Appearance versus Reality in Bertrand Russell's The Problems of Philosophy

Sense of body- involves consciousness of physical sensations, (Piotrowski, 2005). Example: Mary is aware of her frown lines.

Berkeley's attempt to popularize his pro-mind conception of the external world, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, serves to undermine Locke's distinctions between primary and secondary qualities of the external world. In his publication, Berkeley uses dialogue between Hylas and Philnous, which consists of a series of arguments, to determine the most sound theory. Ground rules of the debate consists of: whoever of the two's position avoids skepticism about knowledge of physical objects wins and that if one position can be shown to entail that we cannot know anything about physical objects, consequently that position should be dismissed as absurd (Kelly, 2013). Throughout the arguments, Berkeley weakens Locke's theory of Limited Representationalism by counteracting Locke's with the possibility that instead of “matter” that comprises physical objects in the external world, these objects are simply ideas. Drawing back on Berkeley's catchy motto, “to be is to be perceived”, he proposes three arguments that support his idealist view that the motto encapsulates. The three pieces of support also importantly shed skepticism upon Lockes primary and secondary distinctions involving “matter”. The three statements of support include: The argument that physical

He first disproves of the thought that philosophy studies only controversies to which the answer is impossible to know, and says that it will only matter, and have an effect on those who study philosophy for the purpose of gaining knowledge to connect the sciences for an understanding of the universe. Russell then compares a life without philosophy and a life with philosophy, the difference being that a life without philosophy is confined to only thinking of our world, while one who lives a philosophical life is free to think of the outer world, as well as beyond. He concludes by saying philosophy is not studies for the sake of answers, but for the sake of the questions themselves, in order to expand our knowledge of possibilities and intellectual imagination, in addition to understanding the capabilities and greatness of the

1. Differentiate between sensation and perception. Explain the importance of separating these concepts. The differences between sensation and perception is that sensation is the elementary elements that, according to structuralist, combine to create perception. Whereas, perception is the conscious sensory experience (Goldstein, 2014). This student has always looked at sensations as those things in a persons’s environment that one can see, hear, smell, touch, taste, and feel. On the other hand perception is how a person’s brain will interpret what is seen, heard, smelt, felt, or touched.

There are six senses in total and these are known as languages of the mind, or ‘modalities’. These are Sight, hearing, feeling, smell and taste, although the last two can be put into the ‘feeling’ category. We use all of our senses in a particular situation but all of us will have a favourite which we are more comfortable with and are likely to fall back on in times of crisis. (Chrysalis pg. 4)

The statement “To be is to be perceived” clearly showed that George Berkeley’s “immaterialism”. Berkeley repudiated the existence of material substance. Instead, he pointed out

Imagine walking past a garden with an assortment of flowers. Now close your eyes and take in each distinguishing familiar smell. As you take a whiff you smell the differences between the roses, lilies, and even tulips. We can tell the sound of a drum from that of a gong; the touch of cool, smooth marble as we run our fingers over it distinctively feeling the difference from that of sandpaper. Our everyday lives are continuous experiences of sensations. These sensations have characteristic qualitative features, which are called “phenomenal”, “phenomenological” or “sensory” qualities. In philosophical terms these sensations can be referred to as qualia, which are defined as properties of experiences that type them in phenomenological respects .

Sense perception is one way that allows us to interact and communicate with each other and the world. This is our primary way of knowing because our senses live experiences that we go through. Based on our senses we are to make interpretations of the world. For example, in class, each pair was given a box. Inside the box, there was one metal ball, but you had to figure out the structure or the form of a maze inside the box. We couldn't see inside the box, and we couldn’t touch the inside of the box. By using our sense of hearing and another way of knowing, imagination, we were able to make an educated guess of what the inside structure of the box looked like.

There are two main theories that make up the knowledge argument. The first is Physicalism, (or better known as materialism) which is the thesis that “All facts are dependent upon physical processes.”(Smart) The other main stance taken is property dualism. The thesis of property dualism states that there are “Non-physical properties of physical substances” (Calef) or that there are physical and mental properties. In this article, I will defend the stance of property dualism by acknowledging objections and replying to these objections to show why the argument for property dualism works.

And what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? And is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived?” In an effort to anticipate any criticism that his argument might obtain, Berkeley plans to respond to what someone might say if they were to support a representational theory of perception. A representationalist might suggest that Berkeley’s argument is invalid because premise one could only be true his idea of “perceive” is being used indirectly, and premise two could only be true if “perceive” is being directly

Albeit of course he latterly confers there is a conundrum, which elapses immediately around the ground, breaking concept of sense data and its wider currency in our perceptions towards objects in abnormal circumstances. In this context we are informed of one is seeing something and what is this something if not part of a material thing is the merit of insoluble mystery. This question succumbs hot indignation to Austin, for the straight part of the stick the bit not under water is presumably part of the material thing and we are made aware of that in the same way we are made aware of the bit under water. We can see, come to think of it, the water itself. At an appropriate level thus he concludes that what we see is a stick partly immersed

Bertrand Russell discussed certain problems he found with philosophy. Russell was concerned about how much did we really know. There is the stuff we know with our mind when we have a particular idea, and stuff we know through actually experiencing it which would justify it. But how do we know if it is real, or even there, for that matter? Russell says, “For if we cannot be sure of the independent existence of object, we cannot be sure of the independent existence of other people’s bodies, and therefore still less of other peoples minds, since we have no grounds for believing in their minds except such as are derived from observing their bodies” (Russell, 47). How can Farmer Brown be sure that the dairyman just didn’t have an idea

perception and reality - perception being the evident meaning of each symbol and reality, being

The distinction that causes the most trouble in philosophy is the distinction between "appearance" and "reality," between what things seem to be and what they are. The painter wants to know what things seem to be, the practical man and the philosopher want to know what they are. . . . but if reality is not what appears, have we any means of knowing whether there is any reality at all? - Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy