A National Counter Intelligence ( Ci ) Strategy

The 1776 united States of America Declaration of Independence contain the words that succinctly describe our national objective, strategy, and message, “We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.” In today’s United States of America, the world acknowledges American’s as the preeminent owner of individual freedoms, holding and promoting these three basic principles for some 240 years. During these years, the U.S. has employed the use of intelligence to shape its objectives and strategies, and then in times of war used the same intelligence to shape strategic messages against foreign powers. However, as hostilities decline and give way to the restoration of relative peace, the use of intelligence for strategic messages against foreign powers ceases. Under these circumstances, the void created by secession of U.S. messages, provides a communication opportunity to foreign powers for transmission of anti-U.S. messages. Attempts have been made to reinstate the offices that during war countered these anti-U.S. messages to a comprehensive reorganization of the U.S Government intelligence community. This paper does not support creation of a new agency or department to utilize existing strategic intelligence.

Perhaps the most important change in how the federal government was reorganized after September 11th is the creation of both the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) position and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in 2004 with the passage of the same IRTPA that created TSA. This concept had been first suggested in 1955 after a study by Congress then and was recommended time and again but only became a reality after the September 11th attacks drove the need for major intelligence reform home and the 9/11 Commission continued the push for the creation of such a position (ODNI, n.d., paras. 1-5). As one can see from the mission and vision of the ODNI, the importance cannot be overstated. The mission includes leading intelligence integration while having the IC produce the most insightful intelligence products possible and the vision is fully integrating the IC thus making the nation more secure (ODNI, n.d., paras. 1-2).

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks was among the agencies that associated the 9/11 attacks with lack of coordination among agencies (Best, 2015). This prompted the Congress to enact a legislation that established a centralized intelligence leadership, popular as the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). However, the legislation only helped to increase tension between different agencies, especially on how to approach funding. The legislation was not clear regarding the boundaries between the activities of the DNI, and their interaction with the mainstream intelligence agencies. The congress debated these concerns and later established the framework for the working of the DNI and relationship with different intelligence agencies. Most importantly, this legislation focused on one element of reorganization, which was enhancing coordination of activities between different

Upon analyzing 9/11 it was clear to focus on the limitations that the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Central Intelligence Agency had faced. Security breaches and poor intelligence sharing were just some of the critical failures that were encountered. Moreover, the main focus is pointed towards the miscommunication between these two agencies. Evidently, the execution and tactical strategies went unnoticed despite the apparent red flags that presented themselves, in addition to the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Central Intelligence Agency failure to pursue threats and establish a baseline of security resulted in the disaster of 9/11. In conjunction to these mistakes, the restriction of shared information

Providing for the common defense means that the United States government must preserve the rights, freedom, and safety of the nation as a whole. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) fulfills this goal, as the agency collects, analyzes, and processes information at an international level and utilizes the data to further bolster our nation’s intelligence and security against foreign countries. Without the CIA, we would not be able to be one of the strongest nations on the planet.

Intelligence in this day in age is a vital component of a countries security. The newest proposal increases intelligence spending between 2 and 3 billion dollars, a total adding to nearly $35 billion. In addition to military enhancement, the FBI and other law enforcement/intelligence agencies will also be included in this proposal. A new system has been proposed by President Bush that all information be shared among all agencies. DoD, FBI, and the Department of Counterterrorist Center have drawn closer together to create a Terrorist Threat Integration Center to evaluate information blended from all sources associated with terrorism and to act upon those findings accordingly.

In her 1999 book Flawed By Design, Stanford academic Amy Zegart examines the three main American national security agencies: the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the National Security Council (NSC). She covers the history of each of the agencies from creation to the 1990s. While going through each of their histories, she makes a point to break down their histories into their creations and evolutions. This breakdown allows Zegart to effectively and concisely support her conclusion that the agencies are flawed by design. Furthermore, her conclusions are relevant to the U.S. military today. Any competent military professional should learn lessons from Zegart as the lessons she offers have keen importance

The best way to prevent terrorist attacks in the future is by the gathering of information about terrorist schemes while they are in the planning process. The CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) is the agency responsible for gathering this information. Since the Watergate scandal of the 1970’s, it has been hindered both in the planning of intelligence operations and in tactics used to gather the intelligence. Intelligence operatives can never effectively help in the prevention of future attacks if they do not have the leeway necessary to gather information about such attacks while the terrorists are in the process of planning them.

Consolidation of the intelligence community under the DNI increases collaboration by inculcating a culture of “jointness”, similar to collaborative efforts by the military services following the Goldwater-Nichols reform. Second, establishment of the National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C) provides DNI with a way to coordinate and focus collection efforts across the intelligence community. Lastly, The Library of National Intelligence provides a means for analysts across the intelligence community to gain access to additional sources.

The Testimony of Cofer Black, the Director of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center from 1999-2002, greatly affected my thinking about the domestic intelligence ‘failures’ which led to the inability to foresee or prevent the 9/11 attacks. His testimony, paired with both concurring and clashing views from the 9/11 Commission Report, gave a persuasive ‘defense’ of the intelligence community’s actions and capabilities before September 11, 2001. Three of Black 's ‘agreements’ were particularly influential towards my understanding. First, Black presented a strong argument that the inefficiency of counterterrorism had much to do with pre-9/11 domestic priorities, which left those involved with fighting terrorism, including those acts

The beginning of our present day Counter Intelligence (CI) began after WWII with the combined efforts of the U.S. X-2 branch of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Special Intelligence Services (SIS). These offices gave way to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) responsible for countering activities of foreign intelligence services in the U.S. and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) responsible for coordinating U.S. counterintelligence activities in foreign countries. Within the framework of the development of the United States of America there was not a devised explanation for the use of intelligence within the armed forces. Spies were present during the Revolutionary war. Washington had a spy ring organized called the Culper Ring organized by Colonel Benjamin Tallmadge, spying on the British in New York City. The Culper spies sent messages back to Washington divulging information on British activities at their headquarters based in New York city, as explained in Alexander Rose’s book “Washington’s Spies: the story of America’s first spy Ring”. The need for a CI mission in the U.S. during the Cold War after WWII was paramount to the protection of the U.S. against enemy treats and ability to gain information that would support the U.S. power to negotiate. During WWII the OSS and the SIS mirrored the British intelligence services structure and in combination developed methods of signals intelligence that helped to break

After 9/11, a realization emerged that there was a disconnect between domestic intelligence related to criminal investigations and foreign intelligence. This disconnect manifested due to erroneous perceptions and beliefs within national security circles that foreign intelligence could not be shared with criminal investigators (The 9/11 Commssion, 2004, p.79). The result of this disconnect was that relevant information from the CIA and NSA related to terrorism was not disseminated to criminal investigators (The 9/11 Commission, 2004, p.79). Al Qaeda was able to exploit the discordance between domestic and foreign intelligence as evidenced by the successful execution of the 9/11 attacks. The intrinsic connection between domestic and foreign intelligence is illustrated by what is referred to as the “lone wolf” terror threat. While an Islamist lone wolf terrorist may become self-radicalized on the U.S. mainland, what inspires and motivates such terrorists is not indigenous in origin. Although terror attacks executed by lone wolf terrorists are not directly coordinated by Islamist terror entities, their points of origin can be traced overseas because Islamist terror entities that are catalysts for such attacks are based in foreign countries. Thus, the CIA and other agencies that produce foreign intelligence on the Islamist terror threat must pass on that information to the FBI, DHS, and other federal agencies that deal with domestic intelligence. In turn, federal domestic intelligence agencies must provide that information to agencies at the state, local, and tribal levels via fusion centers, JCAT, and other related entities. The integration of foreign and domestic intelligence cannot be achieved without substantial information-sharing and coordination among government

There are many classified and unclassified publications that cover Counterintelligence (CI) raging from Executive Orders, to National Directives, to Department of Defense Directive, all the way down to an individual organization’s standard operating procedures. All these publication are in place to ensure that CI Agents understand their roles and responsibilities when it comes to the conduct of CI operations and their left and right limits. Outside the standard definitions, there publications are also in place to ensure that all CI operations are conducted ethically, one such document example is EO12333, which not only enables intelligence gathering, but also ensures that the right of U.S. persons are protected.

I think it is necessary to adept our tactics to defeat enemy’s more sophisticated aggressive operations toward us. It is said that the best defense is a good offense. That being said, we have to actively engaging the enemy targets and weakening the enemy’s operations against United States. Cleave argues that by working the foreign intelligence service as a strategic target globally, US counterintelligence should be able to leverage insights into adversary activities and vulnerabilities to direct CI operations to maximum effect. To including network analyses to map terrorist supply chains, support infrastructures, financial transactions, communications channels, recruitment and training activities, and other footprints serve to focus collection,

Counterintelligence (CI) involves actions aimed at protecting the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage from penetration and disruption by hostile nations or their intelligence services (Lowenthal, 2014). Three main components of Counterintelligence include collection, defensive and offensive. The collection is the ability to gather intelligence information about rivalry capabilities against own nation; defensive part of CI involves measures to prevent and thwart other nations ' attempts to penetrate into own nation 's intelligence system; while an offensive aspect deal with running double agents to penetrate, manipulate, exploit, and control targeted adversaries. CI is said to be the most essential aspect of the intelligence disciplines, in the sense that it helps in collecting vast quantities of secret information and produce an excellent analysis of intelligence, although, ineffective counterintelligence measures may diminish confidence in the final results (Van Cleave, 2013).