1982 Falkland Conflict - Operational Logistics and Command and Control

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The Falklands conflict began on Friday, 02 April 1982, when roughly 500 Argentinean special forces landed at Mullet Creek on East Falkland Island. Under Operation Rosario, Argentina advanced on the Government House at Port Stanley against an unorganized garrison of British Royal Marines stationed on the island. Little opposition was encountered and the Argentinean Junta quickly assumed control. On the same day, Brigadier General Mario Menendez was appointed governor of the islands and Port Stanley was immediately renamed Puerto Argentino. Argentina expected at this point that the British would cede sovereignty over the islands through negotiations and with little or no armed conflict. Argentina had been claiming the
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A professional military staff organized in a complicated command arrangement led the Argentinean Junta combat operation. In addition, they commanded a poorly trained and inexperienced combatant force. A theater command, the South Atlantic Theater of Operations (TAOS), was established under Vice Admiral Juan Lombardo to command Argentine naval units and the Falklands garrison. Subordinate to Admiral Lombardo, Brigadier General Benjamin Menendez commanded all Argentine army, air force, and navy units. The Fuerza Aerea Sur (FAS), or Southern Air Force, was established under the command of the air force Brigadier General Ernesto Horacio Crespo. The FAS was outside the authority of the theater commander and reported directly to the Argentine Junta.
The command structure, lacking a sole theater commander over all forces in the Area of Operations (AO), proved ineffective at strategic planning and joint operations. In a 1994 article in Joint Forces Quarterly, Robert L. Scheina, stated the following: "Jointness existed at the operational and tactical levels within the Argentine armed forces during the Malvinas conflict, but did not exist either strategically or doctrinally." Brigadier General Ernesto Horacio Crespo and Army General Benjamin Rattenbach led two separate studies reviewing Argentina's command performance during the
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