A Dialogue On Personal Identity And Immortality

In the “Second Night” of Perry’s Dialogue, Miller argues that memories are what determines personal identity. He began with the idea that if he were to take a person to the stretch of the river and then later come across a different stretch of the river, it could be classified as the same river. He believes that the judgement of personal identity are referred to the parts(stretches of the river) and how they are judged to be connect in certain ways. He then argued that all you need in order to survive after death is to imagine a later person who is in heaven with all the memories that had happened in your present/past. These memories can only be considered real if they were experienced by the same person who had the memories. On page 30, Weirob

In a series of relatively simple though complexly-worded (out of necessity) thought experiments regarding body-swapping and changes to memory and the mind, Bernard Williams attempts to demonstrate that identity should be identified with the body rather than with the mind when identity is extended into the future (and by extension during the present). That is, though it is typical for identity to be associated with the mind at any given moment, Williams argues that the logic that supports this intuitive association does not hold up over longer periods of time, and that anticipation of the future leads to an association of identity with the body rather than with the mind. Whether or not Williams is successful in this attempt is a matter of much debate, with this author finding some fundamental flaws in the very premise of the comparisons and thus the conclusions, however the argument is fairly elegant and persuasive and certainly worth of closer inspection. A careful reading of the argument might lead one to a conclusion opposite to that which was intended, but is no less rewarding for this unusual quirk.

In John Perry's A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, Gretchen Weirob argues that an individual has different character traits that split that person into diverse identities, no one is simple and he or she may have a complex identity. A person who experiences false memory may not be the same person Gretchen makes a careful distinction between two types of identities; these are the numerical and qualitative identities. The writer declares the former to be the identity and the later as the exact similarity. Same body same soul does not necessarily mean it resides in one person. I am numerically identical to myself. The same body could be equated to being numerically identical to oneself, for instance as they could be two and both of them boys, but in essence, they are still two people.

In his 1971 paper “Personal Identity”, Derek Parfit posits that it is possible and indeed desirable to free important questions from presuppositions about personal identity without losing all that matters. In working out how to do so, Parfit comes to the conclusion that “the question about identity has no importance” (Parfit, 1971, p. 4.2:3). In this essay, I will attempt to show that Parfit’s thesis is a valid one, with positive implications for human behaviour. The first section of the essay will examine the thesis in further detail and the second will assess how Parfit’s claims fare in the face of criticism.

Working in conjunction with memory is consciousness, consciousness is the definition of the self; it is the mind’s capacity to point beyond itself, differentiating between itself and an object creating awareness of “I” throughout bodily and memory changes. Consciousness is the heart of free will and intent, it is responsible for the ability of a person to choose. With that said, it is my belief that defining personal identity relies on both bodily and mental continuity.

In this paper, I will argue that the Memory Theory of Personal Identity is the closest to the truth. I will do so by showing that the opposing theories – Body and Soul Theories – have evident flaws and that the

For centuries philosophers have engaged themselves into conversations and arguments trying to figure out the nature of a human person; this has lead to various theories and speculation about the nature of the human mind and body. The question they are tying to answer is whether a human being is made of only the physical, body and brain, or both the physical or the mental, mind. In this paper I will focus on the mind-body Identity Theory to illustrate that it provides a suitable explanation for the mind and body interaction.

The purpose of this essay is to define what Personal Identity is by analyzing John Locke’s argument for Personal Identity. John Locke’s argument for Personal Identity will be examined, in order to establish a better understanding of whether or not the argument for personal identity could be embraced. In order to do so, the essay will i) State and explain Locke’s argument that we are not substances or mere souls and ii) State and explain Locke’s concept of personal identity and its relations to what he calls self, consciousness and punishment. This essay will also focus on Thomas Reid’s perspective on personal identity and iii) State and explain Reid’s criticisms of Locke’s theory of personal identity, and lastly iv) I will evaluate whether or not Reid’s objections are good. Locke’s argument may seem to be plausible at first, however, the essay will conclude by rejecting John Locke’s argument for personal identity due to Locke’s inadequate reasonings and Thomas Reid’s criticisms.

In philosophy, the issue of personal identity concerns the conditions under which a person at one time is the same person at another time. An analysis of personal identity

In, “A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality,” the author, John Perry, proposes three totally different ways of thinking about personal identity. The first theory is presented by a character named Gretchen Weirob, she believes that a person is their body. By this she means that a person’s identity is intertwined with the DNA and molecules of their body. Their personality as well as their personal identity can’t be separated from their body, and they cannot exist without it. The second theory was presented by a character named Sam Miller, he believes that a person is their immaterial soul. So in general, Sam thinks that the soul is this invisible, immaterial substance that is able to exist from the body. The third and final theory was presented by a character named Dave Cohen. Cohen believes that a person has continuity of memory, and/or psychology. So in general Cohen’s theory is that personal identity is a set of correlating experiences and/or memories enclosed in the brain. All three of the personal identity theories state some very valid points, but they also have some inconsistencies, some more than others. But there is one theory that seems to be the most credible, and creates a very compelling argument while also having a little science to back up some of its points.

In this essay it will be argued that the soul is mortal and does not survive the death of the body. As support, the following arguments from Lucretius will be examined: the “proof from the atomic structure of the soul,” the “proof from parallelism of mind and body,” the “proof from the sympatheia of mind and body,” and the “proof from the structural connection between mind and body.” The following arguments from Plato will be used as counterarguments against Lucretius: the “cyclical argument,” the “affinity argument,” the “argument from the form of life,” and the “recollection argument.” It will be shown that Plato’s premises lack validity and that Lucretius’

In the world of philosophy, there has been an ever growing skepticism of the relationship between the human body and its mental state. The physical state of a person is tangible, meaning that they can be seen by anyone and touched. While the mental state of a person is embedded in their consciencousness, meaning that it can’t be observed by others unless willing expressed by said person. I will be using Leibniz’s law of identity to show that the metal states of an individual are distinct from a physical state. Using the notion of sameness, I can prove a valid argument that the physical and mental states are distinct. While this theory in part can be debated, some identity theorists can provide a rebuttal this claim. I will provide a response to an identity theorist rebuttal.

As humans, do we consciously form our own identities? After all, one is rarely who they aspire to be. Take, for example, John Gardner’s character Grendel. Although Grendel seems to intentionally perpetuate his wretched state of being, it is also clear that this process creates, or is the product of some sort of internal struggle between what he considers to be the “two dark realities, the self and the world” (Gardner 47). For many individuals, including Grendel, existence appears to be nothing more than a never-ending series of conflicts, mostly between the actual state of things and our idealistic perception of what they should be. These conflicts, whether realized or not, generate a great deal of emotional and psychological turmoil. This idea is present in nearly every religion and school of philosophy and has been given many names throughout history, but the more recent technical term for this flaw in human thought is “cognitive dissonance”.

Personal identity, in a philosophical point of view, is the problem of explaining what makes a person numerically the same over a period of time, despite the change in qualities. The major questions answered by Locke were questions concerning the nature of identity, persons, and immorality (Jacobsen, 2016). This essay will discuss the three themes John Locke presents in his argument regarding personal identity, which are, the concept of categories, substance vs. man vs. person, and the continuity of consciousness.

If on Tuesday, I suffer an accident and lose all of my memory, it is probable that my family and friends will still love and care for me, creating an impression that I am indeed the same person I once was. These conditions imply the theses of animalism and bodily continuity when it comes to personal identity. However, is this human habit enough to discard the idea that it is psychological continuity that sustains identity? Whilst many may argue that it would be against our intuition to say that I am no longer the same person, I do not believe that this is caused by our intuition, but instead a societal construct that’s sole purpose is to make the trauma of the accident and loss easier to deal with. By using this premise and upholding the psychological