Analysis Of The Book ' Searle 's Chinese Room '

John Searle formulated the Chinese Room Argument in the early 80’s as an attempt to prove that computers are not cognitive operating systems. In short though the immergence of artificial and computational systems has rapidly increased the infinite possibility of knowledge, Searle uses the Chinese room argument to shown

One of the hottest topics that modern science has been focusing on for a long time is the field of artificial intelligence, the study of intelligence in machines or, according to Minsky, “the science of making machines do things that would require intelligence if done by men”.(qtd in Copeland 1). Artificial Intelligence has a lot of applications and is used in many areas. “We often don’t notice it but AI is all around us. It is present in computer games, in the cruise control in our cars and the servers that route our email.” (BBC 1). Different goals have been set for the science of Artificial Intelligence, but according to Whitby the most mentioned idea about the goal of AI is provided by the Turing Test. This test is also called the

Even if a computer was programmed with all the information ever known to man, how could it be capable of conscious thought? Even with the correct programming a computer cannot freely think for itself, with its own conscious thought. John Searle is a philosopher of mind and language at UC

The essay “Watson Doesn’t Know It Won on Jeopardy!” is a paper written by John Searle on February 23, 2011 that probes at how IBM’s computer Watson has no human understanding whatsoever. Searle begins by clearing up the common misconceptions about what a computer actually is. Searle explains that a computer is simply a machine that manipulates symbols based on a programs needs and wants, and that the computational power of a computer is not human understanding; it is in fact a measure of how fast a computer can manipulate symbols. Searle then proceeds to explain the process of how a computer works in terms of a human. He explains that a computer does not understand human language at all. A computer just has a program (in binary) that tells

John Searle's Chinese Room Argument The purpose of this paper is to present John Searle’s Chinese room argument in which it challenges the notions of the computational paradigm, specifically the ability of intentionality. Then I will outline two of the commentaries following, the first by Bruce Bridgeman, which is in opposition to Searle and uses the super robot to exemplify his point. Then I will discuss John Eccles’ response, which entails a general agreement with Searle with a few objections to definitions and comparisons. My own argument will take a minimalist computational approach delineating understanding and its importance to the concepts of the computational paradigm.

The reply states a computer can only derive the semantics from syntax if given enough connections to assist with the derivation from syntax to semantics. However; since the reply is essentially an incomplete argument against Searle’s argument, it is not a very devastating criticism. If the Chinese Room was put into the robot, and I was given all of this syntactical information about the world, I still would not know what the symbols would mean despite what the robot is actually doing because I am only shuffling symbols. I am unable to gain any meaning from them. (Cole, 4.2) The actions of the robot do not prove that the computer operating it is thinking, it only means that it is still able to run through its own

24. What is Turing’s imitation game ‘test’ supposed to show? 4 points Alan Turing, as a Physicalist, saw the mind as the brain, since the brain is the physical object. Applying such views to machines, Turing’s Imitation Game ‘test’ is supposed to demonstrate his claim that certain machines should count as “thinking things” in the same way that we humans do. His argument being that, if a machine could imitate a human well enough to deceive a person that it was not a machine, then it should be considered “conscious.” He found that since most of what we base our foundation of consciousness on (our judgments and interactions with others), if we cannot see the responder in the game (i.e. the computer), and it responds as well as human, then it should also be considered a “thinking thing.” Turing also expected that one day machines would be able to imitate our minds so well, that we would not be able to tell the difference between a real mind or “thinking thing,” and a

John Searle first proposed the argument known as The Chinese Room Argument in a book he wrote in 1984. The argument is well known if not famous and has become one of the best-know arguments in recent philosophy. Searle imagines himself locked in a room following a computer program for responding to questions written in Chinese characters slipped under the door. Searle does not understand Chinese writing, but he can follow the computer program to manipulate symbols and numerals to easily respond to the questions without fully understanding even what he was being asked or responding. The narrow conclusion of the argument is that following instructions and programming a computer might make it seem to understand Chinese but doesn’t have a real

In Minds, Brains, and Programs John Searle objects to Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), particularly that running a program on a computer and manipulating symbols does not mean that the computer has understanding, or more generally a mind. In this paper I will first explain Searle’s Chinese Room, then I will explain CTM and how it relates to the Chinese Room. Following this I will describe how the Chinese Room attacks the CTM. Next I will explain the Systems Reply to the Chinese Room and how the Systems Reply actually undermines Searle’s conclusion in the Chinese Room. Then I will describe Searle’s response to the Systems Reply and how that response undermines the Systems Reply. Lastly, I will evaluate Searle’s reply to the Systems Reply and defend the Systems Reply against the points Searle raises against the Systems Reply.

Searle believed that materialism and functionalism did not give a full explanation to the human mind, that there was much more to the human mind then electrochemical activity. He believed that we could teach machines syntax (sentence order) but not semantics (understanding of theme). Therefore computers would not know what they were doing but basically just replying to specific stimuli.

John Searle starts with two claims of programmed computers being able to have a process where they would understand knowledge and the claim of computers understanding how the human mind works. Searle then states that these claims are rather untrue or without reason. To prove this Searle introduces his Chinese example

One of the most widely known Searle believed that simply manipulating symbols will not ensure computers are able to think or understand, in other words, knowing syntax does not mean understanding the semantics, and function does not mean understanding.

In his paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Alan Turing sets out to answer the question of whether machines can think in the same humans can by conceptualizing the question in concrete terms. In simple terms, Turing redefines the question by posing whether a machine can replicate the cognition of a human being. Yet, some may object to the notion that Turing’s new question effectively captures the nature of machines’ capacity for thought or consciousness, such as John Searle. In his Chinese room thought experiment, Searle outlines a scenario that implies machines’ apparent replication of human cognition does not yield conscious understanding. While Searle’s Chinese thought experiment demonstrates how a Turing test is not sufficient to establish that a machine can possess consciousness or thought, this argument does not prove that machines are absolutely incapable of consciousness or thought. Rather, given the ongoing uncertainty of the debate regarding the intelligence of machines, there can be no means to confirm or disconfirm the conscious experience of machines as well as the consciousness of humans by extension of that principle.

Properly Translating the Chinese Room John Searle's thought experiment concerning the "Chinese Room" attempts to disprove that so-called "strong-AI" (artificial intelligence that demonstrates "true" thinking and "understanding") could ever possibly exist. The argument is relatively straightforward: Searle imagines a computer running a program that allows it to communicate in written

Searle identifies two philosophical positions: strong AI and weak AI. The former proposes that suitably programmed machines can genuinely understand language(or possess any mental ability specific to humans), whereas the latter considers that machines can only simulate such abilities. Searle's view is that he has proved that the strong AI position is