Advantages Of Auftragstaktik

These developments influenced most of the powerful nations of Europe and were soon repeated in similar forms around the world. Furthermore, many of the Prussian enhancements in army doctrine are the foundation of the command structures of many modern militaries today.

Thus, this article can serve as a foundational text for the American perception of the German military and its tactics. Although the article focuses on a particular commander, the level of respect showed towards Brauchitsch reveals the writer’s understanding of the power of Germany. The modern connotation of the word (quick and hard striking maneuver warfare) as a form of military strategy is used and explained here by the author as if it is the official German military doctrine. Historians argue endlessly over the idea of an “origin” and it remains the same here. When was “Blitzkrieg” introduced to the American public? Was it invented by Western journalists to for sensationalism purposes or rather, German propaganda that was “swallowed up” by the Allied press? The author of the article seemed very educated in the concept of Blitzkrieg (if it indeed is an official military concept) and used appropriate language to emphasize the speed aspect of the tactic. Some phrases depicting Blitzkrieg included “a war of quick penetration and obliteration,” “Swift columns of tanks… plunged through Poland…broken down the Polish defenses before they had time to

In February 1891 Count Alfred von Schlieffen was appointed Chief of the Prussian General Staff, a post which he held until the end of 1905. The most important responsibility of the General Staff was to produce the annual deployment plans, which stipulated how the German army was to be drawn up ready for battle in case of war. The initial pattern of deployment was the basis of the operational plan for the conduct of the war itself. The General Staff routinely tested these war plans in studies and exercises. During most of Schlieffen’s time as Chief of Staff, the essential strategic problem for Germany was indeed the likelihood that the next war would have to be fought against two enemies on widely separated fronts, the French in the west and the Russians in the east. Schlieffen never found a convincing solution to this problem. His suggestion was to deploy much greater forces on one of the fronts in order to defeat that enemy quickly and decisively, and then to use rail mobility to reinforce the other front and win a decisive victory there too. That sounded fine in theory, but when it was tested in exercises it proved hard to achieve. An initial victory on one front could not be fully exploited because of the need to switch forces promptly to the other front. Once that happened, the first enemy

In 2012, General Dempsey states “Mission Command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of a profession of arms.” The way Mission Command has evolved through the past years is indicative to the US Military adjusting to a new threat. The concept of Mission Command is not new, what is important is how General Dempsey states “Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging..” The General emphasizes the need for education at the start of the individual’s service. Additionally, this highlights the United States Army’s doctrinal adjustment to the new threat. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US faced an enemy whose creativity and adaptability are two of its greatest assets. The fast-paced situation changes in both of those AOs required tactical level leadership maintain the autonomy to “exercise disciplined initiative.” This type of initiative historically leads to mission success, specifically in fast-paced situations where a key to success is forcing the enemy to react.

MP1 One of the Carl Von Clausewitz’s central issues that describes war’s dynamic is the concept of “culminating point of victory.” Clausewitz advocated the idea that an offensive should be focused on the defender’s collapse, otherwise there is a “culminating point”, a momentum where the attacker loses his advantage for strategic victory. As he mentioned, “every attack which does not lead to peace must necessarily end up as a defense.” Military history has been enriched by battles of commanders with an overestimating self-confidence and high spirit who failed to identify this momentum. As a result, they lost the tactical advantage and they were defeated. Classical example in the World War II

Josef Dietrich’s leadership of the Sixth Panzer Army at the Battle of the Bulge revealed the characteristics of an unreliable General.

General von Steuben established the precedent of NCOs as trainers and wrote much the doctrine that the Army used until the early 19th Century, and that still forms the basis of much of the Army’s current doctrine. The purpose of this paper is to observe the legacy left by Major General von Steuben, to show how that legacy has impacted me as an Army leader, and to reflect on the legacy that I plan to leave on future Army leaders. Background While serving as Ambassador to France, Benjamin Franklin selected Friedrich von Steuben, a former Prussian military Officer, to come to the Colonies to help in the fight

Force management, or what is really otherwise known as planned comprehensive change, is in reality a complex and interwoven process. Though it was designed within the confines of a systemic approach referred to as the DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel and Facilities), in reality it is meant to enable both dutiful and well-thought out change as well as faster, more urgent adjustments in accordance with the evolving nature of war and information gathering tactics. The Army, as one branch involved in this initiative, focuses most of its attention in this regard on the organizational sector because of the way it facilitates an adequate and democratic step-by-step system of review (Student Reader, F102:2). But the fact is that even this initiative remains multi-faceted and appears to be rather bureaucratic in nature (it has five phases, which seems antithetical to an urgent change process), which might not be surprising since implementing the type of changes that are demanded can have major implications of all sorts. Still, it does appear that this concentration is being well received and that it will eventually serve its goal even if it does not appear that way when detailed on a point by point basis.

After seven months of planning at the highest levels, an operation that was to be the crux in Germany’s strategy for invading France rested on the shoulders of a competent but lowly company grade officer, Lieutenant Rudolph Witzig. Thirty-five minutes into the attack, victory was assured. Fort Eben Emael’s guns lay in pieces, it’s men in puddles, and the door to France swung open violently. From an uninformed, superficial level, the storming of Fort Eben Emael may appear to be nothing more than luck, an unrepeatable combination of uncontrollable variables accidentally aligned in the attacker’s favor. After all, the attack featured the untested use of gliders and shape charges, a ten-to-one ratio of

When assessing the strategies formulated by the British Generals, the Somme is good example to evaluate. The fundamental issue with evaluating the Somme’s tactics is that it seemed to be lacking

This mission command analysis evaluates the battle of Team Desobry at the town of Noville, Belgium. These events took place 18-19 December 1944, and later impacted the battle fought at Bastogne during World War II. It is the goal of this review to discuss and analyze three mission command principles displayed during this battle: Create shared understanding, exercise disciplined initiative, and the acceptance of prudent risk. One of the main characters that took part in this story was the 20th Armored Infantry Battalion, 10th Armored Division. The commanding officer of this element was Major William R. Desobry. During the events of World War II, the German forces were trying to gain control of the Ardennes to cut off the allies’ supply lines in order to isolate British forces from the American troops. A pivotal task for German forces to attain this goal was to gain access and take control of the Belgian town of Bastogne. However, an important strategic stepping stone to get there was Noville, which is just seven kilometers northeast of Bastogne. Two main reasons made Noville such a critical location for the Germans: First, it had a junction of roads that were important for displacement of German forces to the West. Second, it provided an alternative road to access Bastogne from the north.1

Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasiblt to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission (ADP 6-), 2012, p. 2). Mission command is broken down into six tenants: undertand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess (Mission Command 2011, 3-5). During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of actions for both allies and the enemy and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet

Marshal De Saxe was born in Goslar, Germany in 1696 and was immediately thrusted into nobility shortly thereafter. This nobility allowed him to be exposed to the military lifestyle of his time at a very young age, which would be a major contributor to his future success. He would eventually serve under and study with such greats as Alexander the Great and then be hired to serve in the French Army. This would lead him to earn the title of “Marshal-General of the Kings camps and armies” while serving under the French. He died in 1750 of “putrid fever”, which is a very un-glorified death compared to a death on a battlefield. Over his life he would be exposed to several different types of leadership and approaches to the battlefield and would document his findings. His findings covered from the individual solider to expectations of future military leaders. After his death Marshal de Saxe’s own writings would be published posthumously and secure his place as a military theorist. Marshal de Saxe used his personal experience and observations over his military career to influence his theory’s that were highly influential to military leaders and military theorist of his time and is studied in modern day by historians and military leaders.

Rommel achieved this legacy by working under some of the worst staff generals of all time, in a German General Staff that included men proclaimed by Rommel to be “fools” such as Wilhelm Keitel and Franz Halder (Young 346). Yet Field Marshal Rommel was able to overcome these obstacles to success with an array of successful strategies such as daring initiative, populist style of command, and bold use of natural camouflage. Germany’s greatest hero, Erwin Rommel was a towering figure at home and abroad, the victor of France, Gazala, and Kasserine

After World War II, historian Captain B.H. Liddell Hart stated “The general verdict among the German Generals I interrogated in 1945 was that Field Marshal Erich von Manstein had proved the ablest commander in their Army, and the man they had most desired to become its Commander-in-Chief. It is very clear that he had a superb sense of operational possibilities and an equal mastery in the conduct of operations with a greater grasp of the potentialities of mechanized forces than any of the other commanders who had not trained in the tank arm. In sum, he had military genius.”