A Viable Option?

Marquis then goes on to disassociate the ‘desire account’ as an influential element of his debate. It is pro-choice belief that takes into account it is someone’s desire to keep living that makes it wrong to kill a person as it interferes with their direct wishes. Once again when relating this view to abortion there is an obvious logical flaw. A fetus does not have the capability to be self aware let alone able to express a desire for the continuation of its life. Dose this make the action morally permissible? If so then Marquis elaborates this idea relating it individuals in circumstances where they either do not desire the continuation of their life or they are unable to express such a desire for instance in a coma. He concedes that it is still deemed wrong to kill them even though there would be no expressed desire for life at the time of the killing. Because the argument is broad it cannot be practically applied in the case of abortion.

The next issue is, in Thomson’s opinion, the most important question in the abortion debate; that is, what exactly does a right to life bring about? The premise that “everyone has a right to life, so the unborn person has a right to life” suggests that the right to life is “unproblematic,” or straight-forward. We know that isn’t true. Thomson gives an analogy involving Henry Fonda. You are sick and dying and the touch of Henry Fonda’s hand will heal you. Even if his touch with save your life, you have no right to be “given the touch of Henry Fonda’s cool hand.” A stricter view sees the right to life as more of a right to not be killed by anybody. Here too troubles arise. In the case of the violinist, if we are to “refrain from killing the violinist,” then we must basically allow him to kill you. This contradicts the stricter view. The conclusion Thomson draws from this analogy is “that having a right to life does not guarantee having either a right to be given the use of or a right to be allowed continued use of another person’s body—even if one needs it for life itself.” This argument again proves the basic argument wrong. The right to life isn’t as clear of an argument as I’m sure opponents of abortion would like it to be or believe it is.

In the article "A Defense of Abortion" Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that abortion is morally permissible even if the fetus is considered a person. In this paper I will give a fairly detailed description of Thomson main arguments for abortion. In particular I will take a close look at her famous "violinist" argument. Following will be objections to the argumentative story focused on the reasoning that one person's right to life outweighs another person's right to autonomy. Then appropriate responses to these objections. Concluding the paper I will argue that Thomson's "violinist" argument supporting the idea of a mother's right to autonomy outweighing a fetus' right to life does not make abortion permissible.

Second, the author uses her “expanding child” example. “Trapped in a tiny house with a growing child and you are up against a wall, and in a few minutes, you will be crushed, on the other hand the child won’t be crushed. The only thing that will save her life is to kill the child. Is abortion permissible to save the pregnant woman’s life? Because the mother being compared to that of the house, this brings up the idea that the mother should be able to do as she pleases with her body, and that her body carries more significance than the fetus’ right to life. This brings in the argument of a third-party intervention, such as a doctor. If a doctor did not agree to perform an abortion, to save this mother, then the mother would be denied her rights, and the right to decide what is done with her body. If a woman doesn’t have a right to their body, then you should not be unplugged, thus, save the violinists life. This reasoning is concluded with two smart statements, “It seems to me that to treat the matter in this very way (refuse abortion for the mother’s health) is to refuse to grant the very status of person which is so firmly insisted on for the fetus by anti-abortion advocates. (243) and “a fetus who existence is due to rape” has no right to use their mother’s bodies, and aborting them is not depriving them of anything they had a

In Judith A. Thomson’s article, ‘A defense of abortion’ Thomson defends her view that in some cases abortion is morally permissible. She takes this stance even with the premise that fetuses upon the moment of conception are in fact regarded as persons. However one criticism of her argument would be that there is a biological relationship between mother and fetus however there is no biological relationship between you and the violinist. Having this biological relationship therefore entails special responsibility upon the mother however there is no responsibility in the case of the violinist. Thomson argues against those who are opposed to abortion with her violinist thought experiment.

Marquis’ argument puts forward the claim that most deliberate abortions are immoral, and this is because the loss of one’s future “inflicts…the greatest possible [loss] on the victim” (SG 168). This is because the deprivation of one’s future reduces the inherent value of any possible future pleasure, experiences and activities (SG 169). This account addresses flaws associated

With Thomson’s violinist analogy she shows that although disconnecting him would result in death, it would not be morally incorrect. This argument can be applied to a woman’s pregnancy, suggesting that if you accept the prior statement and can find no reasonable difference between the violinist and the fetus occupying the woman’s body, then you should accept that abortion can be acceptable. Thomson

He might argue that though the child will suffer, he still has a potential future in which he formulate goals, and have experiences and projects. However, we must note that during his argument, Marquis says "If the patient's future is intolerable...we want our account to allow killing the patient" and that "it is the value of the patient's future which is doing the work in rendering the morality of killing the patient intelligible" (561). Obviously, a quandary arises. Does the fetus in our example have a future that is less valuable than that of a normal one? Can we justify aborting this fetus, because although he will be rational and most likely capable of having experiences, the scope of his suffering will be exceedingly great? Are we in any sort of position to prescribe the value of someone else's future without knowing exactly how it will play out? So while it is plausible that Marquis would still argue from an anti-abortionist stance due to its potential future, this decision will very probably not sit well with the parents who have to watch their child suffer throughout his shortened life. This is one ambiguity that exists in Marquis' argument that has no easy answer, and is worth noting.

In the “Violinist Analogy,” Thomson argues that in cases of rape and other ways in which a woman might become pregnant without making the decision to have sex, it is not immoral to have an abortion. She makes this argument through the analogy that you are hooked up to a “famous unconscious violinist” and if you unplug yourself you are causing the death of that violinist. This point works very well in the argument that it seems as though abortion is allowable in cases of rape.

The debate about abortion focuses on two issues; 1.) Whether the human fetus has the right to life, and, if so, 2.) Whether the rights of the mother override the rights of the fetus. The two ethicists who present strong arguments for their position, and who I am further going to discuss are that of Don Marquis and Judith Thomson. Marquis' "Future Like Ours" (FLO) theory represents his main argument, whereas, Thomson uses analogies to influence the reader of her point of view. Each argument contains strengths and weaknesses, and the point of this paper is to show you that Marquis presents a more sound argument against abortion than Thomson presents for it. An in depth overview of both arguments will be

In “A Defense of Abortion” by Judith Jarvis Thompson, Thompson works to argue that even if a human fetus is considered a person, abortion is still often morally permissible. This paper will work to explain Thompson’s positions on the different accounts of the right to life, and to provide an evaluation of them and explain why they are not plausible, specifically regarding three of the analogies on-which she based her entire argument: the violinist, the coat, and the case of Kitty Genovese, as well as to explore a logical counterargument and explain why it’s stance is impermissible.

Marco 's morals regarding the unborn fetus arise from the theory that only humans have moral status (Sebo, n.d.). In this case, due to severe prenatal deformities, the fetus will not possess human capabilities, which will make it less human and, therefore entitled to less moral respect (Wilson, 1994). Marco considers having an abortion owing to the monetary weight it will place on his family. It is, likewise clear, Marco’s concern about her wife. Many people tend to think that the grieve of the mother could usually be more difficult after the death of a born child than over the loss of fetus (Wilson, 1994). This make the author infer that Marco could be trying to evade her wife to go thru deeper suffering in the future.

In his essay Why Abortion is Immoral Don Marquis attempts to argue that abortion is almost always wrong except for a few special circumstances such as when the life of the mother is being threatened by the pregnancy. In his thesis Marquis asserts that abortion is in the same moral category as killing an innocent adult human being and the ethics of abortion is solvable. The strongest argument that Marquis presents to defend his thesis is the claim that what makes killing wrong is the loss of the victim’s future. In this paper, I will argue that this argument fails because aborting a fetus is not in the same moral category as killing an innocent adult human being.

In “Why Abortion is Immoral,” Don Marquis argues that abortion is immoral because it denies the victim, which is the fetus or embryo, of their right to a future-like-ours. He argues that killing is prima facie wrong, and that this logic can be applied to a fetus. In this paper, I will address the ambiguity within the future-like-ours theory, which I will refer to as the FLO theory, and argue that the fetus’ right to a future of value does not override and should not be prioritized over the right to a future of value for the fetus’ host, which is the mother.

In this argument it has been established then, that a fetus is a person from the moment of conception. Thompson now introduces her “violinist analogy.” This is a key term in her argument. In this analogy she asks the reader to imagine you wake one morning and find yourself in bed with an unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and you alone have the right blood type to save him. You have been kidnapped in the middle of the night, and the violinist’s circulatory system is now plugged into yours. The director of the Hospital is now telling you “Sorry, the Society of Music Lovers did this to you – we would never have permitted it if we had known.” To get unplugged from the violinist will kill him, but in nine months he will be totally recovered from his ailment and you can be safely unplugged from one another. Thompson then asks, “Is it a moral responsibility for the kidnapped person to agree to this situation?” This situation she has concocted is comparable to that of a woman being raped. Pro – lifers say every person has a right to life and that right to life is stronger than the mothers right to decide what happens in her body. Thompson then goes on to say that instead of being plugged to the violinist’s body for nine months – its changed to your whole life. According to the pro –life