An Extremely Interesting Thought Experiment

In this Daniel Dennett’s essay “Where Am I?” Dennett tackles the difference between mind, body, and a person’s identity. In his story, Dennett has his brain removed and preserved in a vat. His body stays alive, and radio transmitters make it so he can still function. Dennett starts to question who and where “he” is. Though Dennett has several strong ideas, he isn’t correct in everything he suggests.

This case counter attacks the psychological approach because it disproves the idea that psychological continuity will allow identity to persist. The splitting of the brain means that when the two hemispheres are together they can make up the same mind. However when divided, they only have half of the capacity as the original whole- they identities of the two pairs are different, and so the identity of the original brain cannot

In a series of relatively simple though complexly-worded (out of necessity) thought experiments regarding body-swapping and changes to memory and the mind, Bernard Williams attempts to demonstrate that identity should be identified with the body rather than with the mind when identity is extended into the future (and by extension during the present). That is, though it is typical for identity to be associated with the mind at any given moment, Williams argues that the logic that supports this intuitive association does not hold up over longer periods of time, and that anticipation of the future leads to an association of identity with the body rather than with the mind. Whether or not Williams is successful in this attempt is a matter of much debate, with this author finding some fundamental flaws in the very premise of the comparisons and thus the conclusions, however the argument is fairly elegant and persuasive and certainly worth of closer inspection. A careful reading of the argument might lead one to a conclusion opposite to that which was intended, but is no less rewarding for this unusual quirk.

The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.

Daniel Dennett tackles these mind and body questions in his essay, Where Am I. In Daniel Dennett’s, Where Am I, Dennett agrees to undergo an operation with would remove his brain from his body and insert an antennae that would enable his brain to control his body remotely. When Dennett wakes up, he finds that he doesn’t know where he is, but not in that sense that he was geographically lost. Dennett has woken up to find himself in his body without his brain, leaving him with the question, where am I? Is Dennett still in his body, in his brain, or in some cross-section between the two?

Am I the same person today as I was yesterday? Will I be the same person a few years from now as I am now? Kagan explains a few theories that can help with figuring out what makes me, me. There is the soul theory, the body theory, and the personality theory. The body theory consists of the brain and body theory and the torso and body theory. After looking into each theory carefully through Kagan’s lectures, I found that there were flaws in all three theories. The theory that I favor, however, is the body theory and more specifically the brain aspect of that theory. In my essay I will discuss why I favor the body theory and its strength and weaknesses. I will also discuss Kagan’s take on survival.

For centuries philosophers have engaged themselves into conversations and arguments trying to figure out the nature of a human person; this has lead to various theories and speculation about the nature of the human mind and body. The question they are tying to answer is whether a human being is made of only the physical, body and brain, or both the physical or the mental, mind. In this paper I will focus on the mind-body Identity Theory to illustrate that it provides a suitable explanation for the mind and body interaction.

Imagine a situation where your entire personality is changed forever by an object that pierces an area of your brain. Those who have had a frontal lobotomy, whether purposefully or not, have had their personality changed permanently. An unlucky foreman of the Rutland Railroad, Phineas Gage, was on the receiving end of a tragic occurrence that severed the frontal lobe area of his prefrontal cortex. He underwent the experience of having a railroad spike pierce him beneath his left cheek and exit through his skull, consequently injuring an important area of his brain. This occurrence changed one part of Gage’s personality completely, though he seemed almost entirely functional after his accident. The one thing that changed in Gage was his ability to imagine the future. He lived completely present in the moment. The unique accident that affected Phineas Gage can be broken down with various different philosophical approaches to answer what is called the “mind-body problem”. The mind-body problem is composed of attempting to explain things like beliefs, consciousness, emotions, etc., in organisms. Physicalism, dualism, and functionalism all have their unique explanation for the mind-body problem’s implication of Phineas Gage’s accident.

“Solitude, yes. Think of being alone and frozen in the crypt, the capsule. Will new technologies allow the brain to function at the level of identity? This is the mask, the created character in the medley of

Thus, one may further conclude that the only difference between a "normal" individual and Dennett's hypothetical case is the great temporal gap that exists between the brain and the body in Dennett's case. A difference that one may believe does not have clear philosophical implications. Therefore, it can be suggested that Dennett, in setting up his scenario in this way, does not contribute much more insight into the ‘self'-phenomenon than many

I strongly agree with David Cohen’s theory that personal identity derives from experiences and memories contained in the brain. To help explain why this theory seems to be the most logical let’s

Many arguments in the philosophy of the mind have been made for and against, whether or not the mind and the brain are the same entity. The mind-brain identity theory is the view that the mind is the brain and that mental states are brain states (Mandik 77). Therefore, we can identify sensations and other mental processes with physical brain processes (Blutner 4). I argue, that the mind is not identical to the brain, and the conceivable idea of zombies, as well as the multiple realizability argument, can disprove this theory.

In the world of philosophy, there has been an ever growing skepticism of the relationship between the human body and its mental state. The physical state of a person is tangible, meaning that they can be seen by anyone and touched. While the mental state of a person is embedded in their consciencousness, meaning that it can’t be observed by others unless willing expressed by said person. I will be using Leibniz’s law of identity to show that the metal states of an individual are distinct from a physical state. Using the notion of sameness, I can prove a valid argument that the physical and mental states are distinct. While this theory in part can be debated, some identity theorists can provide a rebuttal this claim. I will provide a response to an identity theorist rebuttal.

Relating to Daniel Dennett’s essay “Where am I” if Yorrick (Dennett’s brain) were to die would Dennett continue to exist through Hubert (the computer program that functionally mirrors his brain)? Dennett would not be able to survive because even though Hubert functions like Yorrick, Hubert isn’t able to recall memories and thoughts that make up a large part of Dennett. An example of this would be if you were to put your brain in a famous singer’s body and take their brain, would you be where they were or would you be in school right now? If they were to get interviewed about their past, what would they say. Memories and our feelings are vital to who we are. The celebrity might claim to be you and be able to tell personal stories about you. So Even though Dennett continues to have basic function such as breathing and a heart beat, his trust testament to himself, which included his personality, intelligence, and desires are not shown through Hubert.

In the journal “How to Study Human Consciousness Empirically,” Daniel Dennett claims that “people are often just wrong about what they are doing and how they are doing it.” Rather than having an objective and complete understanding of our own intentions and processes, we tend to use assumptions as knowledge, alter facts to align with our beliefs, and theorize about causes and effects. As a result, studies of traditional phenomenology (referred to in this situation as autophenomenology) are often clouded by personal biases and misinterpretations. The evidence of this confabulation is very similar to a curious child – it reveals itself through one repeated question: why? For example,