Analysis Of The New York Civil Practice Law

2. The outcome of this issue is governed by Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965) Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress. The elements of this cause of action are (1) the wrongdoer's conduct was intentional or reckless, that is, he intended his behavior when he knew or should have known that emotional distress would likely result; (2) the conduct was outrageous, that is, as to go beyond all bounds of decency, and to be regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) the conduct caused the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe.

A claim for intentional inflection of emotional distress will be established when the plaintiff is able to prove that: 1) the defendant intended to inflicted emotional distress or knew or should have known emotional distress would likely result from his conduct; 2) the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; 3) the defendant's actions were the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and, 4) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress. Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 355 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Mass. 1976).

Background: Based on the given complaint, on the 28th of March in 2014 the Plaintiff, Linda D. Daugherty suffered an injury on the property of Rauleigh J. Ringer at 814 N. Liberty Street, Alexandria, IN. She is claiming her injury was a result of negligence spawning from the actions, or lack thereof, by Mr. Ringer and Casual Lifestyles Realty, Inc., in which the connection of these three parties has not been clarified with certainty within the claim. The Defendants, by counsel, Mark Maynard, and, pursuant to Rule 12(E) of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure, moved for a more definite statement of the Plaintiff’s Complaint. Mark Maynard argues if said Plaintiff could amend her complaint that is supposedly so vague and ambiguous, the newfound clarity would help the defense frame a response to said Plaintiff’s claim. No other information could be

The student 's motion for summary judgment was granted by the court and dismissed Drakers claims against the students for defamation and libel per se. The students and their families then had to file another motion for summary judgment regarding Draker’s remaining claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, and negligence. Once this happened, Draker filed her third amended petition alleging the students only for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence and gross negligence as to the parents. Eric Goldman states, “the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was dismissed because under TX law the cause of action is a gap-filler, and there was no gap given that the defamation doctrine putatively governs these facts.” Along with her third amended petition, Draker filed a motion for continuance. This motion would give her more time to look into the facts of her remaining claims. This motion was denied by the trial court. Along with the denial of Drakers motion, the court granted the Schreibers ' and the Todds ' motion for summary judgment. Draker argues that the trial court made three mistakes. These mistakes, as listed in the case are (1) granting summary judgment in favor of the students on her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress; (2) granting summary judgment in favor of the parents on her claims of negligence and gross negligence; and (3) denying her motion for continuance and

Intentional infliction of emotional distress - the Court states that because Texas law places a duty on Briles and McCaw, the Plaintiff 's negligence claim will fill any gaps.

6. Holding: As stated in the case: “one who, without a privilege to do so, by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another, with bodily harm resulting from such distress, is subject to liability for such emotional distress and bodily harm even though he has committed no heretofore recognized common law tort.”

. The husband of the plaintiff file a petition to the court that his wife[plaintiff] is mentally ill and needs to have a court order directing the admission of her to the mental health hospital. The petition initiated by plaintiff’s husband is the order of the Wayne County probate court, and it is also appropriately certified by Doctors Wolodzko, who after appearing in her house and introducing himself as a doctor , and have a conversation with her in person that day and another day in telephone, determine that she is suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and Smyk. The court gave the order and the Plaintiff was taken by ambulance from her home to a private psychiatric

City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1254 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U. S. 1116 (1997) (based on a comprehensive survey of circuit case law, the court concluded that "a plaintiff's testimony, standing alone, can support an award of compensatory damages for emotional distress"); Williams v. Trader Publishing Co., 218 F.3d 481, 486 (5th Cir. 2000). Emotional harm may manifest itself, for example, as sleeplessness, anxiety, self-esteem, stress, depression, marital strain, humiliation, emotional stress, excessive fatigue, or a nervous breakdown. Physical manifestations of emotional harm may consist of ulcers, gastrointestinal disorders, hair loss, or

Appellant contends that the district court erred in convicting her under the malicious-punishment statue as well as in ruling that the statute does not require proof of bodily harm. Accordingly, if proof of bodily harm is not required for conviction of malicious punishment, the statute is unconstitutionally vague.

Simpson forced Ms. Groenig to endure. Emotional distress lawsuits can be initiated whenever a person “has suffered physical or mental harm resulted from an intentional or accidental injury” (Akhari, 2014). I argue that Dr. Simpson's antics of ending his relationship with Ms. Groenig in such dramatic fashion qualifies as both intentional physical and mental harm. Dr. Simpson's action in “[moving] out of the apartment he has been sharing with [Ms. Groenig] and [leaving] a note [(with content as such)]” (Nelson, 2014) can be attributed as “intentional infliction of emotional distress” (Akhbari, 2014). Moreover, Dr. Simpson's actions caused Ms. Groenig to be “devastated emotionally, is hospitalized in a near catatonic state for some 10 months, [and] out of work for a year and a half” (Nelson, 2014). I argue that Ms. Groenig's hospitalization could also even be attributed as bodily

Plaintiff further asserts that the Defendant breached its duty of care to her by: (1) “failing to fix a hazardous condition within a reasonable time;” (2) “failing to adequately warn plaintiff of a hazardous condition;” and (3) “otherwise failing to exercise reasonable and due care under the circumstances.” The Plaintiff is seeking compensatory damages in the amount of two hundred thousand dollars, plus interest and costs.

As requested, I have reviewed the facts of the above-captioned file, along with the applicable law and summarized same in this memorandum. Mrs. Mary Smith suffered an injury to her right ankle in an automobile accident on 10/3/95. After surgery and months of rehabilitation, Mrs. Smith still suffers daily. I have researched the facts regarding a personal injury action against Paul Joseph, as well as a medical malpractice action against the medical providers.

Is the judge likely to find that A.C Slater’s conduct satisfies the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress?

The plaintiff, Mr Thomas Corr was an engineer employed by IBC vehicles Limited. Thomas who was 31 years of age at the time was working on a machine, when it threw a metal plate towards him without warning. It hit the right side of his head cutting off some of his ear. Due to the injury, Mr Corr had surgery on his right ear in order to try and fix it. He remained disfigured, suffered persistently from unsteadiness, mild tinnitus and severe headaches and had difficulty sleeping. He suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder due to this accident. Mr Corr became depressed

[2002] UKHL 11; [2003] 1 A.C. 247; [2002] 2 W.L.R. 754; [2002] 2 All E.R. 477; [2002] H.R.L.R. 33; [2002] U.K.H.R.R. 603; [2002] A.C.D. 58; (2002) 99(17) L.S.G. 34; (2002) 146 S.J.L.B. 84; Times, March 22, 2002; Independent, March 26, 2002; Official Transcript; HL