Arab Isreali War

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the one of the world’s oldest conflicts, and it is still an ongoing problem in the world. Zionists and Arabs: two groups with conflicting beliefs who both claim Israel as their own. In wake of the Holocaust the U.N decided to gift the Jews a homeland for the lives lost in the genocide. In 1947, the U.N Partition divided the land of Israel (Historic Palestine) into two separate states: Arab and Jewish. Since then, the state of Israel has been the center of conflict between the Arabs and the Zionists. As time passed the Zionists gained more land from winning the Six-Day War, and consequently the Palestinians had to live as refugees in other Arab countries. Additionally, more than 75% of the land belonged to

In November 1956, the United Nations Emergency Force arrived in the Suez Canal Zone, replacing British and French forces there. Four months later, a similar transition occurred in Sinai, where Israel surrendered to the international troops. Egyptian boundaries reverted to their pre-war peace, and Nasser, the 2nd president of Egypt, retained his hold on power and the Suez Canal.

In 1978, the US President Jimmy Carter invited Begin and Sadat to Camp David, and there they made a comprehension on an essential level that was made up for lost time by a deal in 1979. Israel assented to hand back to Egypt the whole of the Sinai, and Egypt agreed to see Israel. Israel 's edges on one flank had at long last been settled. Besides, the way that the peace between the two countries has not been a warm one, it has held.

On October 6, 1973 Egyptian and Syrian forces launched an attack on Israel to regain land won by Israel during a previous war. Knowing that military forces would be preoccupied with their holy holiday, the two armies attacked Israel. Other Arab nations contributed to the fighting or the supplying of weapons in a later time. Israel asked The United States for help numerous times but the Nixon administration was hesitant to offer immediate aid. Many factors had to be considered before The US could come to a decision. With the Cold War still being fought during this time the US wanted to negotiate a peaceful end with the Soviet Union, who was backing the Egyptians with military supplies. The Soviets agreed to a negotiation but the Egyptians did not, which seemed to

Furthermore, Eisenhower opposed the use of force—the U.S. sought a diplomatic solution to the problem. Unlike the U.S., Britain and France viewed Nasser’s action as a threat to their national interests, which led to Operation Musketeer, involving Israel. On October 26, 1956, when the United States learned of Israel’s military mobilization, President Eisenhower personally sent messages to Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion asking Israel to not take any action that would endanger the peace. However, on October 29, 1956, Israel attacked the Egyptian army, taking control of the Sinai and the Straits of Tiran. Britain, France, and Israel kept the operation secret from the United States. Eisenhower felt personally insulted by his allies—UK and France—for disregarding the Tripartite Agreement of 1950 and Operation Musketeer. “As a professional solider, he understood and did not rule out the use of force” (Lenczowski, 48). In response to these developments, Eisenhower used economic threats to force his British, French, and Israeli allies to withdraw from Egypt. Eisenhower valued the UN system and international law, which explains why he took aggressive action to resolve the conflict through the UN. In a resolution, the U.S. called for an immediate ceasefire and the evacuation of Israeli, French, and British forces from Egypt under the supervision of a special United Nations force.

The six-day war can go down in history as one of the worst wars between Israel and one or more Arab countries. The six-day war heavily impacted Israel and the participating Arab countries in many ways. Israeli and Arab relations have never been good, even before Israel was declared an independent state in 1948. The six-day war should not be considered a new war based on its impact, rather it should be considered as a continuation of a constant war between Israel and its surrounding Arab neighbors. A factor that has always played a major part in instigating a conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors is the refusal and rejection of the Arab leadership to indentify Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people. The war began with all surrounding Arab countries lining up along each border ready to try and wipe Israel out using air attacks, as well as ground attacks. The Six Day War concluded with an evident victory in favor of the Israelis, which to some is surprising due to the overwhelming force of the three militaries, which were ganging up on one small country. The casualty numbers ended up in favor of the Israeli’s who only lost somewhere near 700 people with 2,500 injured, while, Egypt lost 15,000 people and had 5,600 taken as prisoners, Jordan lost close to 6,000 people and Syria suffered somewhere close to 1,000 casualties (Knesset). The Arab attackers lost close to 1 billion dollars worth of aircrafts, tanks and heavy machinery in total between all three countries

Proceeding from a simplistic perception of regional stability, Washington utilized the surrogate strategy to control the outcomes of regional interactions in the Middle East and chose Israel to play the role of regional surrogate. But Israel, in many cases, instead of maintaining regional stability on behalf of the US, served its own interests which were not always consistent with US interest in regional stability. The Israeli violations, however, were either condoned or even approved by the US administrations. These reactions comprised what this chapter addressed as a pro-Israel model of intervention.

On May 15, Anwar Sadat, the Speaker of the National Assembly would visit Moscow, where he would be told by the Soviets that Israel had planned to invade Syria during the May 16 through May 22 time frame, all of this would prove to be false. Soviet intelligence cited the fact that Israeli troops parading in western Jerusalem, for Israel’s Independence Day, were doing so without heavy weapons, which they said were being amassed along the northern border with Syria. The reason as it turns out they were devoid of weaponry during their parades is to ease Arab tensions in the area. Sadat would pass this information along to Egypt and President Nasser, who would then parade Egypt’s forces through Cairo along its way to the Sinai Peninsula (Cleveland, 2009).

Nasser was already at odds with France funding rebels to overthrow their position in the Suez Canal, as well as his ambitions to push the western powers out of the Middle East, destroy Israel, and control the region. While both the United States and Britain supported Nasser’s rise it was, so he would not install a communist regime and work with the Soviets. Nasser’s rise and opposition to both France and Israel made them natural allies and Israel believed they were better suited for a war before Nasser could build up his

As well as the Three ‘Operational Objectives’ from the Sinai Campaign, it consisted of three political aims; to overthrow Nasser, expand Israeli borders and establishment of a new political order in the Middle East. Unlike the successes from their operational objectives, they failed to achieve the political aims. In the first political aim, Israel paid a heavy political price for ganging up with Britain and France against the emergent forces of Arab nationalism. In the second political aim involving Israel’s borders, Israel was forced to disgorge all the territory it had conquered. The third aim however, written by Shlaim tends to contradict Moshe Dayan’s view that the ‘victory in Sinai meant that Israel emerged as a state that would be welcomed as a friend and ally.’ While this may not be directed at Arab nations, it may have been implied in terms of relations with foreign powers. Although Ben Gurion failed to topple Nasser and achieve his political aims, the Suez War had allowed Gurion to force Sharett’s resignation which initially gave him the option of launching a war against Egypt. Moreover, Shlaim contends that Israel and Ben Gurion learned two important lessons from its experience in the Suez War. Firstly, Israel must rely on nuclear deterrence to protect its borders rather than expanding it. Secondly, Israel was to depend on the US in future decision making and must deal and directly consult with the US

The Arab- Israeli Conflict AO1: "What are the main differences between the beliefs and attitudes of the Jews/Israelis and the Arabs/ Palestinians towards the land now called Israel with the Gaza Strip and the West Bank? The Arab- Israeli conflict is one of the most interesting conflicts that have strained relations between the Muslims and the Jews which involves a small but significant piece of land known as Palestine (Israel today). This conflict is not rooted in modern times though, as this section of my coursework will explain. Both groups have extremely strong views on this topic, both historically and religiously important, which has lead to this stalemate between them.

In 1956, while giving a speech in Alexandria, the president of Egypt, Gamal Abdul Nasser speaks the codeword “De Lesseps” , sending Egyptian troops to seize the Suez Canal from the British. Britain currently has a fragile economy given it’s currently the middle of the cold war, and WW2 ended 11 years prior. Britain needs the canal for economic reasons, specifically oil. France is in the midst of a revolutionary war in Algeria, and Nasser currently backs the Algerians. The canal is also operated by a French company, so losing it would hurt the French economically. The Israelites are waiting to jump at any excuse to go to war with Egypt. France, Britain and Israel see that they might be able to suppress Egypt with teamwork and a bit of foul play.

The War of 1967 concluded with Israeli control of Jordanian territories that included Palestinian communities in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. In “Young Palestinian Voices from East Jerusalem,” Road AbuZayyad claims how the Israeli government’s influence and control in East Jerusalem affected the lives of the Palestinians living in the region. In “The Birth of Core Issues: The West Bank and East Jerusalem Under Israeli Administration,” Moshe Elad recounts how issues, predominantly concerning the Arab and Jewish conflict, arose with the implementation of an Israeli Administration after the War of 1967. The articles share how the Israeli control of East Jerusalem cultivated the conflict, however, each article has a focus on different aspects of the Israeli government that created the Arab and Jewish conflict. While Elad discusses how the Israeli Administration increased Arab-Israeli conflict, Abuzayyad focuses on how Israelization, the capture of territory and enforcement of Jewish law, created these conflicts. Additionally, in this paper, I will summarize each of the articles and evaluate them based on their organization, quality of evidence, and perspective. While AbuZayyad effectively establishes his thesis through the use of relevant personal accounts, experiences, and descriptions, Elad evaluates the administration through a historical perspective but fails to adequately prove his thesis due to his lack of relevant evidence and convoluted structure.

Once at Camp David, Begin and Sadat argued for days about wars which took place before Carter took office. Carter then separated the two, going back and forth between Begin and Sadat, attempting to broker a peace plan. After thirteen days, these efforts brought about the Camp David Accords and peace between Egypt and Israel. Under the terms of the plan, Egypt regained control of the Sinai Peninsula and the Suez Canal from Israel and monetary support from the U.S. to modernize the Egyptian military. In return, the Egyptians agreed to recognize Israel as a sovereign

Michael B. Oren, a American-born Israeli historian, takes at the time recently declassified archival documents from the Arab nations, Israel, USSR, Soviet, and USA to attempt to compile a comprehensive book that contains a balanced study of the military and political facets of the war, the interplay between its international, regional, and domestic dimensions, a book intended for scholars but also accessible to wider readership. Oren begins his discussion with a concise yet comprehensive history of the events leading up what is commonly referred to as the Six Day war or June War. From this Oren is seeking to illustrate that the Arab- Israeli conflict occurring the June 1967 war is not a spontaneous event but rather a long history or connection