StudyQuestionsforAP502a

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Study Questions for AP502: World War II through Vietnam 1. How did WWI influence the thinking of early airpower theorists? Guilio Douhet – “a quick victory could be won by early air attack on the enemy’s vital centers, while surface forces work to contain the enemy on the ground” Key Aspects to Douhet’s Theories Major Assumptions:  Air power is inherently offensive; the bomber will always get through  All future wars will be total wars  Civilian morale can be diminished by direct attack  The dominance of the defensive form of ground warfare is permanent Thoughts on Targeting:  The first step is command of the air; the next step is destroying vital centers and civilian morale targets. Thoughts on Air Exploitation:  Once command of the air is won, it must be used to punish the civilians so that they will coerce their own government to come to terms in order to end the suffering. This will happen so rapidly that total suffering will be less than that in the trenches. Implications to Douhet’s Theories: Organization for war:  In order to bring about victory over the enemy before your own civil morale collapses, you must organize air power under a separate air force Role of other armed forces:  Other armed forces will only stand on the defensive until the air force offensive has been decisive.

Force Structure:  The army and navy will be structured to achieve economy of force; all the mass possible will be built into the air force. Technology Requirements:  Only one type of airplane is required – the battle plane. It will be of moderate speed, long range, and heavily armored for self protection. If escort protection is required, battle planes will be made part of the strike package armed with only self defense weapons. Everything not put into the battle plane is a diversion that weakens the main effort and reduces the probability of success. Battle planes will have a combination of high explosive, incendiary, and gas bombs to have a synergistic effect. Influence in Italy:  His influence on Italy was quite significant, in that helped bring about the development of an air ministry and separate air force under Mussolini. Col Billy Mitchell shared many of Douhet’s beliefs and also corresponded with Count Caproni (who was closely associated with Douhet in articulation of his theory) on air power employment. The communication between many of the early theorists promoted a vital dialogue in formulating vital ideas on air power. Influence on the US:  His influence on the US was somewhat indirect. Douhet’s contemporary, Count Caproni, was trying hard to sell his bomber to the US, and he closely associated with Douhet in the articulation of his theory. Col Edgar Gorrell, an early advocate for strategic bombing, met with Caproni and later had an influence on the initial structuring of the Air Service strategic bombing theory.  Several US air power theorists shared Douhet’s view on strategic bombardment. It can be assumed that Douhet had an influence on the formation of air power thought during that period. Portions of his book Command of the Air were translated and incorporated into the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) curriculum. The ACTS would produce the air power architects of the strategic bombing campaign of WWII.

Trenchard – Victory can be achieved by bombing enemy vital centers and thus breaking the enemy’s will to fight. Expanded Thesis:  Victory can be achieved by bombing enemy vital centers and thus breaking the enemy’s will to fight. Trenchard seemed to suggest that civilian morale could be undermined by attacking industrial and communications targets and the loss of will would cause civilians to their government into making terms. Major Assumptions:  The bomber will always get through; it does not need an escort  Civilian morale is fragile; the effect of bombing on morale is more than the physical effects  The offensive is the stronger form of war  Night navigation, target acquisition, and bombing accuracy are manageable problems  Air superiority is a prerequisite for all other military operations Thoughts on targeting:  Trenchard’s ideas of targeting against morale were vague but did allow that international law be followed, collateral damage be limited, targets in urban areas be selected for their military significance, and vital centers in the infrastructure and production systems be attacked. Thoughts on air superiority:  Seeing only limited success with airfield attacks during WWI, Trenchard believed that at least part of the struggle for air superiority should take place in the air. Thoughts on air exploitation:  Both Trenchard and Douhet aimed at the collapse of civilian morale. However, Trenchard wanted to do it indirectly through the destruction of infrastructure targets, while Douhet wanted to attack the people directly.

Implications of Trenchard’s Theories: Organization for war:  Originally Trenchard was opposed to both the creation of an air arm and strategic bombing. His reason for the opposition was that the British Expeditionary Force in France was the key to the British role in the war; therefore, the priority for the Royal Flying Corps was support of the ground forces. After the war, Trenchard became more committed to the ideas of a separate air force and the concept of strategic bombing. He became preoccupied with defending the Royal Air Force from opponents in the army and navy who retained the idea that airpower should remain a support arm. Role of other armed forces:  Trenchard was well indoctrinated in ground warfare. While WWI was still being fought, he was firm in his commitment to ground support and only allowed excess aircraft to be dedicated to independent operations. However, after the war, he argued that the role of army and navy forces was secondary and that RAF strategic attack was primary. Force Structure:  After the war, Trenchard gave a very high priority to bomber units. This prioritization reflected his ever growing belief in the importance of strategic bombing. Technology Requirements:  Arguments have been made that the British squandered a huge lead in aviation technology after 1918. This was not entirely Trenchard’s fault, however. All the services were held to very tight budgets until after the rise of Hitler. Bomber command was not on-line until 1936, and when war came in 1939, all of its bombers were two engine aircraft of unimpressive performance. Fighter command did succeed with some technological triumphs in the late 1930’s, but some have argued that was in spite of Trenchard and his disciples. Trenchard’s Impact

Royal Air Force:  Trenchard’s influence on his own service was enormous. He laid down its initial institutions and doctrine. He remained in office for a decade during a period of theoretical flux and was said to have an enormous impact on his officers.  Trenchard’s ideas of colonial control through air power had a great appeal for Britain’s politicians, in that austere period because of their promised economy. They were most successful in Mesopotamia where, indeed, colonial control was maintained at a low cost, but in some other areas they were a disappointment.  Trenchard is in a large part responsible for making the RAF into a strategic attack force with a strong preference for the offensive. However, he did not advocate attacking the civilian population directly to affect morale. United States:  Through the Army Air Service and Army Air Corps, Trenchard helped to stimulate the commitment to strategic bombardment and to reinforce the arguments for an independent air force in America  Trenchard fortified the America Navy’s arguments for keeping naval aviation within the Navy through a negative example; the combining of the royal army and navy air into the RAF was alleged to have been disastrous for the Royal Navy. WWII:  Once the Battle of Britain was over, the RAF returned to its preference for strategic attack but was assisted in doing so by the political leadership. From June 1941 onward, a major concern was keeping the USSR in the war against Hitler. Stalin complained about the absence of a second front, which did not become possible until the invasion of Africa in 1942 – or in Stalin’s eyes until OVERLORD in June 1944. In any event the combined bomber offensive against Germany from June 1941 until November 1942 was the only way the allies could attempt to prove their commitment to help the USSR in the defeat of Hitler. We cannot know exactly how much impact this had on Stalin’s thought. Even more imponderable, was the impact on the German people. One of the declared goals of the allies in WWII was the extermination of German militarism. Since the burning of Dresden, pacifism has been as strong in Germany as anywhere else in Europe and that outcome may have come from that experience.

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