Analyzing Mission Command Principles Of Gen Braxton Bragg

Six principles comprise the philosophy of mission command: (a) build cohesive teams through mutual trust; (b) create share understanding; (c) provide clear commander’s intent; (d) exercise disciplined initiative; (e) use mission orders; and (f) accept prudent risk. When combined together, these six principles assist the commander in balancing the aforementioned art of command and science of control. To understand how General Robert E. Lee’s performance at Gettysburg lacked the marks of a great mission commander necessitates a deeper understanding of the individual principles of mission command.

Operational leaders see how the individual components of an organization fit together and use those individuals work to make a larger outcome. When they focus on a problem, they think of what works best within the process and systems to make an impact on the situation. These types of leaders play a big part in making sure that things get done in an effective and functioning manner. According to the Army Doctrine ADP 6-0, the Army over time has strayed away from operational leaders and adapted Mission Command, which gives leaders the ability at the lowest level the capability to exercise disciplined initiative in an act of carrying out the larger mission . Mission Command is made up of the following six steps: Understanding, Visualize,

Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0 defines mission command as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (U.S Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Combined Arms Center, Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, 2015, p. 1). The six principles of mission command direct leaders to build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk. These principles enable subordinates that understand their commander’s intent to accomplish missions by adapting to the situation and taking advantage of opportunities as they arise (U.S Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Combined Arms Center, Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, 2015, p. 2). Various battles throughout history provide examples of the application of the principles of mission command as well as the failure to adhere to them. The Battle of the Little Bighorn is an example of the latter and marks the “most decisive Native American victory and the worse U.S. defeat during the long Plains Indian War” (History.com Staff, 2009).

Mission command consist of the following six principles: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create sheared understanding, provide clear commander’s

Successful leadership on a battlefield can be measured in different ways. It is possible for a good, successful leader to lose a battle. Conversely, it is possible for an ineffective leader to win a battle, given the right circumstances. What distinguishes a successful leader from an unsuccessful one is his/her ability to oversee an operation using effective mission command. In ADP 6-0, mission command as a philosophy is defined as “as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (ADP, 1).

McClellan’s caution in waging war is evidenced clearly in the Army of the Potomac’s Peninsula Campaign. McClellan was charged with leading the assault on Richmond, delivering what could have been a fatal blow against the Confederacy. During the Army of the Potomac’s movements towards Richmond, McClellan repeatedly delayed, believing he had inferior numbers to his initial adversary, Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston. Johnston knew the caution McClellan was prone to, and slowly drew McClellan closer to Confederate forces defending Richmond. At the Battle of Seven Pines, Johnston reinforced the idea in McClellan’s mind that caution was necessary. (McPherson, 1988, p. 461) The surprise attach by Johnston’s forces, though ultimately defeated by the Army of the Potomac, delayed McClellan’s advance as he called for more reinforcements from Washington. Johnston was wounded in the battle, and replaced by General Robert E. Lee. Lee, whose prowess as a tactician bordered on legendary, led a series of surprise attacks against McClellan’s Army of the Potomac in the Seven Days’ Battle. McClellan’s forces were pushed back, and he was relieved of duty as commander of the Army of the Potomac, until later in 1862. (McPherson, 1988, pp. 462-470)

The mission command system is expressed as the placement of individuals within a unit conducting operations with a specific set of procedures and principles in place to optimize the use of its equipment. What does it mean to recognize or comprehend the art of Command and the science of Control? There are six key principles of mission command in developing a cohesive team that support all aspects of a mission. The following essay will discuss these principles and examine examples of how the famous Operation Anaconda both endured victories and inadequacies.

When we compare the military leaders of both North and South during the Civil War, it is not hard to see what the differences are. One of the first things that stand out is the numerous number of Northern generals that led the “Army of the Potomac.” Whereas the Confederate generals, at least in the “Army of Northern Virginia” were much more stable in their position. Personalities, ambitions and emotions also played a big part in effective they were in the field, as well as their interactions with other officers.

The Battle of Antietam could have been a devastating and fatal blow to the Confederate Army if Gen. McClellan acted decisively, took calculated risks, and veered away from his cautious approach to war. There are many instances leading up to the battle and during the battle in which he lacks the necessary offensive initiative to effectively cripple and ultimately win the war. This paper is intended to articulate the failure of Mission Command by GEN McClellan by pointing out how he failed to understand, visualize, describe and direct the battlefield to his benefit.

General Washington 's adherence to mission command principles promoted the environment needed to win. Senior allied partners deferred decision making to Washington based on trust and collaborative input. Effective communications encouraged subordinate commanders to propose constructive alternatives aimed at streamlining action. The Siege of Yorktown embodied the approach effectiveness. Admiral Lafayette’s decision to avoid a major naval battle in Chesapeake Bay demonstrated this. Lafayette’s understood Washington’s intent, and the established trust ensured vital Colonial waterway supremacy. This decisive act ensured Lord Cornwallis’ entrapment throughout the siege. (COL Jerry A. Turner, 2015)

During 2003, General Petraeus and his soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division had no clue of the astounding role they were about to embark on. General Petraeus found the city of Mosul in complete destruction, and knew it would take a cohesive effort through mutual trust and teamwork to restore the city. The city of Mosul did not only need a complete make over, but also a regime that shared a mutual understanding as Petraeus. Lastly, with the city rebuilding changes would bring hostility and risk to the soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division. General David Petraeus was successful in Mosul, because he applied the mission command control principles of building cohesive teams, creating shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk.

This paper will analyze the events of the 1865 Carolinas Campaign, which ended with U.S. forces defeating the Confederate forces. The purpose of this analysis is to determine if Maj Gen William T. Sherman effectively exercised a form of mission command by gaining shared understanding of the problem, clearly communicating his intent, and establishing mutual trust with his subordinate joint commanders. Maj Gen William T. Sherman understood doctrine applying it intelligently and flexibly allowing subordinate commanders ----------- to flawlessly execute his orders through an efficient and effective decentralized style. Grant fought his command in a way that demanded confidence and responsible freedom of action in a way that inspired success.

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

After his successes in the West, U. S. Grant became the first Lieutenant General since George Washington on March 2nd of 1864 and assumed command of the entire Union Army. Hopes were high for General Grant, seen in a letter the previous year, President Abraham Lincoln expressed his trust for Grant when he that he originally “feared it was a mistake” in regards to his attack on Vicksburg and “I now wish to make the personal acknowledgment that you were right, and I was wrong.” Heretofore, Union Generals in the East focused on capturing specific cities, however, Grant wanted to cripple the Confederate Army. In a letter from Grant to Major General George Meade before the Overland Campaign began, he outlined his intentions of the operation, writing that “Lee’s army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go