Acquisition Process Of The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected ( MRAP ) Vehicle

The process the U.S. Army utilizes to fill the units they design with personnel to fight and win the nation's wars, equipment to own the air and the night, money to put fuel into the vehicles and bullets in the weapons, and facilities to house the soldiers and their families in is the Acquisition process. The army cannot continue without new soldiers to fill its ranks or weapons and bullets to destroy the enemy, this phase is the building block for the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model and helps dictate training and the rest of the model forward.

Training objectives must support the mission profile and meet the commanders desired end state. Prior to the 56TH train up at the National Training Center (NTC) the deployment location changed from Iraq to Afghanistan (case study). Changes to mission essential tasks were not identified prior to NTC, resulting in the BCT training on collective tasks and validated during MRE based on the Iraq mission profile. However, the shift to the Afghanistan mission profile created gaps in training not identified until units arrived at Bagram Air Field (BAF). i.e. the BCT had to establish an MRAP drivers training program at BAF extending the RSOI process. Training gaps were not limited to company level shortfalls as battalion and brigade staffs were not able to anticipate potential threats and capitalize on opportunities. (case study 2)

Since 1985, eleven different versions of the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) have been in service. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is being developed by the Army and the Marine Corps as a successor to the HMMWV. The Department of Defense (DoD) initiated the JLTV program to replace its aging fleet of the HMMWV. The purpose of this essay is to determine if the high cost of the JLTV should preclude it from replacing the HMMWV as outlined in the 2010 Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy. Because of the cost, an inability to meet joint requirements and the presence of feasible alternatives, the Department of Defense should not continue acquisition of the JLTV.

In September 2011, the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee voted to cancel the Army and Marine Corps' Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) in their version of the fiscal year 2012 defense bill (Munoz, 2011). This measure could have completely shut down efforts to replace a thirty year-old fleet of Humvees, loyal but potentially outmoded tactical wheeled vehicles. The Army's Modernized Expanded Capacity Vehicle program has been a project set to replace the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) family in the works for years. The project, however, continues to be stymied by budgetary constraints. Per-vehicle costs for the JLTV begin at $250,000 and are likely to climb, as Lockheed-Martin secured a preliminary contract for engineering, design, and development. The high cost of the JLTV does preclude it from completely replacing the HMMWV, and yet cost does not preclude the JLTV from supplementing the Army's fleet. A middle-ground solution is the best method of maximizing initial investments, while also banking on the robustness of national security.

The position of strength that the Army has is that everyone has seen over the last ten years what our Army has done, and is capable of. Lots of people want to put the Army in a box. They want to say this is what the Army can do -- they can do this little thing over here. I am here to tell them that the Army is probably the most flexible, adaptable organization across all the services, and that we can respond and be capable anywhere any time to support any Combatant

As a result of conflicting requirements from the Services and unforeseen excess of the Average Unit Manufacturing Cost, the JLTV program was threatened to its termination during its development. The protection, configurations, payload, weight and reliability requirements were changed during the process that were considered to be uncommon compared to the other programs. For example, “DOD had planned to award two contracts for the EMD phase, which was scheduled to last 24 months, but instead opted for a 48-month-long EMD phase before awarding Production and Deployment contracts in the second quarter of FY2016.”

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

I agree that the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) needs improved to meet emerging needs of the Army. The JSPS is too rigid and requires unnecessary levels of approval resulting in delayed decisions. Geographic Combatant Commands are required to develop theater level campaign plans, and Functional Combatant Commands are required to develop global and functional campaign plans. (Sweeney, p. 8) Through the use of In-Progress Reviews (IPR), Combatant Commanders are able to discuss shortages or impacts to their plans directly with the Secretary of Defense. This provides immediate feedback and opportunity to address concerns without all the current approval processes. These IPRs also reduced the confusion created by multiple products and

1948). It is essential to ground forces success that they receive anti-aircraft support. Before, during and after World War 2 we are able to perceive more clearly the significance of Air Defense Artillery (ADA) in the twenty first century. Air Defense Artillery’s roots travel as far back as to the revolutionary war. Understanding that during those times there was no such thing as airplanes but keep an open mind as to where we are heading here. Air Defense Artillery originated from the Coast Artillery Corps who were the guardians of the coast from incoming aggressive ships and boats. It was during World War 1 (WW1) that the army realized the need for

The WRD is limited by the bureaucratic nature of its supervising organization, the Marine Corps. Most current recommendations can only produce incremental change with a narrow scope. It appears there must be a larger transformation of the Marine Corps’ overall organizational culture and its ensuing bureaucracy before real change can be enacted in highly technical departments such as the WRD. While parties, such as a group of USC graduate students, may conduct research and produce recommendations, the current military culture does not appear amenable to or sincerely consider external analysis and input. Therefore, whenever possible, future research must focus around collaborating with Marine Corps commanders to establish and detail prospects

o Expedited the assessment and approval of over 500 C4ISR acquisition documents necessary for materiel release and fielding - support the future Army

The established CMOC “will integrate and synchronize interagency, intergovernmental organization (IGO), and nongovernmental organization (NGO) activities with joint force operations”.6

The MRAP program followed the normal defense acquisition process, but some aspects of the program cannot be duplicated easily. Conatser and Grizio outlined four requirements for a rapid acquisition process – mature technical solution, user’s acceptance of a short term solution, full support by the leadership, and full funding. The MRAP program met all these requirements. There were several MRAP type vehicles already in full production mode that just needed to be mass produced. Using multiple vendors allowed quick mass production of MRAPs. Although later shown to be insufficient to defeat all IED threats as the Insurgents increased the size of IEDs and used Explosive Formed Projectiles (EFP), the commanders in Iraq accepted MRAPs. There were several politicians pushing the U.S. military to procure MRAPs quickly as possible. In 2007, Secretary Gates “made MRAP the top DoD acquisition priority.” Lastly, the Congress allocated sufficient funding for the MRAP program. Secretary Carter cites the MRAP program as an example of “how much can be accomplished with the full backing of leaders in Congress and the

U.S. Navy plans to keep its ships out of the dangerous minefield with the RMS. Navy focuses on decreasing core crew for mine warfare while conducting mine-hunting operations as well. Navy envisions that this concept with RMS on LCS will prove a significant force

Despite mounting Congressional pressure, the Pentagon was not prepared to procure MRAPs under a normal acquisition process. Ultimately, Secretary Gates made the rapid acquisition of the MRAP his number one priority.5 This essay will highlight three factors that made the MRAP acquisition program different from a normal acquisition. First, Congress and Secretary Gates, called for immediate MRAP procurement. Next, MRAP procurement was unexpected as the Pentagon planned to be in and out of Iraq quickly.