Arkansas Rhetorical Analysis

In “Bring Back Flogging”, Jeff Jacoby addresses the problems within America 's criminal justice system. He gives many reasons why imprisonment simply does not work, and suggests that corporal punishment should be used as an alternative. Published in the Boston Globe, a newspaper well known for being liberal, Jacoby provides a conservative view and directs his argument towards those who strongly support imprisonment and view corporal punishment to be highly barbaric and inhumane. However, in order to shed light on our current situation, Jacoby discusses the dangers that we face though our criminal justice system a nd shows concern that imprisonment is doing more harm than good. In effect, Jacoby looks to the past for solutions, and

After the defeat at Fort Sumter there were some northerners that tried to get Lincoln to let the south go. When deciding weather to take Fort Sumter by bombardment, one of Davis's ideas was a bargain with Washington , maybe purchase, for the peaceful turnover of the fort and other federal holding in the seceded states. Thinking Confederate independence was inescapable, Davis prayed that they would slow down long enough to recognize that they could save millions of dollars and many lives by stopping this. He believed that the honor of the Confederate States of America (CSA) would be reestablished if everyone seen Davis challenge Lincoln successfully. While dealing with all of this he still was ready to take Fort Sumter. Davis just wanted peace and to be left alone. The South was fighting a defensive war, which gave it inherent advantage.

So, the war had begun, the Confederacy had their army, and everyone prepared for what they believed was going to be a short conflict. Four years later, they realized how

Throughout his time as commander in chief of the union army, Ulysses S. Grant understood and appreciated the commitment his soldiers made, as suggested by letters to his family, which forced him to focus greatly on war technique, ultimately allowing him to be a great leader of the Union army. In a letter written to his Father, in which he discusses the war, Grant states, “I do not wish to act hastily or unadvisedly in the matter.” Grant’s cautiousness and attention to details, when his troops and his army are concerned, shows that all decisions he makes concerning his troops have been carefully thought out, so he doesn’t put his troops in danger. Grant wishes to give “all the

Despite Van Dorn's speedy march through the wintry terrain, the Federals, under General Samuel Curtis, had learned of the Confederate advance from a Unionist resident of Fayetteville. This made Curtis decide to concentrate his forces at Little Sugar Creek. He dug in there in wait of the Confederate forces.

While many Arkansans had followed Van Dorn to Tennessee, others had deserted their positions and fled back to their homes to protect their families (Whayne, et al. 198-199). Confederate authorities appointed Thomas Hindman, a veteran of the Mexican War, to replace Van Dorn’s command over Arkansas. A great “organizer, recruiter, and administrator” (Whayne, et al. 201), Hindman was prepared to use any means necessary to ramp up the number of men serving in Arkansas. “[Fanatically devoted]” to the Confederacy, Hindman declared, “I have come to drive out the invaders or perish in the attempt” (Whayne, et al. 198). He assumed his command with a “dictatorial [power]” by establishing supply factories, enforcing conscription laws, and “declaring martial law” over Arkansas (Whayne, et al. 198). In addition, Hindman employed the use of guerrilla warfare to harass the enemy and raid their supply lines. Many of these guerillas were not legally bound to protect their state and acted against Confederate commands. Instead, many were armed bandits and ruffians who had personal grudges to settle with anyone of their choosing. Regardless of political affiliation, many citizens in Arkansas would find themselves living in a state of anarchy. Although Arkansas was a Confederate state, many citizens were divided in their politics, but this mattered nothing to the bands of guerillas that would continuously contribute to the breakdown of the state for

Thomas Hindman declared martial law, direct military control, and destroyed the likelihood of any Arkansas native who took the Yankee line to oppose the confederacy. Hindman forced the opposed to burn their crops, drive their livestock away, and poison their wells. During his dictatorship like control there were many brutal guerilla conflicts. He even went as far as disrupting federal operations in Arkansas and completely broke down all law and order within the state. Hindman’s operations became more personal and depicted the idea that his followers where taking out previous grudges and settling them violently. His careless actions later resulted in the

Introduction: On the twelfth of April 1861, Union troops had just taken refuge in Fort Sumter under the cover of darkness. They were out number out gunned and running out of time. The newly formed Confederate States of America (CSA) had now occupied the five other military installations within the Garrison. At 0430, the first shot of the American Civil War rang out and Fort Sumter was fast under the barrage that the surrounding garrison forts occupied by the confederate forces (sumter). Major Anderson was reluctant to return fire, as his previous orders were not to be the aggressor. The first shots returned in volley to the confederate forces was by a private under the Major Anderson, who raced up to the third story of Fort Sumter where the largest artillery guns were loaded and ready to fire. In following his lead, other soldiers in the fort also began firing on the confederate antagonists (Civil War Journal: Destiny of Fort Sumter, 1993). Thirty four hours later Major Anderson surrendered the fort over to General Beauregard without a single loss of life on either side of the battle. However, death was soon to befall the soldiers of Fort Sumter. Thesis: The complete lack of organized military and government intelligence solidified the abysmal start to the civil war. If the Union leadership during the Buchanan administration had anticipated the treachery of the southern officers and leaders within the federal government then they could have prevented the secession

General Beauregard saw a battalion of troops advancing towards him. With both the Confederate and Union flags looking so similar, he wasn’t sure which side these men were on. It wasn’t until he was about to order retreat when a gust of wind unfurled the flag, showing the colors of the Confederate States of America. With this new influx of fresh troops, the Confederates were able to push back the Union. The Union army was not prepared for the new troops arriving, and a retreat was immenent. The Union army fled, but inexperience turned into chaos, with no one retreating with any organization. They were lucky. The Confederates were also mostly green to battle, and their inexperience and disorganization made them unable to pursue the Union

The Battle of Antietam could have been a devastating and fatal blow to the Confederate Army if Gen. McClellan acted decisively, took calculated risks, and veered away from his cautious approach to war. There are many instances leading up to the battle and during the battle in which he lacks the necessary offensive initiative to effectively cripple and ultimately win the war. This paper is intended to articulate the failure of Mission Command by GEN McClellan by pointing out how he failed to understand, visualize, describe and direct the battlefield to his benefit.

McClellan’s apprehension robbed him of victory and allowed Lee’s forces to consolidate prior to the Battle of Antietam (Davis, 1999). If McClellan had defied Allan Pinkerton’s human intelligence information claiming the Confederacy consisted of 120,000 soldiers, he could have defeated Lee prior to the battle of Antietam (Cannon, 1994). Lee relied heavily on J.E.B. Stuart’s scout unit for reconnaissance missions to gather intelligence on the enemy’s position and troop strength (Cannon, 1994).

This paper describes a campaign that helped decide the American Civil War. A General of the Union army named William Tecumseh Sherman helped lead a campaign that started in Georgia go the sea in Savannah, and finish to help aid the main forces in the Carolinas. During this march the soldiers lived off the land and the Southern people’s food and burning anything that could be of military use to the South’s forces. This march helped decisively end the war, and struck many blows to the South’s forces and its people’s morale, that Sherman’s army could march unopposed through the South.

It is here that Gates makes a critical mistake. The very few Continental troops Gates managed to procure were very well trained, disciplined and weathered veterans who had experience with battle. His militiamen, however, were not well versed in military doctrine and experienced much hardship before and during the battle. Gates’ militiamen had suffered significantly due to lack of supplies creating severe dehydration, dysentery and starvation, “The troops of General Gates’ army, had frequently felt the bad consequences of eating bad provisions;” (29). Due to their experiences throughout their travel through South Carolina, many militiamen saw little reason to stay and continue the fight. They knew very little of where they were or the purpose of their movements and actions. Gates did very little to alleviate this as he himself seldom spoke, wrote or in any way communicated his plans or his strategies to his men or officers, “and the arrival of General Gates at Clermont was, when known, a subject of more surprise to the patriots, than to the enemies of the country” (28). This was a serious misstep by Gates as not only does this sever the connection between leader and follower, but it breeds distrust and disrespect for him by his own

The Union Army’s strategy of the Civil War consisted of three parts and was very simple; but if all three were not completed, it would spell disaster for the North. The first

Dated July 18, 1864, the message from General Joseph E. Johnston, commander of the Confederacy’s army of Tennessee, spelled the downfall of Atlanta. For weeks Davis had watched Johnston’s operations in Georgia with mounting dissatisfaction (Wert 1). If the federals captured Atlanta, Southerners perhaps faced inevitable defeat. On July 10, the Yankees crossed the Chattahoochee River, forcing the Rebels to abandon their works North of the stream. The Chattahoochee was the last natural barrier between Sherman’s troops and Atlanta, which lay 6 miles from the river. Throughout these weeks, Davis and Johnston exchanged numerous telegrams concerning the conduct of the campaign. Neither man liked the other (Wert