. in the times of which he writes,—a little before his own. (paulo ante sua secula.) [back]
Note 290. So the original. Edd. 1629 and 1633 have causes. [back]
Note 291. So edd. 1629 and 1633 and De Aug. The original omits Q. [back]
Note 292. This is what he calls in the translation Doctrina de Negotiis Sparsis. The example which follows is greatly enlarged: the number of proverbs commented upon being increased by a third, and the comments being much fuller. [back]
Note 293. Compare L’Estrange’s Fables and storyes moralized, vol. ii. p. 6. ed. 1708. [back]
Note 294. The words vel meridianum are omitted in the translation; and it is difficult to understand how they got in; for they are not to be found in either of the passages alluded to, and they seem to carry the observation beyond the truth. [back]
Note 295. So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has corruptions. [back]
Note 296. So the original. Edd. 1629 and 1633 have highly: a conjectural emendation probably, by some critic who did not know that lightly meant easily, readily, upon slight occasion; or did not observe that the point of the observation rests entirely upon this word. The corrupt judge does not offend less highly than the facile; but less frequently. [back]
Note 297. This proverb is omitted in the translation. [back]
Note 298. In the translation he adds two other causes—the greater tenderness of the mother’s affection, and (perhaps) a consciousness that her own indulgence has spoiled her son; and instead of saying that the mother has “little discerning of virtue,” he only says that the father understands its value better. The allusion to fortune is omitted altogether; and ineed it is not easy to see how it bears upon the case in point; the son in question being by the supposition not unfortunate but foolish. I thought it right to mention this alteration, because it is more than a development of the remark in the text; it is a correction of the opinion implied in it. [back]
Note 299. So the original. Edd. 1629 and 1633 have in such sort: an attempt at correction where none was wanted. [back]
Note 300. This proverb is omitted in the translation. [back]
Note 301. So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has gaine. I doubt whether action be the right word, and should rather suspect aime, which might look very like gaine if the tail of a letter from the line above happened to strike through the a. The translation has unde fit loco exemplaris ad imitationem et practicam. [back]
Note 302. is both in orig. and in edd. 1629 and 1633. Blackbourne substituted because it is. Instead of “private actions,” the translation substitutes “actions of all kinds great and small”—(quoniam omnem occasionum et negotiorum, tam grandium quam leviorum, varietatem complectuntur). [back]
Note 303. So all three editions, though great can hardly be the right word. I should suspect nearer. The translation has magis in proximo et ad vivum negotia solent repræsentare. [back]
Note 304. i. e. de negotiis sparsis. [back]
Note 305. And yet (he adds in the translation) there were no better patriots,—licet patriæ optimis curatoribus. [back]
Note 306. The translation has hoc genus prudentiæ. [back]
Note 307. inutile in the original, and also in ed. 1633: obviously a misprint. Ed. 1629 and the De Augmentis have it right.

  In addition to these instances he cites in the translation another from Julius Cæsar himself. When the soothsayer reported the auspices unfavourable, he was heard to mutter “they will be more favourable when I will.” The anecdote comes from Suetonius. It was the only occasion (Bacon adds) on which Cæsar so far forgot himself as to betray his secret thoughts—(nunquam, quod nemini, impotentiam cogitationum suarum arcanarum prodidit nisi simili dicto); and his death followed soon after. [back]
Note 308. better (adds the translation) than in the instance above mentioned. [back]
Note 309. sed vir certe paulo moderatior. In Bacon’s character of Augustus—the fragment entitled Imago Civilis Augusti Cæsaris—he acknowledges that he was inferior to Julius in strength of mind, but asserts that he was superior in beauty and health of mind; Julius’s aspirations being restless, boundless, and inordinate; those of Augustus sober, well ordered, and within compass. [back]
Note 310. So ed. 1633. The original and ed. 1629 have weaknesse. [back]
Note 311. The translation omits equals: a correction no doubt of Bacon’s own. [back]
Note 312. According to the translation, the weaker and the more simple by their natures; the wiser and the more close by their ends. [back]
Note 313. i. e. not earnestly and constantly—(ad quos, præsertim vehementer et constanter, aspirent). [back]
Note 314. Whereas private persons are almost all like travellers making for their journey’s end; and if you know what they are aiming at, you may guess by that what they are likely to do and what not to do. [back]
Note 315. So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has rinaeur. [back]
Note 316. i. e. something which may be of use hereafter. And therefore (adds the translation) those who are so intent on the business in hand that, like Montaigne, they pay no attention to anything that turns up by the way, make excellent ministers for Kings and Commonwealths, but bad managers of their own fortune. [back]
Note 317. In the translation Pericles is mentioned as another instance—(eadem et Periclis ratio fuit). [back]
Note 318. And men (the translation adds) who were infinitely loyal to Cæsar himself, but arrogant and contemptuous towards all men else; such as Antonius, Hirtius, Pansa, Oppius, Balbua, Dolabella, Pollio, and the rest. [back]
Note 319. In the translation this part of the subject is distributed into three separate heads;—the art of setting a man’s self forth to advantage (se ostentare)—of making himself understood (se declarare)—of turning and shaping himself according to occasion (flectere se et effingere); and the order of the precepts which follow is changed to suit this arrangement. The three next paragraphs belong to the first head,—the art of ostentation. [back]
Note 320. calumniari in the original. [back]
Note 321. i. e. ingenuous. [back]
Note 322. Especially in the beginning, and at once—(quando quis in principio rei gerendæ viribus suis nimium abutitur, et quod sensim erat præstandum uno impetu effundit). [back]
Note 323. This clause is omitted in the translation; which says only ut quod non possimus nolle videamur). [back]
Note 324. Meaning, I think, the least worthy—the last to be resorted to. The translation has impudens certe est remedium, sed tamen &c. [back]
Note 325. i. e. prudent—mercatorum prudentium more, quibus solenne est et proprium, ut &c. [back]
Note 326. i. e. in impudence—(hoc ipso impudentius). [back]
Note 327. So ed. 1633. The original and ed. 1629 have reseussing. [back]
Note 328. As in the case of deformed persons, and bastards, and persons disgraced—(veluti fit in deformibus, et spuriis, et ignominia aliqua muletatis). [back]
Note 329. According to the arrangement adopted in the translation, the observations on the first head—the art of ostentation—end here; and the art of declaration, that is of making oneself understood, is next handled. The substance of the remarks on this head will be found in the next page, in the paragraph beginning “Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good mediocrity,” &c. Then follows the paragraph, which stands next in the text; which refers to the third head,—quod ad animum flectendum et effingendum attinet. And with this he concludes what he has to say of “the two summary precepts concerning the architecture of Fortune.” The rest he gives as a sample of particular precepts (præcepta sparsa) on the same subject. [back]
Note 330. The rest of this sentence is omitted in the translation. [back]
Note 331. This, in the translation, stands as the second of the præcepta sparsa, that of accustoming the mind to value things according as they conduce to our particular ends being placed first. Throughout this part of the work the meaning is expressed more fully and clearly in the Latin, but where no material alteration or addition is introduced, and where the meaning of the English is plain enough, I do not stay to point out the differences. [back]
Note 332. That is, I suppose, by bringing us less into collision with them—(pauciores offendemus). [back]
Note 333. So in all three editions, though the sentence seems to be imperfect. The meaning must be that they cannot seize and turn to advantage accidents which fall out unexpectedly in their favour. The translation has alii toti sunt in mackinando, qui occasiones quæ opportune incidunt non arripiunt. [back]
Note 334. So the original; edd. 1629 and 1633 have whereat many men. [back]
Note 335. So the original; edd. 1629 and 1633 have like to this. [back]
Note 336. though in orig. [back]
Note 337. i. e. he seemed to say what he felt—(nihil malitiæ in eo suspicabantur qui tam candide et ingenue quid sentiret loqueretur). [back]
Note 338. De pretiis vero imperitissime.—De Aug. [back]
Note 339. i. e. the greatest persons used as means—(si magni alicujus aut honorati viri operâ utantur). [back]
Note 340. So the original and ed. 1629. Ed. 1633 has the third. [back]
Note 341. So the original. Edd. 1629 and 1633 have fortunes. [back]
Note 342. Whereas (he adds in the translation) you will find in courts and commonwealths that the best promoters of their own fortune are those who have no public duty to discharge, and make their own rising their only business. [back]
Note 343. This last clause is omitted in the translation. [back]
Note 344. i. e. to turn his labour taken therein to some other use—(ad alium quempiam præter destinatum finem operam impensam flectamus). [back]
Note 345. So the original. Edd. 1629 and 1633 omit an. [back]
Note 346. The rest of this paragraph is omitted in the translation. [back]
Note 347. same in the original: sands in edd. 1629 and 1633. [back]
Note 348. De Aug. viii. 3. The first part of this chapter is entirely altered in the translation; the remarks on the secret nature of Government, as a subject not proper for scrutiny, being omitted altogether; and the complimentary excuse for not entering upon it himself being transferred to the opening of the book. In this place indeed he speaks of it as a subject which his own long experience as an officer of state qualified him to handle, and on which he had some work in contemplation, though he thought it would be either abortive or posthumous; alluding probably to the New Atlantis, in which we know from Dr. Rawley that he did intend to exhibit a model of a perfect government. For the present however he confines himself to two treatises, given by way of example; one on the art of extending the bounds of Empire (which is a translation of the twenty-ninth Essay); the other on Universal Justice. [back]
Note 349. So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has facilitie. By futility I understand idle curiosity. [back]
Note 350. This was no doubt the treatise which is given by way of specimen in the De Augmentis. The perfection of a law is there described as consisting in five things: it must be certain in its meaning; just in its rules; convenient in execution; agreeable to the form of government; and productive of virtue in the governed. Of these heads the first only is discussed; but under it almost all the points enumerated in the text come under consideration, more or less completely. [back]
Note 351. This paragraph is omitted in the translation. [back]
Note 352. This was written just after the conclusion of peace between England and Spain; when the translation was published the disposition of the times was less peaceable, but a greater part of Europe was actually at peace; and accordingly instead of the expression in the text he substitutes, “the peace which is at this time enjoyed by Britain, Spain, Italy, France too at last, and other regions not a few.” [back]
Note 353. De Aug. ix. 1. This chapter is greatly altered in the translation; much of it being entirely omitted, much condensed, and a little added. In the exordium he announces the subject of the book as one which does not belong to human reason and natural philosophy. He will not therefore attempt to lay out the “partitions” of it, but merely offer a few suggestions, concerning not the matter revealed by Theology, but the manner of the revelation. These suggestions, which are but three in number, together with the remarks by which they are introduced, agree substantially with those in the text: all that does not bear immediately upon them being omitted. And I think all the differences may be sufficiently accounted for by the change of design; while the change of design itself may probably have been suggested by the difficulty of expounding the subject of theology on a scale similar to that adopted with regard to other subjects, without introducing matter which might have caused the work to be proscribed in Italy. See note, p. 277. [back]
Note 354. In the translation this is expressed rather differently. In scientia enim mens humana patitur a sensu, qui a rebus materiatis resilit; in fide autem anima patitur ab anima, quæ est agens dignius: Knowledge being (if I understand the meaning rightly) a function of the anima sensibilis, faith of the anima rationalis; the one receiving its impressions from things material, the other from things spiritual. [back]
Note 355. So the original and ed. 1629. Ed. 1633 has graft. [back]
Note 356. It being our own duty at the same time to open and enlarge our understanding that it may be capable of receiving them. Qua tamen in parte nobis ipsis deesse minime debemus; cum enim Deus ipse opera rationis nostræ in illuminationibus suis utatur, etiam nos eandem in omnes partes versare debemus quo magis capaces simus ad mysteria recipienda et imbibenda: modo animus ad amplitudinem mysteriorum pro modulo suo dilatetur, non mysteria ad angustias animi constringantur. [back]
Note 357. The original and also edd. 1629 and 1633 have of. [back]
Note 358. In the translation this last sentence is omitted, and the substance both of this and of the preceding paragraph is set forth in a better order and more concisely, though to the same general effect. [back]
Note 359. In the translation he expressly confines himself to the latter only, and the rest of the paragraph is omitted. [back]
Note 360. Of this paragraph again the substance is given in the translation, though in a somewhat different order; and a sentence is added to the following effect: If any one thinks (he says) that this has been done already, let him consider again and again how far it has been done with sincerity and moderation. In the mean time he who speaks of peace is like enough to receive the answer which Jehu gave to the messenger—Is it peace, Jehu? What hast thou to do with peace? Get thee behind me. For it is not peace between the contending opinions that most men have at heart, but the establishment of their own opinions (cum non pax, sed partes, plerisque cordi sint). [back]
Note 361. A sentence is introduced here in the translation, to say that he speaks only of the method of interpretation, not of the authority: the ground of the authority being the consent of the Church. [back]
Note 362. This censure, as well as the remarks upon the methodical system which are contained in the three following paragraphs, are omitted in the translation; probably as involving matter which would not have been allowed at Rome. [back]
Note 363. Peter the Lombard, Bishop of Paris, wrote a Sum of Theology in four books, entitled “The Sentences;” and according to the taste of the middle ages acquired the title of “Master of the Sentences.” Many of these scholastic titles are curious. Thus Thomas Aquinas is Doctor Angelicus; Buonaventura, Doctor Seraphicus; Alexander Hales, Doctor Irrefragabilis; Duns Scotus, Doctor Subtilis; Raymund Lully, Doctor Illuminatus; Roger Bacon, Doctor Mirabilis; Occam, Doctor Singularis.—R. L. E. [back]
Note 364. Compare with this remark that of Maphæus Vegius—“Existimabas, ut opinor,”—he is apostrophising Tribonian—“plurimum conducere utilitati studentium, al quod antea in multitudine tractatuum tardius effecerunt coangustatis postea libris citius adsequi possunt.… Sed longe secus ac persuadebas tibi cessit. Quis namque nesciat infinitas et nonnunquam ineptas vanasque interpretationes quibus nulla fere lex exempta est?” See Maphæus Vegius de Verborum significatione, xiv. 77., apud Savigny; History of Roman Law in the Middle Ages, ch. 59.—R. L. E. [back]
Note 365. Of these four things he mentions in the translation only the two last; introducing the mention of them in the next paragraph but three, and in the mean time omitting altogether both this and the following paragraph. [back]
Note 366. i. e. from the intimations in the Scriptures concerning the Kingdom of Glory and the Laws of Nature. Edd. 1629 and 1633 have “from the former of these two;” obviously a misprint, though adopted in all modern editions. [back]
Note 367. i. e. the philosophical exposition. The “former,” i. e. the anagogical exposition, is not mentioned in the translation; which only says that the method of interpretation solute and at large has been carried to excess in two ways; first in supposing such perfection in the Scriptures that all philosophy is to be sought there, secondly in interpreting them in the same manner as one would interpret an uninspired book. The remarks on the first of these excesses coincide with the first half of this paragraph (the rest being omitted), those on the second with the next paragraph. [back]
Note 368. The rest of this paragraph is omitted in the translation. [back]
Note 369. And also (the translation adds) because he addressed himself not solely to those present, but to men of all times and places to whom the gospel was to be preached. [back]
Note 370. The rest of the paragraph is omitted in the translation. [back]
Note 371. In the translation he says too many. [back]
Note 372. also “cases of conscience”—which he especially commends further on, in a passage not translated. [back]
Note 373. So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has ilands. [back]
Note 374. This last sentence is omitted in the translation,—no doubt as being inadmissible at Rome. But in its place is introduced one of Bacon’s happiest illustrations, and one which is not, I think, to be found anywhere in his own English. “Certainly (he says) as we find it in wines, that those which flow freely from the first treading of the grape are sweeter than those which are squeezed out by the wine-press, because the latter taste somewhat of the stone and the rind; so are those doctrines most wholesome and sweet which ooze out of the Scriptures when gently crushed, and are not forced into controversies and common places.”

  The next six paragraphs are entirely omitted,—as belonging to that part of the subject with which he has professed in the beginning that he will not meddle. [back]
Note 375. The original, and also edd. 1629 and 1633, have privately. [back]
Note 376. So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has mans. [back]
Note 377. So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has primitive. [back]

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