WS on the Euthyphro

PLATO’S EUTHYPHRO This is one of Plato’s early dialogues in which Socrates discusses “piety” with Euthyphro. Euthyphro, as a priest, considers himself an expert in knowledge of religious matters, including an understanding of “piety.” What Socrates is looking for is an understanding of piety that is “normative,” that is, that will allow him to understand or judge whether a particular act or experience or attitude is, or is not, pious. “Normative” means that it functions as a basis of judgment, constituting a criterion for determining whether something falls within a particular category. The case of piety, in fact, falls within the realm of ethics. Euthyphro is at court to prosecute his father, and so he’s accused of being impious, failing to act with piety. Socrates, similarly, is at court because he is being accused, among other things, of being impious. So Socrates wants to know what piety is so that he can defend himself against this indictment. Has Socrates been acting improperly, violating the ethical and religious norms of his society? “Piety,” unfortunately, is an awkward word to discuss for our class, since we don’t use this word in our society very often; but it helps, for purposes of discussion, to “translate” this word as meaning “good.” So, Socrates has not been acting in a good way, his accuser is claiming. So, we might think of the issue at stake in this dialogue as seeking an answer to this question: What is good? This is something we all want to know, I would think. Is it odd that Socrates, this wise philosopher, does not know what “good” is? In any case, let us translate the word, “piety,” as “good,” in order to help understand what is at stake in this dialogue. 1. Why is Euthyphro at court? Yes, he’s prosecuting his father. Why? Are his relatives right that this is not a good thing to do? Why, in particular, do they object to this? Would you be willing to prosecute your own father under similar circumstances? Why or why not? 2. There are 5 attempts to define “piety” in this dialogue. The first definition is in paragraph 5e (look at the side of the page which numbers paragraphs in accordance with standard writings of Plato). What does Euthyphro say the pious is, and what argument does he give for this? Why in particular is Socrates unhappy with this definition? 3. The second definition is in paragraph 7a: “what is dear to the gods is pious.” Why is Socrates not happy with this? To bring this closer to our current culture, we can translate E’s claim as this: “the good is what God loves.” Does this make sense? Socrates doesn’t know our Judeo-Christian tradition, but many of you do. Are there any aspects of this tradition which would cause you to raise questions about this claim? Why or why not? Think for example of the flood or the tenth plague in the Exodus. Are these events good because God is said to love them? 4. In paragraphs 9a-e, Socrates sharpens the issue. Since all gods don’t agree on what they love, he says, for the sake of argument, they will assume that there are at least some things that all gods love, and so Euthyphro qualified his definition, offering a third definition: “the pious is what all gods love.” Socrates then asks about the status of the “pious.” What takes logical priority: “Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or it is pious because it is being loved by the gods” (12)? This might seem confusing, but the issue is this: Do the gods love X because it is pious, independently of the gods’ love, or is X pious because the gods love it? Do the gods’ loving X make it pious? Are they (or their love) the cause of its piousness? Let’s translate this into more familiar language: is something good because God says it’s good, causes its goodness, so to speak, or is something good independent of God, and that is why God says it is good? What is the line of determination – does God determine what is good, or does good determine God’s love? What do you think, and why? How does Socrates address this issue? 5. Euthyphro’s fourth definition is in paragraph 12e: “the . . . pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods.” Unfortunately, Socrates’ arguments against this definition are very confusing on this page, but he becomes clearer when he asks what “care of the gods” means on the next page. Euthyphro says that care is really service, like the service slaves give to their masters. But Socrates responds by noting that this implies that the gods have particular aims which our service would help them achieve. Yes, says Euthyphro: “I say that if a man knows how to say and do what is pleasing to the gods at prayer and sacrifice, those are pious actions such as preserve houses and public affairs of state” (para 14b). Does Socrates have an argument against this? Euthyphro is saying that one thing the gods want to achieve is to sustain humans in their private and their public lives, so that humans can flourish – and that we are