Analysis Of Alternate Possibilities And Moral Responsibility By Harry G. Frankfurt

Before the turn of the century the Principle of Alternative Possibilities was widely held to be the definitive position on moral philosophy and the free will debate. However with the publication of Harry Frankfurt’s “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” in 1969 there’s now a highly contested debate regarding the issue. In this essay I will briefly present the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) and Frankfurt’s argument to refute it. I will then analyze if Frankfurt was correct to critique PAP and further examine if he succeeded in disproving it.

Over the course of time, in the dominion of philosophy, there has been a constant debate involving two major concepts: free will and determinism. Are our paths in life pre-determined? Do we have the ability to make decisions by using our freedom of will? While heavily subjective questions that have been answered many different authors, philosophers, etc., two authors in particular have answered these questions very similarly. David Hume, a Scottish philosopher from the 18th century, argues in his essay “Of Liberty and Necessity” that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that they can both be accepted at the same time without being logically incorrect. Alike Hume, 20th century author Harry G. Frankfurt concludes in his essay “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” that the two major concepts are compatible. These two authors are among the most famous of Compatibilists (hence the fact that they believe free will and determinism are compatible ideas) in philosophical history. The question that then arises in the realm of compatibilism particularly, is one dealing with moral responsibility: If our paths in life are not totally pre-determined, and we have the ability to make decisions willingly (using free will), then how do we deem an individual morally responsible for a given decision? Frankfurt reaches the conclusion that we are held morally responsible regardless of

Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals serves the purpose of founding moral theory from moral judgment and examining whether there is such thing as a ‘moral law’ that is absolute and universal. In chapter three of his work, he discusses the relationship between free will and the moral law and claims “A free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same.” He stands firm in his belief that moral law is what guides a will that is free from empirical desires. To be guided by moral laws it would require men to be ideal rational agents.

Thus the former is morally culpable for the actions of the latter by virtue of being the cause of the action. Opponents of consequentialism argue that negative responsibility, and the consequentialist doctrine as a whole, is unacceptable because it reduces an agent to merely “a locus of causal intervention in the world.” Instead of being people, agents are no more than origin points of cause and effect, and their integrity is forfeit as a result. Although Williams dedicates a significant portion of his paper to illustrating the problem of integrity, he offers no defense against it. In fact, he acknowledges that life-defining projects and integrity exist, agrees that it is absurd to expect an agent to discard them in order to be moral, and then departs from the problem of integrity without further discussion.

will and moral responsibility. I will argue, that Frankfurt makes an invalid implicit assumption that the

In “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives”, Philippa Foot argues against Immanuel Kant, that morality exists in hypothetical imperatives rather than categorical imperatives. For Kant, categorical imperatives alone serve as moral commands, and it would be impossible for a moral system to be based on hypothetical imperatives because such imperatives serve as means to ends and result from maxims that cannot be universalized into perfect duties. Despite this, Foot holds that acting on many hypothetical imperatives can be morally praiseworthy and can even serve as the basis of moral judgments. Although I agree with Foot that hypothetical imperatives can have moral worth, in this paper, I will argue that a morality based on the purposes that hypothetical imperatives are directed toward appears to be circular. To do this, I will explain Foot’s theory of how morality is known and binds. Then, I will argue that this theory is insufficient to explain the moral purpose that hypothetical imperatives must be directed toward, thus begging the question of what is the moral basis of the purpose directed toward in the hypothetical imperative.

At the heart of the issue that Goodman presents in this article is the unifying theme that runs concurrent through all four stratifications of immoral acts: they all, essentially, present instances in which someone is enforcing his or her will on another, to the contrary of the volition of that other party. Such a practice appears to be morally incorrect, as a number of deontologists (most notably Immanuel Kant) would vociferously argue. A consideration of the four types of actions delineated by Goodman

In “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” Philippa Foot argues that moral judgments are in hypothetical imperatives rather than categorical imperatives. For Kant, categorical imperatives are actions that are good in themselves and do not depend on desires, while, hypothetical imperatives are “actions that are good to some purpose” (306). According to Foot, hypothetical imperatives alone serve as the basis of moral judgments because categorical imperatives give us no reason to obey them. In this paper, I will explain foots argument that moral judgments are hypothetical imperatives. I will then argue that that Foot’s theory of moral judgments fails in two ways. First, placing moral judgments in hypothetical imperatives fails to designate moral from immoral contingent ends, and second, the hypothetical imperative weakens morality by making it too optional. To show this, I will first argue that placing moral judgments in hypothetical imperatives begs the question of what is the moral basis of its own contingent end. I will then propose a decision procedure for determining the moral value of the contingent ends of hypothetical imperatives. Then I will argue that the Leningrad does not solve and that basing moral judgments in hypothetical imperatives still makes morality too optional.

The incompatibilists argue that one is morally responsible for what she has done given that she could have done otherwise. Further, they think that if determinism is true then one could not have done otherwise, so if determinism is true, one is not morally responsible for things she has done. In debates surrounding the issue of free will, philosophers have focused on discussing whether determinism is true or false. Harry Frankfurt thinks even though the requirement of alternative possibilities in order to be held morally responsible for our actions seems intuitively plausible, it is a questionable premise in the argument provided by incompatibilists. Frankfurt calls the premise that “a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise” the principle of alternative possibilities or PAP (Frankfurt, 829). He argues that PAP is false and a person can be held morally responsible even if she could not have done otherwise.

The inconsistencies that I have with Holbach, is that he completely discards moral responsibility. Even if determinism is true, Holbach does not understand that holding moral responsibility is not about free will, it's about rewards and consequences having any effect on future actions. Holbach believes that our desires controls us, and if one desire is stronger than another, than that stronger desire would outweigh the other one. This aligns with holding someone with moral responsible, because the rewards and responsibility can change our behavior, and our motive to act. Holbach believes that we cannot be held morally responsible for our behavior, but he agrees with how one desire can outweigh another desire depending on the situation. For

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility talks about the principle of alternate possibilities. The principle of alternate possibilities states that someone is morally responsible if they could have chosen to do otherwise. People who believe in free will are very supportive of the principle Free will is the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one’s own discretion. The principle of alternate possibilities, moral responsibility, and free will are all involved in this paper written by Harry Frankfurt. Frankfurt states that “its exact meaning is a subject of controversy, particularly concerning whether someone who accepts it is thereby committed to believing that moral responsibility and determinism

Intuitively, a person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise. This is the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP). For any person and any action, that person is morally responsible for performing or failing to perform that action if and only if she had a genuine alternate possibility open to her at the time. An alternate possibility is simply another option that an agent has at the time that he or she acts. This principle may hold in part because of the Ought Implies Can principle, which states that a subject ought to do something only if she can do that action.1 So, someone ought to refrain from a morally incorrect action only if she has the option, or an alternate possibility, to do so.

In this paper, I will argue that Kant’s discussion of the will is not always practical because it is the consequences that actually matter, especially in certain situations. The main reason in support of this claim is that everyone is eventually caught in a situation where they have to choose between the lesser of two evils, which means that people should carefully think about all possible outcomes before making decisions.

It’s time for the big Names for our western philosophy to show themselves. Both Make a philosophy viewing the actions we as humans make daily and trying to decipher if they are good or bad. Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill will be analyzed over their own moral philosophy’s. next I will use both of their theory’s, and try to find how they would approach the moral question if a person comes into a bank and attempts to rob the bank but a cop shoots the robber is that cop doing the right thing?? Finally, I will put my view into the mix on who is “in the right” and why I feel that they are right on the moral question.

Kant theory is unique in the fact he believed “that certain types of actions (including murder, theft and lying) were absolutely prohibited, even in cases where the action would bring about more happiness than the alternative” ( ). Kant believed making a choice to act on something, rather an individual pursues that action does not depend on the consequences but rather if it fulfills our mission or personal fulfilment.