November 8 Case Briefs

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Southern New Hampshire University *

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PROPERTY

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Law

Date

Feb 20, 2024

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docx

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9

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1. Case Name, Court, Date of Opinion Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., Supreme Court of the United States, 2015 2. Factual summary (a brief paragraph, 3-5 sentences) The Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs (Department) (defendant) was a state agency that distributed federal tax credits to developers to build low-income housing. The Department determined which developers would be distributed credits based on specific selection criteria that the Department had established. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (ICP) (plaintiff) was a nonprofit corporation that aided low-income families in obtaining housing. ICP claimed that the Department’s selection criteria had resulted in a disproportionately high allocation of tax credits to predominantly black neighborhoods as compared to white neighborhoods. ICP argued that the Department’s conduct was unlawful in that it created a disparate impact on black neighborhoods. ICP sued the Department for violating provisions of the Fair Housing Act (Act), 42 U.S.C. § 3601   et seq.   Specifically, ICP claimed that the Department had violated 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), which prohibited an entity from otherwise making a dwelling unavailable to a person because of the person’s race, color, or national origin. ICP also alleged that the Department had violated 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a), which similarly prohibited an entity involved in real-estate transactions from discriminating against a person because of race, color, or national origin.   3. Procedural History (what happened in the court(s) below) The district court found in favor of ICP, and the Department appealed. The court of appeals held that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Act but reversed and remanded the case on the merits. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question of whether disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Act. 4. Issue(s) on Appeal Was the disparate-impact claims were cognizable by the Fair Housing Act? 5. Rule of Law After a plaintiff does establish a prima facie showing of disparate impact, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2). The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development has clarified that this step of the analysis is analogous to the Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 requirement that an employer’s interest in an employment practice with a disparate impact be job related. Once a defendant has satisfied its burden at step two, a plaintiff may prevail upon proving that the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect. 5. Court’s Analysis and Reasoning The Court held that the disparate-impact claims are cognizable under FHA .  The Court noted that under the FHA, it was unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to a person because of race” or other protected characteristic, §804(a), or “to discriminate against any person in” making certain real-estate transactions “because of race” or other protected characteristic, §805(a). The results-oriented phrase “otherwise make unavailable” referred to the consequences of an action rather than the actor's intent. this phrase was equivalent in function and purpose to Title VII's and the ADEA's “otherwise adversely affect” language. In all three statutes the operative text looked to results and plays an identical role: as a catchall phrase, located at the end of a lengthy sentence that begins with prohibitions on disparate treatment. The introductory word “otherwise” also signaled a shift in emphasis from an actor's intent to the consequences of his actions. This similarity in text and structure was even more compelling because Congress passed the FHA only four years after Title VII and four months after the ADEA. Although the FHA did not reiterate Title VII's exact language, Congress chose words that serve the same purpose and bear the same basic meaning but are consistent with the FHA's structure and objectives. The FHA contained the phrase “because of race,” but Title VII and the ADEA also contained that wording and this Court nonetheless held that those statutes impose disparate-impact liability. Recognition of disparate-impact claims was also consistent with the central purpose of the FHA, which, like Title VII and the ADEA, was enacted to eradicate discriminatory practices within a sector of the Nation's economy. Furthermore, the Court asserted that an important and appropriate means of ensuring that disparate-impact liability was properly limited was to give housing authorities and private developers leeway to state and explain the valid interest their policies serve, an analysis that was analogous to Title VII's business necessity standard. A disparate-impact claim relying on a statistical disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant's policy or policies causing that disparity. When courts do find liability under a disparate-impact theory, their remedial orders must be consistent with
the Constitution. Remedial orders in disparate-impact cases should concentrate on the elimination of the offending practice, and courts should strive to design race-neutral remedies. The Court affirmed the appealed decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. 6. Court’s Holding Yes. 9. Result (who wins, and disposition, such as “affirmed,” “reversed,” “remanded,” etc.) Affirmed. 10. Why you think this case is significant The Court held that the disparate-impact claims are cognizable under FHA .   The Court noted that under the FHA, it was unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to a person because of race” or other protected characteristic, §804(a), or “to discriminate against any person in” making certain real-estate transactions “because of race” or other protected characteristic, §805(a).   1. Case Name, Court, Date of Opinion Neithamer v. Brenneman Property Services, Inc., United States District Court, District of Columbia, 1999 2. Factual summary (a brief paragraph, 3-5 sentences) William Neithamer (plaintiff), who was gay and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) positive, applied to rent a townhouse in September 1997. Neithamer provided Brenneman Property Services, Inc. (Brenneman) and its agents (defendants) with bank statements and credit reports. Neithamer explained to Brenneman’s agents that he had failed to make payments to creditors years before, because Neithamer had exhausted his financial resources paying the medical bills of his lover, who died of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) in 1994. Neithamer maintained good credit since 1994. Brenneman rejected Neithamer’s application despite Neithamer’s offers to pay a second month’s rent as security, obtain a co-signor, and pre-pay a year’s rent. 3. Procedural History (what happened in the court(s) below)   Neithamer sued Brenneman and its agents under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 46 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq., alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and medical disability. Brenneman moved for summary judgment, arguing it rejected Neithamer’s application because of his poor credit
history and that Brenneman was merely acting as the property owner’s agent. Neithamer provided evidence that Brenneman did not consistently reject applicants with poor credit and did not present the property owner with all of Neithamer’s offers. 4. Issue(s) on Appeal Was the plaintiff's burden of proving a prima facie case of perceived disability in a housing discrimination case satisfied in this suit? 5. Rule of Law When a plaintiff offers no direct evidence of discrimination, his claim of discrimination under the Fair Housing Act,   42 U.S.C.S. § 3601 et seq. , is to be examined under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell-Douglas Corp. established in cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 5. Court’s Analysis and Reasoning There are no cases which address the question of the plaintiff's burden of proving a prima facie case of perceived disability in a housing discrimination case. First, HIV status is not easily identifiable as race usually is. Second, dismissing a case at the summary judgment stage because a plaintiff cannot prove a defendant's suspicions would subject HIV-positive individuals to the very discrimination that Congress sought to prevent, by denying them a remedy even when such discrimination existed. The very fact that this case is brought under the   perceived   disability section of the FHA informs how the question of the plaintiff's burden of proof at the prima facie stage must be approached. Given the difficulty of identifying a person's HIV status, rarely will another's perceptions of that status be obvious. Even if someone had suspicions of another's HIV status, such perceptions could easily be denied. Therefore, requiring a plaintiff to show definitive proof of a defendant's perceptions at the summary judgment stage creates an impossible burden of proof, one that is inappropriate at the prima facie stage. It is sufficient for a plaintiff to demonstrate that there is a material dispute as to the defendant's perception of him as an individual with HIV or AIDS. Defendant's credibility regarding denials of such perceptions is for the jury to decide. 6. Court’s Holding Yes 9. Result (who wins, and disposition, such as “affirmed,” “reversed,” “remanded,” etc.)
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