Essay Alcibiades' Revenge

The Greek victory against Persia was largely due to efforts of mainly Athens but also Sparta as well. Athens was responsible for the major turning points of the Persian invasions, while Sparta was responsible for the deciding battle. Miltiades, with his skilful battle strategies, defeated the Persians during their second invasion at Marathon, which gave Athens a confidence boost on their military. During the third invasion, when the Athenians were evacuated to Salamis, Themistocles had devised a plan to trick the Persians which had resulted in Persian army without a supply line. Sparta?s importance had revealed during their sacrifice at Thermopylae and at Plataea, where they provided the most effective part of the army.

The Peloponnesian War pitted the Athenians against the Spartans. The Peloponnesians’ were an alliance of city-states controlled by Sparta. These two powerful city-states became locked in a struggle for dominance of the eastern Mediterranean area. The roots of the conflict and in particular this expedition is highly complex. As Thucydides says in his history of the war, the underlying cause was Spartan fear of Athens' expansive power. But, the triggering event was Athens' aggressive behavior towards Corinth, an ally of Sparta.

Athens and Sparta were both dominant powers in ancient Greece. However, a legendary rivalry existed between the two. When Athens ended its alliance with Corcyra in 433 B.C. and began to surround Potidaea, it threatened Corinth’s position. Sparta feared that Athens was becoming too powerful and tried to avert war. The Spartans believed that peace was possible if the Athenians would revoke measures against Sparta's ally, Megara. The Athenian leader, Pericles, refused to concur with this because Sparta and Athens had earlier agreed that conflicts would be solved by negotiation. If the Athenians would yield to Sparta's request, they would in fact be accepting Sparta’s orders. This was unacceptable, and as a result, war broke out. Athens and its Delian League were attacked by Sparta and its Peloponnesian League. Diodorus mentions that the Spartans did not just declare war, but sought additional support from Persia.

In his ambitions to conquer Sicily and then move on to Italy and the Peloponnesus, he also shows this thirst.12 The Athenians recognized Alcibiades's brilliance and ruthlessness so they elected Nicias as a general to "[temper] his rashness."13 Alcibiades resorted to violence to gain glory, Pericles, on the other hand, attempted to prolong peace and settle matters with diplomacy. He once tried to persuade the cities to send delegates to meet in Athens to discuss restorations of temples destroyed during the war with Persia, but nothing came of his plan because of Spartan opposition.14 He even went so far as to bribe the chief magistrates of Sparta to buy time to prepare for war, which he knew was inevitable.15

Action from necessity is a constantly recurring theme in Thucydides’ The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War. A sentiment used to explain the growth of the Athenian Empire which some Athenians espoused to an assembly at Sparta best quantifies necessity, “. . . we were necessarily compelled at first to advance the hegemony to where it is—especially by fear, and then by honor, and later by benefit.” (Selected Passages 1.75.3). This claim, referred to as the Athenian Thesis, is used to advance the two following implications: all states act with the motivations of fear, honor and interest and no one can condemn a state for doing so. The Athenian Thesis influences the way many of the Athenian elite structure their patterns of reasoning in both noticeable and subtle ways.

It is vital that we keep our strongest men safe so that we can train several upcoming foot soldiers. Who would we have to protect Athens if our strongest were directed on an expedition and perished? Instead of allowing Athens to become corrupt or even worse weakened under attack we would like to see our great state become self-sustaining. In this we would like Athenian’s to depend on our own resources. We can learn to make what we don’t have and the things that are insurmountable we can learn to live without. This may not be easy but, in time we will become a much stronger Greek unit. Socrates states on page 295 559b “But the desire for a more varied and luxurious diet is one which, with discipline and training from an early age, can normally be got rid of, and which is physically damaging to intelligence and self-discipline. May it therefore rightly be called unnecessary?” We will learn to be happy with our own resources and man-made items. This will make us nondependent on any other city-state. With our hoplite divisions trained, enlarged and, with sufficient equipment we should be less fearful of potential invasions. If by chance an assault on Athens was to transpire we now have many trained and equipped foot soldiers to protect us.

The Peloponnesian War between the city-states of Athens and Sparta (and their respective allies) lasted from 431-404 BC. Conflicts between the two cites dated back further, however, with

The army was responsible for maintaining the reputation of Sparta, arguably the most important role it played. Knows as the best warriors of the Peloponnese the Spartans used their strong military tactics in order to conquer neighbouring lands in order to further expand Sparta and gain larger areas of fertile land. Sparta lead the untied Peloponnese army and was greatly feared throughout the Mediterranean due to their title as the greatest army throughout Greece. This title in itself made the thought and task of attacking or declaring war on the spartiates a feared happening, further defending them from attacks dismissed as useless and never carried out by neighbouring states. The army was the main defence of Sparta keeping the citizens safe and

Hence, the tactics and the paramount strategy devised by Miltiades in the Battle of Marathon as well as the unification of the Greek forces, both effectively crushed the Persian onslaught and significantly increased the confidence of the Greeks to incline themselves in a common cause if the Persians attacked again.

The different geographic location of Athens and Sparta had a great impact on their military strategy and technologies. Athens was close to the sea, therefore it expanded by conquering nearby islands. This necessitated the construction of ships, which was expensive and required a lot of wood material and cheap labor. Both of those were supplied by Athens' allies; wood was purchased with paid tributes and labor came from conquered slaves (Pomeroy, p.22). Sparta was situated far inland on the Laconian plain and had no access to sea. It directed its military expansion towards the neighboring poleis and relied mostly on its standing army. In return, its allies were expected to provide military support to the Spartan army in an effort to appropriate even more land on the Peloponnesian peninsula.

It is remarkable how timeless the Speech of Archidamus is. One could easily imagine the Spartan King were speaking to a modern occupied territory, itching for a revolt. King Archidamus urges the Spartans to head caution when entering war with Athens. He has “seen too many wars” [pg 25, 80] The battles he has witnessed in his lifetime have swayed him of any naive fascination with war. He has learned that violence begets violence, so one should only enter a battle they are prepared to win. Archidamus explains that Athens is stronger in terms of wealth, military might and political power. If the Spartans take the offensive route under these circumstances, they will surely loose both in combat and in terms of public relations. [pg 26, 81] Furthermore, Archidamus explains later that Athens had agreed to mediation, making any fight that Sparta were to start an unlawful preemptive attack. [pg 28, 85] The King assures his people he is not blind to their suffering, he just envisions better ways of ending it. [pg 26, 82] One of these methods would be to create partnerships with other nations who would lend armed forces and capital to the cause. To be done in tandem with confederation would be the accumulation of Sparta’s assets. Archidamus predicts that under these circumstances, Athens could be motivated to surrender. Under the very different circumstances from which he is speaking, the King pushes to avoid war at all costs citing that “complaints can be resolved, whether they are

During the following years, the Athenians decided to take the offensive by attacking the city of Syracuse. They campaigned all throughout western Greece and even the Peloponnese. By 425 B.C., it wasn’t looking good for Sparta and they wanted to bring about peace. They soon, however, gained victory of Chalcidice and Athens were encouraged to revolt, but in a battle at Amphipolis in 422 B.C., two major leaders of Sparta and Athens were killed and Athenians were persuaded to accept Sparta’s peace

His force further had innumerable archers. It was with this in mind that the Athenians made the “fateful” decision to train 40,000 men for 200 ships in 481BCE. This force was relatively inexperienced compared to the Persian contingent, which included skilled Phoenician sailors (D.S 11.18.1). The Persians had light, fast boarding ships compared to the Greeks who had stout, strongly built ramming ships (8.10,60). This would prove critical later at the crowded straits of Salamis in 480BCE. If it were not for this fleet, the “Persian conquest of Greece would have been assured.” (7.139). If Persia had control of the sea, defeat by land would quickly have followed due to the inability of the city-states to hold a united front. The halt in city-state squabbles and the creation of the Hellenic League was “no small achievement” and was to the great disadvantage of Xerxes. This clearly was a factor in the overall demise of the campaign. The construction of the Athenian fleet, advocated by Themistocles, was a precursor to this.

Argos received an excuse from the Delphic oracle to keep it from battle (Hdt. VII.148-152), and Messene was “so corrupted that [it] even tried to prevent Sparta’s attempts to come to Greece’s aid” (Plato, 692d). Other city-states avoided participation in the wars as well. The oracle also excused Crete from fighting (Hdt. VII.169), and the tyrant Gelon of Syracuse refused to let his state help Greece’s cause (Brunt 158-162). If these poleis had chosen to fight, the Persians may have been intimidated by the large Greek forces and avoided war. The Greeks instead presented an image of a nation torn by cowardice, thereby making the Persians more confident in attacking Greece. This lack of unity among the city-states created some

Once back in command Lysander directed the Spartan fleet towards Hellespont, the Athenian fleet of 160 ships followed him and took up a position at Aegospotami, Lysander commanded the mariners and pilots to go on board and sit in silence, they did this for four days. The Athenians were scattered about as the men were sleeping or dining as they grew careless waiting for Lysander to attack, when Lysander’s fleet did attack the men were coming unarmed and scattered to help but many died at their ships which resulted in Lysander seizing the city of Lampascus, killing many of the crews and capturing 3000 men and 160 ships, all prisoners were executed. Having taken their ships in tow he sailed back to Lampascus having accomplished a great work with small pains, the war that had a 25 year duration was finished in an hour, it was put to an end by the ready conduct of one man. Lysander. Lacedaemonians quotes that Lysander wrote to the ephors: Athens is taken” and