Aristotle 's Theory Of Science And Philosophers Essay

     With the possible exception of Plato, Aristotle is the most influential philosopher in the history of logical thought. Logic into this century was basically Aristotelian logic. Aristotle dominated the study of the natural sciences until modern times. Aristotle, in some aspect, was the founder of biology; Charles Darwin considered him as the most important contributor to the subject. Aristotle’s Poetic, the first work of literary notice, had a string influence on the theory and practice of modern drama. Aristotle’s great influence is due to the fact that he seemed to offer a system, which although lacked in certain respects, was as a whole matchless in its extent.

For Popper disproof is of bigger relevance than proof is and therefore science should not stop attempting to disprove theories throughout the process of falsificationism. The harder it is tried to falsify a theory or to disprove a theory the more relevance and credibility the theory attains. All knowledge is hypothetical according to Popper as we can never prove a theory, but only refute it or confirm it.

as the unique properties of scientific theories (Popper, 1962, p. 36). I will argue that Popper’s

The following essay aims to discuss the inconsistencies between the inductivist and Popper’s points of view of science rationality of science in light of claims that the scientific method is inductive yet an inductive method is no. I think is rational to say that inductivist view of science has significant contradiction that Popper’s view solves. To support Popper’s view my argument will introduce the inductivist and falsificationsist views and I will focus in showing the issues of considered science as objective, scientific knowledge as proven and nature as uniform as well as the differences between inductivism and falsificationism to the creation of hypothesis.

Unlike inductivists, falsificationists believe that there is no way to conclusively prove that a theory is true. Consequently, they will resist stating that they’ve proved a theory to be true. Instead, falsificationists will consider a theory to be true so long as it has not been proven to be false. Unlike the strict five-step process held by the inductivist account of science, falsificationists hold that scientific progress comes about “by trial and error, by conjectures and refutations” (Chalmers 60). In the falsificationist picture, theory change happens constantly, and this process is what constitutes scientific progress. “It can never be said of a theory that it is true, however well it has withstood rigorous tests, but it can hopefully be said that a current theory is superior to its predecessors in the sense that it is able to withstand tests that falsified those predecessors” (Chalmers

Popper thinks that it is their weakness. He contrasts Marxism with Einstein’s Gravitational Theory, noting the main difference is that Einstein’s theory is a risky prediction. He says, "The theory is incompatible with certain possible results of observation…" Popper says that confirmations or verifications are easy to come up with for any theory; "Confirmations should only count if they are the result of risky predictions."

Karl Popper is commonly regarded as one of the greatest philosophers of science in the 20th Century. He is well known for his rejection of the inductivist viewpoint of the scientific method, in which one uses observation to propose a law to generalize an observed pattern, and later confirm that law through more observation. Popper states that “induction cannot be logically justified” (Popper 14). Inductivism relies on the process of inductive reasoning which is a logical process in which multiple premises, all thought to be true and found to be true most of the time, are combined to obtain a conclusion and in many cases formulate a law or theory. Popper rejected the inductivist viewpoint in favor of a theory called empirical falsification which holds that a theory can never be proven, but it can be falsified, and therefore it can and needs to be scrutinized through experimentation.

Popper and Kuhn held differing views on the nature of scientific progress. As seen in Popper’s falsification theory, he held that theories can never be proved only disproved or falsified. Once a theory is proved false we move on to the next. Kuhn, on the other, hand argued a new paradigm may solve puzzles better than the old one but you cannot describe the old science as false. Both seem to share the Kantian idea that the really real, independently existing world is completely unknowable. Kuhn further asserts that the empirical world, which is knowable, is partly constructed by our categories and concepts. The fundamental difference in their views are best stated in Kuhn’s own words, “A very different approach to this whole network of problems has been developed by Karl R. Popper who denies the existence of any verification procedures at all. Instead he emphasizes the importance of falsification, i.e., of the test that, because its outcome is negative, necessitates the rejection of an established theory. Clearly, the role thus attributed to falsification is much like the one this essay assigns to anomalous experiences, i.e., to experiences that, by evoking crisis, prepare the way for a new theory. Nevertheless, anomalous experiences may not be identified with falsifying ones.”(Kuhn, 145) As seen by this passage, the fundamental difference between Popper and Kuhn is that Popper disregards “verification” and Kuhn asserts that “falsification” only takes place once a

In this essay I will argue that science and pseudoscience cannot be clearly demarcated: rather that there’s great difficulty and complication on the fringes when asserting strict criteria that distinguishes the two. I will give a brief overview and draw on the arguments made by philosophers of science throughout history and explain why perhaps their criteria are problematic. I will look in depth into ‘creation science’ and why we strongly consider this as pseudoscientific and analyse the more ambiguous peripheries of science such as Freudian psychoanalysis or even economics.

The world of science, as we know it today, is a difficult subject to grasp. So many new ideas are present and these new ideas are not interchangeable. Some parts do work together although as a whole they don’t fully coincide with each other. The three basic ideas that science is now based upon come from Newton, Einstein, and Hawking. I call these ideas/theories “new” based on what I classify the state of the scientific community of today. After looking at what is going on in science, it is clear to me that the scientific world is in a crisis state. According to Kuhn, a crisis state is when science is in the middle of choosing a particular paradigm to work under. For scientists, there is a general theme

Karl Popper was critical of inductive methods used in science. He argued that there is a chain of justifying arguments that could never be complete, therefore an original statement that is made can never receives the justification that it needs (Popper 505-506). He was a firm believer in the concept of falsification, emphasizing that we can never be sure that a theory is true but we can be sure that a theory is false. He continues to explain that all inductive evidence is limited: we do not observe the universe at all times and in all places. Popper identifies that no matter how many observations are made which confirm a theory there is always potential for future observations to refute the claim (Popper 426). For example, if millions of white swans were observed, using inductive reasoning, we could come up with a theory that all swans are white. However, no matter how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this information does not provide us with justification for the conclusion that all swans are white (Popper 426). Therefore induction cannot yield certainty. For scientists to continue to rely on inductive reasoning to

Aristotle believed that the goal of all human life is to achieve ultimate happiness. Happiness is the final Utopia or the end of “a life worth living.” Human instinct is characterized by achieving personal fulfillment, thus leading to happiness. Aristotle warns against going astray and “preferring a life suitable to beasts” by assuming happiness and pleasure are equal. Living a life preferred by beasts incapacitates a person from achieving the end Utopia. Even though Aristotle does not equate the two, he does stress that minimal pleasure is required to achieve happiness. Someone lacking in vital necessities such as food, clothing, and shelter are not capable of achieving happiness due to their lack of pleasure.

truths, and forms. He had no room in his views for imagination and what he saw

Assumptions in the title of this essay imply that results, theories and laws resulting from the current system of peer review multiple perspectives produce completely infallible objective truth, this is a false premise. Whilst the group of knowers known as the scientific community have collectively less bias than one lone knower trying to understand the universe, there is still collective and engrained level of institutional bias. The same problems of confirmation bias and expectation are present in a group of knowers just as they are with one single knower. According to Karl Popper (1902-1994) the best way to eliminate any expectation and confirmation bias was to falsify and disprove rather than confirm one’s hypothesis and predictions. Popper argues: no matter how convincing an argument or theory is, all that is needed to disprove it is one piece of valid counterclaiming evidence. Whilst this theory is valid on an individual level, it really becomes an effective tool in the objectivity of science on a large scale. Despite this attempt at objectifying and ‘protecting against’ error and bias it is inadequate due to inherent flaws in the scientific method. Induction, moving from the specific to the general, is the key element in scientific logic. Any theory or law ‘proved’ through this logic has some key flaws: the main flaw being that inductive logic can never be certain of any event happening or of any prediction. Richard van de Lagemaat

Alan Francis Chalmers is an associate professor who works extensive in the history and philosophy of science (physical). Alan Chalmers has taught at the University of Sydney since 1971, first in the School of Philosophy, and from 1987 at the Unit for the History and Philosophy of Science. He attained a B.Sc. in physics at the University of Bristol, and his M.Sc. in physics from the University of Manchester. His Ph.D. on the electromagnetic theory of J.C. Maxwell was granted by the University of London. He was elected a Fellow of the Academy of Humanities in 1997. He has been a Visiting Scholar at the Flinders Philosophy Department since 1999.