Analysis of Shuttle Challenger and Columbia Shuttle Mishaps

On an unusually cool Florida morning in January 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded 50,000 feet above ground just moments after liftoff killing seven crew members onboard (Palmer, Dunford, and Akin, 2009). A presidential commission, dubbed “the Rogers Commission” (hereafter, the Commission) after former Secretary of State William Rogers, was appointed to investigate the cause of the disaster. Although mechanical failure of an O-ring seal in one of the rocket boosters was identified as the physical cause, the investigation revealed something much more disheartening; organizational deficiencies at NASA had allowed potential safety hazards to be disregarded. The disastrous consequences of NASA’s organizational failure prompted calls

Exhaustive research revealed the technical cause of the disasters. The Columbia was doomed when during the launch a loose piece of foam struck the leading edge of the left wing ripping a hole in the carbon tiles previously thought to be indestructible.

On the cold morning of January 28, 1986, when the temperature hung ten degrees below freezing with the excessive wind chill, The Challenger was set to launch from Cape Canaveral Florida. On board, seven crew members, including the first civilian set to go to space, teacher Christa McAuliffe, awaited the final order to launch. As thousands of children watched on television, the shuttle left the platform, and seconds later, erupted into a plume of smoke, killing all on board. Even though the explosion of The Challenger was a tragedy for America’s space program, the disaster taught NASA many new lessons, a promised a bright future for space exploration,and reinforced the importance of science and math in school.

On this day 79 years ago the Hindenburg crashed. You may not know it but the Hindenburg was the first disaster caught on film. Some believe that the Hindenburg exploded by a helium leak. The Hindenburg had over 61 passengers on the zeppelin. The Hindenburg exploded on May 6th, 1937 when trying Lakehurst Naval Air Station. The Naval Air Station was in New Jersey.

Initial thrust built up while the shuttle was secured to the launch pad, and it was released without issue and traveled upward as designed (5). No issues were noticed by the crew, officials, or observers at the time of launch. Subsequent review of camera footage, however, reveals smoke emanating at a cyclic rate of approximately 4 puffs per second from the aft field joint (AFJ) on the right SRB. As the shuttle left the launch pad, the smoke dissipated from view. The next 55 seconds occurred without issue for Challenger. All systems worked as programmed; notably, the automated guidance system was particularly active on this flight due to record high wind shears experienced by the shuttle, yet continued to be very effective. At 58.788 seconds after launch, flame appeared at the same location on the starboard SRB’s AFJ as the smoke had at launch. This flame continued to spread to the external tank (ET) connection ring, then to the ET itself. It breached the ET, which housed liquid hydrogen (LH2) and liquid oxygen (LO2) fuel for the shuttle’s main engines. A large, visible flash surrounded the stern of the shuttle system, all while the crew carried out normal navigational maneuvers. The shuttle’s engines shut down 73.5 seconds after launch due to lack of fuel, and all signals were lost at 74 seconds following a bright flash around the nose of the ET and orbiter

The fragile of complex and large systems, it is argued, is addressed through the catastrophic events that happened in different fields. This report looks at three serious systemic failures in engineering and finance domains among the history, including the Disaster of Space Shuttle Columbia in 2003, the Japanese asset bubble in late 1980s and the explosion of Deepwater Horizon in 2010. The research draws upon final reports of NASA, related magazines and published books. Looking through the lenses of those catastrophes, the analysis reveals the tremendous loss and effect of system failures and gives a lesson to avoid similar disasters in the future.

The Challenger shuttle crew, of seven astronauts -- including the pilot, aerospace engineers, and scientists-- died tragically in the explosion of their spacecraft during the launch of STS-51-L from the Kennedy Space Center about 11:40 a.m., EST,

On January 28, 1986, millions of people from all over the world sat down, and turned on CNN to watch the Challenger go into orbit on live television. Schools held school-wide assemblies in the auditorium to watch it take off, and adults watched the take off from work. It was 11:39 am, in Cape Canaveral, Florida, when The Challenger took off, however seventy-three seconds into the trip, the Challenger broke apart and caught on fire causing the worst accident in space history. The Challenger Space Shuttle is important because of its background, its mechanics and the science behind it, and the lessons it taught NASA and other space programs.

Overall, from Vaughan’s theory (1996) it reveals that different management levels were to blame for this shuttle disaster. The rejection culture was ingrained at management that putting people outside their job responsibilities. By contrasting analysis of Vaughan (1996) and Perrow (1999), Perrow (1999) argues Vaughan concentrated too much on organizational culture, and understates the power of organization to suppress the engineers’ considerations.

On February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia disintegrated upon reentering Earth’s atmosphere, killing all seven crew member. The disaster was the second fatal accident in the Space Shuttle program after Space Shuttle Challenger, which broke apart and killed the seven- member crew 73 seconds after liftoff in 1986. During the launch of STS-107, Columba’s 28th mission, a piece of foam insulation broke off from the Space Shuttle external tank and struck the left wing of the orbiter. A few previous shuttle launches had seen damage ranging from minor to major from foam shedding, but some engineers suspected that the damage to Columbia was more serious. NASA managers limited the investigation, reasoning that the crew could not have fixed the problem

Despite the Chrysler Bailout and Challenger Disaster being distinct situations, both required a judgmental decision-making approach. The lack of this approach in the Challenger disaster could be attributed to the fact that the face of failure was invisible to the decision makers compared to the Chrysler Bailout. The highest Chrysler’s sales numbers indicated to the decision makers that if a swift and effective decision was not implemented their existence would be short-lived. The highest level of managers at NASA had no idea of the engineer’s concerns about the Challenger.

The space shuttle Columbia disaster lead NASA to finally change their culture and realize that no matter how small a threat may be perceived, it cannot be overlooked. The Columbia disaster was the second disaster in NASA’s history, that a small component, which was not adequately tested, inevitably caused a chain reaction that lead to the disintegration of the space shuttle leaving no survivors. The first disaster was Challenger in 1986. The Columbia disaster investigations lead NASA to look further than just procedures and into the culture behind the entire space shuttle program. “The recognition of human spaceflight as a develop-mental activity requires a shift in focus from operations and meeting schedules to a concern for the risks involved.” [1 p.208]

The purpose of this report is to highlight significant engineer failures over history. Many of the disasters occurred in the latter half of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century. Starting with the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, three aerospace related accidents, Challenger, Apollo 13, and Mars Climate Orbiter. As well as the radiation machine, Therac-25, and the more recent Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Each of the topics will go in-depth on background information, how the incident occurred, way it could have been prevented, and future implications, or measures taken due to these accidents to avoid future disasters.

Employees resist change for a wide variety of reasons, ranging from a straightforward intellectual disagreement over facts to deep-seated psychological prejudices.

On 28th January 1986, the whole world focused on the Challenger shuttle project, which was an evolution of carrying first person into space. However, after 73 seconds into the flight, the Challenger was ripped apart above Cape Canaveral in Florida. As a result, the launch of this shuttle exploded and killed seven