Argument And Morality, Ethics, And The Principle Of A Nation 's Security Interests

The U.S. Constitution provides power to the President and Congress to develop and enact national security policy (Ulrich, 1). As such our civilian leaders have the right and responsibility to maintain oversight of the military. Two civil-military relations theories, Normal and Clausewitzian, offer competing views. The Normal theory suggests officers are professionals and interference from civilian leaders is inappropriate (Cohen, 4). The Clausewitzian theory contends the statesman may inject himself in any aspect of military strategy since

Throughout history, many people have debated over the ethics of war and peace which lead to the creation of the just war theory. There have been a number of wars in the past and even in today’s world that have been proven to be unjustified by the means of this theory. Any war in my opinion, is hard to justify due to the violence, destructiveness, the nature of humans doing during war, and the impact it has on humans and the world. However, I have chosen to discuss why America’s decision to jump in to World War II was justified and by proving it by using the just war theory, mainly focusing on jus ad bellum.

The notion of an American way of war informs how scholars, policymakers, and strategists understand how Americans fight. A way of war—defined as a society’s cultural preferences for waging war—is not static. Change can occur as a result of important cultural events, often in the form of traumatic experiences or major social transformations. A way of war is therefore the malleable product of culturally significant past experiences. Reflecting several underlying cultural ideals, the current American way of war consists of three primary tenets—the desire for moral clarity, the primacy of technology, and the centrality of scientific management systems—which combine to create a preference for decisive, large-scale conventional wars with clear objectives and an aversion to morally ambiguous low-intensity conflicts that is relevant to planners because it helps them address American strategic vulnerabilities.

While the facts of Truman’s decision to drop the bombs have been evaluated time and time again, just as public opinion regarding the bombs has evolved over time, so has the context in which the history of the event must be evaluated. While historians of generations past may simply have examined Truman’s rationale for dropping the bomb, those who continue to be intrigued by the issue demand an explanation in-tune with current sentiment regarding the bomb drop. They require a full-scale examination of the many complex legal and moral facets of the issue. Thus, this paper strives to give them what they desire: initially, an in-depth investigation into the evidence available for President Truman in making his decision to drop the bomb; second, a discussion of universal wartime morality, its implications on World War II and the bomb drop, and a look at how the concept of total war may have reshaped the laws of war; third, an evaluation of the atomic bombing with regards to international law; and finally, a look at the bombing through the Presidential powers enumerated in the United States Constitution. These key facets of the issue will provide readers with a comprehensive examination of the bomb drop issue that attempts to reevaluate the validity

War has been designed to show a ghastly frame that sets out for propaganda, defeats, and victories. Involving multiple aspects, war exhibits a product of both human choice and human actions. “And a person's definition of war often expresses the person's broader political philosophy, such as limiting war to a conflict between nations or state. Alternative definitions of war can include conflict not just between nations but between schools of thought or ideologies.” (Moseley, Alexander.

The legitimate defense of a nation and the responsibility of the Security Council to take actions in the course of maintaining peace within its areas of influence. With the establishment of United Nations and the modernization of war and its materials; the theories and doctrines of the past also needed to evolve. The modern Just war theory in composed of two principles: jus ad bellum, the right to conduct war, and jus in bello, the correct conduct within war. Each principle also has its own set of criteria to follow. Jus ad bellum contains six: Just cause, right intention, proper authority and public declaration, last resort, probability of success, and proportionality. (Orend, 2006)

St. Augustine provided comments on morality of war from the Christian point of view (railing against the love of violence that war can engender) as did several critics in the intellectual flourishing from the 9th to 12th centuries. Just war theorists remind warriors and politicians alike that the principles of justice following war should be universalizable and morally ordered and that winning should not provide a license for imposing unduly harsh or punitive measures or that state or commercial interests should not dictate the form of new peace. “The attraction for jus post bellum thinkers is to return to the initial justice of the war”. This means that war is considered as self-defense.

Also the appropriate authority must be the persons who have declared war and ensured that this call was done on the basis of last resort, after trying to attempt all other methods which could assist in resolving the conflict. The second principle which is of the just war theory is Jus in Bello. (Anon,[n.d]b), These are rules and guidelines which explain some steps that the state must adhere to whilst in the conflict. In order to follow this principle, the states must follow proportionality and discrimination during the conflict. Those who are in fighting in the conflict must not use excessive force, only the force which is needed to achieve the necessary outcome. It is also important for them to be careful and precise when identifying any enemy combatants, and always ensuring they avoid civilians at all costs including illegitimate targets which could potentially cause destruction and violation on their individual rights. (Anon,[n.d]b),

'In war some sorts of restraint, both on what we can legitimately fight for (jus ad bellum) and on how we may legitimately fight (jus in bello), are morally required'.1 However, recent theorists also add the responsibility and accountability of warring parties after the war (jus post bellum) to the main two categories of just war theory. From Christian perspective the function of the JWT was simply an excuse of making war morally and religiously possible writes Michael Walzer. He also agrees with its defendants, that it made war possible in a world where war was, sometimes, necessary. JWT is therefore to be used as a sort of moral rule-book from which legitimate

World War II (WWII) lasted longer and killed more people than the Great War. There was not a fast victory conquered by bombers hitting the heart of the enemy. Air power’s contribution to the allied victory did not represent the ultimate fulfillment of the predictions of interwar theorists. Even though air power had an important role, and many lessons and doctrines emerged after this period, the visions of Douhet, Mitchell and others did not materialized as they expected. In this paper, I will discuss three of the main prophecies: the effectiveness of the strategic bombing, the ability of air power to win the war by itself, and the futility of the use of air power for defense of territory.

President Obama stated that, “[ISIS is] not an existential threat to us. They are vicious killers and murderers who perverted one of the world’s great religions” (Obama, 2016). ISIS resembles a typical state instead of a terrorist organization, through holding territory and region-specific revenue sources (Crawford, 2003). The president’s decision to start a ground offensive against ISIS illustrates the greatest show of force in modern history. While the reasons for going to war are just, the mission 's low chance of success makes the war morally unjust. The ground invasion has too many moral obstacles and would further risk destabilizing the region. The United States could not peacefully end the mission due to regional religious and cultural problems. The United States stands as a legitimate authority and has a just cause for initiating war. Yet, the inability to install a friendly regime in the region and the lack of coalition forces invalidates moral reasoning for the war. The plan for American military intervention against ISIS cannot be morally justified and would forever hurt America’s standing as a legitimate authority. The Just War Theory dates back to the 5th century and defines the guidelines for justly conducting war. Just War consists of three parts: jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum (Moser and McDonald, 2016a). The ground invasion against ISIS violates principles from all three components.

Just War Theory divides the morality of war into two parts. A war can be tried twice, first pertaining to why the nation decides to go to war, and secondly with how the nation actions are during the fighting (Walzer 21). The first part of war called jus ad bellem, translated to the justice of war, provides strict guiding principles with whether the war is just or unjust in the intentions of going to war. The second part of war jus in bello correlates to appropriate conduct while in war (Cook 27). Being just in jus ad bellum does not necessarily mean that jus in bello is just.

War has become a very sensitive, polarizing subject in the past few decades. Either it’s good or bad, right or wrong, black or white. Many people do not find any justification, even though no decision is more thought out than a country’s decision to use military force. for anything war-related because of the negative reality that it is war: violent, nasty, unyielding. All they see is an unprejudiced killing parade that rips lives apart. But what many people fail to realize that there is some gray areas surrounding military force.There is not a definite yes or no when it comes to war, and not all wars are choices. When it comes to national security and keeping America safe, war is undeniably

In their review of Walzer’s 2006 edition of Just and Unjust Wars, Braun and Brunstetter (2013) point out that although these types of interventions can be regarded technically as being acts of war, they also emphasize that, “It is common sense to recognize that they are very different from war” (p. 87). While national sovereignty is violated in each of these cases, it is in fact clear that these types of military interventions cannot be placed on the same level as a total war such as World War II or regional conflicts such as Vietnam or Korea. In this regard Braun and Brunstetter note that no-fly zones et al. “all involve the use of force, the level of force used: [is] more limited in scope [and] lacks the unpredictable and

This essay examines whether or not airpower, along with its technological advances, improved or diminished the United States (US) ability to wage war according to the tenets of jus in bello. The goal of war should not be total annihilation of the enemy without regard to life and property. Although there are many perspectives on this topic, most philosophers believe technologically advanced air power has gone outside the realm of jus in bello. However, based on careful analysis, research shows leaders are required to follow the laws of war and exercise sound judgment. This argument is supported by examining just war theory and the key tenet jus in bello as it applies to technological advances in airpower.