Army Force Management Program (AFP)

In this lesson you will continue to review the key agencies and major force management processes used in developing warfighting capability provided to combatant comman

The United States Army is a complex organization made up of several commands and managed by different command levels. The U.S. Army is an organization different from that of a business in many unique ways. Specific examples of these differences include: financial reporting, disciplinary review procedures, and tactical operations. Although different in many ways, the Army shares many similar characteristics of a normal profit business. Army personnel are managed by supervisors arranged in a command structure similar to that of a business hierarchy. The Army will also encounter internal and external factors that could impede or enhance operations. As such, planning, organizing, leading, and controlling must be used by managers appropriately

The Balancing Role of the Profession Leaders, is challenging. U.S Army strategic leader’s main objective one, balancing the link of the Army current situation and its future area of operation. Profession leaders understand, if balance is not meet, the Army cannot function at its

Talent Management is a key component to the proper development of the Army. As a strength manager, you can play a pivotal role in the talent management process. Strength managers manage the current force pool versus the requirements of the organization. A common approach used in the Army National Guard is to break down the assigned strength into different categories are “Obligors” or “Careerists”. These groups, based on their current time served in the organization and their probable plans to make the Army a career.

The quick evolving military environment, needs the US Army redouble its efforts to reduce the uncertainty associated with the downsizing. There are some predominant principles that can guide the Army’s efforts in minimizing the impact of uncertainty during the force reduction. Even with major political and legislative challenges, keeping balance among the different proportions of readiness is a goal of US defense policy. During the budgetary preparation, downsizing of the armed forces often becomes one of the first victims of fiscal reduction. This was true of the years between World War I and World War II, when the Great Depression made military preparedness a very low national priority. The Army’s downsizing effect put its readiness

The most critical issue that we face when it comes to downsizing the army is the readiness and security of our nation. Politicians say that downsizing the military brings back the nation’s financial stability. Army leaders do not see it that way, but weakens our nation 's defense capability and our commitment to the rest of the world. General Odierno, the Army Chief of Staff (2013), states that “In his professional military judgment, that the projected end strength and force structure levels would not enable the Army to fully execute 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance requirements to defeat an adversary in one major combat operation while simultaneously denying the objectives of an adversary in a second theater. Additionally, it is unlikely that the Army would be able to defeat an adversary quickly and decisively should they be called upon to engage in a single, sustained major combat operation” (Chief, Congress and DoD hammer out Army 's future manning levels, par.18). The military is not just weakened by the numbers, but by experience and

The history of force reductions after the Cold War era and Operation Desert Storm proves the reliance on contract support to America’s fighting force was important to accomplish the mission. (CGSC, 2015). The Army should maintain its level of contract support relative to the current budget constraints and force reductions. Contract support with oversight from Army Material Command is a force multiplier but will require several mitigation measures in order to be effective in future campaigns.

Given constrained funding and the requirements of short-term national military objectives and longer term operations, the Army should balance the Total Force as follows: first, decrease the Active Component deployments and increase the Reserve Component, specifically the National Guard. Second, assign National Guard units to specific regions and/or missions so that their training can be focused on these conflicts. And third, increase the use of National Guard units to reduce active component use particularly for low-intensity conflict and short term missions.

In this chapter, the methodology that will be used to analyze US Army leadership effectiveness in Schofield Barracks, Hawaii will be discussed. The research question of how does sequestration impact US Army leadership effectiveness at Schofield Barracks will be evaluated by collecting data from soldiers and leaders at Schofield Barracks. Through surveys about their experiences after federal sequestration, the research will attempt to define if whether leadership is more or less effective after the implementation of the budget restrictions.

At the close of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the US military ended with varied to questionable results. This is because US policymakers and military leaders did not adjust to the emergence of new conditions due to their dependence on medium structure problem framing. The Army Design Methodology (ADM) is a tool military organizations should use in adaptive environments to develop solutions for complex problems. To understand why the ADM is a critical tool for military organizations, military professionals need to understand the impacts of ill-structured problems on planning and execution and the potential influence the ADM will have on their organization. Once military professionals understand the influence the ADM has on ill-structured problems, they can begin to consider how to integrate the ADM into planning.

Force management, or what is really otherwise known as planned comprehensive change, is in reality a complex and interwoven process. Though it was designed within the confines of a systemic approach referred to as the DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel and Facilities), in reality it is meant to enable both dutiful and well-thought out change as well as faster, more urgent adjustments in accordance with the evolving nature of war and information gathering tactics. The Army, as one branch involved in this initiative, focuses most of its attention in this regard on the organizational sector because of the way it facilitates an adequate and democratic step-by-step system of review (Student Reader, F102:2). But the fact is that even this initiative remains multi-faceted and appears to be rather bureaucratic in nature (it has five phases, which seems antithetical to an urgent change process), which might not be surprising since implementing the type of changes that are demanded can have major implications of all sorts. Still, it does appear that this concentration is being well received and that it will eventually serve its goal even if it does not appear that way when detailed on a point by point basis.

The task of maintaining the Army’s equipment can be daunting at times and implementing such principles as TQM and TPM can seem impossible. The military is involved in a constant tug of war between elements within the organizational leadership level, and between organizational and strategic levels as well. While the Army has one priority, to fight and win this nation’s battles, the method of getting there can be clouded or skewed between the levels of leadership. These competing priorities, in many cases, place emphasis on one thing and then quickly switch to another, thus causing confusion and more importantly contempt at the lower levels.

Adaptive leadership is becoming widespread in the United States Army amongst junior officers in leadership positions that require quick thinking and innovation. Leonard Wong discusses how the versatile and unpredictable enemy and situations in Iraq produces adaptable junior officers. These officers are learning to make decisions under chaotic conditions and are becoming more mentally agile. The Army is changing. The Army is transforming its capabilities in the war in Iraq to be effective and successful. General Schoomaker states that we will not accomplish our goals as a nation in the 21st century unless our Army becomes much more agile but with the capacity for long term, sustained level of conflict. The Army is in the process of

The United States Army has implemented models called the Troop Leading Procedures (TLPs) and the Operations Process in order to facilitate a commander 's capacity to effectively and efficiently organize a task. When these models are executed together, they create a framework for leaders at various levels to excel in any situations they might encounter. Understanding the significance of the relationship between these models requires an in-depth understanding of each of them specifically. Each step of the Troop Leading Procedures contains numerous factors which reflect upon the other steps as well as the entire Operations Process. Likewise, each aspect of the Operations Process profoundly influences the decisions made throughout the TLPs. When applied together correctly, the Operations Process and Troop Leading Procedures provide a structure for strong and adaptable operational leadership.

The multifunctional nature of Operations Management requires a high level of process- and system-based synchronization across many different departments and divisions to be successful. The structural organization of the US Army is heavily dependent on Operations Management for missions to be accomplished, and long-term strategic visions to be attained (VanVactor, 2007). The intent of this analysis is to evaluate how the five areas of accounting, industrial engineering, management, management science and statistics, in conjunction with critical path analysis and linear programming, are used extensively throughout the US Army's supply chain operations.