Essay on Alternative Dispute Resolution

In the case against Sage Rent-A-Car the defendant filed a surety bond with the superintendent of insurance when it incorporated. Therefore, the court should dismiss the suit against Sage Rent-A-Car for failing to state a claim under rule NMRA 1-012B(6). Also under section 66-5-207(E) (1988) of the New Mexico Financial Responsibility Act states, “a motor vehicle approved as a self-insured by the superintendent of insurance is exempt from the act. Therefore, the defendant is not liable for any damages due to filing a surety bond with the New Mexico superintendent and for being self-insured. Lastly, under New Mexico case law Las Lumarias of the N.M Council v. Isengard, 92 N.M 297, 300-301 (Ct. App. 1978) the court held a motion to dismiss due to the plaintiff not being able to recover or be entitled to relief under any state of facts provided under the claim. As one can see under the statutes provided and case law the defendant Sage Rent-A-Car is not liable for damages per the New Mexico Financial Responsibility Act not constituting negligence due to Sage’s actions when

Jeffery Calkin, the defendant, leased a vehicle for our client, Sage Rent-A-Car Inc., and was involved in a car accident with the plaintiff, Jane White. A negligence suit was filed by Ms. White against Mr. Calkin and our client, Sage Rent-A-Car Inc. The suit claims that our client is required to carry insurance and therefore has a duty to assume responsibility for this accident under the provisions of the Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act (MFRA).

Levy introduced me to is contractual law. Mr. Levy allowed me to assist on insurance cases, which included observing meetings, summarizing depositions, and reviewing contracts. Even though I had experience reviewing contracts while working a couple of summers for a General Counsel at a large business, this was completely different because these agreements were among insurance companies and individuals, instead of insurance companies and businesses. Mr. Levy works on behalf of insurance companies, mostly State Farm, when they have disputes with their clients over wind and hail coverage. These cases are interesting because Mr. Levy has to not only deal with the individuals that are claiming the insurance company didn’t follow the contract, but he also must deal with the adjuster in each case. Mr. Levy gave me the responsibility of summarizing the depositions of the adjusters to confirm that none of them said anything that was contradictory or detrimental to State Farm’s case. Often these cases end with settlements or dismissals because either the insurance company decides to compensate the individuals or the attorney representing the insurance company gets a favorable summary judgment. Mr. Levy and other attorneys representing insurance companies frequently seek summary judgments when the plaintiffs don’t have significant evidence to prove that the insurance companies violated the contract. In most of the insurance cases that I assisted Mr. Levy on he was able to receive summary judgment because the plaintiffs didn’t have enough evidence to prove that State Farm was responsible for paying the

Brohawn, supra, 276 Md. at 399. Subsequently, the other party to the altercation filed an action against Brohawn seeking damages for intentional torts and negligence. Id. at 399-400. Transamerica, Brohawn’s insurer, refused to defend Brohawn on the grounds that her coverage contained a policy exclusion whereby Transamerica was not responsible for intentional conduct. Id. at 400. Thereafter, Transamerica initiated a declaratory judgment action, in the same court, seeking to have the court declare that Brohawn’s conduct was intentional, and, therefore, fell within the policy exclusion. Id. at 401. The circuit court dismissed the declaratory judgment action because “the question of coverage would be ‘determined by the jury’s verdict in the tort suits]. . . .” Id. at

David A. Goldmeier and Terry C. Goldmeier v. Allstate Insurance Company 337 F.3d 629 (6th Cir 2003) case supports our

As a follow up to our phone conversation this date, Allstate investigated an intersection accident which occurred on October 4, 2016 in Fairfax, Virginia. Upon completion of our investigation found Geico insured Karen Finger to be the proximate cause of the loss and 100% liable. We determined Ms. Finger failed to maintain proper lookout and yield the right of way while attempting to make a turn and therefore was 100% liable for the loss. Allstate’s investigation found no liability on our insured driver, Nathaniel

Laurence Kaye (“Kaye”), appellant, an attorney, represented Linda Wilson-Gaskins (“Wilson-Gaskins”), appellee, in a wrongful termination lawsuit filed against Wilson-Gaskins’s former employer, Government Employees Insurance Co. (“GEICO”). Following that representation, Wilson-Gaskins filed a complaint against Kaye alleging “legal malpractice.” The Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted summary judgment in favor of Kaye and dismissed Wilson-Gaskins’s complaint. Wilson-Gaskins appealed the dismissal of her claim. We affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court and held that Wilson-Gaskins failed to make a prima facie case for professional negligence. We further held that a release contained in a settlement agreement between the parties

State Farm has asked whether it has a duty to defend the insured pursuant to the insured’s homeowners policy. It is our opinion that State Farm has no duty to defend the insured under the insured’s homeowners policy. The insured’s homeowners policy entitled the insured to a defense for “a suit brought against an insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this coverage applies, caused by an occurrence.” In this case, these elements initially triggering the insured’s homeowners policy are likely satisfied. Nevertheless, the SECTON II – Exclusions section provides that the liability coverage does not apply to any of the fifteen exclusions specifically enumerated therein.

Mr. Alvarado approached my client suddenly after running a red light. The negligence of your insured caused Ms. Tellez to collide into Mr. Alvardo’s left side of the door after Mr. Alvarado ran a red light. Ms. Tellez bags deployed, causing great damage to her car. See Photographs, attached as Exhibit A. The two-car collision occurred suddenly and without warning.

“An insurance company has a duty to act in good faith in settling claims and a breach of that duty will give rise to a cause of action by the insured. That duty, however, runs only from the insurer to the insured, not to third parties.” Id. at page 5.

I attended a hearing on your behalf in the above matter before Judge Burke in Hudson, New York, on 05/17/2017. The claimant was present and represented by attorney Ed DeLauter. Your insured, Robert George, was present to give testimony.

Plaintiff’s allegations must show that Maloney’s behavior was sufficient to prove he is liable. Maloney’s commissions for the sale of insurance policies are insufficient evidence that he acted

Prior to the accident, Plaintiff purchased a disability insurance policy (the “Policy”) from Defendant Common Insurance Company in New Amsterdam which provided issued insurance policy to Plaintiff.

Punitive damages must have been given because Payne had done many things in order to pretend the Krysas into buying the truck, and his conduct did pose a significant risk to the physical welfare of the Krysas and showed an indifference to or reckless disregard of the health or safety of the Krysas.

As the plaintiff he argues that Zoom Car Company should be responsible for his medical bills