A Line Of Effort: A Case Study

Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with

While analyzing the North Africa conflict, a combination of service capabilities would be required to achieve the desired end state of deterring and if necessary, the defeat of Algerian guerilla aggression to prevent regional and global destabilization. Taking into account the current military landscape that exists today, a joint task force (JTF) would be the ideal military response of the United States and collation partner’s while utilizing the regional military assets. Intelligence suggests guerilla forces are capable of a full scale offensive into Morocco in less than 36 hour notice, bringing the factors of time, force and space into consideration.

1. (15 pts) Review the Operational Approach Student Aid Slide #7 for this question. Operational Design and the Operational Approach is a process of iterative understanding and problem framing that supports commanders and staffs in their application of operational art with tools and a methodology to conceive of and construct viable approaches to operations and campaigns.” (JP 5-0, III-1). In the context of the Mediterranean/North Africa Theater of Operations (M/NATO), using the contextual background notes and material provided for this exam in Parts 2 and 3, apply operational design thinking as described in JP 5-0 chapter III to answer the following.

The defense, security, and safety American citizens enjoy each and every day is a result of dedicated professionals committed to Homeland Security and Homeland Defense. These broad initiatives require well-defined missions, organized and focused tasking, and finally, clearly understood duties, responsibilities, and operations. Organizations charged with these responsibilities must be better resourced than those of the enemy. Success in each of these objectives requires a well-organized infrastructure with clear mission sets. The afore mentioned areas of responsibility, related planning, and resource/personnel management are fluid (rightfully so) and are constantly reevaluated, restructured, and/or reinforced to best counterattack our Nation’s vulnerabilities before they become casualties.

In 2008, U.S. forces near the village of Wanat in Nuristan province, Afghanistan were almost overrun during an enemy attack. The attack became known as the Battle of Wanat and resulted in nine soldiers killed and 27 wounded (United States Army Combined Arms Center, 2008). In this paper, a battle analysis review will highlight the circumstances surrounding the battle, and the operational and intelligence failures attributed to the losses in life. A review will highlight what aspects the enemy exploited to give them the upper hand against American forces. Additionally, an evaluation will see what different outcomes would occur if certain factors changed.

In 2013, I was part of Operation Beyond the Horizon (BTH). This is a civil-military mission, which included humanitarian and civic support. In addition, it provides medical, dental, and engineering assistance by Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserves. This is when I first knew about the country of El Salvador and the tragedy it had suffered. This concrete experience has given me the opportunity and real world experience to first hand see what insurgency can do to a Country. Even twenty years later, going in to rebuild schools, provide medical outposts, and repair infrastructures, it is evident that insurgency and its effects are still seen today. What follows is the brief history of insurgency in the Country of El Salvador.

General Petraeus spent years developing an understanding of the Iraqi situation and counterinsurgency doctrine and he framed the coalition’s problem in military terms. Coalition forces must defeat the insurgency and secure the operations center of gravity, the Iraqi people, to shape conditions for political reconciliation. The MNF-I Commander recognized that ethnosectarian violence was the root cause of insecurity preventing political reconciliation and the future of Iraq depended upon resolving conflict through political discourse not armed conflict. General Petraeus’ concluded that MNF-I needed more forces to secure the populace, demonstrate American commitment and foster an environment of political reconciliation.

Joint operations and the six joint functions allow commanders to integrate military capabilities for the achievement of desired goals. Operation Husky presents an opportunity to assess the joint functions of command and control and the integration of the other joint functions at the operational level. Specifically, this paper evaluates command and control using the three attributes of mission command, and then, integration of some of the joint functions as defined in Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. Operation Husky provides multiple examples of the challenges associated with joint operations and the struggles leaders must deal with to succeed at the strategic and operational levels of war. Command and control establishes the base upon which the remaining joint functions are integrated to achieve unity of effort and mission success. The remaining joint functions provide the military capabilities for battlefield success. Commanders adept at integrating and synchronizing the joint functions in joint operations will achieve unity of effort and mission accomplishment.

The fight against terror has been an on going issue in the world for centuries. There is always someone or some group trying to bring harm to a nation or a group of people formed by their hatred. In America, the battle is fought on the home front, in the air, and on the water throughout the world with different intelligence agencies. With every agency grouping together to keep this nation safe it has made big differences. It is the job of every American to keep a watchful eye for those who threaten the future of the country. Grouping all levels of law enforcement is important to the success of homeland security. Throughout this paper, I will be focusing on three agencies that plan a major role in the success of defending our nation’s frontline.

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

Operational Design (OD) provides a useful framework to analyze the United States (US) military’s Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) campaign plan. Using the OD framework, the US OIF campaign plan from 2002 to 2007 was poor at planning and execution. First, this essay evaluates how OIF planners and commanders understood the Operational Environment (OE) and defined the overall problem. Second, this dissertation assesses strengths and weaknesses of the initial operational approach using end state, supported objectives, Lines of Operation (LOO), center of gravity, anticipation, and effects. Next, this paper gauges how planners and commanders assessed the initial OIF campaign plan and refined their operational approach over time. Lastly, this essay evaluates the degree to which current joint planning policy and doctrine (APEX and JP 5-0) incorporate lessons from OIF.

The brand new mission that involved the 1-502nd Infantry regiment was not only a hostile, but a confusing one in the least. In 2005, the 502nd Infantry Regiment was flung out to the 330-square mile region in Southern Baghdad known as the “Triangle of Death,” homing one of the most dangerous insurgency in the country. This area was the focal battleground between the Sunnis and Shi’ites as well as the central grounds for terrorists to ferry men, weapons, and money into the capital (Frederickson 113). The 502nd Regiment was assigned to the task of root out insurgent strongholds, promote social and municipal revival, and to train the local Iraqi Army battalions into a competent fighting force,

The weaknesses with CDRUSCENTCOM’s OA involved the friction and the lack of the integration of the interagency in the planning of phases IV-V and the initial strategic assumptions that affected CDRUSCENTCOM’s OA. The first weakness was the failure of both CDRUSCENTCOM and interagency organizations to include the NSC, Departments of Defense/State, and the U.S. Agency of International Development to integrate and coordinate their strategic objectives into a comprehensive unified plan in support of OIF. This failure enabled the post regime change of Iraq to set the foundation for the insurgency that would start to grow in 2004.

A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects (Publication 2010). Hybrid threats which were previous labeled as irregular warfare or guerrilla warfare, have now emerged in an alarming rate. Hybrid threats are comprised of regular, irregular forces, and criminal organizations merged to achieve an economical or tactical objective. Having the flexibility to transition from a regular to an irregular force allows the threat the ability to exploit weaknesses, permitting the hybrid threat the ability to become more effective. The hybrid threat can exploit a multitude of