An Aristotelian Theory Of Consciousness

A factual definition of consciousness; Consciousness is “2: the state of being characterized by sensation, emotion, volition, and thought: 3: the totality of conscious states of an individual.”(Pp. 1). One is able to physically feel, understand emotion, is a willing individual, and are

Is Martha right in her idea that the robot cannot think, which is why it could never be a duplication of a human, such as Ash? This paper shall attempt to demonstrate the validity of artificial intelligence’s inability to be thinking, conscious entities via Black Mirror’s “Be Right Back” episode by supporting it with Descartes’ Dualism theory.

Turing doesn’t respond directly to each premises of this argument, instead he responds to its conclusion that machines are not conscious. To begin with, Turing follows the consciousness objection’s line of thought and states that the only possible method to know if a machine can think or not is to literally become that machine. Similarly, the only possible method to know if a person can think or not is to literally be that person. According to Turing, these statements represent the perspective of solipsism, the

called consciousness is the Turing test (Turing, 1950) which, rather tellingly, was originally called the

Consciousness a term explained as being aware of all surroundings, emerging from the functions of the brain. When a person gets used to something they may be able to think of other things at the same time, until a change happens, then they regain their consciousness to what they were doing. This essay is to further explore the target which is the slides from lecture 17 consciousness using the slides Meanings and automatization by using examples from the book “ The Robots Rebellion” by Keith E. Stanovich, which is the base to further explain and expand on these points.

The fascination with consciousness dates back to the time of Plato and Descartes. Since those times the term “consciousness” has spurned controversy in many scientific fields, including the fields of biology, psychology, and neuroscience. However, with the recent advancements in brain imaging technologies, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG), human consciousness has shifted from being a subjective, abstract idea into being a observable scientific phenomenon. As neuroimaging capabilities progress, the public interest in consciousness also grows.

If we look at the definition of consciousness, which implies that ‘one has to be aware of all its surroundings and wellbeing’ then machines can certainly not be conscious; as they have all the operations and data already programmed in them by some external forces and are only aware of those situations which have

Some researchers insist that only a conscious

As a result of not being mind readers, humans have learned, through time, the importance on other subtle, verbal/non-verbal communication/behaviorisms as clues to what another individual may or may not be experiencing. For example, if another being behaves in a certain way, such as saying “I am hungry,” humans have learned that it is more than reasonable to assume he or she is in fact hungry. In all actuality, it is unreasonable to assume that this individual is not hungry and is lying. Furthermore, if a robot or computer behaved so similarly to a human, to the point that it succeeded in passing the Turing Test, then what right does a human have in claiming to know what is or is not going on in this computer’s/robot’s mind? For these reasons, I think that it if a robot or computer could exhibit the required behavior to imply that it has a mind, then humans are in no position to tell state whether that robot or computer does or does not have a mind. Humans cannot even reach an agreement on what the mind actually is, therefore, human’s are not in the position to claim whether or not other beings can have a mind. If another being behaves as if it has a mind, then that is the best possible evidence we can ever have towards proving

People always try to imitate skills from good aspect and use those skills in many areas to get more benefits. People only know a little about imitation, as a result, during the process of using imitations people always find new problems that may lead to a totally new project. In the article, Susan gives an example of the robot machine. People want to make the robot to replace people doing some easy tasks but the vision problem is an obstacle in front of researchers. It is impossible to give robot the same ability of vision as human do. People just want to find out what is the reason people can see effortlessly. This is a huge and complexed process and the vision is more likely controlled by consciousness. Brain has the relationship with controlling vision but consciousness also has the relationship with the work of brain. When people are doing the work with robot’s vision there comes the problem with the meaning and function of consciousness. This is just like an example for using the imitation and find the new problems. People always get progress inside this kind of situations. When people deal with one issues, it is also the time using for the deeper area of human evolution. In the essay, Susan states that “we humans can see so effortlessly that we cannot begin to imagine how complex the process has to be.” (32). All the questions come with the very easy question. People just want to let the

Consciousness being immaterial is an successful argument made by Chalmers as he presents it in his piece in the form of an zombie that is identical to an human being. He, however, presents the zombie as an individual that does not contain an conscious, but can do everything an conscious person can do without having the ability to make it an experience. This occurs in his piece when he states “…my zombie twin. He is molecule for molecule identical to me…he will be awake, able to report contents of his internal states… Its just that none of this functioning will be accompanied by any real conscious experiment” (Rondel’s notes). In stating this quote, Chalmers makes the point consciousness is immaterial by making the zombie atom to atom identical to him making the zombie material, but the only difference between the two is that the zombie cannot experience. This makes Chalmers argument of consciousness being immaterial successful as it fulfills the criteria of materialism by having the zombie resemble him, but also tests materialism by having them imagine the zombie not having an conscious.

In this essay I will argue that digital computers are not capable of conscious thinking. First I will use Searle's argument to defend my view. I will then explain the features of consciousness that he talks about in order to use them against counterarguments.

The Representational Theory of Mind proposes that we, as both physiological and mental beings, are systems which operate based on symbols and interpretations of the meanings of such symbols rather than beings which operate just on physiological processes (chemical reactions and biological processes). It offers that humans and their Minds are computing machines, mental software (the Mind) which runs on physical hardware (the body). It suggests, too, that we are computing machines functioning as something other than a computing machine, just as every other machine does.

In his paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Alan Turing sets out to answer the question of whether machines can think in the same humans can by conceptualizing the question in concrete terms. In simple terms, Turing redefines the question by posing whether a machine can replicate the cognition of a human being. Yet, some may object to the notion that Turing’s new question effectively captures the nature of machines’ capacity for thought or consciousness, such as John Searle. In his Chinese room thought experiment, Searle outlines a scenario that implies machines’ apparent replication of human cognition does not yield conscious understanding. While Searle’s Chinese thought experiment demonstrates how a Turing test is not sufficient to establish that a machine can possess consciousness or thought, this argument does not prove that machines are absolutely incapable of consciousness or thought. Rather, given the ongoing uncertainty of the debate regarding the intelligence of machines, there can be no means to confirm or disconfirm the conscious experience of machines as well as the consciousness of humans by extension of that principle.

Substantial studying has been made on the subject and Turing’s overly optimistic point of view, yet, we experience difficulty when trying to combine idea of advancement in technology and what makes us humans: the capability of thinking. Conventionally, we have firmly grasp to the idea that the act of thinking is the official stamp of authenticity which differentiate humans from the rest of beings, and so while trying to decide if a computer can think or not, we are closely scrutinizing the foundation of our nature as beings to its core. But before we dive into the subject matter of why I disagree with Turing, we must inquire about what exactly is thinking. Some have tried to define thinking as having conscious thoughts; but thinking and consciousness are not terminologies that are mutually exchangeable. While thinking is a state of consciousness, consciousness is not thinking. Even as we process information necessary for reasoning, much of our brain activity and processing takes