Analyzing Armstrong's Nature of Mind Essay

I would like to begin this paper by addressing what question I hope to answer through the entirety of this paper: is the mind physical? As simple as this question may seem to be, there still, to this day, is not a definite answer. There are, mostly, two approaches to answering this problem, through dualism or physicalism. The dualist, for the purposes of this paper, simply believes that the mind and the body are not equal and therefore, they are not one in the same. The physicalist, however, would come back to say that there are no such things as non-physical objects and therefore, they would conclude that the body and the mind are both physical. After weighing on both sides of this argument, I am going to defend the physicalist ideas and

Armstrong begins his paper with a question for the reader of what it means to have a mind. It is well understood that man has the ability to perceive, to think, to feel, and so on, but what does it mean to perceive, to think, and to feel? The answer, he believes, lies in science. Seeing that science is constantly and rapidly gaining ground, he asserts that “...we can give a complete account of man in purely physico-chemical terms” (295?) Pointing out the fact that this view has been accepted by various scientists throughout time, he explains it is the most reliable way to approach the mind-body problem.

A strange loop, Hofstadter claims, comes about when a sufficiently powerful cognitive system is able to twist its perception back on itself so that it can observe itself in the way that it observes things in its environment. The result of this strange loop is that the cognitive system perceives what Hofstadter terms “downward causality”, and this in turn reinforces the concept of I-ness, self-awareness, or consciousness.

Churchland begins her article by explaining Thomas Nagel belief of having a point of view.

Descartes’ argue that mind is better known than body by first claiming humans as fundamentally rational, meaning “a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling,” ( Descartes, 19) he therefore argues that humans have the ability to know their proper minds clearly and distinctly. He proposes the conception of the mind where the imagination and the senses are also inherent capabilities of the body (faculties), specifically powers of the mind.

Psychology, due to its complexity can be approached in a variety of ways. To help us understand the human mind, behaviourist and psychodynamic approaches have helped us understand the alternative outlooks in the science of mind and behaviour. Both approaches can be examined by the means of theoretical assumptions and methodology.

The idea that mental states are non-reducible properties of brain states is the central tenant of a theory of mind called property dualism. However, before we can assess the theory we must be aware that the question assumes the existence of mental states and as such we cannot answer this question from some perspectives (e.g. eliminative materialism)

Thesis: The mind-body problem arises because of the lack of evidence when looking for a specific explanation of the interaction of mental and physical states, and the origin and even existence of them.

Canadian composer and Coordinator of the Composition Sector at uOttawa, Professor John Gordon Armstrong, will have four selected compositions presented at a contemporary concert featuring the students and faculty at Tabaret Hall. This opportunity for a Canadian composer is an exciting concert not to be missed!

Many arguments in the philosophy of the mind have been made for and against, whether or not the mind and the brain are the same entity. The mind-brain identity theory is the view that the mind is the brain and that mental states are brain states (Mandik 77). Therefore, we can identify sensations and other mental processes with physical brain processes (Blutner 4). I argue, that the mind is not identical to the brain, and the conceivable idea of zombies, as well as the multiple realizability argument, can disprove this theory.

In 1983 Jerry Fodor opened the introduction to his new research of “Modularity of mind” with the phrase; “Behavior is organized, but the organization of behavior is merely derivative”. This meaning that behaviors are simply imitations, never original nor created. Fodor created a theory of how the mind was structured and how would perform. He studied the architecture of mind in modules; a term that will describe that the mind had different specific structures that had precise purposes. Jesse J. Prinz just like Fodor was a philosopher who was in opposition of the “Modularity of the mind” theory. This essay will have as a purpose to create an argument on the explanation and disagreement that Prinz wrote cluster by cluster against the theory “Modularity of mind” in an article called “Is the mind really modular?”

The mind-body problem, which is still debated even today, raises the question about the relationship between the mind and the body. Theorists, such as René Descartes and Thomas Nagel, have written extensively on the problem but they have many dissenting beliefs. Descartes, a dualist, contends that the mind and body are two different substances that can exist separately. Conversely, Nagel, a dual aspect theorist, contends that the mind and body are not substances but different properties. However, although Nagel illustrates the problems with Descartes= theory, Nagel=s theory runs into the problem of panpsychism. In this paper, both arguments will be discussed to determine which, if either, side is stronger.

The mind is perhaps the most fascinating part of the human body due to its complexity and ability to rationalize. In essence, the mind-body problem studies the relation of the mind to the body, and states that each human being seems to embody two unique and somewhat contradictory natures. Each human contains both a nature of matter and physicality, just like any other object that contains atoms in the universe. However, mankind also is constituted of something beyond materialism, which includes its ability to rationalize and be self-aware. This would imply that mankind is not simply another member of the world of matter because some of its most distinctive features cannot be accounted for in this manner. There are obvious differences between physical and mental properties. Physical properties are publically accessible, and have weight, texture, and are made of matter. Mental properties are not publically accessible, and have phenomenological texture and intentionality (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). This is challenging to philosophers, because man cannot be categorized as a material or immaterial object, but rather a combination of both mind and body (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). Man embodies mind-body dualism, meaning he is a blend of both mind and matter (Stewart, Blocker, Petrick, 2013). The mind-body problem creates conflict among philosophers, especially when analyzing physicalism in its defense. This paper outlines sound

The Representational Theory of Mind proposes that we, as both physiological and mental beings, are systems which operate based on symbols and interpretations of the meanings of such symbols rather than beings which operate just on physiological processes (chemical reactions and biological processes). It offers that humans and their Minds are computing machines, mental software (the Mind) which runs on physical hardware (the body). It suggests, too, that we are computing machines functioning as something other than a computing machine, just as every other machine does.

matter and the mind is not states Gunther (1998). The history of the mind and body