Election Law Isaachroff Text Outline
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L
AW
OF
D
EMOCRACY
Outline
i
A. Introduction
.....................................................................................................................
1
Introduction
......................................................................................................................
1
An Introduction to the Selection of Democratic Institutions (pp. 1-15)
......................
1
Introduction
..............................................................................................................
1
Lucas v. The Forty-Fourth General Assembly of the State of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964)
(pp. 3-15)
.................................................................................................................................
1
Alternative Democratic Structures (pp. 1089-99)
........................................................
2
Reflections on Current System
................................................................................
2
Duverger’s Law, Duverger’s Hypthesis
...................................................................
2
Types of Electoral Systems
......................................................................................
2
B.
Defining
the
Right
to
Participate
.....................................................................................
4
The
Right
to
Participate –
Background
Norms
................................................................
4
Introduction to the Right to Participate (pp. 16-20)
.....................................................
4
The Constitution and the Early History of Enfranchisement in the US
...................
4
Constitutional Text (pp. 20-46)
....................................................................................
4
Introduction to the Constitutional Text
....................................................................
4
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875) (pp. 21-37)
..............................................
4
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (pp. 38-46)
.........................................
6
Class Comments on Richardson
...............................................................................
7
Individual
Rights
..............................................................................................................
7
The Modern Constitutional Framework (pp. 46-72)
....................................................
7
Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (pp. 46-
48)
............................................................................................................................
7
Class Comments on Lassiter
....................................................................................
8
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (pp. 48-52)
................
8
Class Comments on Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections – Introduction to the Modern Era
...........
8
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (pp. 52-58)
....
8
Class Comments on Kramer
....................................................................................
9
Notes and Questions on the Modern Constitutional Framework (Different Categories:
Citizenship, Age, Residency, Homeless, Overseas, Special vs. General Elections)
...............
9
The
Struggle
for
Black
Enfranchisement
.......................................................................
11
Introduction to the Struggle for Black Enfranchisement (pp. 90-101)
......................
11
Early History of Black Enfranchisement
................................................................
11
Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (pp. 91-93)
...................................................
12
Class Comments on Giles
......................................................................................
13
Techniques for Outright Disenfranchisement (pp. 101-102)
.....................................
13
History and Methods of Disenfranchisement of African-Americans
....................
13
The White Primary Cases (pp. 103-117)
....................................................................
14
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (pp. 103-104)
.........................................
14
Class Comments on White Primary Cases – Nixon v. Herndon
............................
14
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (US 1944) (pp. 105-108)
..................................
15
Comments on White Primary Cases – Smith v. Allwright
.....................................
15
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (pp. 108-114)
.............................................
15
Class Comments on White Primary Cases – Terry v. Adams
................................
16
The Demise of Discretion (pp. 117-124)
...................................................................
17
Problems with Unfettered Discretion
.....................................................................
17
The Alabama Literacy Test (pp. 120-124)
.............................................................
17
Redrawing District Boundaries (pp. 125-129)
...........................................................
17
Introduction to Redrawing District Boundaries
.....................................................
17
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (pp. 125-129)
..................................
17
Class Comments on Gomillion v. Lightfoot
...........................................................
18
Voter Registration and Participation
...............................................................................
18
Voter Registration and Participation (pp. 129-140)
...................................................
18
Current State of American Voter Registration and Participation
...........................
18
France Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Why Americans Don’t Vote (1989) (pp.
130-135)
.................................................................................................................
18
Notes and Questions on Voter Registration and Participation
...............................
19
C. The Reapportionment Revolution
.................................................................................
20
Reapportionment – Casting a Meaningful Vote
.............................................................
20
Introduction to Reapportionment (p. 141)
.................................................................
20
Ensuring a Meaningful Relationship between Voting and Democracy
..................
20
The Political Thicket (pp. 142-184)
...........................................................................
20
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (pp. 142-147)
.......................................
20
Class Discussion on Colegrove v. Green
...............................................................
20
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (pp. 147-162)
.................................................
21
Class Discussion on Baker v. Carr
.........................................................................
22
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1946) (pp. 162-177)
..........................................
23
Class Discussion of Reynolds v. Sims
...................................................................
25
Class Discussion of Wesberry
................................................................................
25
Pros and Cons of One-Person/One-Vote
................................................................
26
Karcher v. Dagget, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (pp. 177-185)
.........................................
26
Class Discussion on Karcher
..................................................................................
27
Wrap-Up Discussion on The Reapportionment Revolution – The Political Thicket
................................................................................................................................
28
Issacharoff Summary on the Reapportionment Cases
............................................
28
The Senate, Republic Theory, and Interest Representation
........................................
28
Discussion on Gray v. Sanders
...............................................................................
28
Local Governance (pp. 185-208)
...............................................................................
29
Introduction to Local Governance
.........................................................................
29
Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989) (pp. 187-192)
.........................
29
Class Discussion on Board of Estimates v. Morris
................................................
29
Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (pp. 192-204)
.................................................
29
Class Discussion on Ball v. James
.........................................................................
30
Fumalaro v. Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54 (1990) (pp. 204-208)
....
30
Class Discussion on Fumalaro v. Chicago Board of Education
.............................
30
D. When Elections Go Bad: The 2000 Presidential Election in Legal Context
.................
32
Introduction to Problems with Elections and Judicial Oversight
...................................
32
Introduction (pp. 217-221)
.........................................................................................
32
Problems with Elections
.........................................................................................
32
Issacharoff’s Introduction to Bush v. Gore
............................................................
32
The Federal Interest in Election Procedures (pp. 217-246)
.......................................
32
Two Key Questions to Federal Courts Role in Overseeing Contested Elections
32
State Elections – Introduction
................................................................................
33
State Elections – Lack of Sufficient Federal Interest
.............................................
33
State Elections – Sufficient Federal Interests – Roe v. State of Alabama [Roe I],
43 F.3d 574 (11th Cir. 1995) (pp. 226-239)
...........................................................
33
Class Discussion on Roe v. Alabama [Roe I]
........................................................
34
Distinct Federal Interests in National Elections: U.S. House and Senate Elections
................................................................................................................................
34
Distinct Federal Interests in National Elections: Presidential Elections
................
35
The State Interest in Federal Elections (pp. 246-262)
...............................................
35
Introduction to the State Interest in Federal Elections
...........................................
35
Introduction to 2000 Florida Litigation
..................................................................
35
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board of Harris, 772 So.2d 1220 (Fla. S. Ct.
Nov. 21, 2000) (pp. 249-262)
.................................................................................
38
The Federal Interest Potentially Asserted (pp. 262-281)
...........................................
38
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board (Bush I), 530 U.S. 70 (Dec. 4,
2000) (pp. 262-266)
...............................................................................................
39
Class Comments on Bush I
....................................................................................
39
Art. II and the “Independent State Legislature Doctrine” – McPherson V. Blacker,
146 U.S. 1 (1982) (pp. 267-276)
............................................................................
39
Of “Safe Harbors” and the Electoral Count Act
....................................................
40
The Final Florida Court Decision and the United States Supreme Court State
.....
40
Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 512 (Dec. 9, 2000) (pp. 279-281)
...................................
40
The Federal Interest Decisively Asserted (pp. 281-315)
............................................
40
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (Dec. 12, 2000) (pp. 281-315)
.....................................
40
Class Discussion on Bush v. Gore
..........................................................................
42
Eight Views of the Cathedral – Perspectives on Bush v. Gore
..............................
45
Remedial Possibilities for Defective Elections (pp. 1038-1046, 1054-1068, Supp.
195-205)
.....................................................................................................................
46
Ordering a New Election – Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1967)
........
46
Class Discussion on Bell v. Southwell
...................................................................
47
Adjusting the Vote Totals
.......................................................................................
47
Class Discussion on Delahunt and Reviewing Messed Up Elections
....................
47
Adjusting the Vote Totals – In re the Matter of the Protest of Election Returns, 707
So.2d 1170 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998) (1058-1068)
.......................................................
47
Class Discussion In re the Matter of the Protest of Elections Returns
..................
48
SI Tying it All Together
What can you do ahead of time?
.............................
48
E. The Role of Political Parties
..........................................................................................
49
Introduction to the Role of Political Parties
...................................................................
49
Intermediary Organizations Role in Politics
..........................................................
49
General Questions for Analysis
.............................................................................
49
Historical Note on Political Parties
........................................................................
49
Class Discussion on Political Parties Generally
.....................................................
49
Conceptual Framework for Considering Political Parties
......................................
50
Historical Theoretical Background on 2-Party System
..........................................
50
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Difficulties in Regulation of Political Parties
........................................................
50
The Ballot: Political Parties as Gatekeepers
..................................................................
51
Introduction to the Ballot: Political Parties as Gatekeepers (pp. 348-352)
................
51
Movement Towards Secret Ballot
..........................................................................
51
Restrictions on Whom Voters Can Vote For (pp. 352-362)
.......................................
51
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992)
...............................................................
51
Class Discussion on Burdick
..................................................................................
52
Restriction on Who Appears on the Ballot (pp. 362-373)
.........................................
53
Introduction to Restrictions on Who Appears on the Ballot
..................................
53
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972)
..................................................................
53
Class Discussion Bullock v. Carter
........................................................................
53
Who Can Participate in a Party’s Activities?
.................................................................
54
Introduction to Who Can Participate in a Party’s Activities (pp. 373-374)
...............
54
Importance of Participation in Primary
..................................................................
54
Both the Party and the State Seek to Exclude Citizen X from Participating (pp. 374-
386)
............................................................................................................................
54
Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837 (D. Conn.), summarily aff’d, 429 U.S. 989
(1976) (pp. 374-379)
..............................................................................................
54
Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996) (pp. 379-381)
..............................
54
Class Discussion on Duke v. Massey
.....................................................................
55
Republican Party of Texas v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1997) (pp. 382-
386)
........................................................................................................................
55
The Party Seeks to Exclude Citizen X from Participating But the State Demands that
the Party Permit Him to Participate (pp. 386-404)
....................................................
56
Democratic Party of the United States v. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981) (pp.
386-391)
.................................................................................................................
56
California Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (pp. 391-404)
...............................
56
The Party Wishes to Permit Citizen X to Participate But the State Demands His
Exclusion (pp. 404-410)
.............................................................................................
57
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986) (pp. 404-410)
................................................................................................................................
57
When Can the Government Regulate a Party’s Internal Affairs (pp. 411-417)
.............
58
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214 (1989)
(pp. 411-417)
..........................................................................................................
58
Class Discussion on Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee
................................................................................................................................
59
Does the Existing Legal Regime Improperly Entrench the Existing Two-Party System?
........................................................................................................................................
59
Introduction to Does the Existing Legal Regime Improperly Entrench the Existing
Two-Party System? (pp. 417-418)
.............................................................................
59
Challenges to Ballot Access by Independent and Third-Party Candidates
............
59
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986) (pp. 422-426)
.................
59
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997)
............................
59
Class Discussion on Timmons
...............................................................................
60
Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes
......................................
60
Class Discussion on Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes
.....
60
F. Campaign Finance
.........................................................................................................
62
The First Amendment Background
................................................................................
62
3 Categories of First Amendment Scrutiny (pp. 450-455)
.........................................
62
Time, Place, and Manner Regulation
.....................................................................
62
Content Regulation
.................................................................................................
62
Viewpoint Regulation
.............................................................................................
62
The First Amendment and Campaign Finance Regulation
....................................
62
Class Discussion on First Amendment Background
..............................................
62
Policy Considerations
.....................................................................................................
63
3 Approaches Central to Policy Debate (pp. 456-457)
..............................................
63
Regulation of Political Markets
.............................................................................
63
Equality
..................................................................................................................
63
Liberty
....................................................................................................................
63
Buckley v. Valeo
.............................................................................................................
63
Discussion of Buckley v. Valeo (pp. 457-460)
...........................................................
63
Background on 1974 Reforms to FECA
................................................................
63
Court’s Decision
.....................................................................................................
64
Class Discussion on FECA and Buckley
...............................................................
64
Contribution Limits
....................................................................................................
66
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (pp. 460-474)
................................................................................................................................
66
Expenditure Limits
.....................................................................................................
67
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election
Commission, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (pp. 474-487)
..................................................
67
FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 531 U.S. XX (2001)
(pp. 487-499)
..........................................................................................................
68
Class Discussion on Expenditure Limits and Colorado Republican Line of Cases
................................................................................................................................
69
Do Concerns Over Corruption Justify Campaign Finance Regulation?
....................
71
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (pp. 499-513)
.....
71
Class Discussion on Bellotti
...................................................................................
71
Equality and Liberty in Political Campaigns
.............................................................
72
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (pp. 515-524)
72 Class Discussion on Austin
...............................................................................
73
Has Campaign Finance Reform Worked (pp. 524-526)
.............................................
74
A Caution on Public Financing (pp. 526-527)
...........................................................
74
Proposals for Reform (pp. 527-533)
..........................................................................
74
Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, 205 F.3d
445 (1st Cir. 2000) (pp. 529-533)
..........................................................................
74
The New Frontier: Issue Advocacy (pp. 533-545)
.....................................................
75
The Conceptual Problem: The Boundary Between Electoral Speech and Public
Discourse
................................................................................................................
75
Judicial Administration of the Boundary: the Law of Issue Advocacy
.................
75
Conclusion: Can Campaign Finance Regulation Overcome the Problem of Issue
Advocacy?
..............................................................................................................
76
McConnell v. FEC (Supp. pp. 29-70)
........................................................................
76
McConnell v. FEC, 124 S.Ct. 619 (2004) (Supp. pp. 30-70)
.................................
76
Class Discussion on BRCA, McConnell, and
Others
.............................................
78
G. Congressional Power
.....................................................................................................
81
Voting Rights Act and Preclearance
...............................................................................
81
Introduction to and History of the Voting Rights Act
................................................
81
Issacharoff’s Introduction to the Voting Rights Act and Preclearance
..................
81
Congressional Power to Enact the Special Provisions of the Voting Rights Act
.......
82
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (pp. 548-571)
......................
82
Class Discussion on South Carolina v. Katzenbach
...............................................
82
Summary of Introductory Voting Rights Act Cases
...............................................
83
H. Vote Dilution and Substantive Claims
..........................................................................
85
Majority Rule and Minority Vote Dilution: Constitutional and Legislative Approaches
........................................................................................................................................
85
Defining the Harm
......................................................................................................
85
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (pp. 673-684)
.....................................
85
Class Discussion on Whitcomb v. Chavis
..............................................................
85
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (pp. 684-692)
..........................................
85
Class Discussion on White v. Regester
..................................................................
86
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (pp. 692-713)
................................
87
Class Discussion on City of Mobile v. Bolden
......................................................
87
1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act
..........................................................
88
Class Discussion on 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act
........................
88
Racial Vote Dilution Under the Voting Rights Act
........................................................
90
Judicial Modulation of Section 2’s “Results” Standard: The Gingles Test
................
90
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (pp. 748-776)
......................................
90
Class Discussion on Thornburg v. Gingles
............................................................
90
Reemergence of a “Totality of the Circumstances” Approach
...................................
91
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994) (pp. 813-823)
...................................
91
Issacharoff Wrap-Up of Gingles and De Grandy
...................................................
91
Law and Politics
.........................................................................................................
92
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (Supp. pp. 71-95)
................................
92
Class Discussion on Georgia v. Ashcroft
...............................................................
93
I. Redistricting and Representation
....................................................................................
96
Partisan
Gerrymandering
.................................................................................................
96
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (pp. 867-870)
...................................
96
Class Discussion on
Gaffney
..................................................................................
96
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983)
...............................................................
96
Additional Class Discussion on Karcher and Partisan Gerrymandering
................
96
Davis v. Bandemer
.................................................................................................
96
Class Discussion on Davis v. Bandemer
................................................................
97
Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989).98
Vieth v. Jubilerer, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (2004) (Supp. pp. 129-191)
..............................
98
Class Discussion on
Vieth
......................................................................................
99
Competitive States/Uncompetitive Elections
.......................................................
100
Racial Gerrymandering
................................................................................................
101
Race-Conscious Redistricting
..................................................................................
101
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Introduction to Race-Conscious Redistricting
.....................................................
101
United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (pp.
889-896)
...............................................................................................................
101
Class Discussion on United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh v. Carey...101
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (pp. 897-907)
..............................................
103
Class Discussion on Shaw v. Reno
......................................................................
103
Notes on the Political and Technological Contexts of the Post-1990 Redistricting
(pp. 907-924)
........................................................................................................
104
Notes on Racial Gerrymandering and Standing (pp. 924-934)
............................
104
Notes on Substantive Elements of Shaw Claim (pp. 934-945)
............................
104
Hunt v. Cromartie, 531 U.S. XXX (2001) (pp. 946-958)
....................................
104
Additional Information from Class Discussion on Shaw and its Progeny
...........
105
Class Discussion on Hunt v. Cromartie
................................................................
105
How Do We District in the Post-Shaw World?
....................................................
106
Reconciling Shaw and Its Progeny and the Voting Rights Act
............................
106
J. Other Democratic Forms of Governance
......................................................................
108
Direct Democracy (pp. 982-1037)
...............................................................................
108
Constitutional Underpinnings and Concerns (pp. 982-993)
....................................
108
Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Company v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912)
(pp. 985-991)
........................................................................................................
108
Issacharoff on Direct Democracy Unit
................................................................
108
Note on Money and the Initiative Process (pp. 991-992)
....................................
109
Direct Democracy and Rights of Political Participation – Popular Lawmaking and
the Problems of Entrenchment (pp. 1011-1037)
......................................................
109
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (pp. 1011-1026)
........
109
Cook v. Gralike, 121 S.Ct. 1029 (2001) (pp. 1126-1134)
....................................
111
Direct Democracy and Rights of Political Participation – Popular Lawmaking and
Unpopular Groups (pp. 993-1010)
...........................................................................
112
Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (pp. 1001-1009)
...........................
112
Class Discussion on Evans v. Romer
...................................................................
112
Note on Improving the Process of Direct Lawmaking (pp. 1009-1010)
.............
113
Alternative Democratic Structures
...............................................................................
113
Cumulative Voting (pp. 1099-1132)
.........................................................................
113
Introductory Notes to Cumulative Voting
............................................................
113
Additional Notes on Cumulative Voting
..............................................................
114
Preference Voting or the Single Transferable Vote (pp. 1132-1141)
.......................
114
Limited Voting (pp. 1141-1151)
...............................................................................
114
The Lot Versus the Election (pp. 1151-1155)
..........................................................
115
Debate between Majoritarian Systems & Proportional Representation (pp. 1160-
1167)
........................................................................................................................
115
Introduction
..........................................................................................................
115
Notes
....................................................................................................................
115
Consociational Democracy (pp. 1168-1172)
............................................................
116
Introduction
..........................................................................................................
116
Notes
....................................................................................................................
116
Appendix 1 – Table of Authorities
...................................................................................
117
L
AW
OF
D
EMOCRACY
Outline
1
A.
I
NTRODUCTION
Introduction
An
Introduction
to
the
Selection
of
Democratic
Institutions
(pp.
1-
15)
Introduction
Conventional understanding of democracy privileges private preferences and
collective deliberation as forming basis for state institutions
But, perhaps, unrealistic as democratic politics exists as part of a self-informing
system where pre-existing institutional arrangements constrain range of possible
results
o
Pre-existing institutions are borne of some combination of prior
democratic choices and inertia
o
But those in power will often try to use their power to continue their
control
Courts must strike a balance in their role as steward of democracy
o
Very hard for courts to overturn outcomes from pre-existing democratic
selection processes
o
But courts may be only branch of government capable of creating certain
types of political change that would otherwise fall to those who are already in power and
are not otherwise unaccountable
Lucas v. The Forty-Fourth General Assembly of the State of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713
(1964) (pp. 3-15)
F
ACTS
: District Court upheld apportionment scheme under Amendment XIV in
which districts were allocated state senators and house members such that a
sparsely populated rural districts had a disproportionate share of senators
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Chief Justice Warren): Reversed and remanded; held
that “individual’s constitutionally protected right to cast an equally weighted vote
cannot be denied even by a vote of a majority of a State’s electorate, if the
apportionment scheme fails to measure up to the requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause”
D
ISSENT
(Justice Clark): Would not interfere with state that has referendum system
that continually addresses apportionment situations; agrees with Stewart that
Colorado has variety of environments that may be fairly accounted for with
present scheme; and Colorado’s arrangement is not arbitrary but is like the federal
bicameral scheme
D
ISSENT
(Justice Stewart with Clark): Nothing in Court’s precedent supporting
constitutional rule requiring seats in both houses of bicameral state legislature
must be apportioned on population basis
o
Not about representing individuals but also about accommodation of
group interests
o
Argues for alternative: (1) plan must be rational in light of particular
characteristics of State and (2) must not “systematically” prevent majority rule
N
OTES
&
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(3) “We
the
People”
: Pildes and Anderson argue that “Political institutions
and decision procedures must create the conditions out of which, for the
first time, a political community can forge for itself a collective will”
o
(7) Protecting
Minority
Rights
: Must be some protection of minority rights
Rawls argues that principals underlying political power must be
capable of being articulated and accepted
o
(9) Non-Cedeable
Rights
: In
West Virginia State Bd. Of Educ. V. Barnette
(US 1943), Court held that right to life, liberty, and property and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote
o
(9 continued) Voting as Group Right
: Isasacharoff argues that to have
effective right to vote, must also be able to be aggregated with other like-
minded voters to “claim a just share of electoral results”
Alternative
Democratic
Structures
(pp.
1089-
99)
Reflections on Current System
Arend Lijphart wrote “one of the best-known generalizations about electoral
systems is that they tend to be very stable and to resist change”
Duverger’s Law, Duverger’s Hypthesis
Law
: Systems in which office is awarded to candidate who receives the most
votes in single ballot election will produce a two-party political system rather than
a multi-party one
o
Rational-choice analysis explains this because:
(1) Voters don’t want to waste their votes on losers
(2) Politicians don’t want to waste their resources on capturing
small portion of electorate
Hypothesis
: Systems that use proportional representation will tend to lead to
formation of many independent parties
Types of Electoral Systems
Majoritarian
: Used in UK, US, Canada, Australia, and – until recently – New
Zealand; also used for some elections in India, Bangladesh, Philippines, Zambia,
Nepal, Thailand, and Chile; tend to be based on geographic constituencies where
voters vote for individual candidates
o
“First
Past
the
Post”
(Plurality
System)
: Whoever receives the most votes,
wins
o
Second-Ballot
or
Runoff
System
: Have to get absolute majority
Australia uses instant run-off where all candidates are ranked in
order of preference
Proportional Representation
: Used by all European countries other than Great
Britain, France, and Ireland; tends to focus on parties and often have very large
voting districts
o
List-PR
: Voters vote for a party which puts on a list of candidates on the
ballot
can be open or close list
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o
Two-Vote
System
of
PR
: Voters cast two votes, one for party and the
other for candidate elected from a single-member district
Semi-Proportional
Systems
: Can include cumulative voting, preference voting,
limited voting , and instant run-off voting systems
o
Interestingly, UK, home of the First Past the Post system, is considering
shifting to more proportional form of representation, considering
Alternative Voting/Instant Runoff
B.
D
EFINING
THE
R
IGHT
TO
P
ARTICIPATE
The Right to Participate – Background Norms
Introduction
to
the
Right
to
Participate
(pp.
16-
20)
The Constitution and the Early History of Enfranchisement in the US
In original form, Constitution was very qui
et
on voting
o
Just said that members of House would be elected by people of several
States and electors in each state shall have qualifications requisite for
electors of most numerous branch of state legislature
o
And so left states to determine franchise
Most restricted to small sub-set of population
Supreme Court also noted that “the Constitution of the United States has not
conferred the right of suffrage upon any one” in
United States v. Cruikshank
(US
1875)
Constitutional democratic structure had been designed to prevent rise of parties
avoid factionalism (obviously not terribly successful on that point)
Constitutional
Text
(pp.
20-
46)
Introduction to the Constitutional Text
Most of the Constitutional provisions dealing with the right to vote are phrased in
the negative (e.g., Fifteenth for race; Nineteenth Amendments for sex; Twenty-
Fourth for poll taxes; Twenty-Sixth regarding people age 18 years or older)
Most litigation has focused on first section of Fourteenth Amendment (privileges
and immunities, due process, and equal protection)
Surprisingly, some states have granted franchise only to take it away
see, e.g.,
NJ that gave women the vote in 1776 only to take it away by 1807
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875) (pp. 21-37)
F
ACTS
: Minor, a female Missouri citizen, sued for voting rights under Fourteenth
Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause notwithstanding state’s statute
that clearly did not extend franchise to women
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Chief Justice Waite): Affirm judgment, holding that
Constitution “does not confer right of suffrage upon any one and that the
constitutions and laws of the several states which commit that important trust to
men alone are not necessarily void”
o
Framers would have included it if they had meant for voting to be one of
the rights of citizenship
o
Fourteenth Amendment included use of the word “male”
o
Would have made Fifteenth Amendment duplicative
o
Universal suffrage was not current practice in states at time of adoption
(except for NJ)
N
OTES
&
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1-3) “Male”
Enters
the
Constitution
: Use of the word “male” in Section 2
of the Fourteenth Amendment was hotly contested both before and after
adoption by suffragettes and their supporters
tried using Section 5 of
Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate gender distinctions in state franchise laws
o
(4) Suffragettes’ Movement
: Minor’s suit was considered frivolous in
some circles; in 1872, the same year in which Minor registered to vote,
Susan B. Anthony voted in NY congressional elections and then went on
speaking tour before her trial (directed verdict against her but no
imposition of jail time despite her refusal to pay fine and some evidence
that jurors would have been sympathetic)
o
(5) The End of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
: Continuing trend in
Slaughter-House Cases
, Supreme Court essentially read the privileges and
immunities clause out of the Fourteenth Amendment
o
(6) Modes of Argument in
Minor
: Waite appears to rely on idea of
constitution as fixed compact and then uses originalist interpretation
where necessary
Minor used a more progressive “evolving jurisprudence” approach
Adam Winkler argued in NYU Law Review article that later
causes using this approach (e.g., right to privacy) had more success
when did it piecemeal/incrementally
o
(7)
Dred
Scott
–
The
Relationship
between
Citizenship
and
the
Franchise
:
Dred Scott
brought up the question of how citizenship was related to the
franchise
In his dissent, Justice Curtis argued that African-Americans were
citizens as evidenced by right to vote at time of adoption of
Constitution
Chief Justice Taney downplayed relationship
o
(8) Restrictions
Based
on
Property
: Both
Minor
and
Dred Scott
mention
restrictions on franchise based on property
As of 1934, 14 states excluded paupers
Steinfeld argues that pauper exclusions were adopted to ensure that
voters were independent (a particular political theory of voting and
“self-government”)
o
(9) The
Nineteenth
Amendment
: The Nineteenth Amendment overturned
Minor
Typically traced to 1848 Woman’s Rights Convention in Seneca
Falls, NY
Virtually no litigation surrounding Nineteenth Amendment and so
it is difficult to see how far it extends
See
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital
(US 1923) where the
Court struck down a DC minimum wage law that applied
only to women based on a broad reading of equality
established by Nineteenth Amendment
Really the only way that this question came up was related
to jury service/holding public office where states were split
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Also Congress passed Cable Act (1922) based on
Nineteenth Amendment, allowing women who married
certain foreign nationals to retain their citizenship
o
(10) New Historiography of Suffragette Movement
: Lots of new, good
scholarship such as Keyssar who argued that women’s suffrage was the
largest mass movement for expansion of franchise in American history
with many state-by-state efforts (especially successful in the Western
frontier)
Changes in political and cultural milieu played a role too:
E.g., white women were considered a bulwark against
increased black enfranchisement
But some women argued against their own enfranchisement
o
(11) “No Taxation with Representation”
: Some women were significant
property-holders/taxpayers and there was some civil disobedience related
to lack of franchise
o
(11 continued) Comparing Race and Sex Discrimination
: Siegel argues
that the law treats race and sex discrimination differently, often looking to
long history of instances of de jure racial discrimination but focused on
history of social attitudes that are products of custom an consensus with
sex discrimination
[Think about similar language across Fifteenth and Nineteenth and
Twenty-Sixth Amendments
should they be read as
similar/would this reject Siegel’s interpretive approach to the
Nineteenth Amendment?]
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (pp. 38-46)
F
ACTS
: 3 ex-offenders tried to register to vote in contravention of California’s
constitutional felony disenfranchisement provision and then filed suit based on
EPC of Fourteenth Amendment as well as bringing up § 2 of the Amendment that
deals with “participation in rebellion”
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Justice Rehnquist): Historical and textual reasons to
distinguish felony disenfranchisement from other state limitations under EPC
argues that since § 2 exempts felon disenfranchisement from reducing state’s
congressional seats, it means that felon disenfranchisement cannot violate § 1 of
the Amendment
N
OTES
&
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(2) Philosophical
Underpinnings
of
Felony
Disenfranchisement
: Rests on
notions of contract and competence
But kind of bullshit
see Uggen & Manza work that tracks
number of states with felon disenfranchisement laws and notes the
rise following federal legislation that was designed to enfranchise
more people, primarily racial minorities
o
(3)
Hunter
v.
Underwood
(US
1985)
: Supreme Court struck down § 182 of
Alabama Constitution, which disenfranchised individuals convicted of any
crime involving moral turpitude, because clear discriminatory intent
(delegates to AL constitutional convention had selected those offenses because they were
thought to be committed more frequently by African- Americans)
o
(4) Felon
Disenfranchisement
–
and
its
Racial
Impact
–
Increasingly
Issue
for Public Debate and Litigation
: Almost 13% of black men cannot vote
because of felon disenfranchisement; no other democracy disenfranchises
as many people due to criminal records
So far, litigation based on EPC and Voting Rights Act have been
unsuccessful
In
Baker v. Pataki
(2d. Cir. 1996) (
en banc
), five justices
determined that § 2 of Voting Rights Act (about disproportionate
impact) did not reach felon disenfranchisement because it would
be overreaching of Congress’s enforcement powers that, they
argued, should be limited to redressing historical or purposeful
discrimination while five justices disagreed
o
(5) Felon Disenfranchisement –
Electoral and Policy Consequences
:
Uggen & Manza found that felon disenfranchisement influenced outcome
of elections in Florida and other places
Class Comments on
Richardson
Throwback in analytic structure, returning to
Minor
(ultimate question is whether
there is a right to vote for this category of persons and finding that there is no
right is dispositive of the question)
o
Rehnquist goes through textual provision of 14
th
Amendment to figure out
whether enfranchisement for felons is right or privilege and then looks to
then and now contemporary practices
Problem with Rehnquist’s § 2 textual analysis is that it assumes a lot just because
there is one specified prohibited political remedy
In general commentary on felon disenfranchisement:
o
Rationale for felon disenfranchisement:
Can be thought of as just sentencing/sanction
Think about problems with collateral sanctions generally
Competence and social contract issues
Can’t discriminate against people based on how they might
vote (Mormon case not clearly still good law, see Marshall
dissent in
Richardson
)
o
Possible, even without bringing race into the issue, DPC makes felon
disenfranchisement problematic because it is not generally tied to
underlying offense/often no notice?
Individual Rights
The
Modern
Constitutional
Framework
(pp.
46-
72)
Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (pp. 46-48)
F
ACTS
: Lassiter, black North Carolinian, refused to submit to literacy test and so
was denied registration as voter
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Justice Douglas): North Carolina literacy test is fair
on its face as it is applicable to all and seems designed to test literacy – a
characteristic that is reasonably related to voting – without ambiguity or
vagueness that hinted at devious purpose of other states’ tests
Class Comments on
Lassiter
We should be skeptical of any restriction because we have an intuition that they
may be a form of self-dealing on part of those already in power
Because it is facially neutral (and it is facial challenge),
Literacy tests remain Constitutional but effectively disallowed by Voting Rights
Act of 1965
383 U.S. 663 (1966) (pp. 48-52)
F
ACTS
: Virginia residents argued that state poll tax was unconstitutional
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Justice Douglas): State violates EPC of Fourteenth
Amendment whenever it makes affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an
electoral standard
D
ISSENT
(Justice Black): Would leave government policies to legislatures
state legislatures than Congress who is authorized under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to pass legislation to abolish poll tax if it believes that poll tax is
being used as device to deny voters equal protection of the law
D
ISSENT
(Justice Harlan with Stewart joining): Finds rational basis for Virginia’s
poll tax as voting qualification
property qualifications and poll taxes have been
traditional part of political structure and they ensure that people are invested in
country/participation
Class Comments on
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections
– Introduction to the Modern Era
Rational basis for poll tax
we have user fees all the time
o
Can argue about equity of user fees, but they are widely used and accepted
SI claims that this is stunning because there is no record of any negative impact
($1.50 was small, even then) and so this case really suggests that voting has
become included in the fundamental rights domain (quoting
Yick Wo
, says that
“‘political franchise of voting’ as a ‘fundamental political right, because
preservative of all rights’”), which triggers strict scrutiny [beginning of modern
era]
o
Not going in direction of Michelman’s contention that wealth is becoming
a suspect classification but rather saying that government interest to raise
income is not compelling enough nor narrowly tailored to pass strict
scrutiny analysis
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (pp. 52-58)
F
ACTS
: NY limited right to vote in certain school district elections to residents
who were otherwise eligible to vote in state and federal elections if they also
leased or owned real property within district or were parents or custodians of
children in
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,
basis test
the Court uses rationale
md
2023-09-15 17:43:09
--------------------------------------------
We don't want stupid people voting. But is
there
socio-economic discrimiation here? Many
md
2023-09-15 17:48:53
--------------------------------------------
EPC is not violated so long as reason is not
irrationational.
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local public school
appellant is stockbrokers who was not eligible to register or
vote in local school district elections
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Chief Justice Warren): Overturn statute as it is not
closely tailored enough to meet stated goal of limiting to those “primarily
interest” in school affairs given importance of franchise
o
When dealing with franchise goes to “exacting judicial scrutiny”
D
ISSENT
(Justice Stewart with Black and Harlan joining): Doesn’t see why one
wouldn’t keep with rational basis standard and seems pretty straightforward that
there is such a basis for limitation that is not categorically suspect (as would be
the case with race); additionally, restrictive statute was promulgated by NY state
legislature (which Kramer is eligible to vote for)
Class Comments on
Kramer
Specialized election but still applied strict scrutiny
o
State wasn’t obliged to make board subject to elections but once the state
did, they would be held to more exacting standards
Have to wonder if once you follow
Harper
path, if you can show that there is no
insidious purpose, is it ever permissible to have a state classification touching on
the franchise?
o
Perhaps, we should be less suspicious when certain activities (e.g., school
boards) can be taken out of the franchise arena all together [but must note
that sending stuff to unelected boards is a bit perverse]
Also, we will return to dissent’s question regarding when one has power to
influence state legislature (not being excluded from entirety of polity)
Notes and Questions on the Modern Constitutional Framework (Different
Categories: Citizenship, Age, Residency, Homeless, Overseas, Special vs. General
Elections)
Lassiter
was decided under rational relationship standard
while
Harper
and
Kramer
were decided under strict scrutiny (third tier is
intermediate, which is often used for sex discrimination)
(2) Basis for Strict Scrutiny
: Typically used when suspect classification is used or
when fundamental right is impaired
(4) Citizenship
: For many years, citizenship was not invariable requirement for
voting as was noted in
Minor
; in
Cabell v. Chavez-Salido
(US 1982), Court stated
that “exclusion of aliens from basic governmental processes is not a deficiency in
the democratic system but a necessary consequence of the community’s process
of self-definition”
o
Think about how this might apply in
Kramer
(5) Age
: After Supreme Court held that 1970 amendment to Voting Rights Act,
which enfranchised 18-year-olds in state and local elections, was unconstitutional
in
Oregon v. Mitchell
(US 1970), Congress passed the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
that provided for enfranchisement of 18-year-olds
o
Might suggest that under-18-year-olds have no claim ala
Richardson v.
Ramirez
(1) 3
Tiers
of
Scrutiny
:
md
2023-09-15 17:59:11
--------------------------------------------
Strict, intermediate, rational basis.
o
To some degree, age is arbitrary bright-line rule that is both under- and
over-inclusive when it comes to weeding out those who are not competent
to choose public officials
(6) Residency
: Relatively little litigation over citizenship and age restrictions but
residency restrictions have been challenged more often
o
In
Carrington v. Rash
(US 1965), Court struck down provision of TX
Constitution that prohibited any member of Armed Forces of US who
moved to TX during course of duty was barred from voting until left
service
o
In
Dunn v. Blumstein
(US 1982), Court upheld residency requirement but
held that TN’s additional requirement of substantial period of residency
failed strict scrutiny, rejecting claims that durational requirement was
necessary to prevent fraud (no pressing administrative convenience
concern) and to ensure educated, committed voters (over- and under-
inclusive)
o
But see
Marston v. Lewis
(US 1973) where Court upheld AZ’s 50-day
durational residency requirement for state and local elections given
administrative necessity of obtaining accurate voting rolls in time for
election
Federal law establishes national 30-day cutoff under 42 U.S.C. §
1973aa-1 (1994)
allows person who has moved to vote in old
district via absentee voting or by person if had been registered
there prior to move
(7) Who Counts as a “Bona Fide” Resident?
: In
Carrington v. Rush
(US 1965),
Court struck down TX constitutional provision prohibiting any member of Armed
Forces who moved to TX from voting while still a member of Armed Forces as
overly broad residency restriction
could not do it just for administrative
convenience or because fears of how population might vote
o
Other groups that might overwhelm local populations have been subject to
restrictive enfranchisement schemes
compare
Auerbach v. Rettaliata
(2d Cir. 1985) (upholding NY scheme that provides for more searching
inquiry for certain classes of prospective voters, such as students, that are more likely to be
transient) with
Williams v. Salerno
(2d Cir. 1986) (forbidding registrars of Westchester
County from applying more stringent substantive standard to registration applications of
students living in dorms)
As quick side note, should it matter that census lists students as
living where they go to school? What would this notion of
residency mean for in-state/out-of-state tuition?
(8) The
Homeless
: Most states allow homeless to vote, but about 2/3 require
mailing address
o
In general, courts have held that fixed address is unnecessary if homeless
can otherwise provide sufficient information regarding usual location so as
to allow assignment of precinct as in
Pitts v. Black
(S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(striking down NY law requiring fixed address);
Collier v. Menzel
(Cal.
Ct. App. 1985) (city park could be place of habitation for voting
purposes), and;
Board of Election Commissioners v. Chicago/Gary Area
Union of the Homeless
(Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 26, 1986) (permitting homeless
to register if they provided two pieces of ID and an address or location
description sufficient to enable assignment to appropriate voting location)
(9) Non-Residents
: Courts tend to use rational basis with varying results
o
Compare
Brown v. Chattanooga Board of Commissioners
(E.D.Tenn.
1989) (striking African-Americans challenge to municipal statute that
allowed non-resident property owners to vote) with
Glisson v. Mayor
and Councilmen of Savannah Beach
(S.D.Ga. aff’d US 1962) (permitting
nonresident property ownerss to vote in beach town)
o
Also see odd case of
Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa
(US 1978)
(upholding scheme where nonresidents were barred from voting but were
policed by city officers)
(10) Overseas Voters
: Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act
(1994) requires states to permit certain voters (military service personnel and
those persons who reside abroad but are otherwise qualified to vote) to continue
to participate by absentee ballot in federal elections
(11) Voter Registration
: National Voter Registration Act of 1992 attempted to
broaden registration schemes
o
Note that ND has no registration scheme and a few other states have long
permitted voters to register on election day at local polling places,
arguably calling into question rationality of any registration requirement
(12) “General” versus “Special Purposes” Elections
: In certain cases, one-person,
one-vote does not apply as in
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage District
(US 1973) (upholding CA enfranchisement scheme whereby only
landowners were permitted to vote in water storage district general elections and
these votes were apportioned according to the assessed valuation of the land)
o
But compare with
Rice v. Cayetano
(US 2000) (rejecting HI restriction in
elections for trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs to natives under
race neutrality requirement of Fifteenth Amendment)
The Struggle for Black Enfranchisement
Introduction
to
the
Struggle
for
Black
Enfranchisement
(pp. 90-101)
Early History of Black Enfranchisement
Fifteenth Amendment barred racial discrimination in voting
Black male turnout was high during Reconstruction and first few years of
Redemption
o
E.g., in Louisiana in 1888, there were about 127,923 black voters and
126,884 white voters
but by 1910, only 730 blacks were registered
Neither Congress nor Supreme Court enforced rights
o
E.g.,
United States v. Cruikshank
(US 1875) (dismissing indictments
arising out of Colfax massacre in which white mob murdered group of
black voters in LA);
United States v. Reese
(US 1875) (striking down
other sections of 1870 Enforcement Act as beyond congressional power
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while upholding state efforts to deny other aspects of citizenship to blacks, including right to
participate on juries), and;
Williams v. Mississippi
(US 1898) (no right to participate on juries)
Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (pp. 91-93)
F
ACTS
: Bill of equity on behalf of Alabaman African-American men who were
denied registration; applied for registration in March 1902 and was arbitrarily
denied; particularly problematic because AL constitution had all people registered
to vote prior to 1903 remain electors for life while after that much harder tests
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Justice Holmes): Denies relief because (1) π alleges
that whole registration scheme is unconstitutional and so requested relief of
registering him under doesn’t make sense and (2) Court is not going to be able to
enforce order/change political issues
D
ISSENT
(Justice Brewer): Strictly legal question and precedent for finding
jurisdiction and granting damages relief
D
ISSENT
(Justice Brown): [Not included in casebook]
D
ISSENT
(Justice Harlan): Court lacks jurisdiction because nothing in record
showed amount in dispute was $2000 (then-existing jurisdictional amount) but
otherwise agrees with Brewer
N
OTES
&
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(2) Disingenuousness
of
Holmes’
Opinion
: Can be thought as turning on
distinction between equitable and legal relief but then Giles sought
damages for $5000, but was denied by both AL and Supreme Court
o
(3) Candor
of
Holmes’
Opinion
: Could have dismissed on number of
technical grounds but went further to confront racial issues involved
o
(4) Early
Adoption
of
Voting
Rights
as
Fundamental
: Brewer and Harlan
dissents can be seen as early recognition that voting is fundamental right warranting strictest
judicial scrutiny
Brewer had authored
Berea College
and Harlan authored
Cummings v. Richmond County Board of Education
o
(5) Media
Reaction
to
Giles
: Media recognized sweep of
Giles
with
NY Times
editorial calling it “monstrous denial of justice and a
humiliating admission of helplessness by the court”
o
(6) Congressional Disregard
: Did nothing to sanction or stop
discriminatory practices even though had remedies available including
reducing representation of Southern states in proportion to extent of
disenfranchisement
o
(7) Context and Meaning of
Giles
: Occurred during Redemption when
failure to enforce failure civil rights legislation and widespread efforts to
disenfranchise black voters in the South were prevalent
If
Giles
had come out of differently, would it have meant that
Supreme Court would have had to administrate state government?
Holmes’ view as overly pessimistic realist view, not noting the
fluidity of the enfranchisement status in many places
o
(8)
Guinn
,
or,
a
Possible
Repudiation
of
Giles
?
: In
Guinn v. United States
(US 1915), Supreme Court invalidated “grandfather clause,” exempting
those who were eligible to vote – or were lineal descendents – from
literacy test, in OK state constitutional amendment as violation of
Fifteenth Amendment
Later, OK tried another scheme letting in all those who registered
under struck grandfather clause and requiring everybody else to
register within restrictive 12-day window
Supreme Court struck
this down in
Lane v. Wilson
(US 1939) with Frankfurter
distinguishing this from
Giles
by saying that it was legal, not
equitable, claim being raised and that it is “inequality of treatment
under color of law, not denial of the right to vote” that was being
remedied and that the Fifteenth Amendment “nullifies
sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination”
Class Comments on
Giles
A little Civ Pro history: to get into court, need either diversity jurisdiction or
federal question and, at time of
Giles
, there was minimum amount in controversy
for both and the amount was more with federal question
o
From English common law, there was a basis for alleging such damages
tortious interference with the franchise but this is an action at law and
so equitable relief would not be appropriate
Legal question at hand: Did Fifteenth Amendment provide basis for injunctive
relief against AL for refusal to register blacks to vote?
Case showcases the worst of Holmes and his belief that the law lacked a
legitimate social transformative power
As noted in reading, conventional story of Reconstruction-to-Redemption decline
in black enfranchisement once federal troops left, political will of people was
closely divided and court could have had a huge impact
On other hand, post-
Brown
, very easy to question about effectiveness of judicial
injunctions that Court could not easily implement/enforce versus damages
mechanism especially if individual state actor responsible for
implementation/enforcement is personally liable for damages
o
So, perhaps, Holmes’ constitutional vision – where damages applied at
low-level will be more effective than top-down injunctions – would have
been more effective (think about product liability forcing producers to
internalize costs)
o
But, as Ayana noted, individual suits are very tough
Interesting note, Giles is only black federal employee in
Montgomery, AL, and so is immune from most state action
Techniques
for
Outright
Disenfranchisement
(pp. 101-102)
History and Methods of Disenfranchisement of African-Americans
Cruikshank
(force),
Giles
(arbitrary restrictive registration upheld),
Guinn
(arbitrary restrictive registration struck),
Lane
(arbitrary restrictive registration
struck),
Lassiter
(literacy test upheld), and
Harper
(poll tax struck) illustrate
major techniques of black disenfranchisement
States were pretty explicit about rationale for adopting various provisions
see,
e.g., VA poll tax which was justified at VA Constitutional Convention of 1902 by
sponsor as being about discriminating against African-American voters to extent
allowed by law
Scholars debate about effectiveness of poll tax and whether it was designed to
exclude poor whites too
The
White
Primary
Cases
(pp. 103-117)
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (pp. 103-104)
F
ACTS
: Nixon bought suit seeking damages of $5000 against Judges of
Elections who enforced TX statute barring African-Americans from
participating in Democratic party primary elections
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Justice Holmes): Although political issue, case at
hand is about judiciable private damages and, addressing merits of case, statute is
violation of Fourteenth Amendment EPC (individual rights claim)
N
OTES
&
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(2) Fallout of
Nixon
: After statute was struck, TX passed new statute
granting discretion to political parties; Democratic party adopted rule
prohibiting African-Americans from participating, Nixon sued again and
won in
Nixon v. Condon
(US 1932) (ruling on a technical issue that statute
gave power to executive committees rather than party conventions and so
was state action)
Then in
Grovey v. Townsend
(US 1935), Court upheld African-
American’s exclusion when TX Democratic Convention passed
resolution permitting only qualified white voters from participating
in primary because there was no state action
But in
United States v. Classic
(US 1941), Supreme Court
held
that the right to vote in a primary is part of the larger right to
vote and so denied
Class Comments on White Primary Cases –
Nixon v. Herndon
Question: Whether Fifteenth Amendment is offended by statute that prohibits
African-Americans from participating in Democratic Party primaries?
Overt prohibition against black franchise
Because of his interest in avoiding “political question” and create tort-like action,
Holmes uses Fourteenth Amendment rather than Fifteenth
Why does state of TX do this?
o
Two antithetical traditions that system attempts to deal with: (1) plantation
oligarchy/land-based aristocracy and (2) radical populists
joined by one
feature: they hate
black people
o
We see analog to Democratic Party’s fears realized in Israel where
religious extremists are tipping point and so drive elections
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o
So we see Democratic Party – that has lock on elections/legislative
process – and statute provide enforced lock-up of whites’ faction’s
agreement not to appeal black voters
precommitment with state
enforcement raises the cost of defecting
Overall, this is interesting because we have a notion from
Caroline Products
that
discrete, insular minorities have disproportionally little power while political
theory suggests just the opposite
o
But blacks are not in this same position because they have been
institutionally locked-out and historical weight of racism
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (US 1944) (pp. 105-108)
F
ACTS
: Challenge to
Grovey
in TX based on
Classic
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Justice Reed): Overrules
Grovey
, holding that
political parties that are invested with power by and governed by state statutes can
be conceived of as de facto state agencies and, as technical matter, state put power
in executive committees not party conventions
D
ISSENT
(Justice Roberts): Worries about inconsistency
Comments on White Primary Cases –
Smith v. Allwright
Question: Whether a party that is required by state law to hold a primary may
prohibit black participation?
Raises technical issue of finding state action to handle cases under Fourteenth or
Fifteenth Amendments
In this case, state action was found because primary and party system was part of
official state apparatus
Why do we care about this? Why isn’t general election compensating
mechanism?
o
May be “sore loser” statutes that prohibit losers of primaries from running
in primaries
o
But, primarily, cost of defection is too high (trade-off all financial support,
patronage, etc.) in this state where Democratic Party is so dominant
and so Court gets it
right (primary is conducted under state auspices and is only game that really matters)
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (pp. 108-114)
F
ACTS
: TX county political organization (Jaybird Democratic Association)
excluded African-Americans from primaries on racial grounds
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Black with Douglas and Burton): Reverse Court of
Appeals; affirming District Court’s holding that combined Jaybird-Democratic
election machinery deprived πs’ of right to vote under Fifteenth Amendment as
the state-enforced apparatus produced the equivalent of a prohibited election
C
ONCURRENCE
(Frankfurter): White county officials took part in discriminatory
primary deliberations that effectively determined elections
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C
ONCURRENCE
(Clark with [Chief Justice], Reed, and Jackson joining): Just like
Smith v. Allwright
, just on smaller scale with Jaybird de facto auxiliary to state
Democratic Party
o
Also invokes
Shelly v. Kramer
broad notion of Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment and its “exertions of state power in all forms”
D
ISSENT
(Minton): No state action: claims that Black essentially assumes state
action; Frankfurter places too much weight on officials taking part in Jaybird
device, especially given that they did so as private citizens; and, generally,
nothing legally impermissible with citizens’ voluntary joining up (even if dislike
for Jaybirds’ end)
N
OTES
&
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) Rehnquist’s Memorandum
: Rehnquist wrote memo that essentially
mirrored Minton’s dissent for Justice Jackson who ended up joining with
Clark
o
(2) Logical
Limits
to
Terry
?
: Is there a logical end of
Terry
rationale or
does it apply to every instance where there is some effective small
political machinery?
Consider
Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia
(US 1996) (5-
justice majority held that rule governing who could participate in
Δ’s party nominating convention involved “voting” under Voting
Rights Act of 1965 based on historically-based statutory
interpretation of term but it implicitly found state action given
application of Voting Rights Act)
o
(4) How
Far
Beyond
Race
Do
Smith
and
Terry
Extend?
: In
Davis v.
Beason
(US 1890), Supreme Court upheld territorial statute that
prohibited supporters or practitioners of bigamy to participate in
elections
However, in
Republican Party of Texas v. Dietz
(Tex.Sup.Ct.
1997), TX Supreme Court held that there was no state action where
TX Republic Party refused to allow Log Cabin Republics (gay and
lesbian group) to participate in convention
o
(5) Explaining the Need for the White Primary Statutes
: Pildes and
Issacharoff suggest that White Primary Cases are examples of political
lock-ups (i.e., state enforcement of private agreements, in this case,
amongst competing white factions to not appeal to African-American
voters)
Class Comments on White Primary Cases –
Terry v. Adams
TX has relatively small black population
But many in Fort Bend county (where there was military base) as many southern
blacks had looked to federal army as guarantor of freedom
Jaybirds are completely private organization
doesn’t have any
state involvement, just endorse candidate in Democratic primary
What are the possible remedies available?
Must be some state action
what is it?
o
Ala
Brown
, state historically has created racial problems
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Issacharoff would argue that this case came out wrong, but was understandable
given line of cases and political understanding of context
o
Here there was little prohibiting white factions from reaching out to blacks
as the cost of defection should not have been so high as in other white
primary cases
o
But, reality of situation (and real problem) is that no white candidate
would appeal to black voters because they were effectively
disenfranchised by various Jim Crow laws
o
To effectively break this system, have to have something like Voting
Rights Act of 1965 which gets African-American voting bloc to the polls
The
Demise
of
Discretion
(pp. 117-124)
Problems with Unfettered Discretion
Following abolition of white primary, states moved to other
discretionary/discriminatory devices, including literacy and character tests
o
E.g., LA had interpretation test that it only started using in 1950’s with
record showing it was used to exclude African-Americans
o
And in
Davis v. Schnell
(S.D.Ala.
aff’d
US 1949), Court struck down
AL’s Boswell Amendment which limited registration to persons who could “understand
and explain” any article of Federal Constitution
The Alabama Literacy Test (pp. 120-124)
[Example of literacy test with difficult and highly ambiguous questions]
Redrawing
District Boundaries
(pp. 125-129)
Introduction to Redrawing District Boundaries
Tuskegee gerrymander was last gasp of blatant black disenfranchisement
African-Americans in Tuskegee had done pretty well and state responded by: (1)
Macon County Board of Registrars engaged in series of evasive discriminatory
maneuvers; (2) through statewide referendum, AL adopted constitutional
amendment permitting state to abolish county if “the uppity Negroes there
continued pestering for the vote,” and; (3) AL passed Local Act 140 which redrew
Tuskegee’s municipal boundaries
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (pp. 125-129)
F
ACTS
: Litigation challenging Local Act 140, which redrew boundaries of
Tuskegee from square to 28-sided figure; resulted in removal of all but 4-5 of 400
black voters while leaving untouched the white voting population
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Frankfurter): Petitioners entitled to prove allegations
at trial because arguably good claim that statute unconstitutionally deprived
petitioner of federally-protected right to vote because of petitioner’s race
o
Justice Douglas joined opinion of court but adhered to dissent in
Colegrove v. Green
and
South v. Peters
C
ONCURRENCE
(Whitaker): Decision should rest on EPC of Fourteenth rather than
Fifteenth as statute doesn’t prevent anybody from voting based on race (removes
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everybody from particular municipality) but is clear segregation of races of
citizens that would be prohibited under EPC
N
OTES
&
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(2) Strategic Choice
of
Fifteenth
Amendment
in
Majority
Opinion
:
Frankfurter uses Fifteenth, perhaps, because it is narrower
o
(3) Current
Treatment
of
Gomillion
: Currently, treated as Fourteenth
Amendment case (see
Shaw v. Reno
, US 1993)
Class Comments on
Gomillion v. Lightfoot
Can look at pp. 910-911 to see that many Congressional districts remain
“uncouth”
Perhaps, Frankfurter’s concern is that intent is malevolent
Compare with
Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa
(pp. 67-68) where
incorporated town, per state statute, provided police and other services to outlying
areas that were not eligible to vote in Tuscaloosa
o
In
Holt Civic Club
, Tuscaloosa was authorized to annex outlying areas
o
In this instance, Tuscaloosa did not choose to do so with outlying area that
was majority black
Issacharoff would suggest that really only Whittaker’s concurrence made sense;
the traditional doctrinal approach had an incredibly difficult time with this type of
case
Voter Registration and Participation
Voter
Registration
and
Participation
(pp. 129-140)
Current State of American Voter Registration and Participation
Most Americans don’t vote
o
E.g., in 1990, only 33.1% of voting age population cast ballots for
congressional representatives and, in 1996, only 49.1% voted in
presidential election
o
Recent high-mark was 1992 presidential election with 61.3% turnout
o
But with all of these numbers, some question about accuracy of self-
reporting (people tend to over-report participation)
o
Although US has relatively low turnout, has many more elections (e.g.,
one of a very countries where some judges are elected)
Many commentators focus on voter registration to explain low turnout
France Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Why Americans Don’t Vote (1989) (pp. 130-
135)
Some academic work considers abstention a form of political expression
(essentially a form of latent satisfaction or what they term “the politics of
happiness”) but do little to explain why the phenomena is consistently
concentrated among the least well off
Others suggest that abstention is good because it reduces conflict and provides
political leaders with latitude necessary to govern responsibly
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Piven and Cloward argue that voter registration procedures are “linchpin of the
distorted American democracy”
o
Byzantine as compared to other democracies/no government assistance
o
Once registered, people vote
o
Historically, voter registration wasn’t only driver but it mutually informed
political calculus and arrangement to lead to systematic exclusion of
certain groups (i.e., working class groups)
o
Was once tied to local parties that helped there constituencies navigate
process but gradually such ties withered and just left barrier to
enfranchisement
Notes and Questions on Voter Registration and Participation
(1) Strict Scrutiny Not
Applied to Time Requirements for Registration
: Courts
have never applied strict scrutiny to requirement that voters register substantial
time before general election even though MN, WI, and WY have election day
registration and ND has no registration requirement and the former 3 rank
amongst top states in percent of eligible voters registered
(2) Affirmative v. Passive
: Voting as negative liberty may weaken argument for
greater state action to ensure registration/voting
(3) National
Voter
Registration
Act
of
1993
(“Motor
Voter”
Law)
: Created
affirmative government duty to register voters
o
Not clear that it could survive Constitutional challenge following decision
in
Printz v. United States
(US 1997) (invalidating Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act because federal government cannot command
state-funded state actors to fulfill federal government functions
(4) Mail-In
Voting
: Experts believe that mail-in voting would come with lower
costs but greater risks of fraud
o
Might be impermissible as in
Foster v. Love
(US 1997) (Supreme Court
invalided Louisiana’s non-partisan primary structures where if candidate
received majority of votes, they won) but see in
Voting Integrity Project v.
Comer
(5th Cir. 2000) (allowing TX system where voters could vote up to
17 days before federal election day); OR allows mail-in voting but doesn’t
count votes until election day
(5) Internet Voting
: Important questions include worries about fraud and
disenfranchising vulnerable groups
(6) Who
Doesn’t
Vote?
: Not clear that non-voters have liberal bias
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minded voters seeking to make impact on elections
Vote must be meaningful vote
i.e., must be able to aggregated with like-
voters do not”
necessarily applies to groups: gropus of voters elect representatives, individual
Justice Powell wrote, “[t]he concept of ‘representation’
C.
T
HE
R
EAPPORTIONMENT
R
EVOLUTION
Reapportionment – Casting a Meaningful Vote
Introduction
to
Reapportionment
(p. 141)
Ensuring a Meaningful Relationship between Voting and Democracy
Something more than simply casting a ballot is necessary to define democratic
legitimacy
In an opinion that was concurring in part and dissenting in part in
Bandemer
(US 1986),
The Political Thicket (pp. 142-184)
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (pp. 142-147)
F
ACTS
: Voters in IL districts that have much larger districts than other IL
congressional districts sued; districts were created according to Census of 1900
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Justice Frankfurter): Dismissed as it is not judicial
issue because Article I, Section 4 of Constitution puts it in hands of state/state
legislatures/Congress (alternate institutions to remedy) and it would be too
difficult to administer remedy and court is not competent to establish alternative
system
D
ISSENT
(Justice Black): State legislature uses same districts and so both are tied
together so as to prevent equal protection of laws (because being denied equal
right to vote/have one’s vote be counted clearly/have votes be roughly equal) for
those is larger districts
would have them use at-large election to remedy
N
OTES
&
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(2, 3) Structural Obstacles: Many citizens and then-in power legislators
had incentive to keep format the same
o
(4) Rural
vs.
Urban
: Malapportionment in IL was due to increase of urban
population in twentieth century; raises questions about whether a state legitimately
choose to represent regional interests on a non-population basis
Class Discussion on
Colegrove v. Green
Asks if matter for courts or political process
Constitutional text gives right to Congress to remedy improprieties in state’s
delegations
o
Madison thought national body would rise above local factions
In dissent, Black would have Court order state to have at-large election but this
would have created fully Democratic delegation (coincidently Black’s affiliation)
and would have potentially compromised Court’s legitimacy
Frankfurter was worried that this would lead courts to point where they would
decide elections (see
Bush v. Gore
)
so combined jurisdictional and prudential
obstacles
md
2023-09-15 18:08:32
--------------------------------------------
Where do you draw the line?
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o
(1) Left to coordinate branch (see Article I, §4) and so jurisdictionally
walled off from consideration by courts
o
(2) Requires policy determination for which there is no judicial
competence (both in terms of ability and in terms of jurisdictional power of court)
o
(3) Best left to other institutional actors (political change is better to come
from political actors/ people
more expertise, easier to change)
o
(4) Institutional competence of judiciary over remedy (doesn’t want court
picking representatives)
But there was political failure
o
Congressional remedy was tricky:
(1) Rise of national parties
(2) Problems reproduced across nation and so nobody had
incentive to address
o
State districts were drawn along same lines as Congress, which hadn’t
reapportioned
o
State supreme court was elected
o
Referendum was not available
o
[PERSONAL NOTE: I know that this is terrible, but it seems like people
could just move, if it were truly onerous enough?]
(pp. 147-162)
F
ACTS
: TN had failed to pass reapportionment plan from 1901 to 1961
during which time substantial population shifts occurred
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Justice Brennan): Remand for consideration
o
Justiciable because no separation of powers/Guaranty clause issues are
implicated; rather just about legal question involved, i.e., consistency of
state practice with equal protection clause (recall
Nixon v. Herndon
and
Gomillion
)
C
ONCURRENCE
(Justice Douglas): [omitted]
C
ONCURRENCE
(Justice Clark): Even if not deciding merits, provides his thoughts to
provide lower courts with direction
apportionment must have, at least, some
rational basis and deprived citizens have no other recourse than federal courts
because Congress has not taken up issue and state legislature has stymied all other
efforts
C
ONCURRENCE
(Justice Stewart): Tries to clarify that Court did not address most of
the substantive issues other than justiciability
D
ISSENT
(Justice Frankfurter with Harlan): Just a Guaranty Clause claim
masquerading under another name and substance has long weight of precedence
against justiciability; also, doesn’t like Court spending its capital to handle such a
case
D
ISSENT
(Justice Harlan with Frankfurter): Claims that Court is going beyond
purview in deciding that votes must not weigh more heavily in one district than
another
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
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N
OTES
&
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) Administration
of
Judicial
Review
:
Baker
is virtually silent on matter
of administration of judicial review and court’s competence to navigate
competing concerns presented
o
(2) Strategic Choice of EPC Rather Than Guaranty Clause Claim?
:
Precedent doesn’t explain choice of EPC in
Baker
because
Colgrove
was
dead-on precedent and was overruled
perhaps, because guaranty clause
focuses on structural rights while EPC focuses on individual rights
Prof. McConnell argues that interpretation of guarantee of
republican form of government would allow Court to hold that
minority faction cannot control where majority has no political
remedy
therefore all Court would have to hold was that
Guaranty Clause meant that will of majority ultimately governs
and that this would have been better precedent
e.g., could more
easily distinguish racial gerrymandering (seemingly totally
impermissible under EPC) and apportionment under Guaranty
Clause as racial gerrymandering could be construed as ensuring
minority voting strength was proportional
o
(3)
Baker
is
Destabilizing
Opinion
: Following
Baker
, litigation was
initiated in 34 states
o
(4) Process
Failure
in
Baker
: Justice Clark argues that judicial intervention
is required because there was political process failure
rationale for intervention comports
with
Carolene Products
footnote that drew upon James Madison’s The Federalist No. 10
Class Discussion on
Baker v. Carr
Analytical move is to frame questions as one of rights (recall
Harper
)
Classic form of legal argumentation is to address component pieces of argument
and show how each fails and then conclude that the whole must fail
o
In this instance, has to address the 4 considerations with political question
doctrine noted above (coordinate branches; policy determination; other
institutional actors can take this up; institutional competence of judiciary)
Never really takes affirmative stance on rights issue/remedies, does minimum to
get to making this justiciable claim by addressing individual issues
o
Coordinate branches?
Brennan says issue doesn’t touch on republican Guaranty Clause
not about structures of government but is about individual rights
[SI: this is critical analytical move and that this will come up again
and again
this “original sin” in terms of
reapportionment/political question law]
o
Brennan then claims that judicial standards under EPC are “well
developed and familiar” despite
Colegrove
and so court has institutional
competence and that it is not true policy determination
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o
Clark answers why court is getting involved
other institutional actors
are not going to be responsive (no internal method of redress because
political lock-up of Congress and state legislature)
o
Stewart suggests that state action is so arbitrary on its face as to be
unsustainable
o
Dissents get across issue that legitimacy of state is now justiciable
[SI: This is incredibly radical decision and state legislators realized this and were
vehemently opposed but they were swept aside shockingly quickly in new
elections]
[SI: At the end of the day,
Baker
decision is reasonable and logical; when faced
with these kind of shocking disparities (e.g., 60:1), we do not want to let an
unfair, historically-based system continue to exist when we would not have let it
be so designed]
In terms of political question, historically, look at 1849 case,
which came out of Rhode Island
o
Rhode Island did not show at Constitutional Convention and so we knew
that Articles of Confederation could not be amended (required unanimity)
o
After Constitutional Convention, RI did not adopt new state constitution
and so kept royal charter
led to conflict between charter and constitutional factions
o
Common law claim of nuisance was brought with operative question being
which was the legitimate government?
o
Luther argued that republican
Guaranty Clause
meant that there could be
no government could operate by virtue of royal charter
o
Legitimacy of government is to be made by Congress and, if armed
insurrection, president may suppress
so, no real role for court to intervene on these
questions
(pp. 162-177)
F
ACTS
: Similar to
Baker
but in AL
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Chief Justice Warren): When have voting issue,
going to use strict scrutiny and EPC requires weight o citizen’s vote cannot be
made to depend on where he lives (roughly, one-person, one-vote for state
legislatures
Wesberry v. Sanders
did the same for congressional
representation)
o
Federal analogy is inapposite and irrelevant as states had some measure of
sovereignty that political subdivisions of states do not
o
Can take account of political subdivision but not to point where it subverts
majority will
D
ISSENT
(Justice Harlan): Thinks decision is radical break with precedent and has
Court meddling where it shouldn’t
would hold that states may care about
regional interests and neither EPC nor Art 1, § 2 (used in
Wesberry
) provide
constitutional basis for equipopulation principle
N
OTES
&
Q
UESTIONS
:
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1946)
Luther v.
Borden
,
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o
(2) How
Exacting
Must
Equipopulation Standard
Be?
: Supreme Court had
set different standards for state legislative (in
Mahan v. Howell
, US 1973,
Court upheld VA state redistricting plan with spread of 16.4%
although
this was limit, looks more to 10% deviation to be presumptively valid) and
congressional (must strive for “precise mathematical equality” as in
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler
, US 1969, striking down State’s preference for
pleasingly-shaped districts that yielded 5% spread) redistricting
o
(3) How to Count Population for Reapportionment
: Very difficult as
number voters may not be uniform even if districts have same number of
people
Raises questions about counting prisoners, illegal aliens, etc.
In
Burns v. Richardson
(US 1966), Court upheld HI
redistricting plan based on registered voters even though it
may have been intended to enhance voting power of
permanent residents and exclude military population
On other hand, in
Garza v. County of Los Angeles
(9th Cir.
1990), Court held that underrepresentation of Hispanics
was legally cognizable even though many were not eligible
voters under
Wesberry
and
Reynolds
Also in separate concurrence and dissent in
Garza
, Judge
Kozinski noted that Supreme Court precedents supported
both principles of
equal representation
and of
equal
voting power
o
(4) Principles Underlying Decisions
: Clearly,
Reynolds
relies on
individual right to equal treatment by state, but might there be a greater
principle than simple equality in apportionment that is also hinted at by
Reynolds
?
[Personal note: Generally, in this debate, I wonder if there is some
notion of “voting intensity” where spread of politician’s victory
influences legislative behavior]
o
(5) Purposes
of
Numerical
Standards
of
Apportionment
: As conceived by
Supreme Court in 1960s, reliance on numerical standards of
apportionment was designed to:
(1) Be drawn from unassailable empirical data and therefore
provide objective basis for measuring political equality
(2) One-person, one-vote based on strict population equality was
readily manageable and provided justiciable standard (see
Karcher v. Daggett
, US 1983)
(3) Existence of objective measures would defeat attempts to
gerrymander districting schemes (see
Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist.
, US 1969)
o
(6) Use
of
Political
Factors
: Limitations on use of political factors (e.g.,
pre-existing counties) and rise of computers has allowed for creation of
politically self-serving representational designs
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Class Discussion of
Reynolds v. Sims
A number of big issues that remain with us:
(1) Voting is equal protection issue
o
Chief Justice Warren makes critical move early and positively asserts right
to vote such that governments have to justify their conduct
o
Following from this, Warren says that any restrictions on this right will be
strictly scrutinized
(compelling government interest and narrowly
tailored)
(2) Instrumental
introduces dilution of vote as part of enfranchisement
right
to “full and effective participation” with each citizen having equally effective
right (this was easier when 60:1 and other extreme ratios)
o
But where is this premise in Constitution (after all, we have the Senate)?
Warren says federal analogy is inapposite because sole rationale
for Senate was political expediency and political subdivisions of
state are not sovereign
o
Rob Stillwell: Relationship to
Bolling v. Sharpe
(EPC challenge to D.C.
schools that Court upheld because Amendment retroactively
incorporated)?
SI: Just an anachronism that had to fall
not really strong
precedent
(3) Majoritarian Control
o
Warren believed
Reynolds
was one of most important decision and that
discrimination had to be stamped out and that bad history had led to
minority-control of rural voters who engaged in oppressive practices
towards other minority groups (particularly racial minorities)
o
Tricky analytical move because to protect minorities. Warren’s remedy
required moving to more majoritarian control, which really assumes that
majority will be sympathetic to oppressed minorities)
o
Also, recall EPC was based on
Carolene Products
with its concern for
discrete insular minorities
(4) One-person/One-vote
“Again, people, not land or tress or pastures, vote”
o
Took 2 years to clean-up state governments
almost immediately,
perceived as legitimate and correct despites its sweep
Class Discussion of
Wesberry
Applies one-person/one-vote to Congress, which is important technical move
Thus, it is no longer EPC claim; limited state authority over Congressional
elections; instead uses Art. I, § 2 that grants power of election of members of
Congress to “people”
really one of the very few times where power is granted
to the “people” (see Blackboard posting of Issacharoff/Pildes/Neuborne article
that distinguishesArt. I, § 2 and EPC claims)
o
Results in higher standard/less tolerance for deviation for Congressional
elections than for state legislatures (sum of difference between highest and
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mean and difference between lowest and mean should not exceed 10% in state districts)
Pros and Cons of One-Person/One-Vote
Warren thought one-person/one-vote would give everybody equal voice and to
some degree he was correct
somewhat self-enforcing with Census giving
numbers and popular support
But Census limits mathematical exactitude
And then we have questions regarding places like Huntsville County which has
giant prison
Also, we have questions regarding what population should be used (i.e., should it
be equal representation or equal voting power?)
often can predict divergences
based on demographics
[SI: Real justification for one-person/one-vote is instrumental: there is real
danger of government officials self-dealing with history of misbehavior of
these officials and it is hard to police on case-by-case basis and so Court
decreed prophylactic per se rule that allowed government latitude within this
one-person/one-vote limitation]
o
To some degree, this instrumental rationale explains why state’s are
constrained but federal Senate is not
Karcher v. Dagget, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (pp. 177-185)
F
ACTS
: Question presented was whether apportionment plan for
congressional districts was Constitutional without further question if
population of largest district is less than one percent greater than population
of smallest district
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Justice Brennan):
Kirkpatrick
requires strict
numerical equality; no general assertions of political necessity will allow for even
minor deviations (would have to assert with specificity and such deviations must
be evaluated case-by-case)
D
ISSENT
(Justice White):
Kirkpatrick
doesn’t preclude gerrymandering; forces
courts to draw lines; instead of blindly following
Kirkpatrick
precedent, can allow
for more flexibility that respects political choices related to political and
geographic boundaries/continuity and compactness
N
OTES
&
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1)
Karcher
is End of Road for One-Person/One-Vote
:
Karcher
was
confrontation with Demographic Party gerrymander; a couple of other
justices would have addressed constitutionality of gerrymander directly
o
(2) Census Miscounts
: Given strict reliance on Census figures,
undercounting and miscounting – often biased against racial and ethnic
minorities
In
Wisconsin v. City of New York
(US 1996), Supreme Court
rejected local governments claim that persistent undercount was
unconstitutional as Constitution vests Congress with essentially
unreviewable authority to conduct an “actual Enumeration” and
distributive accuracy was more important than numerical accuracy
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In
Department of Commerce v. United States House of
Representatives
(US 1999), Supreme Court allowed Census
Bureau to use sampling for demographic purposes but not for
purpose of apportioning Congressional seats
Some states, generally those subject to preclearance of Voting
Rights Act, passed statutes requiring use of unadjusted Census
figures
o
(3) Protection
for
Incumbents?
: Open question regarding protection of
incumbents as permissible grounds for departing from equipopulation
command
some might argue that there is invitation to self-serving
behavior by political insiders
o
(4) Must
Majority
Rule
under
Equipopulation?
: In
Gordon v. Lance
(US
1971), Supreme Court upheld West Virginia statute that required super-
majority (60% referendum) for local governments to incur bonded
indebtedness or increase tax rates
Class Discussion on
Karcher
Partisan gerrymander
terrible to lose by 51-49 or win 100-0 (both waste
49 votes)
Last gasp of one-person/one-vote where Court did not what else to do
Wanted to avoid slippery slope but not great Constitutional law given
instrumental as opposed to normative justification for one-person/one-vote,
especially where deviation wasn’t necessarily mathematically meaningful (fell
within margin of error for counting)
BUT THINK ABOUT WHAT ARE CONSEQUENCES OF ONE-
PERSON/ONE-VOTE?
At close of opinion, Brennan tries to accommodate residual sense that there is
political dimension to line-drawing
allows for “any number of consistently
applied legislative policies”
o
Includes protection of incumbents (perhaps, allows Congressional
representatives to gain more seniority) which is odd because of
Reynolds
and other reapportionment cases
o
What does it mean if neutral policy can survive scrutiny if it protects
incumbents?
Same problem as with white primary cases regarding who is
speaking to this desire (self-dealing/those in power get to do this)
o
Brings up problems regarding legitimacy of democratic process:
Minorities may exert disproportionate control
Majority doesn’t really decide in blank-slate way
rather,
questions are presented to majority and the way in which these
questions are presented matters a great deal
See Condorcet voter’s paradox (described below in which
depending on pairing, can control outcome
control of
presentation can often be control of outcome)
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Roads
School
Prisons
I
30,000
60,000
10,000
II
10,000
30,000
60,000
III
60,000
10,000
30,000
This was followed by Kenneth Arrow’s work on public
choice theory that required stability of preference
So we turn to tightening up equipopulation rule
Impose other kinds of constraints
Wrap-Up Discussion on The Reapportionment Revolution – The Political Thicket
4 approaches from
Baker
/
Reynolds
through
Carter
o
(1) Individual rights
o
(2) Majority rule
But recall
Gordon v. Lance
(upholding scheme that said for bond
indebtedness that will burden future generations, need super
majority)
o
(3) Prophylactic rules
Limits ability to self-deal/conduct that is hard to police
ex post
o
(4) Administrability
But inflexible
are we so distrustful that there is going to be only
one model of governance?
Issacharoff Summary on the Reapportionment Cases
Unifying theme so far: Court has critical insight that allows it to get past
Giles
,
the method of structuring the political process can distort outcomes and this
distortion may undermine democratic institutions
Early cases include: (1) individual insult and (2) questions about legitimacy of
political process given distortion
Early cases were easy given extent of distortion and so relatively easy to remedy
but then
Karcher
and other cases highlight constitutional doctrinal
inadequacies and trickiness of remedies
o
E.g., one-person/one-vote is not obvious per se democratic principle but
might be justified because of need to police process
The
Senate,
Republic
Theory,
and
Interest
Representation
Discussion on
Gray v. Sanders
GA used county unit system to determine Senate elections and question is why
can’t Constitution to permit states to do such things when federal structure seems
to deviate in this kind of way
o
Original Constitutional view and initial election processes allowed for
deviations from pure egalitarian majority rule (e.g., Electoral College)
o
Answer is that Senate and Presidential election structure is historical
accident but this doesn’t seem to justify striking down NYC’s law
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Local
Governance
(pp. 185-208)
Introduction to Local Governance
Wide range of non-legislative elected offices (e.g., county commissions, city
council, parks commission, etc.)
In
Avery v. Midland County
(US 1968), Supreme Court held that election of
Commissioners Court of a TX county must satisfy
Reynolds
standard where
Commissioners Court had both administrative/executive and legislative
responsibilities
But in
Sailors v. Board of Education of Kent County
(US 1967), Supreme Court
upheld appointive system for selection of local school board
In
Hadley v. Junior College District
(US 1970), Supreme Court required
equipopulation standard in apportionment of Trustees of Junior College District in
MO as they performed “important governmental functions” and there powers
were general enough
Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989) (pp. 187-192)
F
ACTS
: Board of Estimate of NYC (calculate sewer and water rates, tax
abatements, property taxes on urban development, fixes salaries of city workers,
budget approval, etc.) comprised of 3 members elected citywide plus elected
presidents of each of five boroughs, which have drastically different populations
and so was challenged under EPC
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Justice White): Affirms lower court’s ruling that
scheme violates EPC; powers are general enough and have sufficient impact to
require elections to comply with EPC
N
OTES
&
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) Judges?
: In
Wells v. Edwards
(M.D. La. 1972), court found election of
state court judges didn’t have to be equipopulation because judges don’t
represent people
o
(2) Political
Aftermath
of
Morris
: After
Morris
and invalidation of scheme
that had been in place since 1901, Staten Island thought about seceding
Class Discussion on
Board of Estimates v. Morris
In its formation, NYC created Board of Estimates to be more independent from
political whims and to control certain fiscal matters (created at same time as
national government created the Federal Bank)
Only real way to do this would be to create governor-appointed board (as NY Port
Authority is constituted)
o
But, this is problematic because to protect the constitutional right to vote,
we end up removing body from direct political control
Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (pp. 192-204)
F
ACTS
: AZ water reclamation district restricted voting to landowner and
apportions voting power to amount of owned land
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Justice Stewart): Have addressed a similar exception
before in
Sayler Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District
(US 1973)
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(upholding scheme where district directors were elected only by landowners in
proportion to their stake as they were reason for creation of district and their land
was subject to special liens); upholds AZ scheme because: (1) District does not
exercise government powers like taxation nor provides most traditional
government services like operation of schools; (2) even water functions are
relatively narrow; (3) District’s power business doesn’t affect legality of its
property-based voting scheme even though power business affected lots of people
because provision of electricity is not traditional element of governmental
sovereignty
overall, limited situation where reasonable relationship to statutory
objective
C
ONCURRENCE
(Justice Powell): Have to allow for local-controlled
experimentation especially where no danger of lack of political safeguards
N
OTES
&
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) Public
Choice
Theory
: Aren’t these small, self-interested groups
already overrepresented in process (see, e.g., NRA)?
o
(5) Business
Improvement
District
(BID)
: At local level, BIDS have been
upheld against various challenges as in
Kessler v. Grand Central District
Management Association
(2d Cir. 1998)
Class Discussion on
Ball v. James
Question about general purpose/limited purpose
Court is funny in finding
control of water (necessary to survival) not general purpose but education is
Also see Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) that are enforced by state
Fumalaro v. Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54 (1990) (pp. 204-208)
F
ACTS
: Chicago School Reform Act attempted to vest more power at local
levels; differentiates allocation of votes among parents, community residents,
and teachers in local school council elections
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Justice Ward): Education is fundamental government
power and so falls under “general governmental function” rubric of
Hadley
and
Kramer
and therefore use strict scrutiny and hold that Act violates EPC
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(2) Which Way Does Broad Impact Cut?
: In
Ball
, Justice Powell argues
that broad impact cuts in favor of deference as there will be political check
related to this, note that Chicago School Reform Act was passed by
state legislature as response to perceived crisis in Chicago schools
Class Discussion on
Fumalaro v. Chicago Board of Education
Unconstitutional to privilege parents
recall
Kramer
To some degree, I agree because parents do not bear additional costs of school in
way that water districts do
o
But, upon reflection, should municipalities be able to use voting rights as
economic bargaining chip?
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D.
W
HEN
E
LECTIONS
G
O
B
AD
:
T
HE
2000
P
RESIDENTIAL
E
LECTION
IN
L
EGAL
C
ONTEXT
Introduction to Problems with Elections and Judicial Oversight
Introduction
(pp. 217-221)
Problems with Elections
Margin of error/counting is real problem
Most election processes are not subject to public scrutiny
Difficulties in deferring to political actors when election defects
Courts must be circumspect to preserve integrity
Have to think critically about complex interaction between democratic politics
and formal institutions of the state
Questions with judicial remedies
Issacharoff’s Introduction to
Bush v. Gore
To what extent is
Bush v. Gore
the outgrowth of
Baker v. Carr
(does it have
Frankfurter arising from his grave to say, “I told you so?”)
Frankfurter and Harlan may have been wrong on jurisdictional component of
political question doctrine but prudential components may still have force and it
may act to check the expansive nature of the Constitution
What is the right level of abstraction?
o
E.g., if one just thinks about how election processes involve voting and
democratic processes, of course, one finds a constitutional case?
o
But that is probably unworkable
Recall
Fumalaro
, which was brought by principals
rights
discourse assigns important decisions to judiciary and may create
rigidity, eliminating democratic political experiments where, when
individual rights are implicated, the majoritarian will may not rule
One remnant of political question doctrine: Court hoped that constraints (e.g.,
one-person/one-vote) would be sufficient to address all problems ex ante
o
But Frankfurter/Harlan concern that nothing would stop court from going
all the way and determining election
o
Have federal system and increasing number of concerns regarding what
might go wrong with political process
The
Federal
Interest
in
Election
Procedures
(pp. 217-246)
Two Key Questions to Federal Courts Role in Overseeing Contested Elections
Procedurally, have to figure out timing of federal oversight
at what stage in
election dispute is it proper for federal courts to play a role to enforce the relevant
federal interests, if any, that the election dispute implicates
Substantive question is what reasons are sufficient to justify federal intervention
in election disputes:
o
Constitutional interests/statutory interests?
o
National office?
Tricky federalism questions
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State Elections – Introduction
Every dispute about state election processes implicates questions involving voting
and democratic processes
But not every dispute will be transformed into federal constitutional issue
(compare with France)
State Elections – Lack of Sufficient Federal Interest
In
Gamza v. Aguirre
(5th Cir. 1980), Judge Rubin rejected federal voting rights
in
claim in case where local school board candidate found technological
misconfiguration in voting machines in certain precincts
“recognize a
distinction between state laws and patterns of state action systematically deny
equality in voting and episodic events that, despite non-discriminatory laws, may
result in the dilution of individual’s vote”
o
Also see
Hennings v. Grafton
(7th Cir. 1975) (court rejected claims where
voting machines didn’t meet state standards and election officials didn’t
respond)
o
Judiciary will only intervene where entire election process fails on its face
to afford fundamental fairness
State Elections – Sufficient Federal Interests – Roe v. State of Alabama [Roe I], 43 F.3d
574 (11th Cir. 1995) (pp. 226-239)
F
ACTS
: Disputed election in AL; certain absentee ballots had defect (not
notarized) but then AL court ruled that they could be counted; then other votes
sought federal injunction from District Court prohibiting counting of these votes
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Per Curiam): Uphold District Court ruling finding
that federal intervention is appropriate at this early state where there is (1)
constitutional due process issue
i.e., rule change and (2) EPC issue
i.e.,
detrimental reliance, than there is a claim
D
ISSENT
(Circuit Judge Edmondson): Would urge restraint on part of federal
judiciary; not even clear that there is dispute
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
Aftermath of
Roe
Litigation
: Following
Roe I
, AL Supreme Court found
that ballots in question were legal votes under AL law; then District Court
found that AL state courts had changed rules in
Roe II
; then 11th Cir.
affirmed District Court ruling that ordered Secretary of State to certify
winner excluding contested votes; whole process took about 2 years
o
(1) Necessity of Both Elements
: Not clear if both due process (rule
change) and equal protection (detrimental reliance) need to be present for
federal intervention
o
(2) Vote
Dilution
and
Changes
in
State
Law
: If include more voters, might
dilute those who followed “correct” procedures
troublesome if it looks like federal and
state courts just disagree about interpretation of law; also hard to know if “fundamental
unfairness” is effective limiting standard
o
(3) Assessing
State
Judicial
Interpretations
as
Unconstitutional Changes
in
State
Law
: Can be tough to assess if there is limited formal statutes or case
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history regarding statutes
here, might be worry that federal court is just substituting
judgment for state courts
To some degree, this was situation in Florida where it hinged on
relevant statutes had never been at issue and last statewide contest
of election had occurred in 1919 (long before relevant statues had
been passed)
o
(5) Detrimental Reliance, Due Process, and Constitutional Violations
:
Looking more at detrimental reliance, can examine predecessor case,
Griffin v. Burns
(1st Cir. 1978), where, in local city council race,
Secretary of State concluded that ordinary absentee and shut-in ballot laws
should apply to primaries; publicized this; about 10% of total vote in
primary came from such ballots; McCormick – machine vote winner but
total loser – brought suit and won at RI Supreme Court level as state law
did not authorize actions; Griffin – total winner – brought suit along with
absentee voters in District Court and won because those voters had relied
on advice; First Circuit affirmed remedy of new primary because RI
Supreme Court had ruled that votes were not legal
o
(6) Dissent in
Roe I
: Judge Edmondson dissent argued that the federal
court should not intervene until AL law became clear through the AL
Supreme Court and until the contested ballots were counted should the AL
courts require their inclusion
rests on two principles: (1) ballots should
be counted so Court knew there was real harm and (2) not going to be
irreparable harm in letting ballots be counted
Class Discussion on
Roe v. Alabama [Roe I]
Concerned about actions of Alabama court
has taken neutral rule and
messed with it
Two different reasons to allow people to take such claims to federal court:
o
(1) Individual rights
detrimental reliance
o
(2) Structural reason for ex ante rules that it is prohibition on manipulation
Assumption that there is legal process that might continue after election
Distinct Federal Interests in National Elections: U.S. House and Senate Elections
Art. 1, § 4 of Constitution gives Congress power to regulate time, place, and
manner of holding congressional elections
Seventeenth Amendment provides that states shall have right to vote directly for
senators
But, typically, state law that regulate elections are carried over to national
elections
But Art. 1, § 5 provides both Senate and House the power to judge
qualifications of each of its members
o
E.g., see
Roudebush v. Hartke
(US 1972), where very close Senate
election in IN; Senate provisionally seated Hartke, then Roudebush asked
for manual recount as allowed by state law; Supreme Court upheld power
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of a state to conduct manual recount pursuant to ordinary law, even for disputed Senate
elections where Senate has provisionally seated member
o
Senate itself has engaged in manual recount (process took 7 months and
reached no conclusion in 1924 Iowa election)
Distinct Federal Interests in National Elections: Presidential Elections
At least 3 features of constitutional and federal statutory structure present unique
legal issues when it comes to presidential elections and resolutions over disputes:
o
(1) role of the Electoral College generally
Historical accident
founders expected that Congress would
end up selecting president most of the time
Currently, most states assign all electoral votes to winner of state
Except for 200 and 1888 (Cleveland over Harrison),
candidate winning electoral vote has also won popular
o
(2) role of Art. II, § 1, which empowers state legislatures to “direct the
manner” of choosing presidential electors, and
Raises two questions:
(1) when state legislatures enact presidential-elector
statutes, are they freed from any state constitutional
limitations, and
(2)when state courts interpret presidential-elector laws must
they treat those statutes differently than other state
legislation (i.e., must the courts adhere more closely to text)
o
(3) Electoral Count Act of 1887, which was passed in effort t o recreate
mechanism for resolving disputed elections
Provides that state law procedures in place prior to election are
binding on Congress if they produce definitive result at least six
days prior to day that electors are schedule to meet
And provides mechanism for resolving disputes over whether to
accept votes of electors
If only one return has been submitted, that is
accepted unless both Houses reject because of
irregularities (3 U.S.C. § 5)
If multiple returns, Congress is to accept return that
conforms to state determination under § 5; if Houses
disagree, than whichever is certified by executive of State
is counted
The
State
Interest
in
Federal
Elections
(pp. 246-262)
Introduction to the State Interest in Federal Elections
Often state statutory and administrative machinery for resolving election disputes
(e.g., recounts and contest phase)
Introduction to 2000 Florida Litigation
3 big issues
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o
(1) Detrimental reliance (individual rights)
o
(2) Change in prior practice (risk of ex post manipulation)
o
(3) Federal interest
Can Palm Beach County Board (hanging chad/under-vote issue) have rules
interpretation that under Florida law is to honor intent of vote and therefore
change examination standard?
o
Keep in mind that other counties had other problems
E.g., FL mandates throwing out ballots that have more than one
candidate for office and there were people who voted for Gore and
then wrote-in Gore too (over-vote)
Context
: Divide between those who knew election law and those who knew
constitutional law
o
E.g., SI had never read an election code (too many, too complex) while
states have election code lawyers who know all minutia
Players’
Analysis
: Problem is that administrative election procedures are put into
hands of partisan political officials
o
Administrative Actors
In, FL case, Katherine Harris was Secretary of State and chair of
Bush campaign
Also, have the state AG, Butterfield, chair of Gore campaign
o
Court Actors
FL Supreme Court (recall concerns of Clark in
Colgrove
)
o
Legislative Actors
FL state legislature
Raises question: “If ‘independent state legislature’ doctrine
is correct, what would happen if state legislature
disregarded election results?”
o
Thought about doing this (would have been first
time since 1960)
o
Bush camp
Wanted to get out of state court and so had to find basis for federal
intervention:
(1) Voting is fundamental right (
Harper
/
Baker v. Carr
)
(2) Right can be threatened by dilution (
Reynolds
)
Additional
Problems
:
o
Policing Voting Fraud
At national level, typically, not concerned with retail fraud
Typically, payoff of voter fraud is very low (hard to do and
generally won’t make much of a difference)
probably
advertising is better value
But in presidential election, cliff effect because every state except
for ME and NE give all their electoral votes to winner and, for
example, Ohio’s election was determined by a margin of about
140,000, which looks a lot easier to manipulate
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This issue is compounded by our use of state law to resolve
election problems
Prior cases were not about how election should turn out; it was just
about process rules regarding access
in FL case, every move
was outcome determinative
o
Voting Technology
Punch cards were used primarily in large, urban areas with high tax
base and so were adopted early in these areas
o
Butterfly Ballot
Palm Beach County had this problem but there didn’t appear to be
a solution to it
Gore Campaign’s Tactical Blunder
: Put everything on certification; however,
under FL, certification is mechanical act by Secretary of State but there is still
contest phase
Explaining
the
Florida
Supreme
Court’s
Actions
: Can interpret FL Supreme Court
as responding to administrative breakdown
o
Limited rules/precedent/anticipation of necessity of statewide recount
o
Statutory language was flexible
E.g., there was tension between “shall” versus “may” in FL
election laws
And tricky because very limited time allowed by FL statute but
recounts are mandated
o
Recognition of problems with machinery
o
Court has to do something and so, based on FL constitution, finds
overriding right to have vote counted
o
Highlighted problems with
Roe
’s command to apply rules as they apply ex
ante
ex ante, the rules may not exist/make sense (typically, this is where courts apply
their equitable powers)
Problems
with
Florida
Court’s
Actions
:
o
SI: Kind of strange interpretation, but not outside bounds of what courts
do all the time, but has two problems:
(1) Ex post decisions that are likely to be outcome determinative
and are being urged by partisan actors
About as much prima facie evidence as in
Roe
that there is
departure with FL court’s moving the reporting date
Not clear if need both departure and detrimental reliance
(2) Even if we accept that this is within margins of what courts do
and that courts may apply their equitable powers in this way, there
is a question about whether FL court relied on right set of
principles?
First opinion relies on general principles drawn from FL
constitution
o
Finding that primary interest is ascertaining will of
the voter raises problems because
Roe
is all about
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channeling ex ante solutions while this principle is
all about opening up ex post solutions
Also, there is “independent state legislature” doctrine issue
o
Previously, nobody had heard of
McPherson v.
Blacker
(MI scheme allocating votes by
congressional district with East/West divide for two
Senate votes)
o
Court upheld power of state legislature to select
however they wish
Constitutional delegation
Related to this, recall that federal
government is not to commandeer state
official and make them perform federal
functions (e.g., Brady Bill gun law stuff),
but here there is no state obligation that is
being overridden or disregarded
o
Maybe, this means that FL Supreme Court should
not have relied on FL state constitution
But Court could have drawn on federal precedent (right to vote from
Harper
;
effective right to vote from
Reynolds
all cases are about giving life to will of
people)
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board of Harris, 772 So.2d 1220 (Fla. S. Ct. Nov. 21,
2000) (pp. 249-262)
F
ACTS
: Florida vote was really close and triggered automatic machine recount; FL
Democratic Party filed protest on Gore’s behalf in four counties; Canvassing
Boards determined that standard for full recount (error in vote tabulation) was
satisfied and asked Secretary of State for more time; Secretary of State
determined that she would waive deadline only if problem consisted of fraud,
substantial noncompliance with statutory election procedures or an act of God
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Per Curiam): Secretary of State abused her
discretion; statutory reading suggests that counties can return late
penalties for
late returns suggest that such a thing was contemplated and overriding state
concern regarding suffrage; gave counties until November 26 to complete recount
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) Statutory Interpretation of Florida Supreme Court
: A lot of debate;
Epstein and McConnell suggests that FL court disregarded plain language
and essentially legislated while Kramer disagrees finding that FL court
just used clear statement principle (not clear that contested returns were
not be allowed and clear that voting was privileged)
o
(3) Surrogate
Remedy
; Original issue was about butterfly ballot used in
Palm Beach County but no good remedy for that so Pildes argues that
recount litigation should be seen as search for “surrogate remedy”
The
Federal
Interest
Potentially
Asserted
(pp. 262-281)
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Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board (Bush I), 530 U.S. 70 (Dec. 4, 2000) (pp.
262-266)
F
ACTS
: Bush appealed Florida Supreme Court ruling
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Per Curiam): As general rule, Court defers to state
court’s interpretation of state statute, but federal authority and interpretation is
implicated given Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, with election of national elections; given lack
of clarity, remand to Florida Supreme Court to figure out extent to which FL saw
FL constitution as circumscribing legislature’s authority under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2
and the amount of consideration given to 3 U.S.C. § 5
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(2)
Bush I
and the Source of State Law
: Supreme Court looks to source of
state law, whether derived from constitution or equity; perhaps, Art. II, § 1
and supremacy clause act to free state legislature from any state
restrictions
o
(3) “Independent State Legislature” Doctrine
: Although Court did not
formally decide substantive issue in
Bush I
, everybody acted as if they
decided that state legislatures were free from state constraints in enacting
presidential-elector statutes
Class Comments on
Bush I
Decision says that presidential election carries with it specific federal interests:
o
State courts may not interpret statutes related to presidential electors as
they might other state statutes (hence the remand)
o
Federal interest in predictable application of pre-existing election
mechanism (
Roe
concern)
On remand, FL State Supreme Court issued roughly same opinion but just drew
on more formal statutory analytical grounds and minimized reliance on FL state
constitution without discussing Supreme Court’s decision
Art. II and the “Independent State Legislature Doctrine” – McPherson V. Blacker, 146
U.S. 1 (1982) (pp. 267-276)
F
ACTS
: Challenge to statute passed by MI state legislature regarding allocation of
electoral votes
awarded on congressional district basis and then awarding each
of 2 additional votes (due to Senate seats) to winner of Eastern ad Western halves
of state; challenged as violating Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, and Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, and Electoral Count act
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Chief Justice Fuller): States pretty much get to do
what they want but are limited by later constitutional provisions
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) Meaning
of
McPherson
: Reaffirmed that Court could review claim that
state legislature’s prerogatives in setting mechanism for selection of
electors had been overridden
o
(6)
Bush
I
on
Remand
: FL Supreme Court reached same result as before,
but used more formal statutory analysis
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Of “Safe Harbors” and the Electoral Count Act
(1) The Role of 3 U.S.C. § 5
: If this portion of Electoral Count Act of 1887 is
meant to induce states to follow procedures and provides guide to congressional
evaluation
not clear that it should play role in judicial oversight in elections or
be basis for federal court overturning actions of state courts or legislatures
(3) Constitutionality
of
the
Electoral
Count
Act
: Electoral Count Act might
violate Art. II prohibition on states’ presidential-electoral choices
The Final Florida Court Decision and the United States Supreme Court State
In
Gore v. Harris
, FL Supreme Court fashioned remedy whereby undercount
votes would be accepted
Bush challenged, requesting stay of recount
Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 512 (Dec. 9, 2000) (pp. 279-281)
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Per Curiam): Grant application for stay and
application for staty is treated as petition for writ of certiorari and petition is
granted
C
ONCURRENCE
(Justice Scalia): Counting of votes that are of questionable
legality threaten irreparable harm to petitioner and country and each recount
degrades ballots and renders subsequent recount inaccurate
D
ISSENT
(Stevens with Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer): Majority fucked up because:
(1) should respect opinions of highest courts of States on state law issues; (2)
resolution best committed to other branches should be left to them; and (3) when
federal constitutional questions were not fairly presented to court whose judgment
is being reviewed, should not bring them up
o
Furthermore, no irreparable harm in counting votes
The
Federal
Interest
Decisively
Asserted
(pp. 281-315)
Bush v. Gore
, 531 U.S. 98 (Dec. 12, 2000) (pp. 281-315)
F
ACTS
: Questions presented were: whether FL Supreme Court established new
standards for resolving Presidential election contests, thereby violating Art. II, §
1, cl. 2; failed to comply 3 U.S.C. § 5; and whether standardless manual recount
violated EPC and DPC
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Per Curiam): EPC violation due to lack of standards
for recount
C
ONCURRENCE
(Chief Justice Rehnquist with Scalia and Thomas): Presidential
election is different; 3 U.S.C. § 5 informs application of Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, and
assures finality of State’s determination if made pursuant to state law in effect
before election; FL court’s interpretation of “legal vote” was unreasonable; clear
legislative intent to bring FL into “safe harbor” provided by 3 U.S.C. § 5; remedy
is inconsistent with these concerns
D
ISSENT
(Justice Stevens with Ginsburg and Breyer): No substantial federal
question: 3 U.S.C. § 5 did not impose any affirmative duties upon States that their
governmental branches could violate; Court had never reviewed State’s
determination whether vote had been legally cast; if manual recount raises EPC
concerns so does all nonstandard election decisions that impact accuracy;
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misapplication of 3 U.S.C. § 5, disenfranchises large group; FL state court did not
make substantive change to FL electoral law; implication that state judiciary is
biased is unwarranted
D
ISSENT
(Justice Souter with Breyer joining and Stevens and Ginsburg joining all
but Part C): Should not have reviewed; Part C says EPC claim is only
recognizable challenge but that no reason to assume that FL could not comply
with uniform standard recount
D
ISSENT
(Justice Ginsburg with Stevens and Souter and Breyer joining Part I): In
Part I, shouldn’t review FL’s interpretation of state law and Art. II does not
require the scrutiny undertaken by Court; in Part II, no EPC claim and, if there
were, FL should have been allowed to proceed to try and meet December 12
deadline (under 3 U.S.C. § 5), which is not even real deadline
D
ISSENT
(Justice Breyer with Stevens and Ginsburg joining except for Part I-A-1
and Souter joining Part I): Wrong to take case; in Part 1-A-1, no evidence
regarding EPC’s failure to include overvotes in manual recount nor fact that all
ballots were recounted in some but not all counties, and lack of standard could
have been resolved; in Part 2, no justification for majority’s remedy nor are there
real good federal questions
although presidential selection is of fundamental
national importance, it is political, not legal question
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) Constitutional Right to Vote and EPC
: Following from
Harper
/
Reynolds
, once state legislators choose popular election for
selection, have to comply with EPC
o
(2) Application
of
Right
to vote
and EPC
in
Bush
v.
Gore
:
A: Basic principles of fairness carried the day
applied it
to operation of voting
B: Critics contend that Court looked at manual recounts in
isolation form other bad factors
C: Potentially different concerns with technological issues and
human bias
D: Tons of disparities between FL counties with optical scan and
punch-card machines
E: Posner found correlation between blacks and overvoting
F: Case might compel greater uniformity
G: Prior to case, some voting technologies had been successfully
challenged under VRA at district level
see, e.g.,
Roberts v.
Wamser
(E.D. Mo. 1987) reversed by 8th Cir., where District
Court found punch-cards had disproportionate impact on
minorities but got reversed on standing (candidate challenged, not
voters)
o
(3) Substantive
Due
Process
and
the
Right
to
Vote
: “Intent of voter” is too
imprecise; case requires substantive specificity as what counts as actual
vote
o
(4) Federal
Interest
in
State
Judicial
Interpretation
of
State
Laws
Regulating Presidential Elector Selection
: X
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o
(5) Legislative
History
of
Electoral
Count
Act
: Explicitly did not want
Supreme Court deciding
o
(6) Florida
State
Legislature’s
Response
: Questions regarding what FL
state legislature could have done after statutorily authorized vote
Class Discussion on Bush v. Gore
Is it just a constitutional law case or is there something more?
o
Think about how, even five years out, it is very hard to normalize the case
and read it on its own terms
By way of background:
o
Problems had been side-stepped before
o
Electoral College has distortive effect
e.g., NY and TX generally
do not receive much attention
o
2000 election was based on social security and prescription drugs because
FL and PA were going to be deciding states with the two highest
percentages of elderly
o
Democratic Party wanted to keep issues in state court and Republican
Party wanted to force case into federal court as soon as possible while
preserving all federal questions in state court litigation but not presenting
them
By the time we get to Supreme Court, FL Supreme Court decision has been issued
with some questionable aspects to it (changes at county level; changes to state-
mandated timing; wrote as if no Art. II, § 1; wrote as if Electoral Count Act didn’t
exist; non-uniform standards for county recount
e.g., Miami-Dade County
allowed challenger, Gore, to pick precincts to recount)
One outgrowth of
Roe
is that federal interest in proper procedures accrues later in
the game
o
Analogous to
NY Times v. Sullivan
where have to wait until state court
resolution has been exhausted
o
Similarly,
Kelo
requires that there be state action, but state conduct is not
final until it has been reviewed through all levels of state courts
For federal courts, 11th Circuit found that change from pre-existing practice was
crux of issue
o
But very hard because
Roe
took awhile to resolve as did
Roudebush
One lawyer argued that Bush’s challenge in
Bush v. Palm Beach County
should
have been dismissed for lack of standing but politically unreal
meanwhile,
collateral challenges were going on; eventually, challenged both in federal and
state court
Bunch of questions regarding outcome:
o
Had there been statewide recount, likely that Bush still would have won
based only on undercount votes, which were what were being litigated
(but, had recount included overcounts, Gore likely would have won)
o
Also, FL legislature was preparing mechanism by which they would select
slate of electors regardless of outcome of litigation/popular vote
would
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have led to much litigation; wouldn’t have triggered safe harbor (non- conforming to state
practice); then would have gone to House (with Republican majority, but it could have been
tied because two outcomes were uncertain) to select president and Senate (Democratic, but
also had one race where it might have led to tie in Senate, which would have led to current
VP, Gore, casting tie-breaking vote) to select vice-president who would have power to
break tie in House
o
No enforcement mechanism for electors to have to vote as designated
Once there is final state decision, what does one do about putative finality?
o
Supreme Court orders stay
Extraordinary because of finding of irreparable harm just because
counting went forward
In terms of counting, we accept an error rate, but we do not
tolerate directional bias
Conceivably, part of this litigation, dealt with the
philosophical question of whether we are committed to
reducing error rate to zero or if we are just concerned with
directional bias
But, if notion is that counting will provide information that might
cloud the outcome of other stuff going on, what does one do with
state law that provides for such recounts?
Two splits in
Bush v.Gore
:
o
7-2 split on whether there is cognizable federal claim
What is limiting principle of EPC claim – go to
Harper
,
Baker
, and
Reynolds
to EPC right to equal effectiveness of vote – in this case?
That is, if fairness is absolute equality amongst voters, how
can there be any local autonomy/administrative discretion
(traditional practices/ex ante-ex post shouldn’t matter)?
Potential disruption is incredible
o
However, in this case, Court provided limiting
principle by saying that decision was just for the
day
Alternatively, Constitutionally protected right to not have rules
changed on you (some sort of liberty due process claim) might
have been better approach
Impartial decision-maker is less likely ex post and this
notion that arbitrary and capricious government action is
the animating feature of the DPC claim (i.e., we need to
have standards to constrain government action)
Also creates transparency
For Constitutional purposes, Electoral Count Act is significant
because it can allow you to impute subjective intent to legislature
For the concurrence, Electoral Count Act really embodies
fidelity to ex ante rules (Constitutional commitment to
fidelity
seems to animate both of the earlier claims) and
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that this will ground Article II, §1, cl.2 and will inform
judicial review of presidential election controversies
(structurally, more similar to
Roe
than per curiam EPC
claim)
On other hand, Breyer and Ginsburg argue that principles of
comity apply and therefore Supreme Court should defer/not review
FL’s own affairs (substantive limitations on appellate claims going
up through state court and reasons of deference why federal court
won’t intervene on certain state issues)
Not clear that this is consistent with
Roe
And odd to see Breyer and Ginsburg take this stance
o
On federal claim has been found, 5-4 on whether it should be remanded or
terminated
2 approaches emerge:
o
(1) Narrow equality point (i.e., whether or not every vote has the right to
be treated equally)
Not surprising because it was what parties advocated
And it is in line with
Baker v. Carr
and other EPC/voting cases
o
(2) Obligation towards process integrity
Court has trouble with this issue
but Rehnquist 3
and Breyer/Souter are definitely concerned with it
Also question of comity:
o
For Ginsburg and Stevens, federal interest does not arise
SI: Pre-Civil War Amendments, might have had good claim, but
then one backs into political question doctrine
o
But also comity questions regarding inter-institutional deference:
Breyer finds problems with post hoc alteration/ federal
constitutional interest in non-manipulation and seems to be
offended by FL Supreme Court’s actions
So he (and Souter) join Rehnquist 3 on per curiam
But distances himself from per curiam on two issues:
o
(1) Should there be one more remand (no longer big
deal)
o
(2) And disagreed with timing of
intervention/sentiment behind Scalia saying that
country could not tolerate not knowing/Posner
argument that sometimes Court has to spend
political capital and that Court was only institution
that could fill the breech
Recall Frankfurter debate regarding
prudential and jurisdictional concerns to
political question doctrine
Jurisdictional: Court can never act
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Prudential: Might be times where
Court should not act even though it
may (recall
Luther v. Borden
and see
Breyer’s Electoral Count Act’s
legislative history, which for him
suggests that Court is not right
institution to act
in the first
instance
)
o
Per curiam said that
fact that you could fashion
EPC argument and remedy
meant that Court was
competent institution
If Breyer had majority:
Perhaps, FL would have done recount in time
Or perhaps there would have been failure and thus Bush
would have been certified
Or perhaps something else would have happened in FL
courts
Or perhaps FL legislature was going to act independently
and retrospectively revoke FL citizens’ right to elect
president
o
Under this last scenario, at worst, get two slates that
owe no deference and then Congress gets to resolve
and this might actually be appropriate because it is a
political question where election results are just too
close to call (see Krause’s study on p. 1066)
Consistent with
Hartke
,
Roe
(exhaust other
available actors) and does not create
absolute jurisdictional bar (recall Senator
Sherman’s remarks on p. 315)
But 7 justices reject finding that where there
is EPC question, no jurisdictional bar (recall
Baker v. Carr
)
Does
Bush v. Gore
indicate that
Baker v. Carr
was wrong?
o
Court’s decision wasn’t necessarily final (Congress could have recognized
whomever it pleased)
Eight Views of the Cathedral – Perspectives on
Bush v. Gore
(1) Strauss’s
“Judicial
Act
of
‘Civil
Disobedience’”
: Strauss argues that Supreme
Court was convinced that FL Supreme Court would try and give election to Gore
and so determined that the Court must act, improperly if necessary, to stop that
(2) Pildes’s Democratic Institutions and Cultural Concerns
:
Bush v. Gore
reflects
distrust of democratic institutions to resolve democratic issues
Court may have
perceived need for “judicial salvation”
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(3) Issacharoff’s
Comparing
Rationale
for
Judicial
Intervention
in
Bush
v.
Gore
with
Baker v. Carr
: Rationale for judicial intervention wanes when applied to
electoral majorities particularly those that control alternative institutional actors
(4) Karlan’s Equal Protection
: Reliance on past precedent has formal appeal but
Bush v. Gore
did not have same functional justification (not a systematic
degradation of the franchise of any group)
(5) Fried’s Constitutional Standards for Recount
: Due to FL recount rules, not
clear that Breyer/Dworkin’s recount solution would have been feasible without
further Supreme Court intervention and potential deviation from state law
(6) Michelman’s Crisis Theory
: Court acted to resolve what they perceived as
crisis based on distrust of FL Supreme Court; distaste for disorderly nature of
democracy in action; lack of confidence in Congress’ ability to solve problem;
and country’s need for clean, decisive resolution
(7) Dershowitz’s
Partisan
Will
: Argues that rhetorical inconsistency regarding
principles used in case demonstrate partisan motive of justices
(8) Posner’s Intuition
: Argues that doctrinally judgment may be flawed but
sensible as nonpartisan political necessity
Remedial
Possibilities
for
Defective
Elections
(pp. 1038-1046, 1054-1068, Supp. 195-
205)
Ordering a New Election – Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1967)
F
ACTS
: GA election conducted under procedures involving racial
discrimination which was gross, state-imposed, and forcibly state-imposed
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Circuit Judge Brown): Both white and black voters
were affected; within power of federal courts to order new trial
petitioners did
not request ends-oriented recount, just needed
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) Kenneth
Starr
on
Federal
Invalidation
Power
: Federal intervention in
state elections was relatively new phenomenon as of 1974
Injunctive relief prohibiting unconstitutional behavior left in place
officials elected under illegitimate scheme but new elections are
very costly, create delays that might leave incumbents in office
who lack legitimacy, and might not actually return voters to status
quo
3 theoretical bases for exercising power to invalidate:
(1) Invalidation as retribution for outrageousness
(2) For purpose of ensuring electoral purity
(3) When unconstitutional actions were outcome
determinative
o
(2) Invalidation is Rare
: Courts are very reluctant
see, e.g.,
Hamer v.
Ely
(5th Cir. 1969) (Court did not grant new election even in MS election
where election workers were all white employers or creditors of blacks
who may have needed assistance)
o
(3) Race
and
Invalidation
: Most of cases that involve setting aside
elections involve claims of racial discrimination
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But not all as in
Akizaki v. Fong
(Haw. 1969) where Hawaii
Supreme Court ordered new election, as was specified by HI state
law, in case where invalid absentee ballots were intermingled with
valid ones and it was impossible to determine winner
[PERSONAL NOTE: I have a question regarding new elections
should we assume that
it drastically changes behavior
should never actually return people to status quo
because have more information]
Class Discussion on
Bell v. Southwell
Old-fashioned racist stuff
separated male and female and black and
white voters
However, in this case, black voters were very small minority and so racist
practices were not outcome determinative
Why do we care?
o
Elections are not just about picking the winner
intensity of
results matters (e.g., campaign finance statutes)
Adjusting the Vote Totals
Often litigation follows some kind of administrative proceeding in which
disappointed voters or candidates seek recounts and adjustments of original totals
Wide range in terms of state practices regarding standards for deciding what
counts as legal ballot
Generally, not terribly complex legal issues
exceptions (e.g., Florida stuff)
revolve around not whether particular ballot should have been counted but
whether recounts should have been conducted at all and what standard ought to be
o
Typical example is
Delahunt v. Johnston
(Mass 1996) where
Democratic
primary challenge resulted in court reviewing all ballots (both
at trial level and on appeal)
To get equal treatment of ballots can have detailed substantive rules about what
counts or doesn’t count or procedural rules that ensure uniform treatment (e.g.,
placing all disputed ballots before single arbiter)
Most often, election contest involve attempts to get votes thrown out, not included
Class Discussion on
Delahunt
and Reviewing Messed Up Elections
Pamela Karlan argues that process uniformity is as good as substantive rules ex
ante protection
Adjusting the Vote Totals – In re the Matter of the Protest of Election Returns, 707 So.2d
1170 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998) (1058-1068)
F
ACTS
: Miami mayoral election; massive fraud with absentee votes
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Per Curiam): Invalidated all absentee votes
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) Aftermath
of
Protest
of
Election
Returns
: Legal absentee voters sued;
allowed suit to proceed but found that no constitutional violation by
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throwing out votes as it was known procedure that was necessary to police fraud with
absentee ballots
o
(2) Statistical
Evidence
and
Election
Challenges
: Finkelstein and Robbins
came up with model that provides probability that outcome would change
if illegal votes discarded, but model assumes no bias towards any given
candidate and most courts do not really understand
o
(3) Subtracting Invalid Ballots
: E.g., NJ provides that state elections
contests may have judges require challenged voters to prove residency or
what have you and, if not satisfied, have to disclose vote and that would be
discarded
When don’t know particulars, may subtract via proportional
method or via party affiliation method (if party of invalid votes is
known)
***NOTE: Subtracting votes to which candidate is not entitled is
easy; what about reassigning?
Class Discussion
In re the Matter of the Protest of Elections Returns
Recall
Griffin
(RI case) with detrimental reliance point that suggests FL Supreme
Court’s rights/privileges distinction regarding absentee votes is bullshit
See
In re the Purported Election of Bill Durkin
o
Statistical apportionment
Also see
Bradley v. Perrodin
, where CA listed candidates in wrong order and so
one candidate, Irvin, got “primacy” bump and so trial judge moved these bumps
to candidate Andrews who would have gotten the primacy bump (Irvin ended up
getting jailed for fraud on unrelated grounds)
o
But ballot order was known ahead of time
shouldn’t be able to come
in after
SI Tying it All Together
What can you do ahead of time?
Bush v. Gore
seemed to liberalize fear that courts had regarding ex post review
Highlighted importance of ex ante review and structuring as much as possible
o
Don’t want local judges moving votes around
o
Have to worry about partisan election officials
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E.
T
HE
R
OLE
OF
P
OLITICAL
P
ARTIES
Introduction to the Role of Political Parties
Intermediary Organizations Role in Politics
As early as De Tocqueville, observers have recognized importance of voluntary
intermediating institutions in pluralist democracy
Most individuals engage in self-governance only through representatives, from
churches to NRA
Political parties are tricky because both creators and creations of political system
General Questions for Analysis
To what extent can the government use parties or other mechanisms to channel
individuals’ expression of their political preferences?
To what extent do individuals have rights as against political parties?
To what extent do political parties have rights as against individuals or the state?
When do individuals have right to participate in party’s processes and when does
a party have the right to exclude an individual?
To what extent may the state electoral system delegate to parties?
Historical Note on Political Parties
Constitution was designed to preclude rise of political parties
Throughout much of nineteenth century, conception of party that we now take for
granted was considered antithetical to Constitution
Class Discussion on Political Parties Generally
All modern constitutions recognize political parties
Madison was worried about factionalism (“tyranny of the majority”) and so
fractured power
but did not discuss intermediary institutions (e.g., churches,
political parties, etc.)
Two theories regarding Constitutional state action regulating political parties
o
“Common carrier” theory
(recall
White Primary Cases
): Political parties
are essentially state-created franchisee (essentially have state-created
duopoly and so need regulation)
If you go this route, very tricky (e.g., could not have Christian-
Democratic party)
o
Alternatively, political parties are
rights bearing entities with expressive
purpose
But then how does State regulate it at all
Also have to figure out who is the rights bearer? What happens
when V.O. Key’s 3 forms of political parties come into conflict?
o
(1) Party as electors – party members show up and
vote
o
(2) Party apparatus – people who control how party
functions
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o
(3) Party in government – party now acting as
elected body
Conceptual Framework for Considering Political Parties
Two axes in thinking about political parties:
o
(1) Common carrier/rights-bearing entity
o
(2) Key’s 3 conceptions of the party:
Apparatus
In government
Electorate
Historical Theoretical Background on 2-Party System
Hotelling’s “Spatial Markets Theory”
o
Hypothesize that there is town with population equally distributed
o
On one hand, should find stable equilibriums that maximize economic
welfare of consumers with gas stations at 25 and 75 mark
o
But, assuming zero transaction costs, turns out, will find both gas stations
end up in middle because each will try and maximize profits by sneaking over towards the
50 mark to capture more of the market
Anthony Downs applied this theory to political theory
Duverger posited that this was all applicable even if there was a bell-shaped
distribution and that in any election in which there is a single victor (first-past-
the-post) that you will have two and only two political parties because third-
parties will just hive-off a portion of the electorate and, in the short-term, this will
result in opposition party victory (see, e.g., Bush over Gore; Clinton over Bush)
Latest work is to view all of these theories as a 1-stage equilibrium and American
elections as two-stage equilibrium where there are multiple elections (almost
everywhere has mandatory primary), which may help explain splintering of
contemporary American politics (should end up with candidates at the 25 and 75
mark – that is, the midpoint of the left and right halves – but that would result in
crazy losses and so still end up with candidates that cheat towards center)
o
Process of gerrymandering in legislative elections means that most
jurisdictions are not competitive and so have reduced to one-stage
equilibrium
Anyway, ends up with lots of intra-party tension
Difficulties in Regulation of Political Parties
Can either treat parties as beneficiaries of certain state decisions on how to
regulate the political process and so treat them like we treat any other
common-
carrier
(see Stevens’ dissent in
California Democratic Party
) entity where there
are not competitive markets to check behavior OR can treat parties as private
civic associations critical to healthy democracy (see Scalia’s opinion in
California Democratic Party
)
Under each of these views there are troubling subordinate questions
o
Under Common-Carrier view:
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Going to end up focusing on government action and may end up
questioning whether state should be supporting entrenchment of
two-party system (see
Timmons
)
o
Under Rights-Bearing Entity view:
Going to end up wondering who is the party?
See Scalia’s dissent in
Tashjian
(case where CT
Republicans running for office wanted to free themselves
from Republican Party zealots) that discusses a strong right
of association
but who is the rights-bearer?
o
Scalia claims that right of association is the right to
become a member of the party and that party
members are the rights-bearers
If one assumes that organization has
organizing ideology than group should not
be conditioned upon conforming to
majoritarian preference (Constitution may
override these rights – e.g., Title VI for
housing – but in this case it follows same
analytic path as did
Boy Scouts of
America
v. Dale
)
Generally, have to consider:
o
Who is the party?
o
What is the party?
o
What is the state interest in regulation?
The Ballot: Political Parties as Gatekeepers
Introduction to
the
Ballot:
Political
Parties
as
Gatekeepers
(pp. 348-352)
Movement Towards Secret Ballot
Early voting was conducted viva voce (voice vote or show of hands)
In
Burson v. Freeman
(US 1992), Supreme Court offered traditional account
of
movement toward secret ballot (avoid intimidation/bribery) but this account
ignores effect secret ballot had on illiterate voters and ballots may limit choice to
pre-set field of candidates
Restrictions on
Whom
Voters
Can
Vote
For
(pp. 352-362)
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992)
F
ACTS
: HI prohibits write-in voting
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Justice White): Balancing test with character and
magnitude of asserted injury to rights protected by First and Fourteenth
Amendment versus precise interests put forward by State as justifications for
burden imposed by its rule; HI makes it relatively easy to get on ballot through
creation of new party; as candidate of established party; or via nonpartisan ballot
o
Limited expressive function of voting/more about winnowing field to
select candidate and so little burden
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o
HI has interest in avoiding party-raiding at primary level and wants
acceptance of results by prohibiting factionalism/sore loser candidacies at
general election and wants to allow unopposed victors of primaries to be
designated officeholders and wants voters to be informed so doesn’t allow
late entrants
D
ISSENT
(Justice Kennedy with Blackmun and Stevens joining): Prohibition results
in large number of voters not having effective vote as seen by large numbers of
blank votes, even where there is only one candidate running and locks voters into
candidates who may not address emergent issues/concerns
besides, state
concerns are either very weak or might actually cut for allowing write-ins
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) Other States’ Write-in Policies
: Only HI, NV, OK, and SD prohibit
write-in votes for any office; other states have more limited prohibitions
and many states condition tabulation of candidate’s vote upon filing
declaration of candidacy prior to election
o
(2) Lock-in
Effect
: Given Democratic control of state/entrenchment
issues, Court maybe should have been more skeptical regarding
prohibition on write-in
o
(3) Putting HI Ban in Context
: Court just looked at write-in prohibition,
but did not operate in isolation; state laws made it exceptionally difficult
for new parties/independent candidates to get on ballot
w/ independent
candidates, voters had to pay steep price as could only have one ballot
(with one party’s candidates) and this was particularly problematic in state
where winning Democratic primary generally meant winning election
o
(4) Voting
and
Free
Speech
: Given rejection of strict scrutiny, Court
seems to reject that voting is form of free speech
Hard to differentiate based on anonymity (see
McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Commission
)
o
(5) Supreme Court’s Narrow Interpretation of Right to Vote
: Contrast
Supreme Court’s interpretation with Fourth Circuit Court’s decision that
satirical write-in votes should be thought as integral part (
Dixon v.
Maryland Board of Elections
); plus free speech isn’t just instrumental/also
constitutive (i.e., dignitary aspect)
o
(6) Other Balloting Constraints
: Some jurisdictions prohibit “single-shot”
or “bullet” voting where voters cast fewer than all of their votes for multi-
member office
may enhance minority voting strength
Implicates questions about freedom of speech/right to not vote
(see, e.g.,
Kansas City v. Whipple
, Mo. 1896, striking down tax
on
those who did not vote)
Class Discussion on
Burdick
First thing, Justice White has to figure out if there is strict scrutiny because it
impacts a fundamental right
just says that it is not
[Apparently, everybody wants to vote for Donald Duck
might be funny
thing to explore]
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Still, even under rational relation choice, might not be sufficient state interest
o
Asserted state interests are: avoiding voter confusion; stopping party-
raiding
In Court’s treatment, which we saw most strongly in Scalia’s concurrence
regarding stay in
Bush v. Gore
, there is hidden concern that chaos will ensue
when political process breaks down
Restriction on
Who
Appears
on
the
Ballot
(pp. 362-373)
Introduction to Restrictions on Who Appears on the Ballot
Generally, only Democratic and Republican candidates are guaranteed spots on
ballots due to automatic ballot access rules; so major winnowing occurs in
primary elections
Generally, filing fees and petition requirements limit ability to get spot
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972)
F
ACTS
: TX requires filing fee to get name on primary ballot
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Chief Justice Burger): “[R]ights of voters and the
rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation;” high fees give it
patently exclusionary character and has dramatic effect so goes to close scrutiny
fees are too over-inclusive for limiting field purposes and purse issues are
insufficient
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1)
Lubin
v.
Panish
(US
1974)
: Supreme Court invalidated CA’s filing fee
regime, even though it was nowhere near as prohibitive, as EPC violation
for both voters and candidates
o
(2) Fee
and
Seriousness
: One might be able to argue that if one can’t raise
fees, probably not real candidate
o
(3) Fatal
Flaw
of
Filing
Regimes
: Fatal flaw might have been lack of
alternative
Compare with NY statute that just had incredibly difficult scheme
involving collection of certain percentages of signatures of
registered voters by districts (challenged a lot, including in
Republican primary cases like
Rockefeller v. Powers
, which also
highlighted cost of getting necessary signatures)
o
(4) New York Ballot Access
: Following
Rockefeller
, in
Molinari v.
Powers
(E.D.N.Y. 2000), court invalidated restrictive ballot requirements
as irrational and undue burden on First Amendment rights
o
(8) Lower
Courts
Tend
to
Uphold
State
Ballot
Access
Restrictions
: Tons
of cases upholding state schemes that required various signature
minimums and other obstacles
Class Discussion
Bullock v. Carter
TX had crazy expensive filing fees
But filing fees are not outrageous on their face so what do we do?
o
Can think about “impermissible purpose” (is it discriminatory?)
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o
Can argue that it burdens right that is too dear
Can use
Harper
to say strict scrutiny
can’t condition
participation on money (see
Lubin
where Supreme Court knocks
down CA’s less outrageous filing fees)
Who Can Participate in a Party’s Activities?
Introduction
to
Who
Can
Participate
in
a
Party’s
Activities
(pp. 373-374)
Importance of Participation in Primary
2 main parties have dominated American politics for awhile
Thus primary elections and major party nomination processes are “an integral
party of the procedure for popular choice,”
United States v. Classic
(US 1941)
Both
the
Party
and
the
State
Seek
to
Exclude
Citizen
X
from
Participating
(pp. 374-386)
Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837 (D. Conn.), summarily aff’d, 429 U.S. 989 (1976)
(pp. 374-379)
F
ACTS
: CT required that people register with party to participate in
primary; challenged by people who did not want to register
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Justice White): Parties have rights of association too;
closed primary provides certain integrity of electoral process, and helpful in
housekeeping (i.e., developing party line and ensuring that it is reflective) while
individuals are not really suffering harm (no harassment so no real privacy
concern) and no affirmative duties that come with aligning with one party or
another
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) What Can a Party Require?
: It is open question as to whether party
could limit voting in its primary to persons who agreed to vote for slate
coming out of primary
see such “loyalty oaths” in firehouse primary
context
o
(2) Are
the
Dominant
Political
Parties
Truly
Ideological
Organizations?
:
Justice Powell noted n his dissent in
Democratic Party v. LaFollette
that
parties’ policies have exhibited lots of fluidity
o
(3) Examining
State
Interest
Regarding
Integrity
of
Parties
: Why is this a
public interest? Shouldn’t courts be concerned with this kind of
determination given dominance of government by these two parties?
o
(4) Should
Parties
Have
Greater
Right
to
Exclude
Candidates
: In
Ray
v. Blair
(US 1952), Supreme Court upheld exclusion of Blair’s name
as candidate for Democratic Presidential Elector because he refused to
sign pledge to aid and support Democratic Party’s candidates
given
that nobody knows electors, might be reframed as threat to deny voters
who cast ballots for the Democratic ticket their right to vote
Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996) (pp. 379-381)
F
ACTS
: David Duke received a lot support in presidential primaries in GA, but
then Republican Committee bumped him off of list
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D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Circuit Judge Hatchett): Duke does not have right to
associate with unwilling partner, but still use strict scrutiny examining state
interest in protecting political parties’ right to define their membership
Class Discussion on
Duke v. Massey
How bothered are we by party excluding?
o
On one hand, has to be able to define itself
o
On other hand, particularly given 2-party system, don’t want to effectively
exclude a bunch of people
When barriers are low, concern is less
Hard to reconcile ultimate accountability to election cycle and important right of
participation/think about this case + Republican Log Cabin + White Primaries
Cases
If you are going to have to make a decision as to whether Duke is legitimate
Republican, do you want Democratic secretary of state deciding or Republican
Party leadership?
On other hand, do you want to let Republican Party leadership change ex ante
rules?
Republican Party of Texas v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1997) (pp. 382-386)
F
ACTS
: Log Cabin Republicans denied booth at TX Republican Party convention
D
ECISION
/H
OLDING
/R
ATIONALE
(Justice Abbott): Not every act of political party is
state action and so sidesteps issue by determining that it is just about ordering of
internal affairs
C
ONCURRING IN
J
UDGMENT
(Justice Spector): Not clear that there was no state
action and important to have honest judicial debate on whether political speech
of Log Cabin Republicans sought to exercise was protected under First
Amendment
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) Rationales
for
Excluding
Duke
: Must GA Republican Party exclude
Duke for ideological reasons or can it do so for instrumental reasons
o
(2) Excluding
Homosexuals
: Could Republican Party exclude
homosexuals from holding party office? Note that Democratic Party has Equal Division
Rule that requires party delegations to contain equal numbers of men and women
o
(3) Right of Log Cabin Republicans to Change Internal Platform
:
Everybody acknowledge that Log Cabin Republicans were part of Party,
shouldn’t they have opportunity to work towards changing Party’s internal
platform?
o
(4) 3 Views of the Party
: Lowenstein says that there is (1) party in
electorate; (2) party organization and (3) party running for public office
o
(5) Reconciling
Duke
with
Nixon
v. Condon
: Perhaps there is difference
between excluding based on immutable characteristic (race) and beliefs
following
Terry
v. Adams
, party opened itself up to all voters who took oath to support segregation
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o
(6) Party Associational Rights and Viewpoint Discrimination
: In
LaRouche, Jr. v. Fowler
(D.C. Cir. 1998), in case involving
LaRouche
winning a few Democratic delegates and then being knocked
off bill, Court held that viewpoint discrimination is the sine qua non of a
political party and therefore even if state actors, political parties need
only show that internal party rule rationally advanced some legitimate
interest of party to withstand constitutional scrutiny
The
Party
Seeks
to
Exclude
Citizen
X
from
Participating
But
the
State
Demands
that
the
Party Permit Him to Participate
(pp. 386-404)
Democratic Party of the United States v. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981) (pp. 386-391)
F
ACTS
: National Democratic Party selection rules for national convention
restricts voting in primaries and caucuses to Democratic voters; Wisconsin has
open primary election law
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice Stewart): WI may not bind National Party to
honor binding primary results even though those results were reached in manner
contrary to National Party rules
o
Compelling First Amendment interest trumps asserted state interests in
preserving overall integrity of electoral process, preventing secrecy of
ballot, increasing voter participation in primaries, and preventing
harassment of voters because these state interests are about conduct of
primary not about how delegates must vote
D
ISSENT
(Justice Powell with Blackmun and Rehnquist joining): Notes that
Democratic state party was at odds with national party; WI has interest in
ensuring that nomination process is controlled by individuals
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) Disputes Between National Party and State Rule
: One way to
understand case is to read it as saying that single states should not be able
to unilaterally regulate nationwide activities
o
(2) Disputes Between National and State Party
: Given that WI was
controlled by state Democratic Party, might Court not have a role in
adjudicating what is essentially an internal party dispute?
o
(3) Alternate
Fora
: Court may wish to consider whether there is alternate
forums available for resolution of conflicts
e.g., in 1988, national party revisited rules to
permit WI to use open primary
California Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (pp. 391-404)
F
ACTS
: CA developed blanket primary by which any person could vote for any
primary candidate regardless of political affiliation and that candidate of each
party receiving most number of votes was nominee of party
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice Scalia): Blanket primary violates First
Amendment principles
evidence that danger of party raiding and other cross-
over voting problems (not just that wrong nominee might be selected but
nominees will have to change their appeals)
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o
State interest in producing candidate most likely to represent electorate
and expanding debate beyond partisan concerns is antithetical to freedom
of association
o
State interest in ensuring disenfranchised persons enjoy right to effective
vote is not accurate representation because frustrated desire to vote in
primary of party that one is not affiliated with is not disenfranchisement
(rather it is within right of party)
o
State interests in promoting fairness, affording voters greater choice,
increasing voter participating, and protecting privacy are not enough in
this case because they are not well-tailored or fully applicable
o
Offers alternate solution: nonpartisan blanket primary where there is some
criteria to get onto ballot, no party affiliations are listed, and then top X
vote-getters move on to general election
D
ISSENT
(Justice Stevens with Ginsburg): Should respect state sovereignty to
determine how its officials are to be elected; right to not participate is not
applicable in public affairs (ala state-sponsored primary) and even if it were the
balancing was flawed
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(4) Patronage
Cases
: Scalia dissented from Court’s decision invalidating
patronage employment and contracting practices as violations of First
Amendment rights, as in
Rutan v. Republican Party
(US 1990),
arguing
that the holding was politically naïve and destabilizing
o
(6) Various
Approaches
to
Legal
Treatment of
Political
Party
:
Managerial – highest goal is preservation of political order
Libertarian – maximal rights of association (just another private
organization)
Progressive – hostile to parties, viewing them as obstructions to
popular will
Political markets – places faith with electorate as consumers with
free market (but what about monopolies?)
Pluralist – parties should be broader and decentralized coalitions of
interest groups
o
(7) Political
Parties
as
Intermediary
Institutions
: Can be located in civil
society and viewed as contributing to broader civic values
The
Party
Wishes
to
Permit
Citizen
X
to
Participate
But
the
State
Demands
His
Exclusion
(pp. 404-410)
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986) (pp. 404-410)
F
ACTS
: In 1984, CT Republican Party sought to have primary where
independent voters could participate; unable to get bill passed, first, it was
defeated in party- line vote and then it was vetoed by Democratic governor
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice Marshall): Restrictions violate First
Amendment
o
Following did not rise to level of compelling state interest:
Administribility of primary system
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Prevention of party-raiding
Avoiding voter confusion
Protecting responsibility of party government
o
Not narrowly tailored
D
ISSENT
(Justice Scalia with Rehnquist and O’Connor): Party can put forth who it
wishes, but it does not violate First Amendment to have restriction of party using
state-funded party primary as opinion poll
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(4) Who
is
in
Conflict?
: Professor Lowenstein suggests that conflict in
cases like
Tashjian
might look like party-organization versus party-in-
government and therefore less judicial deference is required
Both should be subject to political give-and-take
o
(5) Party Raiding and Registration Deadlines
: In
Rosario v. Rockefeller
(US 1973), Court upheld NY law requiring voters to enroll in party of
choice at least 30 days before general election in November in order to
vote in the next subsequent closed party primary
When Can the Government Regulate a Party’s Internal Affairs (pp. 411-417)
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214 (1989)
(pp. 411-417)
F
ACTS
: CA state laws prohibit official governing bodies of political parties from
issuing endorsements of primary candidates; composition of official governing
bodies is regulated with criminal penalties
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice
Marshall):
o
Ban on endorsements violates First Amendment rights of free speech and
association and does not survive strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly
tailored to maintain a stable government and protect voters from confusion
and undue influence
o
Requirements regarding composition of official governing bodies burdens
associational rights
No real civil rights served by this regulation
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) Party Approval?
: CA argued that strict scrutiny was not required
because two major parties agreed and could have changed through general
legislative process, but Marshall rejects this argument, in part, noting that
parties can be conceived of in different ways
Lowenstein argues that, essentially, only if plaintiffs were
considered speakers for the party was
Eu
similar to
Tashjian
o
(6) Nominating Process and Finances
: In
Morse v. Republican Party
of
Virginia
(US 1996), Supreme Court looked at Δ’s decision to
hold nominating convention and charge people $45 to attend; Court did
not unite behind single opinion, but Stevens and Breyer relied on
White
Primary Cases
to find parties state-actors and then rejected
party’s First
Amendment claim
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Class Discussion on
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee
Party can’t endorse candidates in primary
Court invalidates statute
Does this overturn
Terry v. Adams
?
o
On speech issue
I would argue that it does not
Terry v. Adams
was about race,
an immutable characteristic, while
Eu
is about views
Also, there was good competition in
Eu
but not in
Terry v. Adams
(no other safety valve)
When you have duopoly, have to be concerned about
concerted action but otherwise it is probably cool (think
about Hoteling and how level of competition connects to
level of regulation)
o
On rotating party chair/even North-South distribution
Third parties might have interest in pandering on regional or fringe
issues
This might marginalize potential third parties by creating barrier to
entry (requires greater regional reach/resources)
Does the Existing Legal Regime Improperly Entrench the Existing Two-Party System?
Introduction
to
Does
the
Existing
Legal
Regime
Improperly
Entrench
the
Existing
Two-
Party System?
(pp. 417-418)
Challenges to Ballot Access by Independent and Third-Party Candidates
See, e.g.,
William v. Rhodes
(US 1968), Court invalidated OH’s laws that gave
place on presidential ballot to candidate or parties that received at least 10% of
votes cast in governor’s election and made other parties collect signatures equal to
15% of votes cast in last governor’s election and file by early-February (well
before major parties had chosen their candidates)
o
But less onerous requirements may be permissible; see, e.g,
Jenness
v.
Fortson
(US 1971) (upholding GA requirement that
independent candidates get signatures equal to 5% of total registered
voters in last election)
Storer
v.
Brown
(US
1974)
discussed
indeterminancy
of
test
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party
, 479 U.S. 189 (1986) (pp. 422-426)
F
ACTS
: Washington had statute that required showing of support to get on ballot;
to prevent voter confusion
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice White): Upholds taking narrow view that
general election ballot is about major struggles
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party
, 520 U.S. 351 (1997)
F
ACTS
: Cross-listing was prohibited
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Chief Justice Rehnquist): Associational rights are
not unduly burdened; stability is good state interest
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D
ISSENT
(Justice Stevens with Ginsburg and Souter joining Part I): Part I found
significant burden on rights to choose and advise voters or choice; in Part III
found two-party entrenchment is not necessarily cool
o
Souter would keep open question that two-party stability is sufficient
Class Discussion on
Timmons
3
rd
parties (except for privately bankrolled ones like Perot’s Reform Party) rarely
last alone
but develop alternate strategy, independent endorsement, that seems
to work, and so many states ban cross-endorsements
State argues that cross-endorsements might create voter confusion and violate
purity of the ballot
Rehnquist is candid about compelling state interest in maintaining political
stability of two-party system and then says narrowly tailored
Recall that strict scrutiny (requiring compelling state interest and
narrow tailoring) where there is a burdened fundamental right
(franchise, speech) and suspect class (largely race) while there is
rational relationship for administrative measures
o
Interestingly, no factual supporting evidence
o
Allows MN legislature to substitute evidence with policy judgment
regarding best way to ensure political stability
Stevens moves inquiry to one that is anticipated in
Washington v. Davis
(police
officer application test that has disproportionate impact) with impermissible
purpose standard that says compelling state interest and narrow tailoring might
not be enough (“fact that the law was both intended to disadvantage minor parties
and has had that effect is a matter that should weigh against, rather than in favor
of, its constitutionality”)
o
If it was just incidental, it might be fine, but introducing deliberate
artificial barriers is messed up
Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes
F
ACTS
: Fringe candidate wanted to get into debate but was denied by state-
owned broadcaster
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice Kennedy): Not a public forum; not viewpoint
discriminatory so alright
D
ISSENT
(Justice Stevens with Ginsburg and Souter joining): Should have neutral
ex ante rules (ad hoc decisions are bad and Forbes was slightly viable/credible
candidate)
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) Jesse “The Mind” Ventura
: Got included in debate and it helped build
support; also MN has generous public financing and same-day
registration
Class Discussion on
Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes
In
AETC v. Forbes
dissent, Stevens argues that need neutral ex ante rules
o
Of course, see some messed up ostensibly neutral ex ante rules as with
selection of presidential candidate debates
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But, in this case, might be fine because really only Democratic or
Republican candidate will win
This is where rules start to slip from ex ante to ex post effect (be
concerned when judicial determination has clear outcome-
determinative effect)
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F.
C
AMPAIGN
F
INANCE
(383-432,
440-474)
The First Amendment Background
3
Categories of
First
Amendment Scrutiny
(p. 390)
Time, Place, and Manner Regulation
Very broad power to regulate time, place, and manner of speech in public forum
Generally subject to rational relations review in EPC law
See, e.g.,
Ward v. Rock Against Racism
(US 1986) (upholding NY law that
regulated volume of music played in amphitheater in Central Park and requiring
use of equipment and technicians provided by city as regulation promoted
substantial government interest that would be achieved less efficiently absent the
regulation)
Content Regulation
When regulating content, First Amendment requires “compelling state interest”
and “narrow tailoring”
Not always clear what counts as content neutral
see, e.g., split opinion in
United States v. Eichman
(US 1990) (divided court invalidating Congressional act
that made illegal flag-burning with majority finding that government’s expressed
interest in preserving flag as national symbol was content-based)
Viewpoint Regulation
Approaches standard that is “strict in theory, fatal in fact”
“most egregious
form of content discrimination” as noted in
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
the University of Virginia
(US 1995)
General idea is that government cannot promote or suppress one side
o
See, e.g.,
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul
(US 1992) (invalidating city regulating
that outlawed hate speech)
The First Amendment and Campaign Finance Regulation
(391)
Professor Bradley Smith argues that campaign finance regulations are viewpoint
discrimination as they are designed to restrict wealthier (generally, more
conservative) voices
Professor Kathleen Sullivan argues that regulations are about promoting either
civic republicanism or populism (either way, viewpoint discrimination)
Professor Frank Askin suggests that it is important to forbid selling of votes and
that healthy democracy might need to regulate campaign finances
Sunstein argues that viewpoint and maybe content neutral as regulations attach
notwithstanding message
Also, Court has determined that heckler’s veto is invalid (
Kovacs v. Cooper
, US
1949) and that speakers have right to expression even if provokes hostile reactions
(
Terminiello v. Chicago
, US 1949)
Class Discussion on First Amendment Background
“Congress shall make no law”
Black and Douglass thought that was where
the inquiry started and ended
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o
But Congress must make certain laws that both promote and restrict
speech (e.g., ballot laws that limit access) and so never took hold
Instead have 3 categories of scrutiny:
o
(1) Time, place, and manner regulation
just requires rational basis
o
(2) Content regulation (message not medium)
have equivalent of strict
scrutiny
Case where it was upheld dealt with restriction on publishing
schedule of ships carrying troops, Holmes said that not allowed to
shout fire in theater
o
(3) Viewpoint regulation (one side is silenced)
pretty much fatal
Is First Amendment a blanket protection?
o
Two readings of
NY Times v. Sullivan
:
(1) Express liberty
right to express oneself unless knowing
falsehood
(2) First Amendment is primarily (at its core) concerned with
political speech/self-government
This might imply a hierarchy
o
Connick v. Myers
(employee disciplined for circulating workplace survey)
suggests move towards First Amendment hierarchy
Policy Considerations
3
Approaches
Central to
Policy
Debate
(410)
Regulation of Political Markets
State has role in preserving open market of political speech
o
Candidates must be able to reach audience
o
Don’t want contamination that may come by powerful market players
threatening vulnerable public officials
Equality
Recall that in
Reynolds v. Sims
, Court spoke of Constitutional guaranty to
“equally effective” voice
As Dworkin argues, don’t want to let certain actors drown out voices of others
Liberty
State regulation against speech is suspect
Buckley v. Valeo
Discussion
of
Buckley v.
Valeo
(pp. 387)
Background on 1974 Reforms to FECA
Amendments limited amount of contributions that could be given in federal
elections by individuals, political parties, or PACs
Also placed ceiling on total spending by candidates in federal elections and
limited personal spending by candidates
Elaborate disclosure and reporting required of candiates
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CONTRIBUTIONS
EXPENDITURES
Donors
Regulated Recipients (Hard Money) Candidates (now $2K)
National Political Parties ($5K)
Unregulated Intermediaries (Sof Money) State Parties
PAC
Bundlers
Issue Advertiser
National Party (uncoordinated)
* 527 organizations bypass regulations (not recognized under FECA but get benefit under tax code)
In exchange, created public system of matching funds
Overseen by FEC, made up of 3 Democrats, 3 Republicans, House Clerk, and
Senate Secretary
ex officio
Court’s Decision
Distinguished between contribution and expenditures
Determined that contributions could be limited as they only minimally impacted
contributor’s speech (marginal value of showing of intensity)
But expenditures could not be limited as they were about getting out message
Good state interests
limiting actuality and appearance of corruption resulting
from large individual financial contributions
o
Criminal laws against corruption/bribery are not necessarily sufficient to
curb
Class Discussion on FECA and
Buckley
1974 Congress passed act following Watergate
Number of difficulties:
o
Promised funding was pretty minimal
o
Capping expenditures involves 2 quid pro quo underpinnings:
Spending limits in exchange for funding
Everybody else has to abide by limits too
Basic structure:
Buckley
just regulated contributions
o
So money just moved to unregulated domain
Generally, Issacharoff argued that this moves money away from
moderating influence of politicians
o
Rationale for regulating just contributions to candidates is that this is the
stage where there is the greatest possibility of corruption or the appearance
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of corruption (only regulatory justification for abridging First Amendment)
But no corruption where candidate buys ad
And don’t need to regulate other intermediaries because they are
not in office and so can’t give political favors as quid pro quo
o
Really tough because demand is unchecked and no diminishing marginal
value of money
Given cliff effect (either win or lose) where don’t know where
additional dollars will put one over the top, no diminishing
marginal value of money
o
Majority of Court has rejected
Buckley
but in different ways so it remains
the law more or less
Thomas (generally with Scalia) argues that, under First
Amendment, contributions cannot be regulated (simply efficient
way of speaking)
Stevens (generally with Ginsburg) argues that line between
expenditures and contributions is Constitutionally unsustainable
but would limit expenditures (money is not speech)
O’Connor has been faithful to
Buckley
, followed by Rehnquist, and
then Souter
Kennedy views
Buckley
divide as unworkable and would generally
deregulate contributions but more about leaving it to legislatures
based on workability of judge-made regulatory scheme
Breyer tends towards regulatory side but is like Kennedy in that he
is concerned with whether
Buckley
is working
Buckley
sets up “corruption” as the only justification for campaign finance
regulation
One interesting feature regarding the line of
Buckley
cases is that “corruption” is
not defined
o
Can’t just be quid pro quo
already have laws against
o
But if it is made too broad, does this mean there can be no campaign
promises? Recall
Brown v. Hartlage
(US 1982) (striking down KY
statute
that prohibited campaign promises
o
Can’t be secrecy
could just use disclosure laws
o
Some justices (see Breyer’s concurrence in
v. Shrink Missouri
that frames
corruption as about allowing people with money to drown out voices of
people without
that is, an equality or fairness argument)
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CONTRIBUTIONS
EXPENDITURES
Donors
Regulated Recipients (Hard Money) Candidates (now $2K)
National Political Parties ($5K)
Unregulated Intermediaries (Sof Money) State Parties
PAC
Bundlers
Issue Advertiser
National Party (uncoordinated)
* 527 organizations bypass regulations (not recognized under FECA but get benefit under tax code)
Think about “hydraulic effect” (or “displacement effect” of regulatory theory) of
limiting hard money contributions
just led to more “soft money”
o
Initially people used PACs but that proved to be inefficient
o
So people capped out to parties and then gave to state parties and to
national parties for local party-building
State parties would take cut and then kick up the rest (essentially
money-laundering)
o
Once there was greater restrictions on parties, money moved to single-
issue groups
In
Shrink Missiouri
, state parties want to speak for themselves but same issues
seem to apply
Contribution
Limits
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC
, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (pp. 460-474)
F
ACTS
: Missouri legislature set up campaign finance regulations limiting
contributions; meanwhile voters passed initiative with even more restrictive
limits; PAC and others sought to enjoin contribution statute as violation of EPC
and First Amendment
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice Souter):
Buckley
is authority for comparable
state regulation but not restricted to exact
Buckley
dollars amounts
o
Quantum of evidence required to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny will
vary with novelty and plausibility of justification raised
Affidavits of legislators, anecdotes, and success of ballot initiative
were enough
C
ONCURRENCE
(Justice Stevens): Money is property; it is not speech
C
ONCURRENCE
(Justice Breyer with Ginsburg joining): First Amendment on both
sides
D
ISSENT
(Justice Kennedy): Would overrule
Buckley
, leaving it to Congress or
state legislatures to craft new reform based on their view of First Amendment
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o
Buckley
creates crazy distortive restrictions
would allow free speech to
take its course
D
ISSENT
(Justice Thomas with Scalia joining): Political speech is primary concern
of First Amendment; shouldn’t limit it as was done by
Buckley
to both
contributors and candidatse
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) Is Speech Money?
: In his
Buckley
opinion (concurring in part,
dissenting in part) Justice White argued that money is not speech in either
contribution or expenditure contexts but that it is just what is needed to
produce speech, but that approach could be abused (e.g., find First
Amendment to job or minimum wage to produce the money to produce the
speech) and that the administrability of
Buckley
was absurd
Furthermore, in terms of corruption worries, why would candidate
not be equally beholden to dude who did not consult and just
bought supporting advertisements directly
o
(2) Troubles
with
the
Contribution/Expenditure
Distinction
: Tricky to
regulate PACs given that individuals could have pursued agendas
separately
o
(3) Was
Buckley
Working?
: In
Shrink
, Breyer and Kennedy both
expressed concerns regarding whether
Buckley
was working
Court didn’t have great institutional competence
Also, conceivably bad side effects with money needing to go
somewhere and might lead to greater interest group pushes away
from moderating influence of candidates and politicians who need
to be elected and thus trend towards the middle
o
(4) Debates
About
Empirical
Effects
: XXX
Expenditure
Limits
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission
,
518 U.S. 604 (1996) (pp. 474-487)
F
ACTS
: Colorado Republicans ran attack ads against Democrat running for Senator
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice Breyer): No evidence that Republican Party
was working with Republican candidate (had not selected one yet) and so couldn’t
be coordinated expenditure but instead was independent expenditure related to
Party’s core First Amendment activities
C
ONCURRING IN
J
UDGMENT AND
D
ISSENTING IN
P
ART
(Justice Kennedy with Rehnquist
and Scalia joining): Shouldn’t matter if expenditure was coordinated or not (in
fact, maybe cuts other way) given First Amendment rights of parties
C
ONCURRING IN
J
UDGMENT AND
D
ISSENTING IN
P
ART
(Justice Thomas with Rehnquist
and Scalia joining in Parts I and III):
o
Part II
Contributions and expenditures both involve core First
Amendment expression
Preventing corruption is only compelling state interest
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Campaign finance is not narrowly tailored to that (already have
bribery laws)
o
Part III
No real threat of corruption with Party supporting candidate
D
ISSENT
(Justice Stevens with Ginsburg): All money spent by political party to
secure election of its candidate should be considered contribution
o
Limits appearance and actuality of corrupt political process
o
Restrictions supplement other spending limitations that were designed to
prevent corruption
o
Important to level playing field
o
Should defer to Congress
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) Shift
from
Shrink
: Note that Rehnquist shifts as does Ginsburg (from
repudiation in
Colorado Republicans
)
o
(2) Independent
Expenditures
of
Parties
are
Core
Activities
: But what is
principle that distinguished parties from fervent supporter?
o
(3) Soft
Money
:
Buckley
just resulted in great increases in soft money
Studies by David Magelby showed that quality candidates mattered
but that in close races soft money tended to increase level of
negativity in campaigning which reduced voter turnout and
participation levels and that direct on the ground efforts led to
more interest group and party-centered system (as opposed to
candidate-centered system)
o
(5) Nobody Likes
Buckley
But…
: At the time, a minority of justices
supported
Buckley
but there were multiple factions with Thomas and
Scalia looking to overturn restrictions on contributions and Stevens who
would keep restrictions on expenditures
o
(6) Kennedy in
Colorado Republican II
and the Role of Political Parties
:
As one might recall from Scalia in
California Democratic Party v. Jones
,
picking/supporting candidate is what party is all about
o
(7) Time Lag
:
FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee
(2001) was resolved some 14 years after election in dispute
FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee
, 531 U.S. XX (2001) (pp.
487-499)
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice Souter): Limits on expenditures by political
parties in connection with congressional campaigns are not facially
unconstitutional
o
Political parties have been functioning over almost 30 years of FECA
limitation so not necessary
o
Parties do more than just promote candidates and parties and candidates
might face different influence and pressures and so are not so indivisible
o
Coordinated contributions pose threat of corruption just like direct
donations to candidates
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D
ISSENT
(Justice Thomas with Scalia and Kennedy and Rehnquist joining Part II):
Too broad, distorts party-candidate relationship, and has not been proven
necessary to combat corruption
o
Part I:
Buckley
should be overruled
o
Part II: Even under
Buckley
, statute doesn’t pass muster
Coordinated expenditures are different than contributions
Political parties are different than individuals and PACs
No evidence as to necessity of such broad regulation
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) Stability
of
Buckley
: Again, despite tepid support, contours of
Buckley
are enforced in
Colorado Republican II
and
Shrink Missouri
o
(3) Evidence of Corruption
: Once one applies
Buckley
approach in full,
question becomes about evidence of corruption or perception of corruption
Class Discussion on Expenditure Limits and
Colorado Republican
Line of Cases
First, can expenditures be attributed to candidate?
o
If not, presumably, under
Buckley
, this is entitled to highest rung of First
Amendment protection
o
If it can, then this is just like a contribution to candidate
o
FECA provides test (is it “coordinated”?)
Colorado Republican I
was as-applied challenge
o
Regulation’s application ran afoul of constitutional protections
o
In this case, argued that there could be no coordination (no candidate
selected yet)
o
Brennan goes back to rationale of
Buckley
and asks whether corruption
rationale is justified in this case
o
Additionally, there may be benefits of money
Money can be sign of intensity (think about election of judges that
nobody knows except for party labels
money acts as screen for
interest)
Worry about having too little money
Recall that in
Ball v. James
, Justice Powell thought that
people would be able for interested parties to overcome
state oppression as it related to regulation of water services
Shouldn’t interested and informed parties have a voice?
o
Justice Thomas argues that we should defer the least to political actors in
this area because there is suspicion that impulse for regulation is most
likely going to be self-regarding (recall that FEC is structured to be least
effective body in D.C.)
o
Worry about how much time politicians spend fundraising could be
addressed in multiple ways: (1) let politicians get more bang for buck
that is, raise more from fewer people or (2) limit spending
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Also think about whether option 1 would actually matter if one
accepts that marginal dollar of campaign money doesn’t have
diminishing value
Colorado Republican II
was facial challenge
o
Regulation must be capable of inflicting harm
o
Worry about under- and over-inclusiveness (recall Amsterdam’s student
note on void-for-vagueness doctrine
imprecision itself might chill
protected activity)
o
In
Colorado Republican II
, it is 2001 but still litigating election from more
than a decade before
Brings up regulatory problem; if party gets it wrong then FEC will
come down on you and you will end up paying $10K or some
other nominal sum more than fifteen years later
o
On its face challenge in
Colorado Republican II
, says, let’s assume that
party got its money legally under FECA, can there be any regulation on
party expenditures?
GOP wants to support Republican candidates (shocker) and recall
California Democratic Party v. Jones
where Scalia wrote that
party’s selection of candidate is its primary thing
FEC says if one does that, it is two-stage contribution and can
regulate, limiting party’s speech on election
This really cuts to core of First Amendment
o
Court will uphold limitation if party spending:
Is coordinated
Creates perception of fraud (directly in line with
Buckley
)
o
Essentially, Court says that all expenditures must be acquired and so can
regulate expenditures just as one would with contributions
But this collapses
Buckley
divide and equally supports Thomas’s
claim that all contributions are anticipated expenditures and so
shouldn’t be regulated at all
o
Parties hate this decision because, with limitation, money may start drying
up or it might start flowing elsewhere
In 1990s, found explosion of soft money and took particular form
of issue advocacy
See, e.g., Bill Yellowtail ad on p. 537
o
Permissible because it does not use magic words of
Buckley
, doesn’t identify candidate, and holds
virtually nobody responsible
Very tough to regulate
o
Some places offer “clean money” regimes that
provide matching funding
May protect incumbents
gives them
money but when millionaire comes in and
spends a ton, then caps have to come
out
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Do
Concerns
Over
Corruption
Justify
Campaign
Finance
Regulation?
First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti
, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (460)
F
ACTS
: 2 banking associations and 3 business corporations challenge MA statute
limiting them from making contributions or expenditures to influence vote on any
question submitted to voters other than on questions materially affecting their
business
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice Powell): Statute inhibits First Amendment
values even if corporations do not necessarily have such a right
o
Statute doesn’t do a good job of dealing with legitimate asserted state
concerns of protecting active role of individual citizen and ensuring that
shareholders’ views are represented
o
No real risk of corruption
referenda are on issues not candidates
D
ISSENT
(Justice White with Brennan and Marshall joining): Ideas that are not
product of individual self-expression deserve less protection; restrictions on
corporate speech do less to impair free exchange of ideas and strong government
interest in regulating corporations; also troublesome given duty to shareholders
D
ISSENT
(Justice Rehnquist): Governments may regulate corporations
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) Free
Speech
for
Corporations
: Maybe not; after all, corporations can’t
vote
o
(2) Convincing
Legislative
Findings?
: Court appears to be hostile, might
be tough to find evidence that satisfied scrutiny
o
(3) Is
Corruption
the
Only
Concern?
: Professor David Strauss would argue
that campaign contributions cement bonds between voters and elected
officials and that real worry must be that certain groups have greater
influence because of their wealth
o
(4) Regulating
Candidates’
Speech
: Court struck down KY
statue prohibiting candidates from making certain promises in
Brown v. Hartlage
(US 1982)
o
(5) Money Pressures
: Possible that Court should worry about money not
just in elections but also as it relates to governance (consider that Senator
averages more than $4M in six-year term)
o
(6) White’s
Deference
to
Legislature
: Justice White keeps dissenting in
post-
Buckley
cases arguing that legislatures are better suited to
determining compelling state interests and precision of fit between
regulation and concern
Class Discussion on
Bellotti
Test case for underlying rationale for
Buckley
o
Can’t be quid pro quo (it’s a referendum)
Ultimately, corruption rationale in
Buckley
is about undue influence on decision-
maker
o
How does this work in this case when it is about speaking directly to
voters?
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Maybe precommitment strategy on part of voters
“Lowering the volume”
Perhaps, there is a “right to hear”
One loud speaker might have point of view that distorts debate
Particularly because corporations have raised money that is
not within system
Can we worry about corporate expenditures as posing a veiled
threat to candidates?
Note that court engages in somersaults as it tries to figure
out relationship between expenditures and contributions
and influence that ultimately breaks down in
Bellotti
and,
even more explicitly, in
McConnell
Rehnquist says corporations are creatures of state and have no First
Amendment rights
Why not limit everybody on any election-related spending?
But this reduces protections on political speech, generally
core of First Amendment
What does one do with media?
What do we do with content?
o
Are voters being misled?
Recall Dworkin’s proposal to really limit debate to “issues”
So need state regulator to create proper mix of what we should be
hearing but this raises tons of First Amendment problems
First Amendment carries with it an extreme distrust
regarding what the citizens should here
Wonder about how to treat Dan Ortiz’s “slacker voters”
Some class of voters are just too susceptible
o
Rehnquist’s approach would work (regulate corporations based on their
lack of personhood)
o
White’s approach would too (have to develop different First Amendment
model due to disparities in wealth)
Equality and
Liberty
in
Political
Campaigns
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce
, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (pp. 515-524)
F
ACTS
: MI law prohibits corporations from making contributions or
independent contributions in connection with state candidate elections
only
issue before Court is constitutionality of ban on independent expenditures
challenged by Chamber of Commerce
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice Marshall): Uphold statute
o
State has compelling state interest in regulating corporations
o
Statute is narrowly tailored
D
ISSENT
(Justice Scalia): Government cannot use censorship to assure the fairness
of political debate (First Amendment)
Overall,
Bellotti
demonstrates failure of corruption rationale
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D
ISSENT
(Justice Kennedy with O’Connor and Scalia joining): Abandons
Buckley
divide and threatens political speech
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) “Corruption”
Caused
by
Disparities
in
Wealth
: Professor Julian Eule
argues that this is just equalization, not about corruption
o
(2) Reconciling
Austin
with
Prior
Cases
: E.g., in
Meyer v. Grant
(US
1988), Supreme Court struck down CO law that made it felony to use paid petition
gatherers in conjunction with trying to get initiative on state-wide ballot
Not clear that
Buckley
can survive post-
Austin
o
(3) Encroachment
on
Political
Liberties
: Professor Bradley Smith argues
that effect of legislation is to make it easier on incumbents
Class Discussion on
Austin
Most significant outlier
MI law prohibits corporations from giving money in any way (and prohibits
recipients of corporate money from speaking)
But kind of crazy because many different kinds of corporations
can have
ideological non-profits that wants to give money to candidate who supports
ideological viewpoint
o
See, e.g., ideological-driven anti-abortion organization in
FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life
where corporate expenditures
were
allowed (seemingly setting up a divide between not-for-profits
and for- profits, as in
Bellotti
)
MCFL could not be regulated because: (1) formed to address
political issues and cannot engage in business activities; (2)
absence of shareholders who might suffer economic harm if they
disagreed and wanted to pull out, and; (3) independence from
influence of business interests
In this case, Chamber of Commerce was not-for-profit organization so why
doesn’t it have same protections as in
FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life
?
o
Because Chamber of Commerce does not have clear ideological point of
view (and so more limited rights of association)
Identifies state interest as “regulation aims at a different type of corruption in the
political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregation of
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political
ideas… Corporate wealth can unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in
the form of independent expenditures, just as it can when it assume the guise of
political contributions”
o
Explodes
Buckley
o
Moves totally away from quid pro quo
o
Suggests that one could apply similar regulations to wealthy individuals
o
Really about equality and this requires such substantive regulations
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Has
Campaign
Finance
Reform
Worked
(pp. 524-526)
FECA did nothing to stem tide of money
in fact, total expenditures has grown
Public financing alternative (carrot given that
Buckley
precludes stick) faces two
difficulties
o
(1) might be expensive and Americans are not so enthused (very few
people check off dollar contribution on tax form)
o
(2) has to be sufficient amount to make it worthwhile for candidates
A
Caution
on
Public
Financing
(pp. 526-527)
Not necessarily going to be effect
o
E.g., FEC has approved a ton of exceptions that allow private entities to
contribute to parties’ national conventions (in addition to $4M in public
funding, adjusted for cost-of-living)
Proposals
for
Reform
(pp. 527-533)
In 2000, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold-Cochran
bill) was passed
o
Critical provisions include:
Ban on all funds to political parties not contributed pursuant to
limitations of FECA
Raising of contribution limits from individuals to state parties from
5 to 10K and total contributions to parties, PACs, and candidates
from 25 to 30K
All election communication that mentions name or otherwise
identifies candidate within 60 days of general election or 30 days
of primary is considered contribution
Bar on use of corporate or union treasury money on election-
related communication
Requirement that parties choose between limited coordinated
expenditures with candidate and unlimited independent
expenditures
Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices,
205 F.3d 445
(1st Cir. 2000) (pp. 529-533
)
F
ACTS
: ME referendum which introduced public funding alternative to private
fundraising for candidates and lowered ceiling on campaign contributions;
challenged by a bunch of people arguing that it violates First Amendment rights
of both donors and contributors because it is too coercive
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Senior Circuit Judge Coffin): It’s cool
o
Matching funds can still give non-participating candidate an advantage
o
Empirically, does not appear coercive (some candidates have chosen to
participate, some to forgo)
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) Applicability
of
ME
Act
to
Federal
Elections
: Thus far, courts have
upheld such clean money programs
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The
New
Frontier:
Issue
Advocacy
(pp. 533-545)
The Conceptual Problem: The Boundary Between Electoral Speech and Public
Discourse
Campaign finance reform must meet at least two requirements:
o
(1) in principle, there must be a theoretical distinction that can be
justified between an area demarcated as “the electoral domain” and that
of the “domain of public discourse”
o
(2) in terms of practicable and administrative regulatory and constitutional
doctrine, there must be a way of giving operational content to whatever
boundary can be offered to distinguish these two domains
In
Buckley
, Court choose a little equality within realm of democratic polity (limits
on contributions) and a little free speech (no limits on expenditures)
Judicial Administration of the Boundary: the Law of Issue Advocacy
The
Supreme
Court
:
o
In
Buckley
, Court required that ads use words like “vote for” to count as
express advoacy
o
Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 749
U.S. 238 (1986)
Anti-abortion group’s newsletter listing candidates and their
positions on key issues
Supreme Court found that it was not just
issue advocacy
The
Magnitude
of
Issue
Advocacy
and
the
Stakes
for
Campaign
Finance
Regulation
:
o
People are using this stuff like a motherfucker
The
Structure
of
the
Regulatory
Problem
:
o
Really hard because going to be very content-specific
o
Have to have clear demarcation so there is no chilling problem
But clear narrow rules will be easy to evade
And clear broad rules will be overinclusive
Lower Court’s
Approaches
:
o
Compare
FEC v. Furgatch
(9th Cir. 1987)
with
FEC v. Christian
Action
Network
(W.D. Va. 1995)
aff’d mem.
4th Cir.
Furgatch
did not require use of any magic words but looked at
“communication as a whole”
At opposite end of spectrum,
Christian Action Network
essentially
said that didn’t matter if named candidate and had clear
intent if possible that it could be read as an issue ad
The FEC
Approach
:
o
FEC has regulations that draw on
Furgatch
approach
Has been found unconstitutional by First Circuit
Other
Proposals
:
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o
Professor Briffualt suggests that express advocacy should be any
communication that (1) refers to clearly identified candidate to distinguish
election-related from other political speech; (2) made within defined
period before an election , and; (3) involves sufficiently large expenditure
of average expenditure of winning candidate for office in two preceding
elections to focus on communication that actually might matter
Conclusion: Can Campaign Finance Regulation Overcome the Problem of Issue
Advocacy?
Very tough
o
Two issues:
(1) As matter of principle or normative analysis, how do we
distinguish between ideas and candidates?
(2) Can regulatory policy generate an administrable and
Constitutional line?
McConnell v.
FEC
(Supp. pp. 29-70)
McConnell v. FEC
, 124 S.Ct. 619 (2004) (Supp. pp. 30-70)
F
ACTS
: BRCA passed in 2002; designed to clamp down on use of issue
advertising (Title II) and soft money by political parties (Title I) in exchange for
raising amount of hard money that could be raised
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
:
o
Justice Stevens and O’Connor delivered opinion of Court for Title I and
Title II:
On Title I/§ 323 (limiting ability of parties to use soft money for
campaigning that combined state or general campaigns with
federal election)
Rise of soft money was problematic
o
That Congress decided to, in part, limit
contributions of soft money by limiting how parties
might spend it was not problematic under
Buckley
o
Also, regulations not disallowed under
California Democratic Party v. Jones
o
Very limited evidence needed because not novel or
implausible (
Shrink
)
o
“Undue influence” of
Colorado Republican II
might
have been at play
So was issue advertising
o
Hard to tell difference
Senate Committee investigation provides evidence of pay-
for-access and other ethical problems associated with
current fund-raising regime
On Title II/§ 201 (limiting electioneering communication):
Buckley
divide between express advocacy and issue
advocacy was based on FECA not Constitution
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BRCA was sufficiently clear and neutral ex ante
Also upholds disclosure requirements and requirement that
corporation use segregated funds (must use PAC)
o
Justice Rehnquist delivered opinion of Court for Title III and IV:
Raising limits on hard money was cool; no equality argument was
available to counter
Prohibitions on those under 17 donating was unconstitutional
because they had free speech rights too and could have more
narrowly tailored if concerned with circumvention (e.g., could
have had limit on family donations)
D
ISSENTING IN
P
ART
(Justice Scalia): Concerned with free speech and incumbent
protection
D
ISSENTING IN
P
ART
(Justice Thomas): Concerned with free speech
D
ISSENTING IN
P
ART
(Justice Kennedy): Concerned
stare decisis
and takes more
narrow view of corruption
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(3) Canadian
Campaign
Finance
Regulation
:
In
Libman v. Quebec
(A.G.), 3 S.C.R. 569 (1997), the Supreme
Court of Canada described 3 guiding principles for campaign
finance law:
(1) the principles of fairness and equal participation, which
may require expenditure or contribution caps;
(2) the principle of the right to hear, which also cuts in
favor of spending limits, and;
(3) the attribution of all election expenses, including those
of independent individuals and groups, to ensure that the
spending limits are effective
In 2000, following these principles, the Canadian Parliament
determined that no citizen could spend more than $3,000 in any
election district of $150,000 nationally
These limits were upheld in
Attorney General of Canada v.
Harper
, 2004 SCC 33, relying on the logic of
Libman
and the
important role of equality and access
o
(5) Hydraulic
Pressures
and
527’s
: Justices Stevens and O’Connor end
section of opinion describing hydraulic pressures and note concern
regarding 527’s as fronts for soft-money
In 2004, saw rise of 527’s with tons of money (somewhere around
$130MM) being put into federal campaigns; but still less totally
soft money than pre-BCRA
o
(6) Scrutinizing
Purpose
of
Campaign
Finance
Regulations
: Pildes argues
that BRCA was subject to popular approval given its high profile and that
this is a bit of democratic check on incumbent protection concerns
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o
(7)
FEC v. Beaumont
(US 2003)
: Justice Souter, writing for Court, held
that regulation of advocacy-oriented corporations that barred these groups
from contributing directly to candidates for federal office was alright
o
(9)
Landell v. Sorrell
(2d Cir. 2004)
: Expenditure limitations may be
alright; Calabresi’ concurrence argued for more open, honest discussion of
competing values and had good point about limits of money as expression
within elections (can’t buy votes!)
Class Discussion on BRCA,
McConnell
, and Others
McConnell
and BRCA:
o
BRCA does two things:
Title I attempts to plug soft money loopholes, particularly with
giving to national parties
Prevent actual and appearance of corruption
Virtually no evidentiary threshold
“quantum of
empirical evidence” required is essentially nil in this case
Title II restrictions on “electioneering communication”
All that needs to happen is that communication clearly
identifying candidate is made 60 days before election/30
days before primary
o
Every other democratic country has made this move
save USA (hamstrung by First Amendment legacy)
o
So this, necessarily, has to create a distinction
between political speech and electioneering speech
Really asks what is role of election, either:
John Stuart Mill/Bork view that
takes First Amendment stance and
requires staying hand of government
Alternatively, this is about serious
and practical selection of
representatives and so need orderly,
regulated process that limits “noise”
o
Tricky, because
elections are really only time
that people pay attention
Watershed moment
if pursued, will totally change stuff
Also note, has disclosure requirement (have to list
everybody who contributes)
Court defers to Congressional judgment that this is
necessary
Could one attack a lame-duck (ineligible to run again)
incumbent?
o
Note Scalia’s opinion (dissenting on Title II), discussing how these kind of
limitations provide immense advantages to incumbents
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Automatic challenges go to 3-judge district court, which are
reviewed only by Supreme Court
Resulted in very long, fractured opinions
And Supreme Court divvied up writing of opinions
o
Rehnquist discussed equality stuff (challenge brought by fringe groups)
Rejects core of
Austin
approach
Reynolds
commitment to
equality was not going to be read broadly into voting/political
arena
draws the line at “access to the ballot or the right to vote”
Also, on BCRA § 318, Court strikes down restriction on donations
by people 17-years-old and younger
Restricting seems to make sense (these people can’t
vote, just like non-citizens
see
Minor v. Happersett
)
This is totally about circumventing the election law
Rehnquist is lying
o
Despite his contention, minors do NOT have
similarly strong First Amendment rights (recall
locker searches)
On this point, resuscitates evidentiary burden (have to show
that there was some corruption), which has been absent
from other core campaign finance cases
In summary, rejects
Austin
(equality argument) and then Rehnquist
in
McConnell
opens door for resurgence of First Amendment
formalism, which would take down all campaign finance
regulation
o
Following BCRA, saw corporations give less money
Pildes claims that
this shows corporations were being shaken down
o
This is not over
how far will it go?
Will this stuff include blogs?
How about 527’s?
Real question is going to be: To what extent, are we going to
tolerate Constitutionally a diminished zone of First
Amendment protection around the election period?
Other Stuff:
o
Note that in
Landell v. Sorrell
(2d Cir. 2004), Judge Calabresi asks
whether
Buckley
corruption mantle was right analytical path (supplement
p. 68-70)
Should there be more?
This will be confronted again in VT case before
Supreme Court
[NOT THAT IT IS FROM ANYTHING THAT
ISSACHAROFF SAID, BUT ASSESSING VT CASE
MIGHT BE GOOD EXAM QUESTION]
o
VT case with its dramatic limits may infringe upon
expressive rights
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Brings back race into discussion
Two main issues
G.
C
ONGRESSIONAL
P
OWER
Introduction
to
and
History
of
the
Voting
Rights
Act
[see text]
Issacharoff’s Introduction to the Voting Rights Act and Preclearance
o
o
And relationship of Congress, states, and courts
Historically, quite recent but a terribly different world in terms of discrimination
Civil rights organizations decided to focus on voting rights because of the
recollection of Reconstruction period where political participation was effective
and because it was straightforward and conceptually easy to enforce (as opposed
to integration where hard to overcome fierce private and public resistance)
Law suits were useless
took forever and then individual officials would
resign and process would begin anew
Strategic choice to march on Montgomery, AL, resulting in crazy,
disproportionate response that sparked public outrage and guaranteed attention
(and federal injunction/legislation)
LBJ pushes Voting Rights Act of 1965 (very serious, very unique)
o
Core provisions will apply only to jurisdictions that meet certain criteria
Coverage trigger is non-appealable determination by AG that
jurisdiction used test or device and less than 50% of voting age
population was registered or voting in 1964 presidential election
All of Deep South, 26 counties in NC, 1 county in HI, 3 in
AZ, and one in IA
Note that had same test been applied in 1968, not a
single state would have been covered
this was
incredibly effective!
Expanded in 1970 to cover literacy tests expressly and then in
1975 it was expanded to cover English-only materials (brought in
TX, parts of CA, parts of NYC)
o
If jurisdiction is covered:
Under § 4, devices or tests are suspended
If they are suspended, if state wants to, in any way , change the
administration of election regulations, has to receive pre-clearance
from Justice Department under § 5 (or can go to 3-judge D.C.
district court as petitioner with burden to prove that there is no
discriminatory intent or effect)
o
If no test or device has been used for five years, jurisdiction may be able
to bail out (but virtually nobody – just a few counties in VA – has been
able to do this)
o
Should note that § 5 was renewed in 1982 and is set to expire in 2007
(because of unique nature, required sunset provision)
Voting Rights Act and Preclearance
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Congressional
Power
to
Enact
the
Special Provisions
of
the
Voting
Rights
Act
South Carolina v. Katzenbach
, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (pp. 548-571)
F
ACTS
: South Carolina challenged Voting Rights Act as Constitutional violation
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Chief Justice Warren): Appropriate legislation clause
of Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment allows Congress to undertake such
action and there is virtually no evidentiary burden required
o
Also discusses various aspects of Voting Rights Act
o
Essentially shifts burdens to state rather than voters
Class Discussion on
South Carolina v. Katzenbach
Question is whether Congress is constitutionally permitted to enact Voting Rights
Act (giant federalism concerns)
Think about interaction of
Lassiter
(literacy tests are alright/do not violate
Fifteenth Amendment) and Voting Right Act § 4 (literacy tests are device and are
suspended) where Congress gets authority from § 2 of Fifteenth Amendment
o
Could bootstrap from stronger federal interest in Art. I, § 4
Instead, Court lets Congress be its own constitutional arbiter (§ 2 of Fifteenth
Amendment is broader than § 1)
o
Goes back to conception of Constitutional law that if law is necessary and
proper to effectuate purposes, Court will defer to Congress and that
evidentiary burden was satisfied by Congressional finding that there was
propensity for using certain tests and devices unconstitutionally (and so
prophylactic measure was alright)
In follow-up case,
Katzenbach v. Morgan
(1970), related to nationwide
ban on
literacy test and Oregon challenged and there was no empirical record
of any racial discrimination, Court said “yet Congress might well have
questioned…” (clearly, the Court is forgoing any real evidentiary requirement)
o
Also, see Brennan’s view on federalism under Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment, describes “ratchet-theory” where Constitution sets baseline
and Congress was free to expand but not contract rights
Questions regarding scope of Section 5’s were raised immediately
o
By way of background, Voting Rights Act is extraordinarily successful but
have to understand that it was not just about formal enfranchisement of
African-Americans
also about breaking down white power and
integrating African-Americans
o
So, have to figure out what needs to be pre-cleared?
White South responded vehemently to Voting Rights Act
o
By way of background, recall that following
Brown v. Board of
Education
, Virginia passed law that required super-majority to
issue school bonds (fear that enfranchised and integrated black public
would
threaten white power), upheld in
Gordon v. Lance
(US 1971)
o
Immediately went to reinforcing majoritarianism
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Smaller unit of governance, the more likely it would be captured
by minority (Madison’s “factionalism”/ modern interest-group
politics)
So, at-large elections were adopted in certain jurisdictions
see,
e.g.,
Allen v. State Board of Elections
(1969) (following
VRA, 3
cases in MS and 1 in VA moved to at-large elections, and
Court said this was unacceptable because one has to be
concerned with ability to influence elections)
Critics said that this is really problematic move from non-
discrimination to quota results
o
Really, one has to figure out what is undiluted state
As a sort of end-around, Court used
Beer
standard in
retrogression that looks to change in status quo (if change
makes it more difficult for minorities to participate in the
political process and to elect candidates of choice, than it is
retrogressive and unlawful)
All of the cases discussed take fairly expansive view of Congressional power
o
Very deferential standard
o
Statutory authority conferred by § 5 may go beyond what the Court found
unconstitutional
o
Again, recall ratchet-theory
o
[PERSONAL NOTE: Is it possible that this makes sense because the
Amendments highlight a political process failure and the checks and
balances involved in passing an Amendment suggest that the Court can
take this very deferential stance to corollary legislative action]
This is not current state of law
o
Recall peyote case (
Smith v. Employment Division
) where Scalia
said,
essentially, there is no longer disparate impact claims
o
So Congress responded with RFRA, which purported to overturn
Smith
o
Supreme Court responded with
City of Boerne
and basically said that
is
beyond power of Congress
Congress can pass equivalent of 42 U.S.C. 1983 (creating private
right of action for Constitutional violations but does not purport to
define Constitutional rights)
But Congress cannot define scope of Constitution (that is the job of
the Court)
Congress really has to show harm (compare with “Congress might
think” language in
Katzenbach
) and is held to remedial powers
(following from Section 2 of Fifteenth Amendment) and that
remedy must be congruent and proportional
So, what happens to Voting Rights Act?
o
Recall that coverage formula used 1964 elections, which makes it hard to
claim congruency and proportionality
Summary of Introductory Voting Rights Act Cases
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o
Furthermore, there was incredible discrimination at time
not clear that
this remains the case today or that it remains the case today in the covered
jurisdictions
o
One caveat to
Boerne
, petitioner argued that a number of federal statutes
(e.g., Title VII) would have to be struck too
Court just said, of course we can differentiate
—they are different because they are different statutes
Following
Boerne
, in
Hibbs
, Court has backed off a little from
its stance as it relates to minority groups (Court might be able to
make distinction that it makes sense to privilege race above
incorporated protections because of Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments’ clear focus and purpose but this has not really been
accepted even though it is philosophically strong)
BURNING QUESTION: Issue that keeps dividing the Court is: What does
anti-discrimination law have to say about results?
o
To extent that we understand Equal Protection to be a negative liberty
(prohibition on state treating group improperly), is there anything in anti-
discrimination law that starts to look at the results?
Giant issue in liberal theory
Recall John Rawls with “veil of ignorance” (ex ante
preferences) and assertion that there is an agreed upon
minimum set of criteria that defines society
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H.
V
OTE
D
ILUTION
AND
S
UBSTANTIVE
C
LAIMS
Majority Rule and Minority Vote Dilution: Constitutional and Legislative
Approaches
Defining
the
Harm
Whitcomb v. Chavis
, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (pp. 673-684)
F
ACTS
: Marion County, Indiana, used multimember district; black residents
brought EPC claim as they had no effective voice in governance
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice
White):
o
Despite lower court’s finding that:
Identifiable racial group
Voting strength has been minimized by district system
Party control and other factors result in legislators being
unresponsive to minority voters
o
Multi-member districts not unconstitutional per se
o
In this instance, black voters not formally prohibited from
registering/voting/exercising franchise and not going to find
o
District Court’s finding that voting power of minority group had been
cancelled out “seems euphemism for political defeat at the polls”
C
ONCURRENCE
(Justice Harlan): Thinks this case marks reversal of commitment to
majoritarianism; furthermore, would have heeded Frankfurter’s warnings in
Baker v. Carr
and thinks case should be remanded to District Court with
directions to dismiss complaint
D
ISSENTING IN
P
ART AND
C
ONCURRING IN THE
R
ESULT IN
P
ART
(Justice Douglas with
Brennan and Marshall): Gerrymandering is in tension with one-person, one-vote
o
Argue that showing of racial motivation is unnecessary when dealing with
multi-member districts and so need only look to invidious effect
o
Finds limit to race and voting in Fifteenth Amendment
Class Discussion on
Whitcomb v. Chavis
One might argue that bad process/purpose
o
However, historically, multi-member districts were sometimes created
because states would add additional member to districts that had grown to
create a new seat
Really, Court is concerned that this is not a race case but rather about Democratic
Party losing
Also, this is the only case in this line of cases until the last few years where the
Court has to look at a claim of minority vote dilution claim in the context of
bipartisan competition and that makes this extraordinary difficult (makes it look
like: “is it unconstitutional for the Republicans to win?”)
White v. Regester
, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (pp. 684-692)
F
ACTS
: Multi-member districts in TX challenged
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice White): Invalidates multi-member districts
given number of factors that speak to discrimination and exclusion from political
process of distinct minority group
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o
History of discrimination against black population in Dallas
o
Cultural/linguistic separation of Hispanic population in Bexar
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) Hybrid
Not
Presumptively
Constitutionally
Invalid
: Hybrid system is
not categorically bad; upheld in
Fortson v. Dorsey
(US 1965)
o
(4)
Zimmer
Factors
: In application of
Regester
, lower courts relied heavily
on en banc Fifth Circuit case,
Zimmer v. McKeithen
(1973), which was affirmed per curiam by
the Supreme Court
Lack of access of slating candidates
Unresponsiveness of legislators
Tenuous state policy underlying preferences of multi-member or
at-large districting
Past discrimination
Large districts
Majority vote requirements
Anti-single shot voting provisions
Lack of provision for at-large candidates from running from
particular geographic subdivisions
Class Discussion on
White v. Regester
How do we get to this being unconstitutional?
o
Before election
Devices/structural obstacles
Past discrimination that touched on voting
Bad electoral outcomes
Racial appeals
Suggests that vote is organized along racial lines
Slating
[NOTE: None of these things violate Constitution and, if they did,
they could be addressed directly]
o
In office
Bad legislation
Lack of responsiveness
To prove lack of responsiveness, what could one look to?
o
Perhaps, could look to number of times that trash is
picked up
o
Hospitals/nursing homes/health clinics
o
Road upkeep/miles of paved roads
o
Funding for local schools
o
Gauge of sewer pipe/open versus closed sewers
o
Parks
[NOTE: Very hard to show as this is completely open-ended
inquiry]
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o
Recognizable group
Bexar County
cultural/linguistic identifiers and separation
Core question/concern is related to behavior of voters (did minority voters get a
fair shake) but this is conspicuously absent from the test
o
One thing that comes out of
Zimmer
factors is inattentiveness to what
happens on election day
Ultimately, not great law but perfectly decent outcomes
courts realize that you
can’t have no black representatives anymore and that multi-member districts were
not really integral to any state policy
City of Mobile v. Bolden
, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (pp. 692-713)
F
ACTS
: City of Mobile has City Commission with 3 members elected in at-large
election
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice Stewart): Have to show purposeful
discriminatory intent to succeed with Voting Rights Act § 2 claim
C
ONCURRING IN
R
ESULT
(Justice Blackmun): Agreed with White regarding finding of
discrimination but thought ordered remedy (change to mayor-council system) was
too much
C
ONCURRING IN
J
UDGMENT
(Justice Stevens): Sees divide between state action that
inhibits individual’s right to vote and that which affects political strength of
various groups; provides following analytical path for all stuff:
o
EPC must apply to all identifiable groups; effect is not enough; subjective
motivations of decision-makers should not be decisive; rather, Court
should focus on whether political decision was consistent with traditional
practices, supported by neutral justification, had adverse impact on group
D
ISSENTING
(Justice Brennan): Discriminatory effect is enough and enough
evidence to find intent too
D
ISSENTING
(Justice White):
Zimmer
factors are good; effect is enough; evidence
supports that intent was there too
D
ISSENTING
(Justice Marshall): Could find discriminatory impact enough or
intent; not just about suspect categories but also about fundamental right
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(3) Subsequent Application of
City of Mobile
: Created very difficult
burden of proof; also see
Rogers v. Lodge
(US 1982) which found that
at-
large system had not been developed for discriminatory purposes but
that it had been maintained for such and that it was therefore no good
Class Discussion on
City of Mobile v. Bolden
New standard that turns on discriminatory purpose
Facts of Case:
o
At-large elections
Recall that move to at-large elections was part of unholy alliance
between progressive in North and redeemers in South to limit
political power of “undesirable” minorities
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Also, interestingly, note that Justice Stewart’s father pushed
through at-large elections in Cincinnati, OH
If we impose intent standard, which standard will we impose?
o
Feeney
-style direct proof
But-for element for this comes at the vote/election
Virtually impossible to prove and not clear what, if any,
remedy is available
o
Arlington Heights
indirect proof/totality of the circumstances
Looks very close to Due Regard standard (should have known that
it would have had negative impact on vulnerable group and
sufficient lack of regard allows for inference of purpose)
Stewart takes classic approach to dealing with multi-factor test: attacks each
factor on its own and once one shows that each factor alone is insufficient to
prove Constitutional-deprivation than the whole test must fail
o
No foreordained outcome is Constitutionally-required
o
If it is about services, sue directly about services
o
Bad legislative acting doesn’t have anything to do with voting
o
Bad past practices doesn’t speak to current bad services
o
At-large mechanics does not disadvantage racial minorities specifically
discriminates against all minority groups
Essentially, Stewart’s opinion closes off results-based suspect classification strict
scrutiny analytical path
Marshall argues that fundamental rights line of cases is certainly not closed off
and so strict scrutiny should still apply to limits on right to vote (intentionality of
state actor does not matter, rather it is about the impact on rights-holder)
o
Go back to
Harper
and poll tax and recall that Court dealt with this stuff
in completely race neutral way
Perception was that
City of Mobile
had terrible facts and so if vote dilution did not
reach this case than it would not reach any
1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act
Mathias v. Hatch debates regarding proportionality
Dole compromise brings back, more or less, to pre-
City of Mobile
Class Discussion on 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act
Recall
that
City
of
Mobile
v.
Bolden
said
disparate
impact
was
not
enough
required intent
So Congress responded in 1982 by taking Section 2, which had been little used,
and giving it teeth (previously had just been grant of authority to DOJ to bring
suits)
Now Section 2 did nothing less than what RFRA purported to do (make showing
disparate impact/
Zimmer
factors in aggregate sufficient or, in other words, return
to status quo)
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o
This return to the status quo (“totality of the circumstances”) sounds a
great deal like a return to common law (not the form of regulation we
associate with legislation)
Congress clearly repudiates
Bolden
o
Right here, we have the
City of Boerne
question: can Congress
move
forward from its remedial powers under Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendment and regulate beyond what the Constitution
allows?
Creates “Senate Report” factors:
o
(1) Extent of history of official discrimination
o
(2) Extent to which voting is racially polarized
o
(3) Extent to which voting has used various regulations or procedures
(e.g., at-large elections, prohibitions on single-shot voting, majority vote
requirements) that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against
minority groups
o
(4) Denial of minority access to slating
o
(5) Extent to which members of minority group bear effects of
discrimination in other areas (e.g., education, employment, health) which
hinder ability to participate
o
(6) Racial appeals in campaigns
o
(7) Extent to which minority groups have been elected to public office in
jurisdiction
o
Additional factors
Lack of responsiveness by public officials to concerns of
particularized needs of minority group
Policy underlying voting qualification has tenuous foundation
One difference between Senate Report factors and
White/Zimmer
factors
o
Recall that
White/Zimmer
factors just looks at inputs and outputs (does not
look at voting behavior, perhaps, because of difficulty of finding state
action at the polling place)
o
Here, Senate Factors includes “racial polarization” in voting
Under old Section 5 cases, sometimes used homogenous precinct
analysis to show retrogression
Over time, social science methodology became much more
rigorous
moved to bivariate regression analysis
Raises ecological fallacy (attributing inferred causal
patterns seen in analytical unit to smaller groups) although
correlation coefficient (r
2
) should reduce this concern
Of course, still leaves correlation/causation question
o
Can do multivariate regression to help pinpoint
effect of race (of course, there can be a lot of effects
that all point in the same direction)
One might claim that difference between bivariate and
multivariate regression analysis is similar to difference
between impact and intent
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One formulation of this analysis suggests that we are
making it unlawful for people to vote in a certain way
o
Fuck that
making it unlawful to have structural
political violence against distinct minority groups
and use results as proxy for this structural political
violence
Racial Vote Dilution Under the Voting Rights Act
Judicial
Modulation
of
Section
2’s
“Results”
Standard:
The
Gingles
Test
Thornburg v. Gingles
, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (pp. 748-776)
F
ACTS
: In 1982, NC General Assembly enacted legislative redistricting plan that
used combination of single-member and multimember districts; black voters in
several of multimember districts filed suit seeking disaggregation of multimember
districts into sing-member districts, some of which would have black effective
voting majorities
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice Brennan): Bloc voting majority must usually
be able to defeat candidates supported by politically cohesive, geographically
insular minority groups
o
Multimember districts may be impermissible:
Minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently
large and geographically compact
Minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive
Minority group must be able to demonstrate that the white majority
votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in the absence of special
circumstances—usually to defeat the minority’s preferred
candidate
Racially polarized voting does not have to be due to racial
considerations (can just show correlation between race of
voters and candidate support)
C
ONCURRING
(Justice White): Doesn’t join Brennan in holding that race of
candidate doesn’t matter
C
ONCURRING IN
J
UDGMENT
(Justice O’Connor with whom Rehnquist, Powell, and
Burger): Would apply traditional multifactor test articulated in
Zimmer
given
concerns that Brennan’s test looked like proportionality
D
ISSENTING IN
P
ART AND
C
ONCURRING IN
P
ART
(Justice Stevens with Marshall and
Blackmun): Would not find election of one black official in District 23
presumptively showed that District Court erred in finding there was § 2 violation
Class Discussion on
Thornburg v. Gingles
All of the previous class discussion brings us to
Gingles
Have to figure out if Section 2 amendments are Constitutional (Court passes on
question) and what the amendments (particularly, polarized voting) mean
o
Should note that no court has ever found Section 2 was unconstitutional
(although, apparently, Kozinski has footnote to that effect in concurring
opinion)
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Court could have softened
City of Mobile v. Bolden
by bringing it under
Arlington Heights
purpose standard (perhaps, like
Rogers v. Loge
), which is
standard Constitutional analysis
Instead, utilizing standard statutory interpretation move,
Gingles
creates more
judicially-manageable (and restricted) test that really focus on racial polarization
Moved inquiry to statistics/expert testimony showing racial polarization (but
recall
De Grandy
, which holds that it is not sufficient)
The divide between Brennan and O’Connor is significant
o
Essentially, Brennan is just looking to bivariate regression as proof
o
O’Connor looks to more factors (as we will see in her opinion in
Georgia
v. Ashcroft
)
not just are blacks and whites voting differently but is it because of race and
is there a remedy (still trying to deal with
Whitcomb v. Chavis
and concern that race will
be used for partisan purposes)
Liability is refusal to create single-member districts coupled with racially
polarized voting (reads into amendments a Congressional intent to overturn
City of Mobile v. Bolden
)
o
Well, what the heck do we do with districting challenges? Is the Court
obligated to create the most representation for minorities that is possible?
Or is it proportional representation (recall caveat in Section 2 that says the
statute does not recognize Constitutional guarantee of/Congressional
statutory entitlement to proportional representation)
Reemergence
of
a
“Totality
of
the
Circumstances”
Approach
Johnson v. De Grandy
, 512 U.S. 997 (1994) (pp. 813-823)
F
ACTS
: Single member districts in Florida were challenged under § 2
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice Souter): Totality of the circumstances;
Gingles
is threshold; failure to maximize is not measure of § 2; proportionality is
not always defense (but probably creates difficult barrier)
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(3)
Voinovich v.
Quilter
: Decided same term as
Shaw v. Reno
, just before
De Grandy
, and held there must be discriminatory effect to have § 2
violation
Generally, questions regarding using voters who are members of
protected class to get into federal court/have stronger claims than,
perhaps, the underlying partisan ones (recall
Whitcomb v. Chavis
)
o
(4) Post-Election
Influence
: Can totality of circumstances test look to
influence post-election?
Issacharoff Wrap-Up of
Gingles
and
De Grandy
De Grandy
exposes how easy the standard of
Gingles
was to meet
By way of background:
o
Saw dramatic transformation of local government in aftermath of §2
amendments akin to transformation following
Baker v. Carr
/
Reynolds v.
Sims
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Going into 1980s, most local officials (from mayor and below) had
been elected by at-large elections
At the time, easy to show racially polarized voting
And so, litigation was very easy/successful if there sufficient
number of minority citizens to create majority-minority district
And so we saw the development of significant minority
representation
o
This success raises a second question: What are the principles involved in
districting?
When one has no minorities in office (e.g.,
City of Mobile v.
Bolden
facts), it is pretty straightforward
Theory of the time was that you needed 65% minority
population to be able to get minority control of district (need
more than 50% because of voting age population, registration,
turnout, etc.
as
quick side note, one should know that registration and turnout rates
no longer turn on race, instead they turn on socio-economics)
Assumes a whole lot (perfectly polarized voting)
Recall that nobody wants to waste votes (bad to win 99-1
or lose 51-49)
Argument is that this theory is derived from
Carolene Products
footnote 4
o
But this footnote really said that “discrete and
insular minority” must have no other redress
o
And it was not hard to apply this when no
minorities are being elected (even if, as a formal
matter, these cases are being decided statutorily
under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act)
So, what happens once minorities have access to political process?
In
De Grandy
, Souter says that goal has to be functioning
political system where everybody has a fair shot to be
elected
o
As screening criterion,
De Grandy
basically said
that once one reaches proportional results, Court not
going to entertain claims
As
secondary
concern,
is
the
objective
“descriptive”
representation (election
of
minorities) or
“substantive”
representation (election of candidates accountable to minorities)?
And, along with the limits of
Carolene Products
, this
brings us to
Georgia v. Ashcroft
Law and
Politics
Georgia v. Ashcroft
, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (Supp. pp. 71-95)
F
ACTS
: Georgia State Senate redistricting challenged under § 5
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D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice O’Connor): § 5 is different than § 2; just
about maintenance not about augmentation or looking against some hypothetical
ideal; descriptive versus substantive representation is open question
C
ONCURRING
(Justice Kennedy): § 5 controls but might be inconsistent with
Miller
v. Johnson
D
ISSENTING
(Justice Souter with Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer): State must prove that
effective coalitional or influence districts will actually occur
o
Comparability and administribility are hard to see with new standard
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(3)
Had discussed
that § 5 did not apply to changes of power amongst elected officials
o
(5) Future
of
§
5
: Pildes argues that changing times make it hard to know
how much flexibility states and local political bodies should have;
Issacharoff argues that blacks are now in position to vie with everybody
else and so affirmative case for Section 5 is weaker; Pitts argues that
Georgia v. Ashcroft
recasts Section 5 in terms that are close to
Constitutional standard
Class Discussion on
Georgia v. Ashcroft
Ackerman argues that
Carolene Products
footnote was wrong
political theory
holds that discrete, insular minorities should have disproportionate political power
o
But Ackerman’s argument is true only if minority group does not face
unique social exclusion and other obstacles
Background:
o
John Lewis, one of the people beaten at Selma March, is now senior GA
legislator
o
Effort by Democratic Party to hold on to power one more time by
gerrymandering the hell out of Georgia even though slight minority
o
Have to spread resources strategically given lesser numbers
o
And this difficulty is compounded by Voting Rights Act requirements
(representation and
Beer
non-retrogression) and presumption that one
needs to create majority-minority districts that are 65% minority (and,
correspondingly, that having district that is 30-50% minority would be the
worst) which resulted in Republican Justice Department’s “Max black”
strategy that essentially just packed black/minority voters
o
But that presumption was based on a number of factors that are probably
no longer true
o
And “max black” strategy would virtually guarantee that Georgia would
go Republican
o
So come up with plan to spread black voters around to create “influence”
districts that the Democratic Party hoped would secure victory
Virtually all black incumbent officials agreed to this plan even
though it put their seats at risk
Issacharoff would argue that it is remarkable sign of Voting Rights
Act’s success that, one generation later, black incumbents would
Presley
v.
Etowah
County
Commissioner
(US
1992)
:
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put their seats at risk based on their belief that they will be able to
attract white cross-over voters
And this raises the question: is there still a
Carolene Products
rationale for legal intervention or is this just politics?
Arguments:
o
Georgia/John
Lewis
: argues that we have reached the point where politics
is working as it should and minorities have equal opportunity to elect
candidates of choice
o
Justice
Department:
Gains by minority voters in Georgia were too recent
and insecure and so Voting Rights Act was necessary to give them some
extra leverage
o
Issacharoff
: if one conceives of this as battle between John Lewis and
John Ashcroft, one would ask “which of these people do you trust to speak
for black voters in Georgia?”
Procedural Posture:
o
Judge Harry Edwards, as part of 3-judge district court, rejects the State’s
argument saying that it was not consistent with purposes of Voting Rights
Act
Decision/Outcome:
o
Essentially, Court was asked if they should:
(1) leave it to politics where there can be calculated gambles
(2) have regulated world where there are allocations/no risk
Recall feminist arguments regarding protective legislation
(putting on a pedestal or in a cage?)
o
In general, this question (what is the line between law and politics)
underlies the course
Saw
Luther v. Borden
where questions of political power were not
entertained
Saw Holmes’ individual rights claim, not about political process
Saw
Baker v. Carr
dealing with individuals rights that deal with
political process
Saw
Gingles
and its group-based rights claim
o
Supreme Court upheld John Lewis’s argument, O’Connor argued that
there was not dilution of black political power because it gave greater
influence (recall question regarding descriptive or substantive
representation)
Also, in support, one might argue that one wants to privilege
Congressional legislature over local legislature
o
Constitutional question that we will address later with
Shaw v. Reno
regarding plan, could raise as applied challenge in Section 5 if it compels
unconstitutional results
see Kennedy’s concurrence (but raises question
as to what constitutes unconstitutional results)
o
In terms of gamble, following this, 4 white representatives switched from
Democratic to Republican Party
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Implications
o
What is left of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act under O’Connor’s
view? Is there a meaningful standard of review? What will Congress
have renewed if they, as is likely, reauthorize Section 5?
Follow-on history of
Georgia v. Ashcroft
:
o
In
Cox v. Larios
, plan
was challenged
under one-person, one-vote
o
District Court found that it was partisan gerrymander and that it violated,
ever so slightly, one-person, one-vote and so struck (summarily affirmed
by Supreme Court)
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I.
R
EDISTRICTING
AND
R
EPRESENTATION
Partisan Gerrymandering
1156-1160, 867-889, Supp. 126-187
Gaffney v. Cummings
, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (pp. 867-870)
F
ACTS
: CT bipartisan gerrymander
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice White): Bipartisan gerrymander is cool;
politics will definitely enter; proportionality isn’t command, but political fairness
is reasonable
Class Discussion on
Gaffney
CT legislature couldn’t and so Bork was asked to redistrict and he used no
political data and it ended up with Democratic gerrymander; CT legislature
decides to funk that and carves up state to preserve status quo
White’s opinion highlights his frustration with claim: if didn’t look at political
data, could end up with gerrymander and political consequences would be known
and, if not changed, intended
at least here, we get “right” results
From vantage point of Equal Protection law where you are looking for a
placeholder of
Carolene Products
discrete and insular minority, the Court in
Gaffney
rejects the claim finding no harm to a discrete and insular minority
(where the hell is real party?)
Karcher v. Daggett
, 462 U.S. 725 (1983)
C
ONCURRIING
(Justice Stevens): Partisan advantage is not legitimate criteria
o
Plan has significant adverse impact on identifiable political group;
objective indicia of irregularity; and lacks neutral, legitimate state interests
Additional Class Discussion on
Karcher
and Partisan Gerrymandering
Both Stevens and Powell thought
Karcher
was about political gerrymandering
thought if you could find a political class whose power was undermined than one
might have a claim (proportional representation creeping in as Constitutional
principle)
o
Stevens would make this a general, objective defect looking at process
failures that might be actionable
In general, hard to find harm unless, like
Gomillion
, there is an invidious purpose
o
Look to intentionality required by
Washington v. Davis
, which serves to
cabin Court’s scope of work
o
But tricky in gerrymandering because it is totally intentional
Davis v. Bandemer
F
ACTS
: Post-1980 districting of Indiana
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice White): Partisan gerrymandering claims are
justiciable; must show intent (easy) and effect/continued frustration of majority
will or effective denial of minority voters of chance to influence political process
(hard)
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C
ONCURRING
(Justice O’Connor with Chief Justice and Rehnquist): Have to worry
about what the standard will be (don’t want proportionality and factionalism) and
partisan gerrymanders tend to be self-limiting
C
ONCURRING IN
P
ART
(Justice Powell with Stevens joining): Would go with
Stevens’ test from
Karcher
Class Discussion on
Davis v. Bandemer
Same term (and, perhaps, same day) as
Gingles
Court basically saying, if we are into looking at vote dilution, we are going to
jump in all the way
Two interesting factual backgrounds:
o
(1) This districting that was challenged in
Whitcomb v. Chavis
recomprised as single-member districts
o
(2) National Democratic Party filed on behalf of Indiana Republican Party
and vice versa
A more real party than in
Gaffney
so, is this a cognizable harm?
o
Well, have to figure out what is the harm being suffered
o
Courts says once has to show consistent degradation
In terms of process failure:
Has one party been shut out?
Has there been deviation from agreed upon prophylactic
rules?
o
See, e.g., one-person, one-vote as remedy for
certain process failure
o
Compactness
Density score (draw box around and see
how much space is left)
Perimeter score (add up angles)
Many-sides
o
Contiguity
o
Political/natural barriers
[Paired with disproportional results gets us to Stevens’
approach
very odd form of Constitutional law, as it turns
on non-Constitutional factors]
Why now?
o
Decided same day as
Gingles
where, arguably, Court crossed threshold
that was seen as unimaginable in
Colgrove
, Court is going to end up
judging who should win elections
Unless there is a way to establish a threshold test that keeps Court
out of political inquiry, Court will end up as political branch
deciding who should win elections
Response in
Baker
was disingenuous was “EPC is familiar;” real
response was in
Reynolds
that is completely ex ante
together
this gets up to
ex ante process failure
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o
When looking at outcomes, very hard to develop this threshold test
White
/
Zimmer
and 1982 Voting Rights Amendment helped provide
way to judge based on outcomes
Court just has to get at complete exclusion ala
City of Mobile
v. Bolden
But racial minorities and major party that just happened to
lose is totally different
o
So, for political parties, Court is just saying we’ll make this justiciable ala
Baker v. Carr
o
However, unlike
Baker v. Carr
, there was no
Reynolds v. Sims
(just two
years later) and so just threw world into uncertainty
o
O’Connor says fuck that: (1) this is self-limiting and (2) moves towards
proportionality requirement
and proportionality requirement will threaten stable two-
party system (perhaps, leading to factionalism and extremism, which was a concern that
was particularly acute to a generation that had seen the rise of Hitler and the Cold War)
Badham v. Eu
, 694 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Cal. 1988),
aff’d
, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989)
F
ACTS
: Republicans challenge CA districting plan
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Circuit Judge Poole with District Judge Zirpoli
concurring): Fine because CA Republicans are not shut out; hold 40% of
congressional seats and Republican governor
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(2) Only
Time
Bandemer
Led
to
Redress
: In
Republican Party of
North Carolina v. Martin
(4th Cir. 1992), Republicans running for
judge positions brought suit and got injunction but won before put into
effect
o
(4) Alternatives
to
Bandemer
: Many arguable standards/very hard to
figure out if there is gerrymandering
Could make redistricting authorities precommit
Vieth v. Jubilerer
, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (2004) (Supp. pp. 129-191)
F
ACTS
: Political gerrymander in
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice Scalia): Non-justiciable
o
Political question
Textually entrusted to Congress in Art. I, § 4
Has been used as in Apportionment Act of 1842 (required
single-member districts for Congress)
o
Bandemer
was unworkable
C
ONCURRING IN
J
UDGMENT
(Justice Kennedy): Some standard might become
available in the future
o
Suggests that First Amendment might apply more readily than EPC
D
ISSENT
(Justice Stevens): Would apply same standard as in racial gerrymandering
(have to have some neutral justification or legitimate government
motivation/essentially
Shaw
)
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D
ISSENT
(Justice Souter with Ginsburg): Would adopt
McDonnell Douglas Corp.
burden-shifting analysis
D
ISSENT
(Justice Breyer): Worries about unjustified legislative entrenchment and
general democratic harm
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(7)
Cox
v.
Larios
: Supreme Court summarily affirmed (2004) and Stevens
wrote concurrence that explained it was messed up partisan
gerrymandering that really got Court’s goat (e.g., pointed to selective
incumbent protection)
Recall, same districts as challenged in
Georgia v. Ashcroft
Class Discussion on
Vieth
Mismatch between popular conception and Supreme Court’s conception on what
is at issue with partisan gerrymandering
o
In 2002, only 4 incumbents lost
o
In 2004, it was thought that there about 15-17 genuinely competitive
House seats and about 14 Senate seats and about 16 gubernatorial
positions
So leading up to
Vieth
:
Editorials and the like thought the case was about whether
something was fundamentally wrong with partisan
gerrymandering (overall legitimacy of incumbents
controlling redistricting)
Rather, Court heard partisan discrimination claim
o
In 2006, we have second-term president who is having problems
Historic problem is that president’s party gets walloped
What we will find is that it is very hard for Democrats to prevail
there are only about ~35 seats that are competitive (incumbent may
get less than 55%) with 11 currently held by Dems and 24 by
Republicans
Two doctrinal difficulties:
o
Court got into this area through
Baker
and its progeny (through
Bandemer
), which made EPC the analytic key
Recall that this is the positioning even in
Bush v. Gore
(compare
with Rehnquist’s thoughts regarding structural issue)
o
Who has standing? Everyone has the right to vote
The only claim can be that one’s vote was improperly aggregated
and this must be a group claim (with single-member districted
system, individual claim is just about equal weighting) and it is
hard to tell at what level does this accrue
According to
Bandemer
, when one is unable to join with
other partisans to achieve a roughly proportional result
Also practical difficulties:
o
Very expensive
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o
By and large, only major political parties have resources/incentive to bring
these cases
Also, structural/textual issue:
o
According to Constitution, Congress has oversight
But what happens when one has Constitutionally-recognized
problem and Constitutionally-mandated fix and it is not working?
Scalia says the Framers were totally aware of this (recall
gerrymander came in VA as attempt to keep out Madison,
who helped write the damn Constitutional clause)
o
But, Framers never anticipated rise of national parties where various states
would care about results in any given state
In many instances, partisan considerations are ok, it is just excessive partisan
considerations that are unconstitutional
o
Scalia is impatient
been at this for two decades and no closer so have to
stop, it is like
Baker
without
Reynolds
(maybe Scalia should have been
more patient given his discussion in
McConnell
on how power’s instinct is
to retain power)
o
Petitioners offer model that would normalize elections in every district to
50% how much performance would tip the balance to one party or another
The Court is very divided:
o
4 hold nonjusticiable
o
4 hold justiciable (albeit under 3 different standards)
o
Kennedy holds that it might be justiciable and so would allow District
Courts to futz around with it
Scholars (including Issacharoff) argue that Court has to move paradigm from
discrimination model to competition and structural issue
o
See also Posner weighing in and potential of applying anti-trust law
(Souter and Ginsburg suggest that this might be way to deal with it)
Very hard to get out of box and move away from long line of case law
Competitive States/Uncompetitive Elections
Battleground States
o
AK, FL, IA, LA, ME, MI, MN, MO, NV, NH, NJ, NM, NC, OH, OR, PA,
VA, WA, WV (WI proved competitive but this was not predicted)
o
In 2000 presidential election, about 4.75% difference, in 2004, even less
(around 4%)
o
In 2000 contested House races was 30%
After 2000 Redistricting (2002 elections)
o
Main party contested races drops from somewhere a bit over 80% (looks
to be about 85%) to 80%
o
Usually redistricting leads to lower incumbent re-election rate (goes from
about 95% to about 9%); in 2002, went to about 96%
o
In non-competitive elections, people give virtually no money to
challengers
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Racial Gerrymandering
Race-Conscious
Redistricting
Introduction to Race-Conscious Redistricting
Problems with cracking and packing and requirements of Voting Rights Act and
rights of “filler” people in majority-minority districts
United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh v. Carey
, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (pp. 889-
896)
F
ACTS
: Brooklyn is subject to § 5; to ensure that it complied, split
Hassidic population in Brooklyn
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice White): No violation of Fourteenth or
Fifteenth Amendment; although used race, white people were not subject to
stigma or fencing out of political process
C
ONCURRING IN
P
ART
(Justice Brennan): Just reminding folks of dangers of racial
categorizations (adequately balanced in this case):
o
(1) Sometimes hard to tell if it is benign
o
(2) May perpetuate latent social racism
o
(3) Many in society view any racial categorization as unjust generally and
discrete insular minority groups of whites (e.g., the Hassidim) may bear
brunt of costs
D
ISSENTING
(Chief Justice Burger): Sees application of mechanical racial
gerrymandering that is at odds with “melting pot” and notion of
nondiscrimination guaranteed by Constitution
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) Hassidim
as
Minority
: Justice White’s opinion treats Hassidim just like
other whites but Brennan and other commentators have noted that
Hassidim have distinct position (and later upstate NY district was created
to give Hassidic enclave a voice)
o
(2) “Influence
District”
Claim?
: Since Hassidim didn’t compromise
majority, isn’t this really just “influence district” claim anyway?
o
(3) “65% Rule”
: Often cited for “65% rule,” which suggests that black or
Hispanic supermajority of 65% is required because white residents are more likely to be
citizens of voting age; be registered to vote; and have higher turnout
Class Discussion on United Jewish Organizations of
Williamsburgh v. Carey
White looks to see if it is not just purposeful (past
Washington v. Davis
) but
purposefully hurtful (and finds that there is no stigma or exclusion for whites, in
this case)
o
Rule coming out of this: Within this context, State may use race so long as
it does not create stigma or exclusion for an identifiable racial group
Hassidim might have argued that they were disadvantaged by race, but given time
and context, instead, they chose to argue that it was just prohibited
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Brennan says that, although it didn’t come up in this case, he wants to ensure that
the cost-bearer is not vulnerable group too
HOLDING: Race cannot be used if either: (a) purposeful discrimination against
an identifiable group ala
Gomillion
or (b) provable vote dilution ala
Gingles
Issacharoff believes that it is key to the majority of the Court that it is majority
political powers (white folks) burdening itself in the form of Congress with the
Voting Rights Act and, in
UJO
, the NY State Legislature
o
Compare with
Croson v. City of Richmond
(1989) that had set-asides for
minority contractors
O’Connor writes about difference between
Croson
and earlier civil rights cases (African-Americans control city
legislature and so benign discrimination is not self-evident)
Issues of Standing
o
With
UJO
harm, who has standing?
With standing, generally have to have ability to benefit from
remedy (not
jus terti
or third party claim)
People who have been denied the vote
Groups that have been disadvantaged (diluted voting strength)
o
Court’s argument should knock out future claims all together because
there can only be standing to bring one of these two claims
On issue of standing, in
Hays v. Louisiana
, Court held that person
only has standing if one is in challenged district
However, in
Northeast Florida Contractors
(1994), Court
seems to reject standing criterion in
Hays
and injury from
UJO
o
There were set-asides but lower court said that there
was no standing because dude couldn’t prove next-
in-line
o
Justice Thomas said if one is subject to
governmental decision-making that involves race
and race is a consideration in a decision that is
adverse to you, the fact that government took race
into account is sufficient for standing and for
shifting burden to government
o
Academy’s view
Pam Karlan goes with
UJO
(have to have clearly cognizable
injury)
Pildes says if government goes with impermissible expressive
conduct (virtually everybody has standing)
Issacharoff is somewhere in the middle
Difference between
UJO
(no cognizable individual or group constitutional claim)
and
Shaw
and its progeny is that the latter are really first order Constitutional
case; brings up the following question, “what is the line of demarcation between
law and politics?”
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o
Recall
Chevron
-style deference is not available in the Constitutional
domain
Shaw v. Reno
, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (pp. 897-907)
F
ACTS
: NC has relatively dispersed black population; AG objects under § 5 to first
plan, which contained only one majority-minority district of 12; state submits
revised plan that includes I-85 district
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice O’Connor): Redistricting that is “so bizarre
on its face that it is unexplainable on grounds other than race” demands strict
scrutiny review, notwithstanding if it is for benefit or determinant of minority as
racial gerrymander carries with it expressive harm (recall standing in
Northeastern Florida Chapter Of The Associated General Contractors Of
America
)
D
ISSENTING
(Justice White with Blackmun and Stevens): No harm where
whites remain majority with disproportionate representation
D
ISSENTING
(Justice Stevens): No violation when majority acts to facilitate
minority representation, particularly when it applies to African-Americans
Class Discussion on
Shaw v. Reno
Background
o
NC brokered deal to preserve Democratic power/incumbents’ positions
o
Republican-led Justice Department teamed with civil rights groups to use
“max black” strategy
o
Districts were screwy but all districting can be screwy and odd shape does
not necessarily imply use of racial categorization
Standard moves
o
Race-neutrality
o
UJO
(literal reading of EPC that says law is not neutral as to racial identity
of affected group/and looks to stigma or adverse effect)
o
Whites still retain more than proportional share of Congressional
delegation (no claim stemming from
UJO
or any other case that we have already looked
at/probably no standing either)
In contrast to standard moves, O’Connor makes claim that map in questions is
analogous to “political apartheid” but districts are really integrated (not like
Gomillion
) and so must be relying on Pildes’ notion of an expressive harm that
focuses on restriction on state’s ability to use race as predominate criterion (see
Kennedy’s lead opinion in
Miller v. Johnson
)
o
Given political/racial reality, Issacharoff argues that this Constitutional
doctrine that argues for opacity
Alternatives
o
Could say that the Constitutional issues are unworkable but institutional
mechanisms for making decisions/procedural issues are
best/Constitutionally-mandated (see prophylactic rule in
Reynolds v. Sims
)
o
Could use sub-constitutional factors to define parameters of conduct that
government actors may take (moves to second-order evidentiary factors
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that of themselves are non Constitutionally-required)
maybe this is like
O’Connor
approach in
Grutter
and
Shaw
(can’t be visible that race is only
criteria)
Additional Cases
o
Miller v. Johnson
only time that O’Connor doesn’t write lead
opinion;
Kennedy writes lead opinion that says
Shaw
can be read about
bad districting practices ala
Gomillion
but this is not what Court is talking
about, what Court is talking about transcends geographic concerns/sub-
constitutional factors; cases stand for the principle that race cannot be
predominate motive
O’Connor joins and then also writes concurring opinion saying that
this analysis can only be used when there are all these other
evidentiary factors present
o
Vera v. Bush
TX only used race and partisan variables to draw
districts; O’Connor writes majority opinion blasting use of racial data;
then writes own concurring opinion saying that it is only when there are
expressive harms that one gets to by seeing bad evidentiary factors (e.g.,
bad shapes)
Notes on the Political and Technological Contexts of the Post-1990 Redistricting
(pp.
907-924)
[See text]
Notes on Racial Gerrymandering and Standing
(pp. 924-934)
Expressive harm in
Bush v. Vera
Harm from discrimination as in
Brown v. Board
Harm
from
racially-discriminatory
practices
as
in
City
of
Jacksonville
(contractors unable to compete on equal footing)
But with racial gerrymanders (notwithstanding
Shaw
, where this wasn’t the case),
have to be in district according to
United States v. Hays
(US 1995)
Notes on Substantive Elements of
Shaw
Claim
(pp. 934-945)
According to
Miller v. Johnson
(US 1995), strict scrutiny is triggered when
race
has served as predominant factor and Justice Department cannot force state
to do something unconstitutional/grant constitutional absolution
In
Bush v. Vera
(US 1996), race was probably predominate factor
(partisan concerns were not deemed countervailing) and plan was
invalidated
o
However, compliance with Section 2 might be compelling state interest
o
Ditto with Section 5 (but must be remembered that Section 5 is about
maintenance and not augmentation)
Hunt v. Cromartie
, 531 U.S. XXX (2001) (pp. 946-958)
F
ACTS
: Was race predominant factor in drawing district lines in NC?
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice Breyer): Nope, District Court’s finding was
clearly erroneous; evidentiary burden is high
Party attacking legislatively
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drawn boundaries of majority-minority districts where racial identification
correlates with political affiliation has to show that boundaries could have been
redrawn that would have met partisan objectives with less racial
manipulation/equal concordance with traditional districting principles
D
ISSENT
(Justice Thomas): Needed to defer more to findings of District Court
o
In footnote, questions whether incumbent protection is acceptable when it
is based on impermissible racial gerrymander (see note 4 on p. 953)
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(6) Viewpoints
of
Court
:
(1) Race Neutrality – Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas
(2) Racial Pluralsim – Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, Stevens
(3) “Not
too
Much” – Kennedy, O’Connor
o
(7) Not
Just
Geography
Anymore
: Gerald Frug argues that tying politics to
geography might be outmoded; could get five votes to distribute anywhere
o
(8) Success
of
Black
Candidates
Post-Reconfiguration
: All black
incumbents whose districts were reconfigured still won
Additional Information from Class Discussion on
Shaw
and its Progeny
In some ways,
Ashcroft v. Georgia
is natural ending place in terms of materials
Generally,
Shaw
and its progeny provided a way of experimenting with crossover
voting
o
Assumption was that no reliable source of crossover voting/no sense that
any crossover voting might be partisan rather than racial
In
Shaw
line of cases, not a single black representative lost to a white challenger
o
Number of potential factors: greater inclusion; advantage of incumbency
In District 12 in Georgia (challenged 4 times), this happened too with Mel Watt
winning handily every time even as district gets less black
Class Discussion on
Hunt v. Cromartie
Combines the following 3 cases and their elements:
o
Shaw
: Appearances
o
Miller
: Race cannot be predominate motive
o
Vera
: Race/politics overlap is not a defense (but bad evidence where State
only had race and partisan affiliation)
Seems obvious that it had odd appearances and, given that it was about satisfying
Justice Department’s directive, it had to be all about race
o
Issacharoff finds this crazy
I would argue that it was not about race, it was about compliance
with a Justice Department directive to get preclearance for plan as
a whole
Holding
: Party attacking legislatively drawn boundaries of majority-minority
districts where racial identification correlates with political affiliation has to show
that boundaries could have been redrawn that would have met partisan objectives
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with less racial manipulation/equal concordance with traditional districting
principles
o
Not harmonized with
Shaw
and previous cases/virtually nobody could
satisfy this
How Do We District in the Post-Shaw World?
Issacharoff realized that
Bakke
and restricted standing doctrine had muted
criticism of affirmative action, allowing years of affirmative action with all of its
benefits as well as issuing a warning to state actors to tread carefully with racial
considerations
o
Court issuing a warning is a lot more like a policy mandate and not of
Constitutional principle (much more Constitutional integrity to positions
taken by either dissents—as long as no stigma, its fine or no racial
consideration is permissible—but these are discordant with more intuitive
notions of justice
O’Connor “specialized in the jurisprudence of the intuition,” which
Cass Sunstein celebrated as new form of judicial restraint where
Court avoids reaching Constitutional principles to ensure that
flexibility is retained
Without a good, clear principle, one would think that there should be a lot of
litigation in the post-
Shaw
world
however, there was virtually no litigation
under
Shaw
; instead, we saw accommodation of black majority districts so long as
Justice Department did not come in and really force the creation of oddly-shaped,
excessively-packed districts and we saw black incumbents win in their new
districts and we saw a real downplaying of racial considerations in favor of more
muted approaches
o
Lesson: Constitution need not be the guiding principle for the application
Again, question is whether this should be left to political process
Reconciling
Shaw
and Its Progeny and the Voting Rights Act
What does
Shaw
line of cases say about the VRA?
o
Certainly, “max black” strategy looks unconstitutional (
see
Miller v.
Johnson
)
o
Section 2 is unlikely to be read as compelling the creation of black
majority districts without regard to any other consideration
Johnson v.
De Grandy
says
mechanical
application
of
Thornberg
v. Gingles
cannot stand and doesn’t require greater than
proportionality
o
Also, doesn’t survive
Georgia v. Ashcroft
because it brings back
“totality
of the circumstances”
o
Not
clear
that
mechanical
Beers
non-retrogression
standard
still
exists
So, unlikely that VRA would be challenged because its current reading does not
compel any questionable line-drawing
But Congress is considering reauthorization of Section 5
o
Rumors that Congress will overturn
Georgia v. Ashcroft
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J.
O
THER
D
EMOCRATIC
F
ORMS
OF
G
OVERNANCE
Direct Democracy (pp. 982-1037)
Constitutional
Underpinnings
and
Concerns
(pp. 982-993)
Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Company v. Oregon
, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (pp.
985-991)
F
ACTS
: Oregon passed 2% tax on utility under state constitutional provision
that allowed for popular referendum
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Chief Justice White): Facial challenge to
constitutional provision that it was invalid under guaranty clause was left to
coordinate political branch (Congress, which could choose not to seat members
from Oregon if that was what they found)
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) Constitutionality of Direct Democracy Goes Unexamined
: Although
Court has truck down results of many initiatives and referenda, it has not
found those processes unconstitutional in and of themselves
o
(2) National
Referendum
: Not clear if direct democracy is consistent with
The Federalist Papers No. 10; nevertheless, considered trying to develop
national referendum by statute and by constitutional amendment
o
(3) Judicial
Scrutiny
and
Interpretation
of
Results
of
Direct
Democracy
:
Possible that courts should be more skeptical of results of direct
democracy because not otherwise subject to checks and balances (just
majority rule); also; popular intent is very hard to find, which creates
interpretative problems
o
(4) Values
of
Direct
Democracy
: Might help solve legislative gridlock
and/or legislative entrenchment
Issacharoff on Direct Democracy Unit
Conflict between original Constitution and modern sense of what it should be
about as it relates to regulating political arena
o
Returning to Madison, saw strong distrust of direct democracy
Set up institutional buffers to hinder translation of immediate
passion into policy
o
Over time, this has changed
direct democracy can be captured
by special interests as can local parties and national parties
o
2 modern themes
Attachment to simple notion privileging individual right of
democratic participation
gets to belief that majority should be
able to control (recall
Baker v. Carr
)
Not clear that state should be able to restrict this (recall
Kramer
)
Minority groups also get to make claims regarding political rights
Direct democracy rises too
o
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph
found that facial challenge to referendum
was nonjusticiable; as applied, many results of referendum have been
invalidated
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o
Not clear that it always has good effects
Hard to register intensity with referenda
In contrast, log-rolling/tradeoffs of deliberative legislative
process may better capture intensity and true will of
electorate
o
But this deliberative process might not be realistic
May produce particularly uninformed laws (see Jane Shacter’s
questioning of popular intent and problems of judicial
interpretation)
Some states have single-issue provision; other states have
secretary of state or other official confirm that language is
appropriate
Legislators
have histories and this allows voters to hold people
accountable and evaluate their performance
o
Lynn Baker argues that some issues (e.g., abortion affirmative action,
death penalty) are sufficiently first order questions of principle and are
sufficiently mature (having been subject to much public debate) that they
should go to the people and not the legislature
o
Richard Rafalk(?) makes argument that subjects (e.g., redistricting
commissions, campaign finance reform, term limits) that come up in
referenda and initiatives (particularly the latter) tend to be things that
challenge legislative entrenchment
o
Always concern that initiative will be used in way that is hostile to
minority rights (perhaps, repudiation of
Carolene Products
footnote)
Note on Money and the Initiative Process
(pp. 991-992)
Recall
Meyer v. Grant
(US 1988) (discussed in Chapter 6) where the
Supreme
Court held Colorado’s ban on paid signature gatherers a violation of
the First Amendment
o
Supreme Court had construed state’s interest very narrowly as about
preventing fraud and found no evidence that paid signature gathering
generated more fraudulent signatures (later Colorado did find evidence of
this); also possible to more broadly construe “The integrity of the initiative
process”
Also recall
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti
(US 1978) where
Court was
skeptical of corporate money, even though restrictions were struck
Generally, given structure of getting initiatives on ballot, it is very expensive and
may generate significant special interest spending
But may be good device for handling legislative entrenchment
Direct
Democracy
and
Rights
of
Political
Participation
–
Popular
Lawmaking
and
the
Problems of Entrenchment
(pp. 1011-1037)
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton
, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (pp. 1011-1026)
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F
ACTS
: Via popular referendum, Arkansas enacted statute that prohibited people
who had served 3 terms in House of Representatives or 2 terms in Senate from
being on the ballot
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice Stevens): Indirect attempt to impose term
limits on congressional incumbents that violated the Qualifications Clauses in
Article I of the Constitution rather than a permissible exercise of the State’s
power to regulate the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives” under Article I, § 4, cl. 1
o
Earlier precedent,
Powell v. McCormack
(395 U.S. 486, 1969), held that
Congress could not add more qualifications than were found in text of
Constitution because: (1) opportunity to be elected was open to all and (2)
sovereignty is vested in the people and that sovereignty confers on the
people the right to choose freely their representatives to National
Government
o
Not reserved under Tenth Amendment because states did not enjoy such a
power before its adoption
o
Basically, to so thoroughly change government structure, need
constitutional amendment
D
ISSENT
(Justice Thomas with Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Scalia joining): Logical
conclusion of Constitution is that Framers did not want national government
imposing additional qualifications, not that the people/state could not
o
Slippery slope argument: under this precedent, many existing state statutes
must be struck (e.g., banning mentally incompetent or imprisoned from
running for office)
o
Incumbents have so many advantages, ballot restriction/term limits might
be leveling the field
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1) States
with
Direct
Democracy
Have
Term
Limits
: NH is only state that
has term limits that does not have direct democracy mechanism;
otherwise, virtually all states with direct democracy mechanism passed
term limit statues in 1990s for state offices
o
(2) Term Limits and Conceptions of Democratic Politics
: Supreme Court
takes view that most important principle is that people choose whom they
please to govern them; but term limits might help by reducing pressures
to vote for incumbents and reducing barriers to entry for new challengers
o
(3) Applicability
of
Thornton
to
State
Offices
:
Thornton
might be thought
to be limited to federal offices/offices created by Constitution; but used in
California,
Bates v. Jones
(N.D. Cal. 1997) to toss out term limits on state
legislators
o
(4) Term
Limits,
Campaign
Finance,
and
Incumbent
Gerrymandering
: All
of these things are linked in creating the current morass
o
(5) Misuse
of
Powell
:
Thornton
relies heavily on
Powell
, but very
different facts
in
Powell
, Powell was elected by voters even after
allegations that he
acted improperly and perhaps illegally in previous term
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in House and so was denied seat despite clear manifested desire of constituents
On other side, another difference is that
Thornton
was creating
categorical prohibition while
Powell
was ad hoc individual case
o
(6) Constitutional
Amendment
for
Term
Limits
is
Probably
Unconstitutional
: Two paths under Article V
Under first path, 2/3 of both houses have to agree to propose
constitutional amendment
Under second path, 2/3 of state legislatures have to call
constitutional convention that can propose amendments (never
been done)
o
(9) Term
Limits
and
Districting
: Possible that districting a violation of
Thornton
holding regarding state-added/federal statutory-added
qualifications
o
(10) Twenty-Second
Amendment
: Term limits for president
o
(11) Is
it
Different
for
“People”
to
Promulgate
New
Qualifications
: Worry
about self-dealing if Congress or state legislatures developed additional
qualifications but harder to see this apply to people; Court dismisses this
concern by saying that the law is the law and it doesn’t matter from where
it comes
o
(12) Implications of
Thornton
on Ballot Access Cases
:
Thornton
might
provide means to attack earlier restrictive ballot access statutes that Court
upheld
Cook v. Gralike
, 121 S.Ct. 1029 (2001) (pp. 1126-1134)
F
ACTS
: Missouri adopted amendment to state constitution that required all
members of MO’s congressional delegation to advocate for term limits; if did not
or if refused to pledge to do so, this would be marked on ballot
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Justice Stevens): De facto regulation of electoral
outcomes as ballot markings does not have other legitimate relation to time, place,
or manner of elections and severely penalizes candidates or incumbents that
disagree with term limits or MO’s specified constitutional approach
C
ONCURRING
(Justice Kennedy): Joins but wants to make clear that states can
request specific action from Congress or express their concerns, just that MO
went beyond prerogative in this case, interposing itself between national
government and people
C
ONCURRING IN
P
ARTS
I
AND
IV
AND THE
J
UDGMENT
(Justice Thomas): Continues
to believe that States have reserved powers to prescribe qualifications for
representatives to Congress or to authorize elected state legislator to do so, but
this premise was conceded by parties and so concurs
C
ONCURRING IN THE
J
UDGMENT
(Chief Justice Rehnquist with O’Connor): Would
affirm based on First Amendment right of candidate to appear without pejorative
language affixed to name based on position
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
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o
(1) Implications of
Cook
: Majority engaged in very formal structural
analysis finding that statute violated congressional power to regulate time,
place, and manner of elections
what does this mean for states t regulate
federal elections
o
(2) Ballot
Notations
: Seventeenth Amendment (direct election of senators)
started with Oregon Scheme that asked senatorial candidates to pledge to
follow will of popular advisory election and, in NE, evolved into same
kind of scarlet letter as seen in
Cook
o
(3)
Cook
and the First Amendment
: Both district court and court of
appeals argued that ballot notation in question limits speakers by
punishing candidate for speaking out against term limits and from taking a
position of issue
not mentioned in majority Supreme Court opinion
Direct
Democracy
and
Rights
of
Political
Participation
–
Popular
Lawmaking
and
Unpopular Groups
(pp. 993-1010)
Evans v. Romer
, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (pp. 1001-1009)
F
ACTS
: Colorado state voters passed constitutional amendment that
disallowed statutes that employed protected status based on sexuality
D
ECISION
/R
ATIONALE
/H
OLDING
(Chief Justice Rovira): Strict scrutiny because
fundamental right and seems to be infringing upon right to participate
N
OTES
AND
Q
UESTIONS
:
o
(1)
Romer
and
Hunter
: Supreme Court decided
Romer
on rationale basis
scrutiny of conventional EPC analysis; CO court decided based on
fundamental rights analysis based on
Hunter v. Erickson
(US 1968),
in
which the Supreme Court had stated, “A state may no more
disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to enact
legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person’s vote or give any
group a smaller representation than another of comparable size” and
“The majority needs no protection against discrimination”
o
(2) Scalia
and
the
Political
Process
: Scalia dissented suggesting that this is
just a political process question
Class Discussion on
Evans v. Romer
Basically, sought to ensure that certain decisions are made at state level
Scalia’s dissent might have been asking if majority decision was constitutionally
enshrining political choice theory whereby smaller jurisdictions would be able to
be picked off and captured by special interests
Perhaps, minority vote dilution and creation of districts is all about requiring
subdivisions to protect minorities
Ultimately, what probably drives Supreme Court majority is Equal Protection
notion that there was disfavored group, even if not traditional suspect class, and
not going to implicate majority control
A number of other areas where this issue becomes more salient
o
E.g., Proposition 209 in California would prohibit use of affirmative
action in higher education
in form, challenges look very much
like
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Evans v. Romer
where it makes it impossible for particular view to get foothold in subdivision
of state
Litigants must choose how to challenge this
Started by bringing up racial discrimination concerns
o
Thought to be too weak an EPC claim
So brought it as challenge that it burdened women
o
Strange effect in 9
th
Circuit saying that too extent
that it was challenge brought by women, Court
could not hear it on process distortion grounds
given that women are majority of state
Note on Improving the Process of Direct Lawmaking
(pp. 1009-1010)
Some states have adopted a single-subject rule
ABA emphasized pre-ballot review by courts or administrative agencies to
address misleading or confusing language in titles and propositions; also
recommends information pamphlets and open hearings and debates
Alternative Democratic Structures
Cumulative Voting
(pp. 1099-1132)
Introductory Notes to Cumulative Voting
(1) Pildes
on
Pros
and
Cons
:
o
Advantages:
Avoids drawing of radically defined political districts
Diminishes conflicts between minority groups struggling over
district boundary lines
Basically, takes care of many of gerrymandering problems
Allows voters to define themselves
“redistricting” is done
by voters, not be politicians
o
Cons:
Too confusing
But IL used it after Civil War until 1980 when whole IL
House structure was changed
In New Mexico, used for city council of Alamogordo
Arguably higher transaction costs (voters have to know about more
candidates, more expensive to run, governing bodies might become
more fractured)
(2) Lani Guinier
: Recall Lani Guinier’s advocacy on use of cumulative voting,
which got a lot of attention when nominated to be head of Civil Rights Division
of DOJ
o
She argued that it was a move away from territorial or racial constituency
to one of politics or psychology
(3) Threshold of
Exclusion
:
o
For CV: (1/(1+N))+1 where N is the number of seats to be filled
o
For FPTP: (1/2)+1
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(4) Cumulative
Voting
in
Practice
: CV is increasingly used as remedy in voting-
rights litigation, particularly in rural South where it is difficult to draw districts
with concentrations of black voters as majority
o
In Alabama case,
Dillard
, defendants entered into consent decree that
created CV system
In case study, the CV system worked in that it resulted in minority
representation but it was widely disliked and there was disconnect
between representatives and constituents (hard to locate on both
sides)
Additional Notes on Cumulative Voting
(1) Use
of CV
in the
US
:
o
After Civil War, IL adopted CV system that lasted until 1980; reduced
geographic divisions between parties and increased minority
representation; but also resulted in collusion and diminished competition
where parties would only run small number of candidates in given district
o
Alamogordo, NM, adopted CV in 1987 for city council until 1997
o
In TX, at least 26 small cities and school districts use CV
Lewyn, pp. 226-227, argues that CV is best for small cities, for
nonpartisan elections, and for jurisdictions with stable, dominant
majority faction or party
o
Corporations often use CV
o
Lani Guinier has suggested that it could be used in legislatures too
Preference
Voting
or
the
Single
Transferable
Vote
(pp. 1132-1141)
Individuals rank candidates and if vote would be wasted (i.e., the dude would win
without vote or if cast for losing candidate), transferred to next ranked candidate
o
For surplus situation, any number of ways to allocate votes
Preferred is to distribute winning candidate’s surplus votes
according to percentage of second choice preferences registered on
winning candidate’s ballots
o
Threshold of exclusion: (V/(N+1))+1
V = total number of votes
N = number of seats to be filled
Limited
Voting
(pp. 1141-1151)
Less votes than number of seats
Threshold of exclusion: (V/(V+N))+1
o
V = number of votes a voter may cast
o
N = number of seats to be filled
In general, when comparing with CV, can think about following factors:
o
Costs and difficulties with coordination (e.g., visibility of election,
existence of political organizations with resources and sophistication to
organize)
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Generally, LV requires less strategic coordination among minority
voters
The
Lot
Versus
the
Election
(pp. 1151-1155)
There could be any number of different systems that involve a lottery system
Debate
between
Majoritarian
Systems
&
Proportional
Representation
(pp. 1160-1167)
Introduction
Often framed as debate between representation (proportional representation) and
good, stable governance (majoritarian systems)
Professor Ferdinand Hermens argued that proportional representation leads to
extremist views and argues that such a system led to rise of Hitler in Germany and
Facists in Italy
o
But this claim has been disputed
Notes
(1) Stability
: Not clear that PR systems are unstable in terms of government
changes (in Europe, first 5 most stable countries all used PR and UK, with MS,
was sixth)
o
Under MS, if two parties have widely divergent views, even small change
in voter preferences can lead to incredible policy shift (see, e.g., Great
Britain during 1970s where Labour and Conservative parties traded
positions and whole industries were nationalized and de-nationalized)
o
PR generally requires coalition-building/consensus and may lead to more
incremental changes
(2) Coalition Governments and Electoral Mandates
: Critics of PR sometimes
argue that tends to produce coalition governments which may lack clear electoral
mandate and be more ineffective/less accountable
o
On other hand, sometimes, under MS, minority can win majority control
(“manufactured majority”)
o
One could conceive of difference between PR and MS as being one of
timing
with PR, negotiate after elections; with MS, negotiate before to
form blocs
(3) Extremist and Fringe Parties
: One of causes of demise of PR in local
government in US was in the 1930s and 1940s when Communists started winning
office
o
Michael Gallagher found that no correlation between PR and MS and rise
of fringe parties (perhaps, bringing extremist party into government results
in moderation of views)
o
Issacharoff also notes “kingmaker” power problem
(4) Election
of
Women
: PR systems tend to enhance representation of women
o
Due to structure of most PR systems where parties run slates, not
individual candidates, and so appeal to diverse constituencies
o
Also, often parties have adopted quotas
o
In US, women fare better in multi-member districts
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(5) Deliberation
: Some scholars argue that single-member/majoritarian systems
lead to less democratic deliberation because so much of the real political wheeling
and dealing happens out of sight
o
Alternately, MS might lead to more because it is more about government
by persuasion
(6) Voter
Turnout
: Lijphart has study that seems to confirm claim that one gets
higher turnout with PR because less chance of wasting vote
(7) Gerrymandering
: Less of a problem with PR
(8) Examples of PR Failings in Specific Countries
: Sometimes people focus on
problems with forming stable government by looking at examples of countries
where it has not been easy under PR
but many of these countries, e.g. Israel,
have extreme PR system (elects all 120 members of legislative body in one
national election, which means that party can get seat with less than 1% of vote)
Consociational
Democracy
(pp. 1168-1172)
Introduction
Institutional structure devised in several countries to attempt to sustain democracy
in the midst of powerful differences
Notes
(1) Theory and Structure
: Basic focus is to foster cooperation among political
elites
generally, four common elements: (1) government by grand collation of
all significant segments where there essentially is a sharing of power with
different groups getting to be at the head for some period of time; (2) mutual veto
or concurrent-majority voting rule for some or all issues where issue might have
to be approved by majority of different segments to pass, not just total majority;
(3) proportionality as principle for allocating political representation, public
funds, civil service positions, and; (4) considerable autonomy for various
segments of the society to govern their own affairs
(2) Favorable
Conditions
: Six conditions identified: (1) multiple balance of power
among three or more groups similar to notion advanced by Madison in
The
Federalist Papers
No. 10; (2) small country size; (3) territorial isolation of the
various segments; (4) overarching loyalties; (5) prior traditions of elite
accommodation; (6) crosscutting cleavages
(3) Costs
: Have to weigh various costs
o
In short-term may more deeply entrench divisions
o
Government might be paralyzed or grossly inefficient
o
Hard to know if it is worth it
does one measure by absence of violence
or economic prosperity or reduction of differences or who knows what?
(4) American
Consociationalism?
: Lijphart argues that differences between
countries that try it and those that don’t are often overdrawn
o
Lani Guinier argues for limited use with race questions
o
Some states use supermajority requirement
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A
PPENDIX
1 – T
ABLE
OF
A
UTHORITIES
Authority
Proposition
Constitution Art. 1, Section 2
"The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second
year by the people of the several states, and the electors in each state shall have the
qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state
legislature...Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
several states which may be included within this union, according to their
respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of
free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding
Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be
made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States,
and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law
direct."
Constitution Art. 1, Section 4
"The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the
places of choosing Senators."
Constitution Art. 1, Section 5
"ach House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own
members, and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a
smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the
attendance of absent members, in such manner, and under such penalties as each
House may provide."
Constitution Art. IV, Section 4
" The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form
of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application
of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)
against domestic Violence."
West Virginia State Bd. Of Educ. V. Barnette
(US 1943)
Life, liberty, property cannot be ceded by popular vote
United States v. Cruikshank (US 1875)
Supreme Court also noted that “the Constitution of the United States has not
conferred the right of suffrage upon any one;” dismissed indictments arising out of
Colfax massacre in which white mob murdered group of black voters in LA
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875)
(pp. 21-37)
Women don't get to vote under Fourteenth Amendment
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974)
(pp. 38-46)
Second clause of Fourteenth Amendment negates protected class of felons
Hunter v. Underwood (US 1985)
Can't have impermissble classifications within felony disenfranchisement
Baker v. Pataki (2d. Cir. 1996) (en banc)
Section 2 of VRA doesn't reach felony disenfranchisement claims
Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of
Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (pp. 46-48)
Facially neutral literacy test was permissible
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966) (pp. 48-52)
Poll tax was unconstitutional
Kramer v. Union Free School District No.
15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (pp. 52-58)
Resident can participate in school board elections
Cabell v. Chavez-Salido (US 1982)
Court stated that “exclusion of aliens from basic governmental processes is not a
deficiency in the democratic system but a necessary consequence of the
community’s process of self-definition”
Carrington v. Rash (US 1965)
Court struck down provision of TX Constitution that prohibited any member of
Armed Forces of US who moved to TX during course of duty was barred from
voting until left service
Dunn v. Blumstein (US 1982)
Court upheld residency requirement but held that TN’s additional requirement of
substantial period of residency failed strict scrutiny, rejecting claims that durational
requirement was necessary to prevent fraud (no pressing administrative
convenience concern) and to ensure educated, committed voters (over- and under-
inclusive)
Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa (US
1978)
Upheld scheme where nonresidents were barred from voting but were policed by
city officers
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage District (US 1973)
Upheld CA enfranchisement scheme whereby only landowners were permitted to
vote in water storage district general elections and these votes were apportioned
according to the assessed valuation of the land
Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (pp. 91-
93)
Denies relief because (1) π alleges that whole registration scheme is
unconstitutional and so requested relief of registering him under doesn’t make
sense and (2) Court is not going to be able to enforce order/change political issues
Guinn v. United States (US 1915)
Supreme Court invalidated “grandfather clause,” exempting those who were
eligible to vote – or were lineal descendents – from literacy test, in OK state
constitutional amendment as violation of Fifteenth Amendment
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Authority
Proposition
Lane v. Wilson (US 1939)
Frankfurter distinguishing this from Giles by saying that it was legal, not equitable,
claim being raised and that it is “inequality of treatment under color of law, not
denial of the right to vote” that was being remedied and that the Fifteenth
Amendment “nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of
discrimination”
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (pp.
103-104)
Although political issue, case at hand is about judiciable private damages and,
addressing merits of case, statute is violation of Fourteenth Amendment EPC
(individual rights claim)
United States v. Classic (US 1941)
Supreme Court held that the right to vote in a primary is part of the larger right to
vote and so denied
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (US 1944)
(pp. 105-108)
Overrules Grovey, holding that political parties that are invested with power by and
governed by state statutes can be conceived of as de facto state agencies and, as
technical matter, state put power in executive committees not party conventions
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (pp.
108-114)
Reverse Court of Appeals; affirming District Court’s holding that combined
Jaybird-Democratic election machinery deprived πs’ of right to vote under
Fifteenth Amendment as the state-enforced apparatus produced the equivalent of a
prohibited election
Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia (US
1996)
5-justice majority held that rule governing who could participate in Δ’s party
nominating convention involved “voting” under Voting Rights Act of 1965 based
on historically-based statutory interpretation of term but it implicitly found state
action given application of Voting Rights Act
Davis v. Beason (US 1890)
Supreme Court upheld territorial statute that prohibited supporters or practitioners
of bigamy to participate in elections
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)
(pp. 125-129)
Petitioners entitled to prove allegations at trial because arguably good claim that
statute unconstitutionally deprived petitioner of federally-protected right to vote
because of petitioner’s race
Printz v. United States (US 1997)
Invalidating Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act because federal government
cannot command state-funded state actors to fulfill federal government functions
(raises questions about Motor Voter Act)
Foster v. Love (US 1997)
Supreme Court invalided Louisiana’s non-partisan write-in primary structures
where if candidate received majority of votes, they won entire election
Voting Integrity Project v. Comer (5th Cir.
2000)
Allow write-in TX system where voters could vote up to 17 days before federal
election day
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946)
(pp. 142-147)
Dismissed as it is not judicial issue because Article I, Section 4 of Constitution
puts it in hands of state/state legislatures/Congress (alternate institutions to
remedy) and it would be too difficult to administer remedy and court is not
competent to establish alternative system
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (pp.
147-162)
Justiciable because no separation of powers/Guaranty clause issues are implicated;
rather just about legal question involved, i.e., consistency of state practice with
equal protection clause (recall Nixon v. Herndon and Gomillion)
Luther v. Borden (US 1849)
With Guaranty Clause, Congress has oversight
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1946) (pp.
162-177)
When have voting issue, going to use strict scrutiny and EPC requires weight o
citizen’s vote cannot be made to depend on where he lives (roughly, one-person,
one-vote for state
Wesberry v. Sanders
Same as
Reynolds
but based on Art. 1, Section 2
Mahan v. Howell (US 1973)
Court upheld VA state redistricting plan with spread of 16.4%
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler (US 1969)
Striking down State’s preference for pleasingly-shaped Congressional districts that
yielded 5% spread
Burns v. Richardson (US 1966)
Court upheld HI redistricting plan based on registered voters even though it may
have been intended to enhance voting power of permanent residents and exclude
military population
Garza v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir.
1990)
Court held that underrepresentation of Hispanics was legally cognizable even
though many were not eligible voters under Wesberry and Reynolds
Karcher v. Dagget, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (pp.
177-185)
Kirkpatrick requires strict numerical equality; no general assertions of political
necessity will allow for even minor deviations (would have to assert with
specificity and such deviations must be evaluated case-by-case)
Wisconsin v. City of New York (US 1996)
Supreme Court rejected local governments claim that persistent undercount was
unconstitutional as Constitution vests Congress with essentially unreviewable
authority to conduct an “actual Enumeration” and distributive accuracy was more
important than numerical accuracy
Department of Commerce v. United States
House of Representatives (US 1999)
Supreme Court allowed Census Bureau to use sampling for demographic purposes
but not for purpose of apportioning Congressional seats
Gordon v. Lance (US 1971)
Supreme Court upheld West Virginia statute that required super-majority (60%
referendum) for local governments to incur bonded indebtedness or increase tax
rates
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Authority
Proposition
Gray v. Sanders
GA used county unit system to determine Senate elections and question is why
can’t Constitution to permit states to do such things when federal structure seems
to deviate in this kind of way
Avery v. Midland County (US 1968)
Supreme Court held that election of Commissioners Court of a TX county must
satisfy Reynolds standard where Commissioners Court had both
administrative/executive and legislative responsibilities
Sailors v. Board of Education of Kent
County (US 1967)
Supreme Court upheld appointive system for selection of local school board
Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688
(1989) (pp. 187-192)
Affirms lower court’s ruling that scheme violates EPC; powers are general enough
and have sufficient impact to require elections to comply with EPC
Wells v. Edwards (M.D. La. 1972)
Court found election of state court judges didn’t have to be equipopulation because
judges don’t represent people
Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (pp. 192-
204)
Have addressed a similar exception before in Sayler Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin
Water Storage District (US 1973) (upholding scheme where district directors were
elected only by landowners in proportion to their stake as they were reason for
creation of district and their land was subject to special liens); upholds AZ scheme
because: (1) District does not exercise government powers like taxation nor
provides most traditional government services like operation of schools; (2) even
water functions are relatively narrow; (3) District’s power business doesn’t affect
legality of its property-based voting scheme even though power business affected
lots of people because provision of electricity is not traditional element of
governmental sovereignty; overall, limited situation where reasonable relationship
to statutory objective
Kessler v. Grand Central District
Management Association (2d Cir. 1998)
Upholds BIDs
Fumalaro v. Chicago Board of Education,
142 Ill. 2d 54 (1990) (pp. 204-208)
Education is fundamental government power and so falls under “general
governmental function” rubric of Hadley and Kramer and therefore use strict
scrutiny and hold that Act violates EPC
Gamza v. Aguirre (5th Cir. 1980)
Judge Rubin rejected federal voting rights in claim in case where local school board
candidate found technological misconfiguration in voting machines in certain
precincts; “recognize a distinction between state laws and patterns of state action
systematically deny equality in voting and episodic events that, despite non-
discriminatory laws, may result in the dilution of individual’s vote”
Roe v. State of Alabama [Roe I], 43 F.3d
574 (11th Cir. 1995) (pp. 226-239)
Uphold District Court ruling finding that federal intervention is appropriate at this
early state where there is (1) constitutional due process issue, i.e., rule change and
(2) EPC issue, i.e., detrimental reliance, than there is a claim
Griffin v. Burns (1st Cir. 1978)
Where, in local city council race, Secretary of State concluded that ordinary
absentee and shut-in ballot laws should apply to primaries; publicized this; about
10% of total vote in primary came from such ballots; McCormick – machine vote
winner but total loser – brought suit and won at RI Supreme Court level as state law
did not authorize actions; Griffin – total winner – brought suit along with absentee
voters in District Court and won because those voters had relied on advice; First
Circuit affirmed remedy of new primary because RI Supreme Court had ruled that
votes were not legal
Roudebush v. Hartke (US 1972)
Where very close Senate election in IN; Senate provisionally seated Hartke, then
Roudebush asked for manual recount as allowed by state law; Supreme Court
upheld power of a state to conduct manual recount pursuant to ordinary law, even
for disputed Senate elections where Senate has provisionally seated member;
Senate itself has engaged in manual recount (process took 7 months and reached no
conclusion in 1924 Iowa election)
Electoral Count Act of 1887
Passed in effort t o recreate mechanism for resolving disputed elections
- Provides that state law procedures in place prior to election are binding on
Congress if they produce definitive result at least six days prior to day that electors
are schedule to meet
- And provides mechanism for resolving disputes over whether to accept votes of
electors
• If only one return has been submitted, that is accepted unless both Houses reject
because of irregularities (3 U.S.C. § 5)
• If multiple returns, Congress is to accept return that conforms to state
determination under § 5; if Houses disagree, than whichever is certified by
executive of State is counted
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board of
Harris, 772 So.2d 1220 (Fla. S. Ct. Nov. 21,
2000) (pp. 249-262)
Secretary of State abused her discretion; statutory reading suggests that counties
can return late; penalties for late returns suggest that such a thing was contemplated
and overriding state concern regarding suffrage; gave counties until November 26
to complete recount
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Authority
Proposition
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board (Bush I), 530 U.S. 70 (Dec. 4, 2000)
(pp. 262-266)
As general rule, Court defers to state court’s interpretation of state statute, but
federal authority and interpretation is implicated given Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, with
election of national elections; given lack of clarity, remand to Florida Supreme
Court to figure out extent to which FL saw FL constitution as circumscribing
legislature’s authority under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2 and the amount of consideration given
to 3 U.S.C. § 5
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1982)
(pp. 267-276)
States pretty much get to do what they want regarding electoral voting but are
limited by later constitutional provisions
Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 512 (Dec. 9, 2000)
(pp. 279-281)
Grant application for stay and application for staty is treated as petition for writ of
certiorari and petition is granted
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (Dec. 12, 2000)
(pp. 281-315)
EPC violation due to lack of standards for recount
Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir.
1967)
Both white and black voters were affected; within power of federal courts to order
new trial; petitioners did not request ends-oriented recount, just needed
Hamer v. Ely (5th Cir. 1969)
Court did not grant new election even in MS election where election workers were
all white employers or creditors of blacks who may have needed assistance
Delahunt v. Johnston (Mass 1996)
Adjusted vote totals where Democratic primary challenge resulted in court
reviewing all ballots (both at trial level and on appeal)
In re the Matter of the Protest of Election
Returns, 707 So.2d 1170 (Fla. Ct. App.
1998) (1058-1068)
Where fraud, invalidated all absentee votes
In re the Purported Election of Bill Durkin
Statistical apportionment
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992)
Balancing test with character and magnitude of asserted injury to rights protected
by First and Fourteenth Amendment versus precise interests put forward by State as
justifications for burden imposed by its rule; HI makes it relatively easy to get on
ballot through creation of new party; as candidate of established party; or via
nonpartisan ballot; Limited expressive function of voting/more about winnowing
field to select candidate and so little burden; HI has interest in avoiding party-
raiding at primary level and wants acceptance of results by prohibiting
factionalism/sore loser candidacies at general election and wants to allow
unopposed victors of primaries to be designated officeholders and wants voters to
be informed so doesn’t allow late entrants
Kansas City v. Whipple (Mo. 1896)
Striking down tax on those who did not vote
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972)
“[R]ights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat
separation;” high fees give it patently exclusionary character and has dramatic
effect so goes to close scrutiny; fees are too over-inclusive for limiting field
purposes and purse issues are insufficient
Lubin v. Panish (US 1974)
Supreme Court invalidated CA’s filing fee regime, even though it was nowhere
near as prohibitive, as EPC violation for both voters and candidates
Molinari v. Powers (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
Court invalidated restrictive ballot requirements as irrational and undue burden on
First Amendment right
Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837 (D.
Conn.), summarily aff’d, 429 U.S. 989
(1976) (pp. 374-379)
Parties have rights of association too; closed primary provides certain integrity of
electoral process, and helpful in housekeeping (i.e., developing party line and
ensuring that it is reflective) while individuals are not really suffering harm (no
harassment so no real privacy concern) and no affirmative duties that come with
aligning with one party or another
Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir.
1996) (pp. 379-381)
Duke does not have right to associate with unwilling partner, but still use strict
scrutiny examining state interest in protecting political parties’ right to define their
membership
Republican Party of Texas v. Dietz, 940
S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1997) (pp. 382-
386)
Not every act of political party is state action and so sidesteps issue by determining
that it is just about ordering of internal affairs
LaRouche, Jr. v. Fowler (D.C. Cir. 1998)
In case involving LaRouche winning a few Democratic delegates and then being
knocked off bill, Court held that viewpoint discrimination is the sine qua non of a
political party and therefore even if state actors, political parties need only show
that internal party rule rationally advanced some legitimate interest of party to
withstand constitutional scrutiny
Democratic Party of the United States v.
LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981) (pp. 386-
391)
WI may not bind National Party to honor binding open primary results when those
results were reached in manner contrary to National Party rules
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Authority
Proposition
California Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567
(2000) (pp. 391-404)
Blanket primary violates First Amendment principles; evidence that danger of party
raiding and other cross-over voting problems (not just that wrong nominee might be
selected but nominees will have to change their appeals)
o State interest in producing candidate most likely to represent electorate and
expanding debate beyond partisan concerns is antithetical to freedom of
association
o State interest in ensuring disenfranchised persons enjoy right to effective vote is
not accurate representation because frustrated desire to vote in primary of party
that one is not affiliated with is not disenfranchisement (rather it is within right of
party)
o State interests in promoting fairness, affording voters greater choice, increasing
voter participating, and protecting privacy are not enough in this case because they
are not well-tailored or fully applicable
o Offers alternate solution: nonpartisan blanket primary where there is some
criteria to get onto ballot, no party affiliations are listed, and then top X vote-
getters move on to general election
Rutan v. Republican Party (US 1990)
Scalia dissented in patronage case
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,
479 U.S. 208 (1986) (pp. 404-
410)
Restrictions limiting participation in primaries to party members violate First
Amendment
Rosario v. Rockefeller (US 1973)
Court upheld NY law requiring voters to enroll in party of choice at least 30 days
before general election in November in order to vote in the next subsequent closed
party primary
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic
Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214 (1989)
(pp. 411-417)
o Ban on endorsements violates First Amendment rights of free speech and
association and does not survive strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored
to maintain a stable government and protect voters from confusion and undue
influence
o Requirements regarding composition of official governing bodies burdens
associational rights
Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia (US
1996)
Supreme Court looked at Δ’s decision to hold nominating convention and charge
people $45 to attend; Court did not unite behind single opinion, but Stevens and
Breyer relied on White Primary Cases to find parties state-actors and then rejected
party’s First Amendment claim
William v. Rhodes (US 1968)
Court invalidated OH’s laws that gave place on presidential ballot to candidate or
parties that received at least 10% of votes cast in governor’s election and made
other parties collect signatures equal to 15% of votes cast in last governor’s
election and file by early-February (well before major parties had chosen their
candidates)
Jenness v. Fortson (US 1971)
Upheld GA requirement that independent candidates get signatures equal to 5% of
total registered voters in last election
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S.
189 (1986) (pp. 422-426)
Ballot access can be restricted based on showing of support
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,
520 U.S. 351 (1997)
Associational rights are not unduly burdened; stability is good state interest
Arkansas Educational Television
Commission v. Forbes (1998)
Not a public forum; not viewpoint discriminatory so alright
Brown v. Hartlage (US 1982)
Strikes down KY statute that prohibited campaign promises
Buckley v. Valeo
Upholds contribution limits; invalidates expenditure limits; permits issue advocacy
FEC v. National Conservative Political
Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480, 508-09
(1985) (White, J., dissenting)
Slippery slope problems with the Buckley contention that money is speech because
it generates speech; For example, one might be able to use the First Amendment to
claim a right to a job because money is required to live and to speak
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,
528 U.S. 377 (2000) (pp. 460-474)
Contribution limits are acceptable to extent they allow for "effective advocacy";
quantum of evidence required to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny will vary with
novelty and plausibility of justification raised; footnote noting that bribery laws
only capture most egregious violations
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee v. Federal Election Commission,
518 U.S. 604 (1996) (pp. 474-487)
As applied challenge, invalidated because no coordination
FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee, 531 U.S. XX (2001)
(pp. 487-499)
Limits on expenditures by political parties in connection with congressional
campaigns are not facially unconstitutional
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978) (pp. 499-513)
Statute inhibits First Amendment values even if corporations do not necessarily
have such a right
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Authority
Proposition
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652 (1990) (pp. 515-524)
Uphold statute
o State has compelling state interest in regulating corporations
o Statute is narrowly tailored
Meyer v. Grant (US 1988)
Supreme Court struck down CO law that made it felony to use paid petition
gatherers in conjunction with trying to get initiative on state-wide ballot
MCLF
MCFL could not be regulated because: (1) formed to address political issues and
cannot engage in business activities; (2) absence of shareholders who might suffer
economic harm if they disagreed and wanted to pull out, and; (3) independence
from influence of business interests
Daggett v. Commission on Governmental
Ethics and Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445
(1st Cir. 2000) (pp. 529-533)
Public financing scheme so cool if not coercive
FEC v. Furgatch (9th Cir. 1987)
Furgatch did not require use of any magic words but looked at “communication as
a whole”
FEC v. Christian Action Network (W.D. Va.
1995) aff’d mem. 4th Cir.
Christian Action Network essentially said that didn’t matter if named candidate
and had clear intent if possible that it could be read as an issue ad
McConnell v. FEC, 124 S.Ct. 619 (2004)
(Supp. pp. 30-70)
o Justice Stevens and O’Connor delivered opinion of Court for Title I and Title II:
§ On Title I/§ 323 (limiting ability of parties to use soft money for campaigning
that combined state or general campaigns with federal election)
• Rise of soft money was problematic
o That Congress decided to, in part, limit contributions of soft money by limiting
how parties might spend it was not problematic under Buckley
o Also, regulations not disallowed under California Democratic Party v. Jones
o Very limited evidence needed because not novel or implausible (Shrink)
o “Undue influence” of Colorado Republican II might have been at play
• So was issue advertising
o Hard to tell difference
• Senate Committee investigation provides evidence of pay-for-access and other
ethical problems associated with current fund-raising regime
§ On Title II/§ 201 (limiting electioneering communication):
• Buckley divide between express advocacy and issue advocacy was based on
FECA not Constitution
• BRCA was sufficiently clear and neutral ex ante
• Also upholds disclosure requirements and requirement that corporation use
segregated funds (must use PAC)
o Justice Rehnquist delivered opinion of Court for Title III and IV:
§ Raising limits on hard money was cool; no equality argument was available to
counter
§ Prohibitions on those under 17 donating was unconstitutional because they had
free speech rights too and could have more narrowly tailored if concerned with
circumvention (e.g., could have had limit on family donations)
Libman v. Quebec (A.G.), 3 S.C.R. 569
(1997)
The Supreme Court of Canada described 3 guiding principles for campaign finance
law:
• (1) the principles of fairness and equal participation, which may require
expenditure or contribution caps;
• (2) the principle of the right to hear, which also cuts in favor of spending limits,
and;
• (3) the attribution of all election expenses, including those of independent
individuals and groups, to ensure that the spending limits are effective
Attorney General of Canada v. Harper, 2004
SCC 33
Upheld Canadian finance relying on the logic of Libman and the important role of
equality and access
FEC v. Beaumont (US 2003)
Justice Souter, writing for Court, held that regulation of advocacy-oriented
corporations that barred these groups from contributing directly to candidates for
federal office was alright
Landell v. Sorrell (2d Cir. 2004)
Expenditure limitations may be alright; Calabresi’ concurrence argued for more
open, honest discussion of competing values and had good point about limits of
money as expression within elections (can’t buy votes!)
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966) (pp. 548-571)
Appropriate legislation clause of Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment allows
Congress to undertake such action and there is virtually no evidentiary burden
required
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Authority
Proposition
Allen v. State Board of Elections (1969)
Following VRA, 3 cases in MS and 1 in VA moved to at-large elections, and Court
said this was unacceptable because one has to be concerned with ability to influence
elections
Beer
Mechanical retrogression standard under Section 5
Smith v. Employment Division
Peyote case, where Scalia said, essentially, there is no longer disparate impact
claims
City of Boerne
RFRA goes too far
Hibbs
Court has backed off a little from its stance as it relates to minority groups (Court
might be able to make distinction that it makes sense to privilege race above
incorporated protections because of Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments’ clear
focus and purpose but this has not really been accepted even though it is
philosophically strong)
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971)
(pp. 673-684)
o District Court’s finding that voting power of minority group had been cancelled
out “seems euphemism for political defeat at the polls”
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (pp.
684-692)
Invalidates multi-member districts given number of factors that speak to
discrimination and exclusion from political process of distinct minority group
Zimmer v. McKeithen (5th Cir. 1973)
§ Lack of access of slating candidates
§ Unresponsiveness of legislators
§ Tenuous state policy underlying preferences of multi-member or at-large
districting
§ Past discrimination
§ Large districts
§ Majority vote requirements
§ Anti-single shot voting provisions
§ Lack of provision for at-large candidates from running from particular
geographic subdivisions
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55
(1980) (pp. 692-713)
Have to show purposeful discriminatory intent to succeed with Voting Rights Act
§ 2 claim
Rogers v. Lodge (US 1982)
Court found that at-large system had not been developed for discriminatory
purposes but that it had been maintained for such and that it was therefore no good
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986)
(pp. 748-776)
Multimember districts may be impermissible:
§ Minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and
geographically compact
§ Minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive
§ Minority group must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in the absence of special circumstances—
usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate
• Racially polarized voting does not have to be due to racial considerations (can
just show correlation between race of voters and candidate support)
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994)
(pp. 813-823)
Totality of the circumstances; Gingles is threshold; failure to maximize is not
measure of § 2; proportionality is not always defense (but probably creates
difficult barrier)
Voinovich v. Quilter
Decided same term as Shaw v. Reno, just before De Grandy, and held there must
be discriminatory effect to have § 2 violation
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003)
(Supp. pp. 71-95)
§ 5 is different than § 2; just about maintenance not about augmentation or looking
against some hypothetical ideal; descriptive versus substantive representation is
open question
Presley v. Etowah County Commissioner
(US 1992)
Had discussed that § 5 did not apply to changes of power amongst elected officials
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973)
(pp. 867-870)
Bipartisan gerrymander is cool; politics will definitely enter; proportionality isn’t
command, but political fairness is reasonable
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983)
Stevens concurrence says partisan advantage is not legitimate criteria; Plan has
significant adverse impact on identifiable political group; objective indicia of
irregularity; and lacks neutral, legitimate state interests
Davis v. Bandemer (1986)
Partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable; must show intent (easy) and effect/
continued frustration of majority will or effective denial of minority voters of
chance to influence political process (hard); recall same area as in
Whitcomb
Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Cal.
1988), aff’d, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989)
Fine because CA Republicans are not shut out; hold 40% of congressional seats
and Republican governor
Republican Party of North Carolina v.
Martin (4th Cir. 1992)
Republicans running for judge positions brought suit and got injunction but won
before put into effect
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Authority
Proposition
Vieth v. Jubilerer, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (2004)
(Supp. pp. 129-191)
Non-justiciable
o Political question
§ Textually entrusted to Congress in Art. I, § 4
• Has been used as in Apportionment Act of 1842 (required single-member
districts for Congress)
o Bandemer was unworkable
Cox v. Larios (2004)
Supreme Court summarily affirmed and Stevens wrote concurrence that explained
it was messed up partisan gerrymandering that really got Court’s goat (e.g., pointed
to selective incumbent protection) (also recall same districts as in
Georgia v.
Ashcroft
)
United Jewish Organizations of
Williamsburgh v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144
(1977) (pp. 889-896)
No violation of Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment; although used race, white
people were not subject to stigma or fencing out of political process
Croson v. City of Richmond (1989)
Invalidated set-asides for minority contractors; O’Connor writes about difference
between Croson and earlier civil rights cases (African-Americans control city
legislature and so benign discrimination is not self-evident)
Hays v. Louisiana
Court held that person only has standing if one is in challenged district
Northeast Florida Contractors (1994)
Court seems to reject standing criterion in Hays and injury from UJO
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (pp.
897-907)
Redistricting that is “so bizarre on its face that it is unexplainable on grounds other
than race” demands strict scrutiny review, notwithstanding if it is for benefit or
determinant of minority as racial gerrymander carries with it expressive harm
Miller v. Johnson (US 1995)
Strict scrutiny is triggered when race has served as predominant factor and Justice
Department cannot force state to do something unconstitutional/grant constitutional
absolution
Bush v. Vera (US 1996)
Race was probably predominate factor (partisan concerns were not deemed
countervailing) and plan was invalidated
o However, compliance with Section 2 might be compelling state interest
o Ditto with Section 5 (but must be remembered that Section 5 is about
maintenance and not augmentation)
Hunt v. Cromartie, 531 U.S. XXX (2001)
(pp. 946-958)
District Court’s finding was clearly erroneous; evidentiary burden is high à Party
attacking legislatively drawn boundaries of majority-minority districts where racial
identification correlates with political affiliation has to show that boundaries could
have been redrawn that would have met partisan objectives with less racial
manipulation/equal concordance with traditional districting principles
Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph
Company v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912)
(pp. 985-991)
Facial challenge to constitutional provision that it was invalid under guaranty clause
was left to coordinate political branch (Congress, which could choose not to seat
members from Oregon if that was what they found)
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514
U.S. 779 (1995) (pp. 1011-1026)
Indirect attempt to impose term limits on congressional incumbents that violated the
Qualifications Clauses in Article I of the Constitution rather than a permissible
exercise of the State’s power to regulate the “Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives” under Article I, § 4, cl. 1
Powell v. McCormack (395 U.S. 486, 1969)
Held that Congress could not add more qualifications than were found in text of
Constitution because: (1) opportunity to be elected was open to all and (2)
sovereignty is vested in the people and that sovereignty confers on the people the
right to choose freely their representatives to National Government
Cook v. Gralike, 121 S.Ct. 1029 (2001) (pp.
1126-1134)
De facto regulation of electoral outcomes as ballot markings does not have other
legitimate relation to time, place, or manner of elections and severely penalizes
candidates or incumbents that disagree with term limits or MO’s specified
constitutional approach
Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994)
(pp. 1001-1009)
Strict scrutiny because fundamental right and seems to be infringing upon right to
participate
Hunter v. Erickson (US 1968)
“A state may no more disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult
to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person’s vote or give any
group a smaller representation than another of comparable size” and “The majority
needs no protection against discrimination”
Dillard
Defendants entered into consent decree that created CV system
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