Airpower And Its Effectiveness Against The Enemy 's Fielded Military Forces

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

Clausewitz’s attack of enemy centers of gravity and Sun Tzu’s prioritization of attack of important elements of national power provide contrasting approaches to the development of effective strategy. These contrasts are reflections of each author’s perspective on how war should be waged, the proper use of force, their definitions of the ideal victory and how best to achieve that victory as well as their methodologies,

Ever since the beginning of time, there has been conflict and conflict will always play a role in the development of history. The world has experienced hundreds of wars with countless casualties, these wars date back to the 10th Century and forward to the present. The United States of America is no stranger to war having participated in over 100 wars either it being a small war or a world war. Michael C. C. Adams “The Best War Ever” gives a rational explanation on the events that led the U.S to become the powerhouse country after sacrificing so much for the war, or did they? In this paper we will support the argument made in Adams “The Best War Ever” Chapter four, appropriately titled “The American War Machine”, other primary sources used will be such as Harry S. Truman first speech to congress in April 1945 and General George S. Patton’s praise speech to the Third Army. The argument being that the U.S did in fact play an impacting role in the outcome of World War 2 but how it also used appearances as an advantage to further develop itself as an international force, just like the tale from the Trojan War, the Trojan horse was all about appearances but with a precise objective.

The ways in which the United States has conducted its military operations since becoming an independent nation has largely depended upon the overall political and military objectives of each individual conflict. The United States first three hot wars after the end of World War II display the marked difference in US objectives and the operations used to achieve them better than any other modern wars in which American troops participated.

Carl Von Clausewitz and Helmuth Moltke the Elder were both practitioners and theorists of the war art in the 19th century. Their military thoughts on war’s character and its dynamics have influenced the later militaries in the conduct of war. Particularly, the Clausewitzian concept of the “culminating point of victory” and the Moltke’s principle of “Auftragstaktik”, or mission type tactics by a decentralized command were implemented and culminated in the battlefield of World War II. Moreover, today, the US Army has adopted both concepts in its latest refined “AirLand Battle” doctrine recognizing their importance in the operational art of modern warfare.

This paper was written by Dr. Richard L. Kugler from the National Defense University, Center of Technology and National Security. Operation Anaconda was a success, but taught many lessons for modern-era force operations and defense transformation that deserves to be remembered (Kugler, 2007). Even though the battle plan was complex and sophisticated, it was not followed by the Afghan forces, which left US ground troops to do the battle alone. US forces had to replan the battle at a moment's notice.

According to Washington National Intelligencer, “The final step ought to be taken, and that step is WAR. By what course of measures we have reached the presents crisis, is not now a question for patriots and freeman to discuss. It exists: and it is by open mainly war only that we can get through it with honor and advantage to the country.”

The development of the allied military strategy in World War II (WWII) presented challenges for the U.S. and Great Britain as they worked together to defeat the Axis powers. First, this paper will review the environment at the time of WWII when Admiral Stark penned the “Plan Dog” memorandum and MAJ Wedemeyer’s War Defense Team put together the “Victory Plan”. Next, it will look at the advantages and disadvantages of coalition operations with supporting examples. Then, a review of two major meetings between U.S. and Great Britain will identify what strategic decisions were made and the effects they have on the war. Finally, this paper will explore the foundations of strategy (Clausewitz and Sun Tzu) by which the allied forces used and

The notion of an American way of war informs how scholars, policymakers, and strategists understand how Americans fight. A way of war—defined as a society’s cultural preferences for waging war—is not static. Change can occur as a result of important cultural events, often in the form of traumatic experiences or major social transformations. A way of war is therefore the malleable product of culturally significant past experiences. Reflecting several underlying cultural ideals, the current American way of war consists of three primary tenets—the desire for moral clarity, the primacy of technology, and the centrality of scientific management systems—which combine to create a preference for decisive, large-scale conventional wars with clear objectives and an aversion to morally ambiguous low-intensity conflicts that is relevant to planners because it helps them address American strategic vulnerabilities.

“The power of an Air Force is terrific when there is nothing to oppose it” (Churchill,

The air war in North Africa highlighted the gap in US air doctrine’s emphasis on exclusive strategic bombing. Tactical airpower

War is a monumental factor for how the Country will operate in the future. Losing can mean the end of that country, but victory can help grow and gain respect for the country. When should a country resort to war? A country should resort to war when three things are at risk. These things are Society, Economy, and Politics. When the people, the economy, and politics are at stake it is appropriate to go to war. As of the Society, if human lives are at risk, it is putting society at risk. As of economy, if trade individually or with other countries is at risk, it is putting the economy at risk. As of politics, if any type of political event is affected, it is putting politics at risk. The ends justify the means if the means are provoked by the

Additionally, there must be a reasonable chance of success and should only be entered into as a last resort.2 Basically, no one can just go out and start a war against another country without appropriate rationale.

Giulio Douhet, in his seminal treatise on air power titled The Command of the Air, argued, “A man who wants to make a good instrument must first have a precise understanding of what the instrument is to be used for; and he who intends to build a good instrument of war must first ask himself what the next war will be like.” The United States (US) military establishment has been asking itself this exact question for hundreds of years, in an attempt to be better postured for the future. From the Civil War, through the American Indian Wars, and up until World War II (WWII) the American military’s way of war consisted of fighting traditional, or conventional, wars focused on total annihilation of an enemy. Since that time, there has been a gradual shift from the traditional framework towards one that can properly address non-traditional, or irregular wars. While the US maintains a capability to conduct conventional warfare, the preponderance of operations where the US military has been engaged since WWII have been irregular wars. Therefore, this question articulated by Douhet, as to understanding the character of the next war in order to properly plan, train, and equip, is certainly germane to the current discussion of regular war versus irregular war. In today’s fiscally constrained environment, the questions remains, which will dominate the future and therefore, garner further funding and priority. Based on the current threats and the US role as a superpower, the US

Famous Prussian military theorist Karl von Clausewitz said that "war is the continuation of politics by other means." which supports the idea of war as a culturally influenced situation that is determined by the political power in control. War is a tool in the arsenal of a successful power to use when debating and non-violent persuasion fail to achieve the goals of the power. War is always waged for a reason, war is not a random act of slaughter. It is consequential to both the attacking and defending parties and no matter the amount of casualties, war comes with a heavy price. The financial cost of war is astronomical and the effects of war can be damaging to the political power. This is why war is usually a secondary resort instead of an impulsive decision coming from instinctive biology and not rationale. Biology has shown us that we do have reflexive, self defense mechanisms built in that serve the purpose of defending us from predators. But instead of fighting for a cause initiated out of respect for our self defense, we find these mechanisms being manipulated by the political power in order to gain public support for a war waged for entirely calculated reasons and not based on emotional expression. Denis Diderot, a French philosopher, elaborates on war as a