Are Bricks R Us Contributory Negligence?

There are two defences to an action in negligence: contributory negligence and voluntary assumption of risk. (FoBL, 2005, p83) This case only involves contributory negligence.

BP is unable to work as a result of injuries sustained to his left leg and hand through previous violent acts. Additional to this, BP is an alcohol dependent individual who has been in relapse for approximately 12 months. BP is subject to an Indeterminate Public Protection (IPP) life licence for the offence of Wounding with Intent. This offence occurred in 2005, at a time when his alcohol consumption as at its heaviest and was “sofa surfing” with associates he met as previous supported accommodation sourced through the Salvation Army. The circumstances of the offence were that BP and his associate had been drinking constantly throughout the day in the victim’s flat and that an argument broke out over the level of music being played by BP. Feeling aggrieved by this, BP asked the victim to step outside for a fight. As a result of BP feeling ignored by the victim through the nil response, BP took the knife that he was holding and lunged towards the victim stabbing him in the neck before dragging the knife downwards on the neck. Subsequently, BP tried to stab the victim in the chin before retreating and apologising. In reviewing BP’s antecedents he has 28 convictions for 48 separate offences. Pertinent to the index offence are those committed in 1980 for section 47 assault, breach of the peace numerous times between 1981 and 1995, possession of a bladed article in a public place in 1997 and a further section 47 assault in 1998.

Did the defendants Robert Green and James DeVon participate in, aid, or procured the battery of Mr. Paur making the defendant Rose City liable vicariously.

Last of all, Cost of avoiding harm needs to be taken into account. The argument that a danger was too costly to eliminate is not a legitimate argument. However courts do recognise a balance between the risk and the cost of eliminating it. If the risk is remote and the precautions needed to be taken are very expensive, the defendants lack of action by not doing anything may be justified. The greater the risk is and the more likely it is, the consideration is given towards the cost of the eliminating measures which the defendants may have taken to safeguard. The decision in these circumstances relies on whether the courts decide that the defendants had acted reasonable in the given

3. Dudley and Stephen will be charged with first-degree murder. Their punishment should be 20-30 years or life in prison. The murder of Brooks was no accident because it was premeditated. Despite the malnutrition as a factor Brooks was still sane and refused to be eaten but the other two ignored this without a second thought. By convicting Dudley and Stephen it will show that the law of the country is absolute. It will also decrease the chances of someone appealing because "They were mentally ill during the time of the killing."

The defendant was involved in a fight in which he inflicted a deep cut on the victim's finger. The victim failed to take care of the wound or get medical assistance and the wound became infected. Eventually gangrene set in and the victim was advised to have his arm amputated. The victim refused and died. The defendant was liable for his death despite the victim's actions in contributing to his own death.

In Pennsylvania, a plaintiff claiming negligent infliction of emotional distress must establish one of these four situations: “1) that the defendant had a contractual or fiduciary duty; 2) plaintiff suffered a physical impact; 3) plaintiff was in a “zone of danger” and at risk of an immediate physical injury; or 4) plaintiff had a contemporaneous perception of tortious injury to a close relative.” Doe v. Phila. Cmty. Health Alternatives AIDS Task Force, 754 A.2d 25, 27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). The first element does not apply to our client because there was no fiduciary or contractual duty relationship. Secondly, it could be argued that Nordlund suffered a physical impact because after Sumner’s accident, Nordlund could not eat, could not

App. Ct. Mass. App. Ct. at 341, the court reasoned that the degree of emotional distress can be inferred from the actual conduct and the circumstances, no need for an expert witness. Caddys had headaches and stomachaches and could not concentrate on work because their home was taken away from them which is not something an ordinary person could endure. Id. Similarly, Taylor felt so unsafe that he and Mya quit their jobs, he withdrew his membership from the union, and they left Massachusetts altogether because Murray was threatening their lives. No reasonable person could carry on with their life when someone is threatening to take their life. Although, Murray may argue that Taylor’s weight loss, insomnia and nervousness are not severe enough physical ailments, according to a holding in Agis, 371 Mass. Mass. at 146, absence of physical damages should not thwart a claim. Thus, the court will likely rule that Taylor’s favor on this

The case that I decided to analyze is a criminal case, State Vs Stepp. Joshua Stepp was charged with first-degree murder as well as first-degree sexual assault of his ten-month-old step daughter Cheyenne Yarley. Stepp is an ex-military man who claims to suffer from PTSD. Stepp asks that the court charge him with second-degree murder on the account that he “was unable to perform the specific intent to kill” due to his PTSD.

While at the hospital, surgery is performed; however, the victim dies on the operating table. It is later discovered the hospital staff gave the patient medication during the procedure in which the victim was allergic to, but was not the cause of death. The cause of death was determined to be the severed artery and loss of blood. Even though the injuries were life threatening and the victim died anyway, the defendant could argue the hospital staff was the proximate cause of the victim’s death by giving them the medication they are allergic to. This should not release the defendant from a murder charge since the victim died from injuries they sustained from the stabbing. With the artery being severed, there was no hope for the victim. The medication given to the patient, while negligent in the dose administration, did not cause the death of the

In this argument paper I will be examining whether or not Rayon McIntosh was unethical in his defense against an attack from Denise Darbeau and Rachel Edwards at his place of employment McDonalds. At what point do you go from defending yourself to being the attacker. That is the question in the case of Rayon’s situation.

Torts of negligence are breaches of duty that results to injury to another person to whom the duty breached is owed. Like all other torts, the requirements for this are duty, breach of duty by the defendant, causation and injury(Stuhmcke and Corporation.E 2001). However, this form of tort differs from intentional tort as regards the manner the duty is breached. In torts of negligence, duties are breached by negligence and not by intent. Negligence is conduct that falls below the standard of care established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm(Stuhmcke and Corporation.E 2001). The standard measure of negligence is the universal reasonable person standard. The assumption in this case is that a reasonable

) First and foremost, in order for us to claim for the psychiatric damage that Adam has suffered under tort law, we will have to prove that Adam is either a primary victim or a secondary victim and Adam is suffered from a recognised psychiatric illness, anxiety and stress will generally not sufficient. Primary victims are those who directly involved in the event and secondary victims are those who are suffered a psychiatric illness when someone they know is killed or injured in an accident. A recognised psychiatric condition is defined as a genuine illness or injury, needed medical evidence and has a long term effect. Adam might claim as a primary victim in this case, because a primary victim has to suffer physical injury or at a risk of physical injury and psychiatric injuries. The liability of causing psychiatric injury depends on foreseeability of physical injury, for example, in the case of Page v Smith where Mr Page suffered no physical injury but a recurrence of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and became unable to work, Smith is liable as he could reasonably foresee that Mr Page suffer physical injury. Adam could claim as a primary victim if Adam is in the zone of physical danger, I firmly believe that Adam was in the zone of danger at that time because he was seated in the row of the seat immediately behind their children and the risk of physical injury of Adam was also foreseeable, therefore, Adam owed a duty of care in relation to psychiatric damage. Besides, the

The Supreme Court case, R v Murray[4], states that the appellant pleaded not guilty to one charge of murder – where the appellant was found guilty of manslaughter – where, although the appellant intended to kill the deceased, he was only criminally responsible for manslaughter because of provocation under section 304[5] - where the appellant was sentenced to nine years imprisonment under section 161B[6] - where there was a declaration that the applicant had been convicted of a serious violence offence. Where the case R v McDougall and Collas[7] was applied as a precedent to the final decision of the case.

However this did not replace the approach of unintentional damage. In R v Briggs 1977 the defendant damaged a car and his appeal was successful as the judge did not explain the term 'reckless ' and the fact that the defendant 's state of mind has to be taken into account. The definition of when a man is reckless was changed in the case of R v Parker 1977 and was changed again in R v Stephenson1979 . The defendant had tried to sleep in a hollow he had made in the side of a haystack and he lit a fire whish set fore to the stack and damaged property worth £3500. However he suffered from a long history of schizophrenia and expert evidence at trial suggested that he may not have had the same ability to foresee or