MAT232 week 3 Discussion

For the next set of multiple choice questions, consider a construction contract between a builder and a client, where V = $20,000 R = $1,000 P = $15,000 V = the client's value of performance; R = the client's reliance investment; and P=the contract price, payable on performance. Suppose that at the time the contact was made, the cost of performance to the builder is uncertain, but it was known that it will definitely take one of the following values: C=($10,000; $14,000; $18,000; $22,000). 23. It is efficient for the builder to breach this contract if it turns out that (a) C=$10,000 (b) C=$14,000 (c) C=$18,000 (d) C=$22,000. 24. Calculate the amount of expectation damages for this example. It is equal to: (a) $1,000 (b) $5,000 (c) $15,000 (d) $20,000 25. Under expectation damages, the builder will breach the contract rather than perform if C equals (a) $10,000 (b) $14,000 (c) $18,000 (d) $22,000

Explanation with answer

In 1938, major powers met in Munich to discuss Germany’s demands to annex part of Czechoslovakia. Let us think of the issue as the proportion of Czechoslovak territory given to Germany. Possible outcomes can be plotted on a single dimension, where 0 implies that Germany obtains no territory and 1 implies that Germany obtains all of Czechoslovakia Most countries at Munich (“Allies” for short) wish to give nothing to Germany: their ideal point is 0, which gives them utility of 1. Their worst possible outcome is for Germany to take all of Czechoslovakia; hence an outcome of 1 gives them utility of 0. In between these extremes, the Allies could propose a compromise, X, which gives them utility of 1 – X. The question for the Allies is whether to propose a compromise or fight a war with Germany, which they are sure will ensue if they offer nothing. If they propose a compromise and Germany accepts, they get a payoff of 1 – X. If they fight, they win with probability p and lose with…

In 1938, major powers met in Munich to discuss Germany’s demands to annex part of Czechoslovakia. Let us think of the issue as the proportion of Czechoslovak territory given to Germany. Possible outcomes can be plotted on a single dimension, where 0 implies that Germany obtains no territory and 1 implies that Germany obtains all of Czechoslovakia:   Most countries at Munich (“Allies” for short) wish to give nothing to Germany: their ideal point is 0, which gives them utility of 1. Their worst possible outcome is for Germany to take all of Czechoslovakia; hence an outcome of 1 gives them utility of 0. In between these extremes, the Allies could propose a compromise, X, which gives them utility of 1 – X. The question for the Allies is whether to propose a compromise or fight a war with Germany, which they are sure will ensue if they offer nothing. If they propose a compromise and Germany accepts, they get a payoff of 1 – X. If they fight, they win with probability p and lose with…

In 1938, major powers met in Munich to discuss Germany’s demands to annex part of Czechoslovakia. Let us think of the issue as the proportion of Czechoslovak territory given to Germany. Possible outcomes can be plotted on a single dimension, where 0 implies that Germany obtains no territory and 1 implies that Germany obtains all of Czechoslovakia: Most countries at Munich (“Allies” for short) wish to give nothing to Germany: their ideal point is 0, which gives them utility of 1. Their worst possible outcome is for Germany to take all of Czechoslovakia; hence an outcome of 1 gives them utility of 0. In between these extremes, the Allies could propose a compromise, X, which gives them utility of 1 – X. The question for the Allies is whether to propose a compromise or fight a war with Germany, which they are sure will ensue if they offer nothing. If they propose a compromise and Germany accepts, they get a payoff of 1 – X. If they fight, they win with probability p and lose with…

In 1938, major powers met in Munich to discuss Germany’s demands to annex part of Czechoslovakia. Let us think of the issue as the proportion of Czechoslovak territory given to Germany. Possible outcomes can be plotted on a single dimension, where 0 implies that Germany obtains no territory and 1 implies that Germany obtains all of Czechoslovakia:   Most countries at Munich (“Allies” for short) wish to give nothing to Germany: their ideal point is 0, which gives them utility of 1. Their worst possible outcome is for Germany to take all of Czechoslovakia; hence an outcome of 1 gives them utility of 0. In between these extremes, the Allies could propose a compromise, X, which gives them utility of 1 – X. The question for the Allies is whether to propose a compromise or fight a war with Germany, which they are sure will ensue if they offer nothing. If they propose a compromise and Germany accepts, they get a payoff of 1 – X. If they fight, they win with probability p and lose with…

You could choose any position A (the first mover) or B (the second mover) in the following three bargaining games. For each game (I, II, or III), explain which player (A or B) you would pick in order to maximize your expected payoff? 1. Game I (one stage): A will make the first move and offer her partner a portion of 6 dollars. If the offer is accepted, the bargain is complete and each player gets an amount determined by the offer. If the offer is declined, each player gets nothing. 2. Game II (two stages): A will make the first move and offer her partner a portion of 12 dollars. If the offer is accepted, the bargain is complete and each player gets an amount determined by the offer. If the offer is declined, the 12 shrinks to 5 and B then gets a turn to make an offer. Again, the bargain is complete if A accepts and the division is made according to the terms of the offer. If player A declines the offer, each player gets nothing. 3. Game III (three stages): A will make the first move…

Suppose that Winnie the Pooh and Eeyore have the same value function: v(x) = x1/2 for gains and v(x) = -2(|x|)1/2 for losses. The two are also facing the same choice, between (S) $1 for sure and (G) a gamble with a 25% chance of winning $4 and a 75% chance of winning nothing. Winnie the Pooh and Eeyore both subjectively weight probabilities correctly. Winnie the Pooh codes all outcomes as gains; that is, he takes as his reference point winning nothing. For Pooh: What is the value of S? What is the value of G? Which would he choose? Eeyore codes all outcomes as losses; that is, he takes as his reference point winning $4. For Eeyore: What is the value of S? What is the value of G? Which would he choose?

Economics CHOOSE THE CORRECT ANSWER. Remember that in the equilibrium prediction of an ultimatum game, the Proposer will offer the smallest non-zero amount of money possible. First-year Commerce students were asked to play an Ultimatum game where a choice had to be made over the division of R100. Offers could only be made in R10 increments, and the results of the various offers made are reported in the table below. Amount offered by Proposer RO R10 R20 R30 R40 R50 Proportion rejected 100% 60% 50% 30% 10% 0% What is the equilibrium split of the R100 between the Proposer and the Responder? O A. Proposer: R50, Responder: R50 O B. Proposer: R10, Responder: R90 O C. Proposer: R90, Responder: R10 O D. Proposer: R60, Responder: R40 O E. Proposer: R40, Responder: R60

Back in 2007, William Beeny, the 81-year-old founder of a quirky roadside museum devoted to proving that Elvis Presley is still alive, put the museum's entire collection of Elvis memorabilia up for auction. The collection included photographs, books, yellowed news clippings, and replicas of Elvis' Cadillac. His wish was that the winning bidder would buy the collection and carry on his theory that the King never died. Beeny refused to put a value on his collection. "Value is in the eye of the beholder," he said. "One man's trash is another man's treasure." Suppose four individuals decided to participate in the auction and that their private values of the collection are as follows: Bidder Valuation Dimmy $147,000 Virginia $158,000 Burt $153,000 Hope $150,000 Which of the following statements is correct? O In a first-price sealed-bid auction, Virginia would win the collection but might end up paying more than $158,000 (winner's curse). O In an English Auction, Virginia would win the…

Some people claim that the answer is not 200/3. When I solve by Lagrangian I get 200/3 as well. But most of my friends claim that the correct aswer is 80! Could you help me figure out why?

Suppose that there are three plots of mountain resort land available for sale in Interlaken and six potential buyers, each interested in purchasing one plot. Assume that all of the plots are basically indistinguishable and that the minimum selling price of each is $595,000. The following table lists each potential buyer's willingness and ability to purchase a plot of land. Person Willingness and Ability to Purchase (Dollars) Amy 660,000 Carlos 620,000 Deborah 570,000 Felix 540,000 Janet 530,000 Van 750,000 Which of these people will purchase one of the three mountain resort plots? Check all that apply. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Amy Carlos Deborah Felix Janet Van Now, assume that the three mountain plots have been sold to the people that you indicated in the previous section. Suppose that a few weeks after the last of those mountain plots is sold, another basically identical mountain plot goes on the market for sale at a minimum price of $582,500. This fourth plot will purchase it from the seller for…

Consider the following compound lottery, described in words:  "The probability that the price of copper increases tomorrow is objectively determined to be 0.5. If it increases, then tomorrow I will flip a coin to determine a monetary payout that you will receive: if the flip is Heads, you win $100, while if it is Tails, you win $50. If it does not increase, then I will roll a 10-sided die (assume each side is equally likely to be rolled). If the die roll is a 4 or lower, you will win $100. If it is a 5, then you will win $200, and if it is a 6 or greater, you will win $50." Fill in the blanks below for the reduced lottery that corresponds to this compound lottery (write in decimals).   R= (      , $50;          , $100;          , $200)

Suppose you observe a person's answer to two decision problems. Problem 1: You are offered $40 today. What is the minimum amount x you demand one month from today in order to be willing to give up the $40 now? Answer: x = 52. Problem 2: Your are offered $40 today. What is the minimum amount x you demand one year from today in order to be willing to give up the $40 now? Answer: $60. 1. Demonstrate that the rational model of time preferences is violated for this choice pattern. 2. Derive this individual's B and d for the hyperbolic time discounting model. 3. Suppose the utility you get from eating ice cream now is 10 utils. But you pay a cost of -4 utils per hour for the next 4 hours, because it gives you indigestion and makes you feel lethargic. If your hourly B and d for this problem are B = .6 and d = .9, ... 1. What is the total discounted utility of eating ice cream now? 2. What is your total discounted utility now of planning to eat ice cream after lunch tomorrow? 3. Do you eat ice…

Two players play the Ultimatum Game, in which they are to split $20.  A purely rational agent would only reject an offer of … Group of answer choices... -$20 -$19 -$1 -$0 -$10

In Las Vegas, roulette is played on a wheel with 38 slots, of which 18 are black, 18 are red, and 2 are green (zero and double-zero). Your friend impulsively takes all $361 out of his pocket and bets it on black, which pays 1 for 1. This means that if the ball lands on one of the 18 black slots, he ends up with $722, and if it doesn't, he ends up with nothing. Once the croupier releases the ball, your friend panics; it turns out that the $361 he bet was literally all the money he has. While he is risk-averse - his utility function is u(x) =, where x is his roulette payoff - you are effectively risk neutral over such small stakes. a. When the ball is still spinning, what is the expected profit for the casino? b. When the ball is still spinning, what is the expected value of your friend's wealth? c. When the ball is still spinning, what is your friend's certainty equivalent (i.e., how much money would he accept with certainty to walk away from his bet). Say you propose the following…

Economics Explain in detail how you would extend the Cox- Ross{Rubinstein binomial tree model for pricing options if instead of considering two states of nature in each period you consider three states of nature (e.g. a good state, a middle state and a bad state). Focus on a tree with two periods (periods 0, 1 and 2) and draw the corresponging trinomial tree.

Do not know how to solve

Two people have $4 to divide between themselves. They use the following process to divide the money. Each person names a number of dollars (a nonnegative integer), at most equal to 4. If the sum of the mounts that the people name is at most 4, then each person receives the amount of money she names (and the remainder is destroyed). If the sum of the amounts that the people name exceeds 4 and the amounts named are different, then the person who names the smaller amount receives that amount and the other person receives the remaining money. If the sum of the amounts that the people name exceeds 4 and the amounts named are the same, then each person receives $2. (a) Write a payoff matrix to represents the game. (b) Find all strictly dominated strategies for each player. (c) Find all weakly dominated strategies for each player. (d) Find all the Nash equilibria of the game in pure strategies.

Suppose players A and B play a discrete ultimatum game where A proposes to split a $5 surplus and B responds by either accepting the offer or rejecting it. The offer can only be made in $1 increments. If the offer is accepted, the players' payoffs resemble the terms of the offer while if the offer is rejected, both players get zero. Also assume that players always use the strategy that all strictly positive offers are accepted, but an offer of $0 is rejected. A. What is the solution to the game in terms of player strategies and payoffs? Explain or demonstrate your answer. B. Suppose the ultimatum game is played twice if player B rejects A's initial offer. If so, then B is allowed to make a counter offer to split the $5, and if A rejects, both players get zero dollars at the end of the second round. What is the solution to this bargaining game in terms of player strategies and payoffs? Explain/demonstrate your answer. C. Suppose the ultimatum game is played twice as in (B) but now there…

The blue curve on the following graph shows the tradeoff between security and tourism; that is, combinations of security and tourism above the blue curve are not possible, and those on or below the curve are possible. The vertical axis measures security, defined as the probability that a terrorist is intercepted before entering the country. The horizontal axis measures the number of yearly visitors to the United States, in millions. Suppose that before 9/11, there were 55 million visitors per year, and the probability of intercepting any particular terrorist at customs and immigration was 10%, as indicated by the purple point (diamond symbol). After the 9/11 attacks, a debate is held in Congress. Members of both parties agree that security measures need to be improved. However, there is some disagreement as to how much additional security is needed. Suppose the first bill that is introduced mandates that security be improved so that the probability of catching a terrorist at the border…

Suppose an individual is looking to build a house in a plain that is prone to flooding. Because of the risk of damage due to flooding, the buyer's top dollar for building the house is only $290,000. Suppose the cost of building a house in this area is $330,000. A wealth-creating transaction is not possible since the seller's bottom line (or the cost of building the house) is (LESS THAN, EQUAL TO, GREATER THAN) the buyer's top dollar. The difference between the cost of building the house minus the buyer's top dollar is $_______.   Suppose the government subsidizes flood insurance for homes in the flood plain. Because of this, the buyer has access to very cheap insurance, worth an expected $70,000. Without such a subsidy, the high likelihood of flood results in extremely high rates for flood insurance. With this subsidy, the individual (IS, IS NOT) incentivized to build a house in the flood plain..

Consider the following scenarios in the Ultimatum game, viewed from the perspective of the Recipient. Assume that the Recipient is motivated by negative reciprocity and will gain $15 of value from rejecting an offer that is strictly less than 50 percent of the total amount to be divided between the two players by the Proposer. Assume that the Proposer can only make offers in increments of $1. If the pot is $30, what is the minimum offer that the Responder will accept? What percent of the pie is this amount? The minimum offer that will be accepted is S. which represents percent of the pie. If the pot is $100, what is the minimum offer that the Responder will accept? What percent of the pie is this amount? The minimum offer that will be accepted is S, which represents percent of the pie. (Round answers to 2 decimal places as needed)

Willa and Lora are playing the dictator game. Let ww and wL be the amount of money Willa and Lora receive in the game, respectively. Willa plays the role of the dictator and must decide how to split $10.  Suppose Willa’s preferences are given by U(ww,wL)=ww (second letters are subscripts). How much will Willa keep and how much will she give to Lora? Explain your answer in one or two sentences. Suppose instead that Willa’s preferences are given by U(ww,wL)=min(ww,wL). (second letters are subscripts) . How much will Willa keep and how much will she give to Lora? Explain your answer in one or two sentences.

In the question that follows, n refers to the number of people rather than a fraction of the population. In the land of Pampa, living in the countryside gives you a fixed payoff of 100 (Pampa has lots of land), while living in a city gives you a payoff that first increases with the number of people living in the city (agglomeration), and then declines after the number of people goes above a certain threshold (congestion). Let us write this payoff as r = 20n - n²/2, where n is the number of city dwellers in that particular city. (a) Let N be the total population in Pampa. If only one city can exist in the entire country, trace out the set of equilibria (i.e., population allocations between countryside and city) as N varies from 0 to infinity. (b) Now suppose that new cities can come up, each yielding exactly the same payoff function as above. Focus on the equilibrium in each case with the maximum possible city dwellers, and explain how this equilibrium will move with the overall…

A. (1) A large American oil company has just reported a major oil spill. How would one go about systematically analysing the impact of the public release of this information on the oil company's market value? (2) If you wanted to analyse the impact of such events on the value of oil companies globally, what things would you do differently from question (1) above.   B. Dr. Gambles has a utility function given as U(w)=In(w). Due to the pandemic affecting his consulting business, Dr Gambles faces the prospect of having his wealth reduced to £2 or £75,000 or £100,000 with probabilities of 0.15, 0.25, and 0.60, respectively. Suppose insurance is available that will protect his wealth from this risk. How much would he be willing to pay for such insurance?   C. Explain the concept of iso-expected return lines, iso-variance ellipses, and the critical line and describe how these are useful in identifying the minimum variance frontier and the efficient frontier.