Case Study 2

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4384

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Political Science

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Jan 9, 2024

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Diego Araya Professor Enia POLS 4384 Sept 25, 2016 Case Essay #2 Russian aggression in the vicinity of the Black Sea and the eastern fringes of Europe is nothing new. Conflicts such as the Crimean War, the overall rivalry between the United Kingdom and the Russian Empire which manifested itself as the Great Game, and Soviet geopolitical desires immediately before and after 1945 demonstrate a Russian willingness to achieve regional security in regards to European, and particularly Western European, states. Whether under the rule of a czar, general secretary, or president, Moscow has repeatedly sought to politically or economically control the states which would ensure either its safety from the West or regional hegemony, the latter goal often conflicting with the national or economic ambitions of the West. Modern Russian ambitions in Eastern Europe and the Baltic, whether real or imagined, can certainly be traced from a historical precedent. As NATO has expanded to include former Warsaw Pact and Eastern European states, Russia finds itself increasingly surrounded by states which look to the West for political and economic ties. This has in turn isolated Russia, worsening relations between the West and Russia, and by default, NATO and Russia.

From the offensive neorealist perspective, Russia is seeking to maximize its relative power, which would explain its desire to control the states which would provide Russia with access to warm water ports in the Baltic and Black Sea. In addition to the commercial and military benefits of these ports, territorial control of Ukraine complements the diplomatic control Russia exerts over Belarus and provides a buffer zone between itself and NATO. This would effectively establish Russia as the regional hegemon and negate NATO influence in the East. From this perspective of defensive neorealism, Russia would seek to maximize its security in regards to NATO in particular, given that NATO is the amalgamation of both czarist Russian and Soviet rivals (Britain, France, Germany, and the United States). In other words, NATO is what Russia has fought and sought to defend its interests from over the past 300 years, if not more. Russia has historically felt unsafe from the West, and in order for the Russian state to achieve stability and success, safety must come in the form of absolute freedom from Western influence. In neither lens, however, is direct conflict likely. Russia is not seeking to confront the United States and Britain, but rather establish regional hegemony. If it directly confronts NATO, it risks losing any gains made since the annexation of Crimea. Both lenses indicate Russia’s aggression will not cease, but as was the case in Ukraine, hybrid warfare is much likelier. In spite of the benefits of controlling the Baltic states, NATO provides a significant deterrent ambition, as it would have had Ukraine been a part of the organization. In both lenses, the West presents a significant obstacle to either Russian maximization of power or Russian security, and it is precisely because of NATO’s size and power relative to that of Russia that conflict with the allied states is undesirable for Russia. Finally, the Sino-Soviet split during the Cold War demonstrates that Russia’s nearest and largest potential military ally would not necessarily provide much needed help against NATO in the event of direct conflict. Though also opposed to traditional

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