Carlill V Carbolic Smoke Ball Company Case Summary

In 1974, the Southeastern promotions, Ltd. V. Conrad case came to the Supreme Court. This came to the court because they believed it violated the First Amendment. The First Amendment protects freedom of religion, speech, press, petition and assembly. In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. V. Conrad it was argued that Southeastern Promotions was stripped of their freedom of speech because they were denied the use of the Tivoli Theater in Chattanooga, Tennessee to put on the rock musical Hair. The Supreme Court had to uphold the First Amendment while still allowing the theater to keep their reputation of being a family establishment.

Rule: ‘“While in some of the cases cited and relied upon by the Commonwealth lesser amounts of drugs were in issue, there was evidence in addition to the drugs themselves which was susceptible of an inference of the intent to distribute and which was inconsistent with the notion of personal use.’ Commonwealth v. Wooden, 13 Mass.App.Ct. 417, 423–424, 433 N.E.2d 1234 (1982).” Com. v. Ahart, 63 Mass.App.Ct. 413 (2005)

An advertisement involving a transaction in goods is an offer when it invites particular action, and when it is clear, definite, and explicit and leaves nothing open for negotiation.

The Petitioners claim that, since it included offer and acceptance, supported by consideration, contained definite terms and was signed by all

In the wrongful death case of Barker v. Hennessy, Richard Barker’s widow and children filed a claim against Hennessy Industries Inc. for losses sustained by virtue of the death of Richard Barker. Barker claimed that Hennessy Industries Inc. was liable for her husband’s death, under the theories of strict liability, negligence, false representation, and concealment, since they manufactured the equipment that was used to grind, sand, and cut asbestos brake linings and shoes that Barker had used in his profession as a mechanic ("Fern Barker v. Hennessy Industries Inc | FindLaw," n.d.). The court ruled in favor of Hennessy, finding that they were not liable because the machines that Hennessy made did not actually contain the asbestos that caused the death of Barker.

One court found that New York’s mandatory generic drug law was conclusive proof that the plaintiff received a generic drug because the pharmacist had no choice, but to fill the prescription with generic drugs. Zandi v. Wyeth, No. A08-1455, 2009 WL 2151141, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. July 21, 2009). In contrast, a different court found that West Virginia’s generic drug law was not conclusive evidence because it merely allowed a pharmacist to fill a prescription with a generic version of a drug. Keffer v. Wyeth, No. CIV.A. 2:04-0692, 2011 WL 1838966, at *3-4 (S.D.W. Va. May 13, 2011).

Analysis: This situation should belong to Offer and Acceptance Section. An offer is not valid until it is received by the offered, and the offeror is not limited by the offer until such time as it is accepted according to Communication of an Offer. So in this case, Bishop received the letter on May 3rd, before May 3rd, it is not bounded. On may 22nd, Bishop wrote to this company and accepted this offer. According to Acceptance of an Offer, the acceptance must take the form if certain words or acts in accordance with the offer that will indicate to the offeror that the offeree has accepted the offer. In addition, the acceptance of the offer takes place when the letter of acceptance, properly addressed and the postage paid, is placed in the postbox or post office. So for Bishop (defendant), it obeys the rules of an offer and acceptance. For Armstrong Aggregates Company (plaintiff), they cannot change their offer by increasing the offer because Bishop had already accepted the offer and sent to this company on May 22nd. Meanwhile, the company did not communicate with Bishop about change the price. Therefore, this action is not valid and this company should still accept this offer at $180.

The offer was properly communicated because the offer was in written form in the newspaper, making it sufficient for communicating the offer.

There was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Barnes did understand the label to constitute a representation in the form suggested. It was found that Glendale was negligent and in all circumstances, it was considered there was a duty on Glendale to include in the packaging a warning as to the consequences of using corrosive product with hot water in a confined space such as a drain. There was no specific defect with the caustic soda but the issue is whether it was defective within the meaning of Section 75AC. It was found by the court the label to be defective within the meaning of section 75AC.

The offer and acceptance model is flawed- only an agreement is necessary. In order to fully comprehend this statement, we must first establish what constitutes and offer and what constitutes acceptance. “An offer is a statement by one party of willingness to enter into a contract on stated terms, provided that these terms are, in turn, accepted by the party to whom the offer is addressed”. Acceptance is “…an unqualified expression of ascent to the terms proposed by the offeror”. The “Offer and acceptance model” is based on the court’s adopt the “mirror image” rule of contractual formation. Applying the definitions stated above, we can take this to mean that there must be a clear and unequivocal offer which must be matched by an equally

The Society’s argument was that the display of products was an offer, which was accepted when the customer selected and placed the products into the shopping basket. Because a pharmacist did not supervise this process, Boots was in breach of the Act. Boots argument was that the sale was effected at the till and was supervised in accordance with the Act. The lower court had found that the method used by Boots was not in contravention of the Act. Pharmaceutical Society appealed the decision.

Besides that, goods on display is an invitation to treat and it is not an offer. (Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd［1953］ 1 QB 401)

The leading cases, CIR v Mitsubishi Motors Ltd [1995] and Commissioner of Taxation v James Flood Pty Ltd [1953] that reflect a taxpayer

The ratio decidendi means the principles of law on which the decision is founded. In the case of Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co Ltd (1892). The ratio decidendi in this case was that the advertisement was a unilateral contract, whereby, the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company made a promise to perform an obligation. The fact that the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company deposited £1000 with the Alliance Bank demonstrated intent of that promise and therefore it was not a ‘mere puff’. Communication of acceptance of the offer was not necessary in this case as Mrs Carlill accepted the offer from her conduct, in that, she purchased the smoke ball and performed the conditions of using the smoke ball as outlined on the advertisement. It was also established

Hanover-Bates Chemical Corporation produces chemicals for the chemical plating industry. It has plants in Los Angeles, Houston, Chicago, and Newark. The production process involves taking chemicals purchased from other suppliers and mixing them into user-based formulas. The Hanover-Bates has a strong balance sheet and trades on the over-the-counter market. There are seven sales districts within the organization with a total of forty sales representatives. Each receives a salary, fringe benefits, and commissions of 0.5 percent of their dollar sales volume up to their sales quota. Field sales efforts are extremely important and quality control is critical with supplying the plater with the