A Scientific Theory Of Consciousness

Consciousness, Thomas Nagel states, “is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable.” Here he refers particularly to phenomenal consciousness, which Block defines as “perceptual experiences,” and Nagel describes as “something that it is to be.’ This experiential element appears to present a challenge to the physicalist assertion that all mental processes are explicable in terms of physical brain states, biochemical reactions and the laws of physics. Frank Jackson presents this argument in his 1982 thesis Epiphenomenal Qualia. Whilst Jackson’s argument occupies a seminal position in philosophy of mind, whether he adds anything new to knowledge of the nature of conscious experience, is debateable. Thomas Nagel’s What is it like to

The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.

In the wake of slavery, the black body is constantly under attack. The hold co-exists within the wake of slavery. According to Christina Sharpe, college professor, author of In the Wake on Blackness and Being, (2016) “The wake; a state of wakefulness and a state of consciousness” (pg. 5). Being in the wake of slavery means one still faces the negative effects it and is aware of the negative affects it has on the black community. The hold co-exists in the wake of slavery and the black body is inhibited by this hold. Sharpe defines the hold as, “A large space in the lower part of a aircraft in which cargo is stowed (of a ship or aircraft); keep or detain (someone)” (p. 68). In the hold, the black body has been introduced, taught, ingrained and continues this idea of the language of violence. Through the actual hold of the ship during the Middle Passage, to the perception of blacks which also holds the black body, and to the engrained idea of the “masculine black body” which keeps queer black bodies in their own hold. In this paper, I will examine the intersectionality of blackness and queerness which is being held in the wake of slavery.

Consciousness it is a state of awareness on both the external and internal actions and reaction toward different stimulus. Consciousness has greater impacts on our daily life and could influence survival of different organisms that lives on planet earth. The benefits is that it offers protection as it control the self .Consciousness regulate what we think and the reaction that we respond to the different experiences that we undergo on daily basis. Also, it allows us to either allow a thought or respond or terminating the thought as it might be not useful both the inner and outer experiences.

The understanding on the knowledge of other minds has provided a puzzle known as the inverted spectrum. This possibility has emerged as an important challenge to functionalist accounts of qualia. Functionalism is committed to defining mental states in terms of their cause and effects . By identifying sensory events with casual roles, however, functionalism appears to be missing qualitative aspects all together. The topic of spectrum inversion has often been raised as a contradiction to functionalism, as well as other materialist theories about consciousness. These negates to functionalism show that even when all the relevant physical facts are held constant, the facts about qualia can still vary, hence that the phenomenal must be over

When pondering consciousness, people commonly distinguish between the physical characteristics of neurons firing signals throughout the body and the mental aspects of how being alive actually feels. Furthermore when studying consciousness, the imposing battle between physicalists, people who believe the physical and mental aspects are the same, and dualists, people who believe the physical and mental are two distinct aspects, brings about controversy. In What Is It Like to Be a Bat? Thomas Nagel claims, “it would be a mistake to conclude that physicalism must be false” but then goes on to add, “physicalism is a position we cannot understand because we do not at present have any conception of how it might be true.” Even though the claims appear mutually exclusive and Nagel states that physicalism is incomprehensible, Nagel’s claims are able to be simultaneously true and his conditions for understanding physicalism are improper.

Place and Armstrong explain the possibility of “consciousness is a process in the brain” by comparing it to “lighting is a motion of electrical charges”, for what we

Identity theory attempts to explain the relationship between the body and the mind. It states that some mental states are the same as some brain states. This implies that one could group mental events – like pain, pleasure or hunger – into events that correlate with physical states of the brain; for example, when one feels pain, C-fibers are firing(mason, “identity theory”). However, there are many objections to this theory. Overall, these objections are compelling and show that identity theory is weak and untrue. In this essay, I will argue that mental states are not identical to brain states by breaking down the Identity Theory.

In the essay “Epiphenomenal qualia,” Jackson introduces the mental experience of “qualia” as an objection to physicalism – the idea that all true information is physical information. Beyond this conclusion, Jackson further argues that qualia are epiphenomenal by rebutting three possible responses. I believe that Jackson’s objections are valid but unsound, and that epiphenomenalism of qualia is more plausible than its counterargument. As for the knowledge argument which proves that physicalism is false, I agree with Churchland that it is unjustified, but I concur with Jackson’s conclusion that physicalism is false.

And what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? And is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived?” In an effort to anticipate any criticism that his argument might obtain, Berkeley plans to respond to what someone might say if they were to support a representational theory of perception. A representationalist might suggest that Berkeley’s argument is invalid because premise one could only be true his idea of “perceive” is being used indirectly, and premise two could only be true if “perceive” is being directly

According to David Chalmer’s paper, Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, easy problems is explaining the functions in the brain. Such as how the brain process information, categorizes, discriminates, and reacts to environmental stimuli, or can differentiate between being asleep and wake. What Chalmer calls “easy problems” represent an ability and a the performance of a function. These functions or as Chalmer labels them, phenomena, can be explained with science. Chalmer does state that these phenomena are not actually easy, but easy in a relative term.

The most striking parts of the book for me were those that described the “spiritual aspects” of the helping process. I could easily identify with them because spirituality resonates very deeply in my heart. I agree completely with the books contention that our “spiritual nature” is ONENESS. Consciousness is the underlying basis of our lives as human beings. Our ability to know and experience the world of objects and our bodies is only possible when we are conscious. Nothing can exist without our sense of being present. Although unseen and action-less, consciousness underlies all aspects of our “individual” nature and our personality type. Indeed, it is consciousness that reflects through the body making our thoughts, feelings, emotions,

Indeed, it might be claimed that not only mental states not identical to those properties, but furthermore they cannot be reduced to those properties. In other words, Putnam’s argument is amenable to a non-reductive view. Putnam maintains that “Thus if we can find even one psychological predicate which can clearly be applied to both a mammal and an octopus (say 'hungry'), but whose physical-chemical 'correlate' is different in the two cases, the brain-state theory has collapsed” (Putnam, 1967/1975, p. 437). It is clear that if, contra Smart, sensations are not identical with neurological properties, then a sensation cannot be reduced to a unique brain state of a unique brain, thus, if sensations are multiple realizable, then the identity theory seems to be hard to maintain in the sense defended by Place and Smart. In Putnam’s

In this paper, I will discuss whether the subjectivity of experience can be accounted for adequately with a functionalist theory. By defining mental contents in terms of their causal roles, phenomenological experience is no longer confined to a private realm, but can be specified by counterfactual statements that are intelligible to others. In this paper, I argue that the subjectivity of experience cannot be completely characterized by language with a functionalist theory by examining the meanings of language and the contents of mental states. I conclude that a functionalist theory can only provide an approximate sketch of the major features of subjective experience while leaving subtle details out of the picture.

To James and Lippmann, the stimuli world is a buzzing confusion that bombards the perceiver. From Shakespeare and Socrates to Kant and Kohler, the power of perception has been discussed by philosophers and psychologists alike. Construction of perception and knowing is subjective, depending on factors such as motives, wants, needs, values, cultures, norms, and mood. Meaning is constructed to end doubt, prepare for action, and obtain sub-jective feelings of control. In the social world, inferences and categorization happen at an unconscious level. However, we have the cognitive flexibility to engage in effor