Ambiguity Of Compatibilism

In this paper I will present an argument against free will and then I will defend a response to that argument. Free will is defined as having the ability to make our own choices. Some will argue that all of our decisions have already been dictated by our desires therefore we never actually truly make our own choices. The purpose of this paper is to defend the argument that we have free will by attacking the premise that states we have no control over what we desire. I will defeat this premise by showing how one does have control over his/her desires through the idea of self-control. I will then defend my argument against likely rebuttals that state that there is still no way to control our desires proving that we do have free will.

Determinism is a doctrine suggesting that for every event there exist conditions that could cause no alternative event. Free will is a philosophical term describing a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. Understandably, the dichotomy between these two concepts is a topic philosophers have debated over for many years. As a result of these debates, a number of alternative philosophical perspectives arguing for the existence of free will, namely libertarianism and compatibilism, have emerged, existing in stark contrast to determinism. In order to ascertain the extent to which free will is compatible with determinism, one must first consider these different approaches to

The subject of freewill and determinism has been a matter of intense debate in the philosophical community for ages with the topic of compatibilism and incompatibilism. This essay will be reviewing and critiquing the work of a very well-known philosopher Peter Van Inwagen and his article “An Argument For Incompatibilism” and what does he mean by freewill and determinism.

When discussing the topic of compatibilism, several aspects of the concept must be considered, such as free will and determinism: those who are skeptical and criticize this philosophical position and or stance, are typically weary or concerned with the reality of both free will and determinism flowing freely together.

There are 3 basic views that can be taken on the view of determinism, (1) deny its reality, either because of the existence of free will or on independent grounds; (2) accept its reality but argue for its compatibility with free will; or (3) accept its reality and deny its compatibility with free will.In this paper I am going to be defending the view compatibilism, specifically W. T. Stace’s view of compatibilism.

In this paper I will defend W.T. Stace’s position of compatibilism in respect to the problem of free will, as presented in Religion and the Modern Mind. I will explain Stace’s position on how free will and casual determinism are compatible. I will consider the following two objections against Stace’s position of free will: compatibilism is too weak a notion of free will that it conflicts with determinism, and there is no real difference between free and constrained action.

People believe that genuine freedom of choice is not always possible because our decisions and actions are determined by factors beyond our control. This view is known as Determinism. There is also an extreme form of determinism known as ‘hard determinism,’ in which they believe that every demeanor can be traced to a cause, although they may disagree about what those causes are. The idea of determinism poses a difficult issue to the concept of ‘free will’. Are we able to make free choices if all our thoughts and actions are predetermined by our own past and the physical laws of nature? Majority of us would like to believe that we have the freedom of will and are able to make decisions based on our own discretion but, I personally believe that the deterministic view holds true to a certain extent and that most of our actions are a result of a force that is beyond our comprehension. My purpose in this essay is to explain and critically analyze Baron d’Holbach’s view on determinism.

Many believe that the world is largely determined but we can still act freely as our behaviour is not predictable. Thomas Aquinas disagreed with hard determinism as he believed that ‘man chooses freely, not out of necessity’. Although Aquinas and others that criticise hard determinism and disagree with the hard determinist views, would still agree with hard determinists in that free will and determinism are incompatible, but would argue that we have free will but our lives are not determined. This view that free will and determinism are incompatible but it is free will that exists, not determinism, is also supported by libertarians.

Compatibilism is right in the middle of both the other two theories of free will. They believe that events are determined by prior events just like the hard determinist do, but they do also believe in free will like libertarians. In every situation prior events shape the present or future events. Every time we think of a reason to do something this is because of our prior events that caused us to think one way or another. But then how can we have free will? We can have free will by the decisions we make. For example, if you are thirsty, you may drink water or milk. Prior events have caused you to be thirsty, but what you chose to drink or when is free will.

Stace, Frankfurt, and Wolf are all compatibilists. They hold that free will and determinism are compatible. In this paper, first I will define and explain key terms determinism, free will, and compatibilism. Next, I will discuss the individual views of each compatibilist and how they object to parts of determinism; then compare and contrast their views. They all believe in parts of determinism and parts of free will, even though determinism holds we are not morally responsible and free will holds we are morally responsible; thus, they are technically incompatible. This concept will be explained in this paper.

The first matter to be noted is that this view is in no way in contradiction to science. Free will is a natural phenomenon, something that emerged in nature with the emergence of human beings, with their

Those who identify as a compatibilist believe that even though determinism is true, thus meaning that every event that occurs is determined by preceding events and/or the laws of nature, our actions can still be free. Stace is a philosopher that identifies as a compatibilist and believes that free will occurs because of internal mental states like desires. He also believes that actions that are not free are the ones that are caused by external physical forces such as the laws of nature or preceding events. Stace believes that, “acts freely done are those whose immediate causes are psychological states in the agent. Acts not freely done are those who immediate causes are states of affairs external to the agent” (Stace, 378). However, Stace realizes that there are some cases in which an external physical force can cause you to have a desire that you act on therefore this is

In “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, Harry Frankfurt illustrates the concepts of freedom of will and freedom of action, but more importantly, Frankfurt has refined the compatibilism theory. Compatibilism allows the freedom of will to exist in the deterministic world. According to determinism theory, the future state of worlds is determined by some events in the distant past (E) and the laws of nature (L). More specifically, E refers to the history, such as experiences or states whereas L refers to scientific or physical law like gravity. For example, an alcoholic’s action is determined that he will not stop drinking. Here E is that he had been drinking in the past, and L is the physiological addiction effect caused by

Like Thomas Hobbes before him, Hume sought to reconcile human freedom with the mechanist (or determinist) belief that human beings are part of a deterministic universe whose happenings are governed by the laws of physics. Hume’s reconciliation of freedom and

In this essay I will explain why I think the strongest position of the free will debate is that of the hard determinists and clarify the objection that moral responsibility goes out the door if we don’t have free will by addressing the two big misconceptions that are associated with determinists: first that determinism is an ethical system, and secondly that contrary to common belief determinists do believe in the concept of cause and effect. I will also begin by explaining my position and why I believe that the position of the indeterminist does not hold water as an argument and the third