Analysis Of The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle

The MOL system has transformed how the Marine Corps functions in many different ways. The IS has allowed the organization as a whole to reduce waste and streamline the data it collects to a central location. Requirements of the system have always been present within the organization until recently has not been reasonably attainable with the amount of employees within the organization. The ultimate drive of the system is unit readiness and the unit readiness is easily quantifiable within the system because the commanders within the Marine Corps have instant access to the information required to gauge it. Unit readiness is the ability to leave at a moments notice when called upon by the president or congress to deploy to a war zone. The type and basic uses of the system are some of the most essential parts of the IS. Without the basic use of this system the Marine Corps as a whole would be at a loss without the use of it. In essence the application of this system has changed the business processes of the Marine Corps as a whole.

2. Summary: ADP 6-0 is broken down into three major sections. These sections are; the guiding principles, the Art of Command, and the Mission Command Warfighting Function. This paper will place emphasis on the guiding principles and the Art of Command portions of the manual as they provide the baseline for conceptual implementation. Additionally, as a Group Support Battalion (GSB), the Mission Command Warfighting Function predominantly lies within the responsibility of line Battalion commanders. Within the GSB, our primary mission is to provide augmentees and unique enablers to commander’s to further enable them to meet mission success.

Request the SC of USAG Benelux favorably consider and approve retention of 1EA Mercedes VITO 7 PAC Vehicle for support of the following critical missions. Mercedes Vito van, IF-AE 512 (seven passengers) is primarily used by TSC Benelux/Chievres for daily operational support in the local area and long distance missions to destinations as far away as Vilseck, GE. In addition to supporting normal Soldier training, we also provide Visual Information (VI) support missions throughout Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg. Non Tactical

Current capability set fielding along with future fielding 's including Bradley engineering change proposal (ECP), Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development (EMD), and full rate production (FRP) radio variants are the Army 's answer to brigade combat team modernization. The tactical environment is the tip of the spear, a challenging space where effectiveness, survivability, and sustainability provide the keys to success. That success is becoming increasingly reliant on data. Data drives our missions, from operations, intelligence, and fires, to other areas such as medical and logistics. Consumption of data is being fueled by the introduction of new communication systems. Warfighter information tactical (WIN-T) has begun to bring this data down to the Brigade and Battalion level with the Point of Presence (POP), and the Battalion and Company level with the Soldier Network Extension (SNE). New radio waveforms are providing conduits for data down to the tactical edge. WIN-T and Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS) radios are being integrated into Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) vehicle platforms now. The Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio (MNVR) is just around the corner in FY17.

Since 1985, eleven different versions of the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) have been in service. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is being developed by the Army and the Marine Corps as a successor to the HMMWV. The Department of Defense (DoD) initiated the JLTV program to replace its aging fleet of the HMMWV. The purpose of this essay is to determine if the high cost of the JLTV should preclude it from replacing the HMMWV as outlined in the 2010 Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy. Because of the cost, an inability to meet joint requirements and the presence of feasible alternatives, the Department of Defense should not continue acquisition of the JLTV.

Chief Warrant Officer Three Teddy Vanzant is an extraordinary instructor whose technical abilities and extensive combat systems experience make him uniquely suited to train United States Army, Ordnance Warrant Officers. Teddy has spent the last 13 months completely redesigning the Programs of Instruction for the M1A2SEPv2, Abrams Main Battle Tank and the M3, Bradley Fighting Vehicle. He provided sound guidance and assistance to the CASCOM, Training Development during the validation of not only these two critical combat systems, but for the M109A6, Paladin as well. Due to these qualities and his dedication to the instructional mission, I recommend CW3 Vanzant to compete for the Distinguished Instructor Award, and the Army Logistics University,

In September 2011, the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee voted to cancel the Army and Marine Corps' Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) in their version of the fiscal year 2012 defense bill (Munoz, 2011). This measure could have completely shut down efforts to replace a thirty year-old fleet of Humvees, loyal but potentially outmoded tactical wheeled vehicles. The Army's Modernized Expanded Capacity Vehicle program has been a project set to replace the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) family in the works for years. The project, however, continues to be stymied by budgetary constraints. Per-vehicle costs for the JLTV begin at $250,000 and are likely to climb, as Lockheed-Martin secured a preliminary contract for engineering, design, and development. The high cost of the JLTV does preclude it from completely replacing the HMMWV, and yet cost does not preclude the JLTV from supplementing the Army's fleet. A middle-ground solution is the best method of maximizing initial investments, while also banking on the robustness of national security.

In a fiscally constrained operating environment and a reduced footprint overseas, the Department of Defense is consistently looking for ways to mitigate challenges associated with rapid global projection. By having multiple means to deliver sustainment to the warfighter, the JMMLV will prevent a single point of failure. The JMMLVs design provides an additional option along with current capabilities that exist to sustain operations and rapidly employ combat power. As Australian Maj Gen Rick Burr, Deputy Commanding General, US Army Pacific highlighted in a 2013 Defense News article concerning logistics, “The potential for anything to happen at any time is very real particularly with natural disasters…being prepared to respond to any crisis that could happen at short notice is clearly the most pressing issue at the moment.” (McLeary 2013) The United States and its ability to respond to a crisis is crucial for success and supporting global responsibilities. The use of the JMMLV offers advantages that will benefit Combatant Commands, the Services, Defense and Federal Agencies, and our coalition partners that routinely provide mutual support to one another to sustain operations.

In FY13 the Army will transition as we reduce the size of the assigned personnel and force structure. The initial stage of drawdown for Active Component Operational Support is expected to end by FY15 and begins to eliminate the wartime allowance completed by FY17 affecting the ability formations. The Army has enough Soldiers to fill authorization aggregate, but still has shortages in Rank and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). We need to assign personnel that are available to determine manning effectiveness as well as readiness in deploying units. Synchronizes and integrates readiness priorities for the war fighter and our Army including all forces. The Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle and the Army priorities are already established

2. Summary. On Monday 26 February, the Army Chief of Staff has approved 35th TTSB to transition 50th Expeditionary Signal Battalion (50th ESB) to an Army Communication Support Battalion (ACSB) by 1 October 2018. This pilot program will result in extensive MTOE modifications, thereby, affecting personnel and equipment. Currently, 35th TTSB HQ (Building 25526) footprint is not adequate, to accommodate 24-hours future operations. Also, the Headquarters building was originally designed to conduct administrative functions, instead of facilitating signal operations and ancillary functions. As to date, 35th TTSB HQ (Building 25526) lacks the proper the square footage/ventilation

Three short years ago, the 4th ABCT was considered among the best maneuver brigades in FORSCOM. In all areas, the brigade shined. Morale was high and it exerted a pull on the best and the brightest officers and non-commissioned officers. Leaders lead, Soldiers soldiered, and a family atmosphere of support emanated within the brigade. The work ethic was strong. Competition amongst the battalions was positively oriented toward the success of the brigade and there was frequent coordination among peers to share information, resources, and lessons learned. Now, after a jaded Afghanistan deployment, it appears that the climate has shifted and the battalions are striving to make themselves distinct from each other and the brigades rather

provide modernized and ready, tailored land force capabilities to meet combatant commanders’ requirements across the range of military operations;

Since the founding of the United States innovations and technologies have intermittently intersected providing critical direction in how we fight on the battlefield. From breech-load cannons, fully automatic machine guns, airplanes, helicopters…to computers, night vision goggles, and lasers; each exerted influence on the trajectory of modern warfare. However, arguably one of the greatest innovations that forever changed the battlefield landscape was the advent of the motor powered vehicle.

1. Purpose: To provide a summary on the functional concept utilized to develop and employ sustainment for future Army operations.

Our squadron is one of two commands on the west coast operating the MQ-8 Fire Scout able to deploy on Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). This fiscal year, we received two Fire Scout UAVs and the difficulties of maintaining