Bio 527

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Dec 6, 2023

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Bio 527: Animal Behavior Exam 2 Study Guide Optimality modeling Terminology Despotic distribution: helps explain the distribution of animals within their habitats based on competition for limited resources and individual competitive abilities . Ideal free distribution: this theory explains how the organisms are going to distribute themselves among sites so that the payoff is going to be the same at each of those sites Diminishing returns: Diminishing returns in animal behavior refer to the principle that as an animal continues to forage or exploit a resource, the rate of gain or benefit from that resource decreases over time. It represents the idea that the longer an animal spends in a specific foraging patch, the less it gains per unit of time, as the most accessible or valuable resources are depleted. Giving-up time: Giving-up time in animal behavior refers to the point at which an animal decides to leave a particular foraging patch or habitat and move on to another. It is the moment when the animal perceives that the costs or risks of foraging in that location (e.g., exposure to predators) exceed the benefits or resources gained. Frequency-dependent strategies: Frequency-dependent strategies in animal behavior refer to behaviors or tactics adopted by individuals based on the relative frequencies of alternative strategies in a population. An individual's success in using a particular strategy depends on how common or rare that strategy is within the population. These strategies can be advantageous when they are less common and disadvantageous when they become more common in the population. Conditional strategies: Conditional strategies in animal behavior refer to behaviors or tactics that individuals adopt based on their specific circumstances, characteristics, or environmental conditions. Rather than having a fixed, one-size-fits-all strategy, animals adjust their behavior based on factors such as their age, size, health, or the availability of resources in their environment. Game theory: game theory uses models to predict phenomena that get at their causes
ESS (evolutionarily stable strategy): predictions about which social behaviors will be stable over evolutionary time. A set of behaviors that is resistant to invasion by any other strategies if everyone’s already doing the ESS Hawk-Dove strategies: classic model with two contestants. The hawk always escalates to fight: dove only displays V= value of resource C= cost of injury Both contestants have equal change of winning when playing the same strategy Example: Hawk-Dove Models • Classic model with two contestants – Hawk always escalates to fight; Dove only displays • V = value of resource; C = cost of injury • If both contestants have equal chance of winning, then: Hawk Dove Hawk (1⁄2)(V-C) V Dove 0 V/2 – What is the ESS? • Strategy is an ESS when it cannot be invaded – Is Dove Strategy ever an ESS? • No! (only when V/2 > V, i.e., V is negative) – Is Hawk Strategy ever an ESS? • YES, when (1/2)(V-C) > 0 (i.e., V > C) – What happens when C > V (injury very costly)? Concepts What are the general differences between animals that follow a more “despotic” model of territoriality, and those that favor more of an ideal free distribution? Despotic Distribution: In this model, some individuals control and defend the best territories, leading to unequal resource distribution. Dominant individuals have preferential access to resources.
Ideal Free Distribution: This theory predicts that individuals distribute themselves among sites so that the payoff (resources) is the same at each site. Individuals can choose habitats that match their competitive abilities. How does the leaf aphid example illustrate aspects of both? This example illustrates aspects of both models. Some aphids distribute themselves across leaves in an ideal free manner, while others might occupy certain leaves and defend them, following a more despotic strategy. How would you graphically represent the ideal free distribution? It's typically represented with a graph showing resource distribution across sites. In an ideal free distribution, the resources at each site are roughly equal. Why is the reproductive success of individuals in different quality habitats generally equal if they conform to an ideal free distribution? In an ideal free distribution, the reproductive success of individuals in different quality habitats is generally equal because individuals move to habitats where resources are more abundant, which balances the payoff. What types of assumptions go into the creation of an optimal foraging model? Assumptions include knowledge of resource distribution, energy maximization, and time constraints. How would an animal behaving in accordance with the optimal giving-up time model change its behavior in response to changes in the parameters of the model? Animals change their foraging behavior in response to changes in resource availability. As resources become scarcer, animals should spend more time foraging in the same patch. How was the class bead game used to illustrate the principles of the optimal giving-up time model? it's used to illustrate the principles of the optimal giving-up time model by simulating foraging decisions in a controlled environment. Why does the giving up time model apply to starlings, but not to honeybees?
It applies to starlings because they adjust their patch residence time based on resource density, but not to honeybees because they have a different foraging strategy. Why are optimal foraging models often constructed iteratively, after field data has been collected? They can persist in a population due to individual variation, spatial heterogeneity, or frequency-dependent selection. How does the oystercatcher example illustrate that process? What are some ways that alternative foraging strategies persist in the same population? How do predators or parasites affect optimal foraging decisions? When examining a payoff matrix how would you determine whether a given strategy is an ESS? To determine if a strategy is an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) in a payoff matrix, you would typically look for a strategy that cannot be invaded by any alternative strategy. In other words, if a population is primarily composed of individuals using the ESS, no rare mutant strategy should be able to invade and replace the ESS. What is the logic behind the payoff structure in the hawk-dove game? The logic is that hawks are more aggressive and may win the resource but incur a cost, while doves avoid conflict but may get a reduced share of the resource when faced with hawks. In the hawk-dove game, the logic behind the payoff structure is that it represents the relative costs and benefits of engaging in aggressive behaviors (hawk) versus avoiding conflict and displaying a submissive behavior (dove). Under what conditions is there no pure ESS in the hawk-dove game? There is no pure Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) in the hawk-dove game under the following condition: When the cost of engaging in conflict (C) is less than the potential gain from winning the resource (R). In other words, if C < R, it is not stable for all
individuals to choose the dove strategy because hawks can benefit by challenging doves. How do you find the stable proportion of strategies in a game with no pure ESS? To find the stable proportion of strategies in a game with no pure ESS, you would typically look for a mixed strategy equilibrium. In a mixed strategy equilibrium, individuals in the population adopt a combination of strategies, and no single strategy can dominate the population. The proportions of strategies in the mixed equilibrium can be determined by analyzing the payoff matrix and considering factors like the relative payoffs of each strategy and the frequency of interactions between different strategy types. Game theory techniques, such as the replicator dynamics, can be used to find the stable proportions of strategies in mixed equilibria. What principle does the addition of the “defender” strategy illustrate in the Hawk-Dove game? The addition of the "defender" strategy in the Hawk-Dove game illustrates the principle of coexistence and stability of multiple strategies in a population. It shows that, in certain situations, adding a new strategy can contribute to the persistence and stability of the overall population, even when there is no pure ESS. The "defender" strategy acts as a mediator that reduces conflict between hawks and doves, promoting coexistence by preventing overly aggressive interactions. This principle of coexistence and the introduction of alternative strategies can lead to more stable and diverse populations in nature. Predator-Prey Terminology Parasitoid Constitutive defense
Inducible defense Renunciation, Inactivation, Circumvention, Utilization Stabilamenta Aggressive mimicry Crypsis Batesian mimicry: A harmless organism mimics the appearance of a dangerous or unpalatable species. Mullerian mimicry: Two or more harmful or unpalatable species evolve similar warning signals. Aposematism: Warning coloration or signals that indicate the unpalatability or danger of an organism. Unprofitability advertisement: Signaling that communicates an organism's unprofitability as prey. Pursuit-deterrent signal: Signals that discourage predators from pursuing prey. Dilution effect Selfish herd Confusion effect Coevolution Arms race
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