9/11: Underestimated The Power Of Al-Qaeda

Beginning in 2001 Intelligence about the impending nature of an attack was increasing, not only from US Intelligence sources but also from 11 other countries such as Britain, Israel, India, Egypt, Morocco and even a top Taliban commander from Afghanistan (Thompson.) Beginning in August warnings become coming in from everywhere, foreign governments, CIA and FBI sources and so on however, next to none of this information was shared between the many intelligence agencies. In April, NORAD launched a training scenario in which the pentagon was to be incapacitated by a hijacked airliner however the Joint Chiefs of Staff disregarded the scenario as “too unrealistic” (September 11 attacks advance-knowledge debate.) On august 19th the Israeli’s gave US intelligence personnel credible information including, the list of 19 suspected terrorist’s names and the fact that a large aircraft would be the primary weapon involved. The names were not shared by the CIA with other intelligence agencies (Robinson.)

The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 were the direct result of the failure of US agencies, ranging from the White House to airport security, to recognize vulnerabilities present in the various symptoms. The reason why these vulnerabilities were not acknowledged and repaired is that these various agencies were trapped in a cognitive dissonance cycle of thinking. After the Cold War, terrorism was seen as a regional problem (9/11 Commission, 92). The majority of terrorist groups were either groups sponsored by governments or militants trying to create governments (i.e. Palestine Liberation Organization). As a result, the tactics used for fighting terrorism were centralized mostly in the Middle East and were restricted to

It was a clear Tuesday morning; September 11, 2001, nineteen Islamic terrorists from Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations boarded four fully fueled American airliners. These airliners were set to depart to cities in California. Little did the staff for each of the planes or the people boarding them know that plans had changed. Within the space of an hour, al Qaeda

Recognizing the threat Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups posed provided homeland security with the basis which is now important to state and local law enforcement agencies (Sheehan, Michael, 2011). After nearly a decade after the September eleventh, more than twenty terrorist related plots were uncovered by the federal government. As the war against terrorism continues, it has cost America the lives of more than six thousand service members and nearly 1.5 trillion dollars (Ortmeier, P, 2009).

The intelligence community knew that Osama bin Laden had threatened to “cut off the head of the serpent” (the US) and cause mass casualties; it also knew that Bin Laden was planning to do something with aircrafts. An FBI field office knew that several pilots were in training, but didn’t seem to piece it all together (Simonsen & Spindlove, 2013, Pg. 69) However, the past “Dots” lead to a buildup by internationalized terror fanatics from the Islamic world, with serious planning for perpetrating attacks against the U.S. The U.S. had no idea that the attackers were actually being flight trained in Florida and the U.S. were

Upon analyzing 9/11 it was clear to focus on the limitations that the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Central Intelligence Agency had faced. Security breaches and poor intelligence sharing were just some of the critical failures that were encountered. Moreover, the main focus is pointed towards the miscommunication between these two agencies. Evidently, the execution and tactical strategies went unnoticed despite the apparent red flags that presented themselves, in addition to the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Central Intelligence Agency failure to pursue threats and establish a baseline of security resulted in the disaster of 9/11. In conjunction to these mistakes, the restriction of shared information

The day 9/11, was ranked the most audacious attack in American history, because of the tragic bombing that occurred, the hijackers rammed jetliners into the world trade center in new york, and the pentagon in virginia, this left a storm of ashes,smoke and fallen victims. I believe that the american response to this attack is not good because of the steps they took to handle the situation,like attacking states that may harbor these people, or by doing unreasonable search on people that may be clean on all the searches, and to just pick a random person to get cuffed for no reason is a bit harsh.

The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 were the direct result of the failure of US agencies, ranging from the White House to airport security, to recognize vulnerabilities present in the various symptoms. The reason why these vulnerabilities were not acknowledged and repaired is that these various agencies were trapped in a cognitive dissonance cycle of thinking. After the Cold War, terrorism was seen as a regional problem (9/11 Commission, 92). The majority of terrorist groups were either groups sponsored by governments or militants trying to create governments (i.e. Palestine Liberation Organization). As a result, the tactics used for fighting terrorism were centralized mostly in the Middle East and were restricted to

2001-Al Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan are targeted by the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and the CIA’s

Qaeda planned carefully in the attacks on the Unites States by sending nineteen militants over a period of several years to keep our suspicions down. They also held their meeting all across the globe. The planning meetings were held in Malaysia, they took flying lessons in the United States, and the leaders of al-Qaeda were in Hamburg, Germany. This is how many militants got over to the United States undetected especially the lead hijackers Mohammed Atta who was on our “watch list”. He was the one who communicated with Osama Bin Laden over e-mail about when the attacks were going to take place. This was just the preparation of what is about to come the United States’ way.

In the Communist invasion of Korea in the summer of 1950, Stalin believed North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung when he said he was “absolutely certain of success.” However, Stalin made it clear the USSR would not be footing the bill for a war in Korea if Sung was wrong, and he was. Once the United States sided with the South Koreans, the war became a fiasco instead of the quick, easy, and cheap spread of Communism Stalin thought he was signing on for, and Korea has never been stable since. Similarly, on September 11, 2001, al Qaeda underestimated American retaliation when they orchestrated and executed terror attacks on U.S. soil. Since Americans started a “war on terror,” al Qaeda’s efforts have become “desperate self-promotion” and most of “their” attacks have been made by affiliated and never again had such a catastrophic impact as 9/11 (p 123).

On the morning of September 11, 2001, the Islamic terrorists group al-Qaeda hijacked four planes and crashed into the United States’ centers of power: the

On September 11, 2001 the United States was attacked by terrorist group name Al Qaeda, they hijacked four planes and planned on crashing them into American landmarks. Two of the four planes crashed into the World Trade Center, one plane crashed into the the Pentagon, the last plane did not make it to intended landmark but, instead crashed into a field. The terrorist attack on September 11th could not have necessarily have been prevented but, could not has been as severe. Certain things like lack of government communication, not very thorough background checks on middle eastern immigrants, lack of proper preparation for possible terrorist attacks impacted the severity of the situation.

When the September 11, 2001 attacks occurred the United States responded in a manner which was seen as a traditional reaction to such an attack; it used its overwhelming superior military to invade the nation of Afghanistan. As Afghanistan was the operating base of the terrorist group responsible for the attacks, Al Qaeda, the invasion all but destroyed the group's operating capacity. But in response to the United States' apparent victory the terrorists have re-organized themselves into a looser confederation and turned to alternative methods of finance and operation. One could say that the success of the American military's answer to the September 11th attacks have created a new environment in which terrorists currently operate. This includes the use of the internet, unconventional alliances with international criminal organizations, as well the inception of the "lone wolf" terrorist. Faced with these new type of threats, the United States and its allies must find a way to identify and deal with them.

As a direct consequence of September 11, a number of substantial challenges lie ahead in the area of counter-terrorism..   The most prominent of these is the changing nature of the terrorism phenomenon.  In past years, when terrorism was largely the product of direct state sponsorship, policymakers were able to diminish prospects for the United States becoming a target using a combination of diplomatic and military instruments to deter potential state sponsors.  Today, however, many terrorist organizations and individuals act independently from former and present state sponsors, shifting to other sources of support, including the development of transnational networks.