In Star Trek’s episode, “The Measure of a Man,” two characters, Picard and Maddox, who exhibit a view regarding the mind/body problem. Since, for instance, Commander Bruce Maddox referring to Data as an “it” instead of a “he”, Maddox appears to believe that humans are more than matter. He was willing to dissemble, with the risk of not being able to reassemble, Data, an android, because, although Data had the materialistic appearance of a human, Maddox viewed Data as a computer. Furthermore, when he argued against Picard, Maddox strengthened his apparent view of mankind being more than mere matter: “You are endowing Data with human characteristics because it looks human, but it is not. If it were a box on wheels I would not be facing this opposition.” …show more content…
Hence, Maddox seemingly believes that humans have a physical brain and an immaterial mind. Piccard, on another hand, upholds an empathically stance towards Data. While he defends the android, Piccard, after admitting that Data was a machine, argued that humans are also machines, “just machines of a different type.” This argument suggests that as Data is merely material, humans are also. Namely, there is no immaterial mind in the composition of man, according to Piccard; there is only physical material. Returning to Maddox, his view of what distinguished humans from Data was a threefold set: “intelligence, self-awareness and conscious.” According to Maddox, if Data had fulfilled the criteria, others should consider Data as a human. Data appeared to have these qualities. After seeing the appearance, Maddox’s view seemed to change: Maddox called Data a “he” and called him remarkable. Ultimately, Piccard held a materialistic view. Namely, he believed that exclusively through matter, a humanlike creature could exist, such as Data. Moreover, Piccard could possibly uphold emergentism since he believes that the material brain, such as Data’s “positronic brain”, could create genuine
Data is the equal to a human being ,in key respects, because he shares similar qualities with humans. In order to be human or have human qualities, a being must have feelings, which Data does. In the text, Data expresses feelings
Martin Greenfield, a world famous tailor, wrote a memoir called “Measure of a Man.” There’s an excerpt from the memoir. It’s called “The Day a Holocaust Survivor Got Revenge on His Tormentor.” Greenfield talks about his experience during the Holocaust. He talks about how badly he was treated.
William Hasker uses multiple categories to list out the different views on the mind/body problem in his book Metaphysics: Constructing a World View. Captain Picard, Data’s commanding officer and the defending attorney for Data’s case, would be classified as a materialist. Picard views Data as having rights just like the rest of the humans who work for Starfleet. In trial Picard says, “We too are machines, just machines of a different type” (Scheerer, 1989). This statement from Picard alone shows his materialism thinking. Materialism thinking does not believe in souls thus since Data is manmade he would not have a soul as well making him an equal to human beings. Picard believes since Data is intelligent, self-aware, and has a consciousness of his existence and actions then this makes Data a sentient.
In David M. Armstrong’s “The Nature of Mind”, Armstrong praises the field of science and seeks to put the concept of mind into terms that agree with science’s definition of minds. His interest is in the physico-chemical, materialist view of man. Armstrong considers science to be the authority over other disciplines because of its reliability and result in consensus over disputed questions.
Based on my reading of Hasker (1983), I believe the view of the mind or body problem that was exhibited by Piccard in the synopsis from Star Trek: The Next Generation was the Dualism view. Picard stated that, “Data has rights among them the right to refuse to undergo an experimental procedure such as this.” Here, Picard ascribes both physical and mental attributes to the robot (Data). This view correlates to Hasker (1983) statement that, “Dualism begins by taking quite seriously the fact that human beings have both physical properties and mental properties…” (p. 65). Hasker (1983) further indicates that even though the mind and body are different, they are not detached, but continuously interacting (Dualism Interactionism), which is
In On the Nature of Things, Lucretius argues that not only is the whole of the human body (both tangible parts, like organs, and intangible concepts, like the soul) created from distinct types of atoms, but that this is the basis upon which an afterlife may be disproved.
I would like to begin this paper by addressing what question I hope to answer through the entirety of this paper: is the mind physical? As simple as this question may seem to be, there still, to this day, is not a definite answer. There are, mostly, two approaches to answering this problem, through dualism or physicalism. The dualist, for the purposes of this paper, simply believes that the mind and the body are not equal and therefore, they are not one in the same. The physicalist, however, would come back to say that there are no such things as non-physical objects and therefore, they would conclude that the body and the mind are both physical. After weighing on both sides of this argument, I am going to defend the physicalist ideas and
Summary: The problem of the soul continues as Descartes suggested that the human is composed of two completely different substances; a physical body which Descartes compares with a machine, and a non-physical mind, related to the soul, that allows humans to think and feel even if it has no “measurable dimensions” (67). But Elizabeth put in doubt his ideologies when she realized that a non-physical thing doesn’t have the strength to push and move the body. This led to several questions unanswered and also let space for other materialist theories such as behaviorism, mind-brain identity, and functionalism, which also fail in offering an explicit solution.
The mind-body problem is an age-old topic in philosophy that questions the relationship between the mental aspect of life, such as the field of beliefs, pains, and emotions, and the physical side of life which deals with matter, atoms, and neurons. There are four concepts that each argue their respective sides. For example, Physicalism is the belief that humans only have a physical brain along with other physical structures, whereas Idealism argues that everything is mind-based. Furthermore, Materialism argues that the whole universe is purely physical. However, the strongest case that answers the commonly asked questions such as “Does the mind exist?” and “Is the mind your brain?” is Dualism.
The mind is perhaps the most fascinating part of the human body due to its complexity and ability to rationalize. In essence, the mind-body problem studies the relation of the mind to the body, and states that each human being seems to embody two unique and somewhat contradictory natures. Each human contains both a nature of matter and physicality, just like any other object that contains atoms in the universe. However, mankind also is constituted of something beyond materialism, which includes its ability to rationalize and be self-aware. This would imply that mankind is not simply another member of the world of matter because some of its most distinctive features cannot be accounted for in this manner. There are obvious differences between physical and mental properties. Physical properties are publically accessible, and have weight, texture, and are made of matter. Mental properties are not publically accessible, and have phenomenological texture and intentionality (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). This is challenging to philosophers, because man cannot be categorized as a material or immaterial object, but rather a combination of both mind and body (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). Man embodies mind-body dualism, meaning he is a blend of both mind and matter (Stewart, Blocker, Petrick, 2013). The mind-body problem creates conflict among philosophers, especially when analyzing physicalism in its defense. This paper outlines sound
Rene Descartes’ “Discourse on the Method” focuses on distinguishing the human rationale, apart from animals and robots. Wherein, he does so by explaining how neither animals, nor machines possess the same mental faculties as humans. For Descartes distinguishes the human rationale apart from non-humans, even though he does agree the two closely resemble each other because of their sense organs, and physical functions (Descartes, pp22). Nevertheless, it is because the mechanical lacks a necessary aspect of the mind, which consequently separates them from humans. For in Descartes “Discourse on the Method,” he argues that the noteworthy difference between humans, and the mechanical is that machines are only responding to the world through of their sense organs. Whereas humans possess the significant faculties of reasoning, which allows them to understand external inputs and information obtained from the surrounding environment. This significantly creates a dividing ‘line’, which separates humans from non-humans. For in this paper, I will firstly distinguish the differences between the human and mechanical’s mentality in regards to Descartes “Discourse on the Method”. Secondly, I will theorize a modern AI that could possess the concept of an intellectual mind, and then hypothesize a powerful AI that lacks the ability to understand its intelligence. Lastly, in disagreeing in why there are no such machines that is equivalent to the human mind. For humans don’t possess all the
Is Data a Person? According to Daniel Dennett, there are six factors a being must meet to be considered a person, regardless if they are human or not. The six factors are: rationality, conscious mental state and intentionality, verbal communication, self-consciousness, subject of a special stance or attitude, and reciprocating this person regarding stance. Within the single episode, The Measure Of A Man, Data proved to be able to meet all these requirements, thus making him a person.
The Representational Theory of Mind proposes that we, as both physiological and mental beings, are systems which operate based on symbols and interpretations of the meanings of such symbols rather than beings which operate just on physiological processes (chemical reactions and biological processes). It offers that humans and their Minds are computing machines, mental software (the Mind) which runs on physical hardware (the body). It suggests, too, that we are computing machines functioning as something other than a computing machine, just as every other machine does.
The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.
In David Armstrong’s thought-provoking work titled, The Nature of Mind, he explains that the most convincing way to make sense of the mind-body problem is to approach it in a materialistic way. Specifically, Armstrong shows that the science of physico-chemical processes of the brain is the best way to explain the nature of our mind. He goes on to explain traditional and dispositional behaviorism, and states his own materialistic take on behaviorism. His arguments throughout his paper are very logical, and though there have been arguments against his explanations, he effectively justifies the materialistic view of the mind.