Abolishing The Gambia, New Zealand And Singapore

On the surface, it seems that determining how much power courts have would be a simple task. However, history has proven this to be false. The courts have been viewed in many different ways through out the history of our country. There are three common views of court power that are important for modern scholars of the court system. Those who believe courts have little power to cause social change are said to adhere to the Constrained Court view. Those who believe courts have a great deal of power to cause social change are said to adhere to the Dynamic Court view. The final, and youngest, take on court power combines aspects of the Constrained and Dynamic views into what I shall call the Condition Dependent Court view of power.

When comparing the communist nation of China with the democratic nation of Australia many differences are apparent. The application of the legislative (law making and modifying function), executive (administrative function) and judiciary (law enforcing and dispute resolving function) is vastly different between the two nations as can see when we compare and contrast the underlying principles of each system of government. Firstly, both nations claim to uphold the concept of the rule of law, although due to corruptive forces surrounding the Chinese court system, this concept is often thwarted and equality before the law is not upheld. Within the constitutions of both nations the basic principles of separation of powers have been applied;

Judicial independence is a concept of constitutional law that requires the judiciary o be kept away from all other arms of the government. It requires that the judiciary be free from influence from the other arms of the government and any private individuals. It is vital for the doctrine of separation of powers. Judicial accountability is a principle that brings the concept of keeping the judiciary under scrutiny. It requires that the judiciary and judicial officers be held accountable for their actions while in office (Seibert-Fohr & Muller 2012, p.10). This essay is aimed at discussing these two principles and assess whether the change in the Australian judicial appointments process would enhance judicial independence and judicial accountability with a view of making recommendations where changes are necessary.

The Australian Constitution is a rich amalgam of various classical political principles. The concepts of the Rule of Law and the doctrine of the Separation of Powers evident in Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws are both salient examples of political theses that are central to Australian Constitutional Law. The structure of the Constitution itself and decisions of the High Court of Australia unequivocally validate the entrenchment of the doctrine separation of powers in the Commonwealth Constitution . In particular, the High Court has applied this with relative rigour with respect to the separation of judicial power. The separation of the judicial power is fundamentally critical to upholding the rule of law. The High Court in Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs noted that “the separation of the judicial function…advances two constitutional objectives: the guarantee of liberty and, to that end, the independence of Chapter III judges” . Kitto J in R v Davidson also identified that the judiciary should be subject to no other authority but the law itself . This is a critical aspect ensuring the concept of legal equality is upheld. Therefore, its role clearly extends to providing checks and balances on the exercise of power by the legislative and executive arms of government . This ensures the liberty of the law and limits the abuse of the judicial system. Judicial Power is defined as “the power which every sovereign must of necessity have to decide between its subjects

Proponents of Judicial Elections argue that electing judges at a state level allows the judges to reconnect with the people in a closer way and to be more sensitive towards public opinion. However, the Judiciary system, unlike its other two counterparts, was not created to be a democratic institution. Instead, it was built to examine whether the government or the people are acting in accordance to law. Therefore, I oppose Judicial Elections for several reasons. One, it introduces partisanship to a supposedly impartial system and two, it risks disrupting the initial purpose of the Judiciary System which is to counterbalance the steps taken by the Congress and the Executive branch with the law.

Thomas R. Dye and Susan A. Macmanus states, “ courts are political institutions because they attempt to resolve conflicts in society. Courts make public policy in the process of resolving conflicts. Some of the nations most pivotal policy decisions that we follow today have been made by courts rather than legislative or executive bodies at both the federal and state levels.

78 examining issues surrounding the judiciary department of the new government being proposed. In his paper, Hamilton justifies the method of appointing the judges, the tenure by which they are to hold their places, and the partition of the judiciary authority between different courts, and their relations to each other. The method of appointing judges was fully discussed in earlier papers, and Hamilton saw no need in reiterating what was already said. Hamilton states that judges appointed are to hold their offices “during good behavior” (Bianco & Canon, 2015, p. A18). Hamilton’s belief that the standard of good behavior for the duration in office was one of the most valued advances in government. Basing a judge’s tenure on good behavior “secures a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws” (Bianco & Canon, 2015, p.

Thus, when faced with arbitrary legislative action or inaction, judicial intervention “is not only appropriate but essential” to protect citizens’ constitutional rights. Furthermore, when the Court resolves constitutional questions that, for whatever reasons, elected representatives, cannot, its rulings can guide lower courts, legislators, and citizens concerning the scope of individual rights and permissibility of governmental conduct. When the Court applies the standing doctrine regardless of legislative inertia or entrenchment, some citizens are left with rights but no remedies and a government that is unaccountable and unresponsive to its citizens.

In the course preserving the law and order, the effectiveness of the system designed to administer justice cannot be over emphasized. Faith in the adjudicatory system by the populace is often underscored by the satisfaction the populace derives from it in terms of its administration of justice. Hence it is pertinent to analyze the approach certain countries are employ in their respective adjudicatory process.

It is recognised that Australia’s System of decision making in the court is in need of reform, if the

The neoliberal policies, which South Africa has implemented after the end of the Apartheid era, has lead to increased inequality, both on the national as well as the global level. This has led many to argue that South Africa today faces a new kind of imperialism, one that is not so much based on political subordination but rather on a new type of economic subordination through a so-called "empire of capital". This idea, among others, falls under the broader theory of "economic imperialism".

This essay will explore the changes that Article 263 TFEU has had to the accessibility of judicial review before the CJEU as well as assessing whether the reforms introduced were sufficient enough in improving a private parties ability to bring government decisions under scrutiny. In addition, the judgments of the Court in Inuit and Microban will be considered. This essay will analyse present criticisms of the definition set out in the two cases and the overall effect of the new article.

Some judges in their obiter dicta have declared their inclination to disregard the Parliament’s legislative objectives, and therefore limit parliamentary sovereignty if the rule of law is vulnerable or if the circumstances demand “a principle established on a different hypothesis of constitutionalism” . They have also suggested that, while the British Constitution is dominated by parliamentary sovereignty, “The rule of law enforced by the courts is the ultimate controlling factor on which our constitution is based” . This represents a possibility of stretching the dominance of the rule of law in constitutional law so that it becomes more powerful than parliamentary sovereignty in the British Constitution .

In Li CJ’s judgment in A Solicitor v Law Society of Hong Kong [2008] 2 HKC 1, he commented in paragraph 9 that the “rigid and inflexible adherence by this Court to the previous precedents may unduly inhibit the proper development of the law and may cause injustice in individual cases. The great strength of the common law lies in its capacity to develop to meet the changing needs and circumstances of the society in which it functions.” In this essay, this statement would be discussed with reference to the role of the courts and their relationship to the legislature.

If the judiciary are intentionally straying into matters of governmental policy then they as unelected, impartial adjudicators should only do so when cases arise that call for such action, potentially when governmental action threatens the rule of law – a right afforded to them as a constitutional check on governmental power. While the judiciary can be viewed as in a constant skirmish with the Legislature and the Executive much of the judiciary’s power to interoperate statutes liberally comes from powers delegated to it by parliament .