Essay on A Philosophy of the Impersonal

In his 1971 paper “Personal Identity”, Derek Parfit posits that it is possible and indeed desirable to free important questions from presuppositions about personal identity without losing all that matters. In working out how to do so, Parfit comes to the conclusion that “the question about identity has no importance” (Parfit, 1971, p. 4.2:3). In this essay, I will attempt to show that Parfit’s thesis is a valid one, with positive implications for human behaviour. The first section of the essay will examine the thesis in further detail and the second will assess how Parfit’s claims fare in the face of criticism.

In John Locke’s argument for personal identity, he believes that we are not substances or mere souls. In his argument, Locke stresses to convey that there is a crucial difference between distinguishing a “man” and a “person” (Locke 221). According to Locke’s definition, a man is a living body which is homogenous to an animal’s body. Therefore, any living body of a particular shapes refers to a “man.” Locke emphasizes that a “person” is a sensible being that is aware of its own

To the ignorant and self-oblivious person, the true individuality of a man’s self is presumed through his ability to possess an apt and socially preferable state of mind. Quite ironic in fact—and if I’m not mistaken—the widespread consensus regarding human identity, is that it is at its most ripe, and fertile upon one’s inevitable decision to conform to the mass. Such logic is somewhat of a paradox-in-itself and if we deconstruct the meaning of the terms ‘conform’ and ‘individuality’ their contrast is vast, and their apparent use is irrational, therefore all aspects of the human mind remain complacent, and mundane to a certain degree that it erases any former beliefs of a unique human being. Rather, human personality is an

In philosophy, the issue of personal identity concerns the conditions under which a person at one time is the same person at another time. An analysis of personal identity

The world has become modern and global. Identification of the self is a complicated, though, an important problem of every individual. Self- identity is based on inner values and reflections on culture, politics and social interactions. The main point is that people label themselves to any particular group in the society (Worchel etc., 1998). According to Ferguson: “Identity commonly refers to which it makes, or is thought to make

Mary Anne Warren’s argument on the legal status of abortion stands on a concrete understanding and realization of an individual’s personhood. Now Mary Anne Warren’s unyielding argument on the basis of personhood is that, “If we assume that an entity is a person just because it happens to belong to our favored biological classification, we stand convicted of speciesism, close cousin to racism. There are properties that do qualify an entity as a person, but simply being human is not one of them” (124). To first be able to argue why the abortion of a fetus is permissible she needs to give a clear distinction of what can be established a decisive factor of personhood. To distinguish a line between a fetus and a human and if abortion is to be morally permissible there needs to be an understanding of when this cut off between the two officially happens. In an example of the potential personhood and a right to life Mary Ann Warren uses a hypothetical scenario of a space explorer who lands on an unknown plant. While on this plant he encounters a race of aliens. Now since he is on another plant in the presence of these alien beings how should he act towards these beings. He must first determine if they have the capability of morality or if it is acceptable to consume these aliens for food. To determine if these aliens are in fact part of a moral personhood maybe he can notice works of art, forms of tools, and communication. However, even without evidence of these things they could

Personhood is a central issue within ethics and natural rights debates. For any theory of ethics or system of declaring natural rights which purports how man should be treated and/or to what rights he is so entitled must begin with what ‘man’ is. There is no doubt man has an inherent value that entities such as flies and trees lack. This value does not come from mere physical form, but from what comprises personhood; because these things can be separated from our physical form they can fail to be developed or instantiated within man’s physical form. Natural rights, and the debate about what they are and where they come from, have been long-standing issues in the philosophical as well as political communities. One thing that does seem clear

In this document, Mazzini largely focuses on how the ideas circulated after the French Revolution regarding the rights of man have corrupted the true nature of a nation by creating a culture of greed and egoism. While he openly discourages the erasure and pursuit of these rights, he is quick to point out that individuals’ egoism and each nation’s separation of class “… has grown and grows worse in nearly every country, and especially where I write the price of the necessaries of life has gone on continually rising, the wages of the working-man in many branches of industry falling and the population multiplying” (87). He argues here that allowing any nation to be solely characterized by the rights of its citizens causes a nation to define itself based on the millions of individuals, dividing any community or society—which he believes is the backbone of the nation. In Mazzini’s view, the solution to this is by fostering a national culture of duty to one another. When he asks, “What is Society but a collection of men who have agreed to bring the strength of the many in support of the rights of each?” the audience is forced to question their own personal hierarchy between rights and duties; for what is a nation if there is no work or duty in achieving and maintaining the rights of every man within the nation (89)?

Personal identity, in a philosophical point of view, is the problem of explaining what makes a person numerically the same over a period of time, despite the change in qualities. The major questions answered by Locke were questions concerning the nature of identity, persons, and immorality (Jacobsen, 2016). This essay will discuss the three themes John Locke presents in his argument regarding personal identity, which are, the concept of categories, substance vs. man vs. person, and the continuity of consciousness.

Dresser analyzed ethical and policy issues using her own views and focused on “different possibilities for implementing an approach incorporating the position that human embryos have an intermediate moral status”(Dresser, R. 2005). Dresser encountered many boundaries that limit her article because she does not touch the topic of religion and this enables her to make a stronger statement. Such if embryos are considered to have moral status of a person “based on the view that conception is the point that a person begins”. This limits Dresser’s opposing viewpoint because some of her audience are “religious”. Although Dresser is not able to present concrete religious viewpoints, she is able to express her point in different parts of the article.

Principally, morality and ethical issues continue to be a topic of debate, particularly in the modern day world. Essentially, this is because some of them touch the heart of the human life and failure to find a convergence of opinion threatens existence (Piazza & Landy, 2013). In this respect, religion is one tool that has significantly influenced and continues to shape this discourse. Accordingly, this easy draws from the moral teaching of the Catholic Church to discuss some of the biggest challenges that human beings face today. The life of every person should be treated with respect and the dignity that it deserves.

Personal identity is a concept within philosophy that has persisted throughout its history. In the eighteenth century this problem came to a head. David Hume dedicated a portion of his philosophy in the attempts to finally put what he saw as a fallacious claim concerning the soul to rest. In the skeptical wake of Hume, German idealist, beginning with Immanuel Kant, were left with a variety of epistemic and metaphysical problems, the least of which was personal identity.

The question on personal identity has been a philosophical debate for a long time. Philosophers over time have tried to argue what being a person that one is, from one day to the necessarily contains. In their endless search for philosophical bases on the same, multiple questions on the issues of life and death arise such that the correct answers to personal identity determine the changes that one person undergoes, or may undergo without being extinct but rather continuing to exist. Personal identity philosophical theory confronts the most ultimate questions on our existence as well as who we are and if by any chance there is a possibility of life after death. In attempts to distinguish change in a person in survival and after death, a criterion of personal identity over time is given. Such criterion specifies all the necessary and sufficient conditions that must prevail for a person to continue to exist (Perry et al,103)

Inbuilt in the nature of the personhood theory, therefore, is to restrict any other human interest or value in grounding human rights. This raises the question, why is personhood any more determinant than any other concept or human interest. This question becomes all the more pertinent when the personhood account is applied to human rights recognised in contemporary human rights culture.

While numerous philosophers have debated how to quantify personal identity, It is my contention that Rene Descartes presents the best argument .This essay will examine the strengths and weaknesses within his theory. This essay will also also compare Descartes argument to Rick Parfit and David Humes individual interpretations of what personal identity is. Lastly, this essay will examine the weaknesses within Descartes argument and the points some have contention with.