week 4

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Arts Humanities

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Feb 20, 2024

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1. Why did MacArthur's defensive plans for the Philippines fail? How was a numerically inferior Japanese force able to defeat him? During his time in the Philippines MacArthur’s was not ready for because he was waiting on convoy that never made it (1). While awaiting his convoy and the attack on Pearl Harbour made it confusing on best way to attack. After, the attack on Pearl the Japanese government had planes already in the air moved their attack towards the Philippines where they had the best advantage. Even though Japan had fewer forces the element of surprise and the distraction pearl gave them the upper hand. The Japanese government understood that they couldn’t win a straightforward attack, so they divided the forces (2). This here made MacArthur retreat out Milian and moved his forces away, since they were able to take their air support. His plans were based on help from the convoy and having full air regimen available to fight against but since they were taking by Surprise, he was not able to respond. This foothold in the south Asai made it harder for the allied forces to respond back since the attack it was on heel on major blows. This mindset of being protected was because months prior the U.S made big wins Japanese forces and they felt as the Japanese were bold enough for another attack (3). This false sense of security probably did not help there posture in the Philippines, but it did go back to help was suppose to come never made. 1-Foot, M. R. D. “The Oxford Companion to World War II.” Oxford Reference, 2014. https://www.oxfordreference.com/abstract/10.1093/acref /9780198604464.001.0001/acref-9780198604464 . 2-Foot, M. R. D. “The Oxford Companion to World War II.” Oxford Reference,
2014. https://www.oxfordreference.com/abstract/10.1093/acref /9780198604464.001.0001/acref-9780198604464 . 3-Sturma, Michael. “Atrocities, Conscience, and Unrestricted Warfare.” War in History 16, no. 4 (2009): 447– 68. https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344509341686 .
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