Week 5 responses

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Suffolk University *

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Oct 30, 2023

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Uploaded by timlynch1217

Well done. Do you think that the chance of an outbreak is low due to the security precautions of both the United States and the Russian Federation? Or, is is because we have eradicated smallpox across the world? Are there any chances that and outbreak could occur? I guess I consider the threat of an outbreak low because the CDC considers the threat to be low and there are allegedly only two known stocks of smallpox remaining. The CDC mentioned that a “credible concern” that countries have made the disease into a weapon and it had potentially fallen into the hands of terrorist. The two remaining stocks, one in Atlanta and another in Koltsovo, Russia, are under heavy security. The only reason I consider there to be a threat at all is because these stocks do exist and there is no way to tell if there is any other remaining traces of the disease out there. https://www.cdc.gov/smallpox/bioterrorism/public/threat.html Class, Smallpox, according to the Center for Disease Control, is an infectious disease caused caused by the variola virus. People who had smallpox suffered from fever and skin rash which often left permanent scars. A majority of the infected persons survived but every 3 out of 10 died (CDC, 2016). Because of the success of the smallpox vaccination, the last natural outbreak of smallpox in the United States occurred in 1949 and in 1980, the World Health Assembly declared smallpox eradicated (CDC, 2017). Since the last outbreak in 1977, there has not been any further cases of smallpox in the world (CDC, 2016). Currently there are two stockpiles of the smallpox virus in the world, one being the Center for Disease Control in the United States and the other being the Russian State Centre for Research on Virology and Biotechnology in the Russian Federation (CDC, 2016). There has been lots of debate and controversy in regards to these stockpiles. One side thinks that they should both be destroyed so that there is zero threat if the virus were to end up in the wrong hands (terrorism, black market). The other side believes that these stored viruses should remain under tight security for research and the further development of vaccines in the event the virus comes into the wrong hands. I believe that these stocks should remain as they are today, under tight security. The smallpox virus is a tool in our toolbox when it comes to building further vaccines and research in the event that the virus did end up being used in a bioterrorism event. Also, what guarantees that these stockpiles are completely destroyed and what guarantees that Russia does not keep part of their stockpile? The chances of the smallpox virus ending up in the wrong hands, in my opinion is slim, due to the extremely secure facilities that the viruses are stored in. CDC. (2017, July 12). Smallpox. Retrieved April 06, 2018, from https://www.cdc.gov/smallpox/index.html

CDC. (2016, June 07). Smallpox. Retrieved April 06, 2018, from https://www.cdc.gov/smallpox/about/index.html CDC. (2016, December 19). Smallpox. Retrieved April 06, 2018, from https://www.cdc.gov/smallpox/bioterrorism/public/threat.html I like that you referred to the remaining stock at a “tool”. That is exactly how I see it in the event that there ever is an outbreak. I agree that the stocks should remain as they are as long as security is maintained. There is no guarantee that even if an agreement is made on both sides to destroy the stocks that either side will follow through. "Smallpox was arguably one of the most deadly diseases to ever exist. It is estimated to have killed up to 500 million people in the 20th century. Throughout time, it has probably killed more people than all other infectious diseases combined. By 1980, smallpox was eradicated, and today it remains the only disease to have been eliminated by the World Health Organization" (Dovey, 2014). Except smallpox is not quite eliminated, the virus is being kept in two vials, one in the United States, the other in Russia. The main argument to keep the samples is for further research and creating vaccinations if needed. Synthetic smallpox is an unfortunate reality in the near future and some claim having a live sample will be greatly beneficial. Those who seek to destroy the samples claim there is enough data to make having live samples unnecessary. Some believe that the far less dangerous monkeypox is efficient for vaccine testing moving forward. "The last natural case was diagnosed in 1977, and today, the risk of a smallpox outbreak emerging is minuscule. However, scientists don’t know exactly how long variola virus can survive in dead tissue" (Dovey, 2014). I can see both sides of the argument and think there are very valid points on either side. If I had to pick I would not destroy the sample. No one knows what the future will hold. There have been recent cases of measles mumps and whooping cough, illnesses that were supposed to be suppressed. As mentioned before, it is unknown how long smallpox can survive in dead tissue and synthetically created smallpox is a real threat. Keeping a live sample is a risk, but it is also a risk to destroy it. The unknown factor is what made me decide that it may be better to keep the live sample and have faith that it is handled properly. Dovey, D. (2014). Should We Destroy Our Last Living Samples of the Virus That Causes Smallpox? Smithsonian Science Center. https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/should-we-destroy-our-last- living-samples-virus-causes-smallpox- I particularly liked two things in your post. First you pointed out exactly how deadly smallpox has been in the past. I am sure many, including myself, did not know how devastating smallpox actually was. Seeing the number 500 million really drives home the seriousness of the disease. I also liked how you pointed out how there have been recent cases of mumps and whooping cough, both diseases considered to be suppressed. This shows that a re emergence of a

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