Adr5

A) The topic concerning this case is negligence law. The issue is whether Simon would be successful perusing a negligence claim.

Our client, Sage Rent-A-Car Incorporation, leased a vehicle to Jeffery Calkin. The Defendant, Mr. Calkin was involved in a collision by failing to stop at a stop sign, therefore colliding with Jane White, the Plaintiff. Ms. White filed a negligence law suit against Mr. Calkin and Sage Rent-A-Car Inc. In the complaint, the Plaintiff claims that our client is required to carry insurance under the provisions of the Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act and therefore, has the duty to assume liability for the Defendant’s negligent collision. This matter is before the court on a motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s complaint.

In the case against Sage Rent-A-Car the defendant filed a surety bond with the superintendent of insurance when it incorporated. Therefore, the court should dismiss the suit against Sage Rent-A-Car for failing to state a claim under rule NMRA 1-012B(6). Also under section 66-5-207(E) (1988) of the New Mexico Financial Responsibility Act states, “a motor vehicle approved as a self-insured by the superintendent of insurance is exempt from the act. Therefore, the defendant is not liable for any damages due to filing a surety bond with the New Mexico superintendent and for being self-insured. Lastly, under New Mexico case law Las Lumarias of the N.M Council v. Isengard, 92 N.M 297, 300-301 (Ct. App. 1978) the court held a motion to dismiss due to the plaintiff not being able to recover or be entitled to relief under any state of facts provided under the claim. As one can see under the statutes provided and case law the defendant Sage Rent-A-Car is not liable for damages per the New Mexico Financial Responsibility Act not constituting negligence due to Sage’s actions when

Jeffery Calkin, the defendant, leased a vehicle for our client, Sage Rent-A-Car Inc., and was involved in a car accident with the plaintiff, Jane White. A negligence suit was filed by Ms. White against Mr. Calkin and our client, Sage Rent-A-Car Inc. The suit claims that our client is required to carry insurance and therefore has a duty to assume responsibility for this accident under the provisions of the Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act (MFRA).

One of the principal grounds for rejecting insurance claims is that the claim is not covered by the terms of the policy, or is specifically excluded. The rule that coverage provisions should be interpreted broadly and exclusion clauses should be interpreted narrowly is really just a corollary of the Contra Proferentem rule which applies in the event of ambiguity i.e. it is the insurer who likely drafted the insurance contract and construing coverage provisions broadly, or exclusion clauses narrowly, will be to the detriment of the insurer as the party who drafted the contract. The construction of exclusion clauses and coverage provisions helps justify the objective intention of the contract. This is the intention which the court considers, a reasonable person in the position of the contracting parties, would have had. It is submitted that coverage provisions should be broad and encompassing and exclusion clauses should be narrow. However, before such a conclusion is reached, this paper will aim to justify the reasoning behind such a claim analysing arguments for and against such a proposition, drawing upon the landmark case Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty Ltd to help relate the discussion to issues raised by such considerations.

State Farm has asked whether it has a duty to defend the insured pursuant to the insured’s homeowners policy. It is our opinion that State Farm has no duty to defend the insured under the insured’s homeowners policy. The insured’s homeowners policy entitled the insured to a defense for “a suit brought against an insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this coverage applies, caused by an occurrence.” In this case, these elements initially triggering the insured’s homeowners policy are likely satisfied. Nevertheless, the SECTON II – Exclusions section provides that the liability coverage does not apply to any of the fifteen exclusions specifically enumerated therein.

The case involved construction defect case against a construction company, Pacific Trades. Appellant Underwriters undertook Pacific Trades’ defense in the action under the terms of its general liability insurance policy. Appellee ProBuilders, also an insurer of Pacific Trades, denied defense on the basis that under the terms of its policy, it had no duty to defend when another insurer provided defense.

"Nothing in the insurance policy states that if National Union breaches the insurance policy and fails to timely pay its policy limits, that it will not be responsible for any pre or post-judgment interest that is required by Oregon statute for a breach of contract," they argued.

This Case relates to Fortuitous happenings because the insurance company had tried make its claim stating that the Plaintiff had no coverage due to lack of the accident happening out of accident but instead happening out of his own fault. Though they were right, the Judge still found that the Plaintiff had tried to save his boat and that under a different clause still covered under the insurance policy he had with the company, is still covered.

One troublesome but important aspect of the good faith performance obligation is its application to contracts, which provide that one party to the contract may, in its "sole discretion," take certain actions pursuant to the contract. In such cases, the actions of the party who can exercise its discretion may affect all parties to the contract, and dependent parties must rely on the "good faith" of the party given the right to exercise its discretion. Often, the discretion exercised by the party in control will adversely affect the dependent party. However, it does not necessarily follow that

"[a]n insurance company has a duty to act in good faith in settling claims and a breach of that duty will give rise to a cause of action by the insured." Pasipanki v. Morton, 61 Ohio App. 3d 184, 185, 572 N.E.2d 234 (1990) (quoting Bean v. Metro. Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co., 9th Dist. No. 13543, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 4275, 1988 WL 114464 at *1 (Oct. 26, 1988)). Gekko did not act in good faith to settle Vic’s claim against Donna, and their failure to do so enables Donna has a cause of action against Gekko.

Engendering a vast array of undesirable outcomes, including setting into motion a host of unpredictable collateral damage akin to falling dominoes, one poorly orchestrated strategic decision gone awry can have far-reaching effects. Even the best-laid plans can become casualties of immitigable disruption, disaster or destruction. And for this reason, the insurance industry retains significant influence around the globe by fiscally protecting people and entities on a broad range of applications covering healthcare, infrastructure, intellectual property and even errors made by third-parties. Part of risk mitigation strategies, insurances serve their customers well as an indemnifier. However, they don’t guarantee an outcome. Nor would they somehow reverse devouring years of someone’s life, destroying their

The court’s general goal in interpreting an insurance policy, is similar to their goal when interpreting a contract, which is to ascertain and carry out the party’s intentions. Hirschhoren v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company 338 Wis.2d 761, ¶ 22, 809 N.W.2d 529, 2012 WI 20 (2012). When making this analysis of the policy language, courts will try and best “interpret

Controversy surrounds the ground of the section 19MIA. Both the decisions of Blackburn v Vigors3 and the Blackburn v Haslam4 contribute to the codification of section 19 MIA. Phillips J in Deutsche Ruckversicherungs v Walbrook Insurance5 upheld the view that the duty of disclosure of the agent to insure finds ground on the imputation of the agent 's to insure knowledge to the assured. This viewpoint was one of the opinions explicitly put forward in the Vigor 's decision which contradicts the other viewpoint in the same case, whereas it was maintained that this duty is an independent one irrespective of the assured 's actual or constructive knowledge. The latter notion was later upheld in Sail v Farex6.

b. If the conditions stipulated in the insurance contract are not fulfilled, the insurer shall not be liable for damages. The condition usually stipulated by the insurer is to eliminate the loss caused by the intentional act of the insured, to eliminate any interests of the insured, or for any reason. The insurer has the right to refuse the insurance contract because of these conditions.